Black v. Sims

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

MIDDLE DIVISION

KEITH ALLEN BLACK, ]

]

Plaintiff, ]

]

v. ] Case No.: 4:21-cv-01555-ACA

]

SHERIFF PHIL SIMS, et al., ]

]

Defendants. ]

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Nickolas Keith Black (“Mr. Black”) died while incarcerated as a pretrial

detainee in Marshall County Jail. His father, Plaintiff Keith Allen Black (“Plaintiff

Black”), represents Mr. Black’s estate and brought this lawsuit against four

defendants, including Sheriff Phil Sims and Chief Correctional Officer Matt Cooper.

(Doc. 42 at 11, 13). Plaintiff Black asserts that Sheriff Sims and Chief Cooper were

deliberately indifferent to Mr. Black’s serious medical needs and that they had an

unconstitutional custom or policy of such deliberate indifference. Sheriff Sims and

Chief Cooper move to dismiss the claims against them. (Doc. 47).

The court WILL GRANT IN PART and WILL DENY IN PART the

motion to dismiss. Because Plaintiff Black has not stated a claim of any

unconstitutional custom or policy, the court WILL DISMISS that claim against both

defendants. And because Sheriff Sims is entitled to qualified immunity from the

claim of deliberate indifference, the court WILL DISMISS that claim against him.

But because Chief Cooper is not entitled to qualified immunity from the deliberate

indifference claim at this stage of the proceedings, the court WILL DENY the

motion to dismiss that claim against him.

I. BACKGROUND

At this stage, the court must accept as true the factual allegations in the second

amended complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

Butler v. Sheriff of Palm Beach Cnty., 685 F.3d 1261, 1265 (11th Cir. 2012).

Mr. Black suffered from Wegener’s Disease, a serious kidney ailment that

required him to undergo a kidney transplant in February 2013. (Doc. 42 at 4 ¶¶ 20–

21). He received regular treatment and medication from his nephrologist, Dr. Todd

Broome, before and after the kidney transplant. (Id. at 4 ¶¶ 22–23). The kidney

transplant left Mr. Black immunocompromised. (Id. at 4 ¶ 24).

Mr. Black was incarcerated as a pretrial detainee in Marshall County Jail on

January 24, 2020. (Id. at 4 ¶ 18, 12 ¶ 69 n.4). Another inmate assaulted Mr. Black

soon after he entered the jail. (Doc. 42 at 4 ¶ 25). Upon learning of the assault on his

son, Plaintiff Black informed Chief Cooper, who was the Chief Correctional Officer

at the jail, that Mr. Black “was a kidney transplant recipient, immunocompromised,

and that physical abuse and injury to [Mr. Black’s] transplanted kidney could cause

serious health problems and even death.” (Id. at 4–5 ¶ 27). Chief Cooper responded

that Mr. Black would be “treated just like every other inmate.” (Id. at 5 ¶ 28).

In October 2020, Mr. Black left the jail with permission for a check-up from

Dr. Broome. (Id. at 5 ¶ 31, 9 ¶ 53 n.2). Dr. Broome adjusted Mr. Black’s medications

and “his blood work came back as satisfactory for his condition.” (Doc. 42 at 5 ¶ 31).

Late the next month, Mr. Black’s parents called Dr. Broome after learning that

some or all defendants had changed or attempted to change Mr. Black’s medications.

(Id. at 5 ¶ 32). Soon after, Dr. Broome called Chief Cooper to inquire about

Mr. Black’s health. (Id. at 5 ¶ 33). Chief Cooper told Dr. Broome, “[w]hat goes on

here . . . is none of your business,” to which Dr. Broome responded that it was “his

business” as Mr. Black’s treating physician for over ten years. (Id. at 5 ¶¶ 34–35).

Dr. Broome then told Chief Cooper “in no uncertain terms that changing

[Mr. Black]’s medications must be carefully considered.” (Doc. 42 at 6 ¶ 36).

Dr. Broome requested that he be allowed to review Mr. Black’s medical records

from the jail, but Chief Cooper refused, telling Dr. Broome that he would need a

subpoena to view Mr. Black’s records. (Id. at 5 ¶¶ 36–37).

Mr. Black’s health began to deteriorate significantly in late January 2021. (Id.

at 6 ¶ 39). He had “respiratory issues, weakness, loss of appetite, and loss of energy.”

(Id.). Other inmates told “each of the defendants” and Mr. Black’s parents (doc. 42

at 6 ¶ 42), that he “could not stand, could not eat, would urinate on himself, and was

otherwise visibly very ill” (id. at 6 ¶ 41). Mr. Black’s parents called the jail

repeatedly to express concerns about his health. (Id. at 6–7 ¶¶ 40, 43–44). Plaintiff

Black called Chief Cooper several times, leaving messages “that he was gravely

concerned about [Mr. Black’s] health, and further request[ing] that [Chief] Cooper

take proper steps to ensure [Mr. Black] received proper healthcare.” (Id. at 6–7 ¶ 43).

Chief Cooper took no action in response to those calls. (Id.). Ms. Black called “each

of the defendants” (doc. 42 at 7 ¶ 44), to express her concerns about her son’s health

(id. at 6 ¶ 40). Each time, she was told that he was “fine.” (Id.).

At some point—the precise date is unclear—Mr. Black was placed on a “sick-

call list of inmates,” which “clearly indicated that [Mr. Black] was seriously ill.”

(Doc. 42 at 7 ¶ 45). Sheriff Sims and Chief Cooper both knew that Mr. Black was

on the sick-call list, though there is no allegation that they knew exactly what the

sick-call list said about Mr. Black’s condition. (See id.).

Jail medical records indicate that Mr. Black was visibly ill by at least January

29, 2021. (Id. at 7 ¶ 46). On that day, Mr. Black’s mother called Defendant Lisa

Rigsby, the medical director and a nurse working at the jail under a contract her

employer, Defendant Southern Health Partners, Inc., had with the jail to provide

medical care for inmates there. (Id. at 2–3 ¶¶ 12–13, 7 ¶ 46). Ms. Black reported that

Mr. Black “was feeling sick, his urine was dark (a symptom of special concern for a

kidney patient), and his energy level was low.” (Doc. 42 at 7 ¶ 46). Nurse Rigsby

assessed Mr. Black and he was returned to his cell. (Id.).

On January 31, 2021, Nurse Rigsby noted that Mr. Black continued “to have

some symptoms.” (Id. at 7 ¶ 47). She observed visibly increased hand tremors and

ordered that the jail provide Mr. Black double portions of food because he was not

eating and losing weight. (Id.). Nine days later, on February 9, 2021, Nurse Rigsby

noted that Mr. Black “ha[d] been shaking from being cold” and ordered that the jail

provide him two additional blankets. (Doc. 42 at 7 ¶ 48).

Four days after that, on February 13, 2021, Mr. Black’s mother called Nurse

Rigsby “after receiving alarming messages from another inmate that [Mr. Black]

was weak, not eating, grunting, and urinating on himself.” (Id. at 8 ¶ 49). Nurse

Rigsby informed Mr. Black’s mother that HIPAA prevented her from discussing

“anything about the patient,” but that Mr. Black was “fine, but just depressed.” (Id.).

Later that day, a urine specimen was collected from Mr. Black. (Id. at 8 ¶ 50).

At 7:30 a.m. the next morning, Nurse Rigsby saw that Mr. Black was pale and

panting; was complaining of severe fatigue, shortness of breath, nausea, and

vomiting; could not stand to take medications; and had a pulse rate of 120 and an

oxygen saturation level of 88%. (Doc. 42 at 8 ¶ 51). There were six untouched trays

of food inside Mr. Black’s cell. (Id.). An hour later, Nurse Rigsby reported her

findings to Dr. Hughes, the jail doctor employed by Southern Health Partners. (Id.

at 8 ¶ 52). Dr. Hughes ordered Nurse Rigsby to have Mr. Black transported

“directly” to Huntsville Hospital, but he was not transported there until the next day.

(Id.).

Huntsville Hospital admitted Mr. Black at 10:00 a.m. on February 15, 2021 in

a “confused and altered” mental state. (Doc. 42 at 10 ¶ 58). The hospital assessed

the following conditions: acute kidney injury likely due to sepsis; renal transplant

recipient; hyperkalemia; hypoxemic respiratory failure; pneumonia in an

immunocompromised patient; septic shock; malnutrition; D-dimer blood test above

reference range; anemia; thrombocytopenia; elevated bilirubin; and large

arteriovenous fistula. (Id.). Mr. Black died at the hospital a week later. (Id. at 11

¶ 61).

Plaintiff Black asserts two federal civil rights claims and one state law

wrongful death claim. (Id. at 11, 13–14). Count One asserts that all defendants—

Sheriff Sims, Chief Cooper, Nurse Rigsby, and Southern Health—were deliberately

indifferent to Mr. Black’s serious medical needs in violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment by denying him proper medical care for his kidney disease. (Doc. 42 at

11–13). Count Two asserts that Sheriff Sims and Chief Cooper maintained and

enforced an unconstitutional custom or policy of deliberate indifference to detainees’

serious medical needs. (Id. at 13–14). And Count Three asserts that Nurse Rigsby

and Southern Health committed medical negligence that caused Mr. Black’s

wrongful death. (Id. at 14–15). Nurse Rigsby and Southern Health have answered

the second amended complaint (docs. 45, 46), but Sheriff Sims and Chief Cooper

move, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), to dismiss the two claims

against them (doc. 47).

II. DISCUSSION

“To survive a [Rule 12(b)(6)] motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead ‘a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Butler, 685 F.3d at 1265 (quoting Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Id. (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In deciding whether a plaintiff has stated a claim, the

court follows a two-step approach, “first separating out the complaint’s conclusory

legal allegations and then determining whether the remaining well-pleaded factual

allegations, accepted as true, ‘plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.’”

Franklin v. Curry, 738 F.3d 1246, 1251 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

679).

Sheriff Sims and Chief Cooper contend that Plaintiff Black failed to state a

plausible claim for relief against them because his allegations do not overcome their

entitlement to qualified immunity. (Doc. 48 at 14–37). Qualified immunity protects

government officials performing discretionary functions from claims brought

against them in their individual capacities “unless their conduct violates ‘clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

have known.’” Dalrymple v. Reno, 334 F.3d 991, 994 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting

Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)). “The purpose of qualified immunity is

to allow government officials to carry out their discretionary duties without the fear

of personal liability or harassing litigation, protecting from suit all but the plainly

incompetent or one who is knowingly violating the federal law.” Gilmore v. Hodges,

738 F.3d 266, 272 (11th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks and alteration omitted).

An officer asserting the qualified immunity defense bears the initial burden of

showing that he was performing a discretionary function. Holloman ex rel.

Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1263–64 (11th Cir. 2004). If he can do that,

the burden shifts to the plaintiff to “show that: (1) the defendant violated a

constitutional right, and (2) this right was clearly established at the time of the

alleged violation.” Id. at 1264.

Sheriff Sims and Chief Cooper contend that they were performing their

discretionary functions because their duties include ensuring the provision of

medical care to inmates in the county jail. (Doc. 48 at 11–12). Plaintiff Black

responds that Sheriff Sims and Chief Cooper were not performing a discretionary

function because they lack the discretion to withhold necessary medical care. (Doc.

50 at 8–9).

Sheriff Sims and Chief Cooper have carried their initial burden. Contrary to

Plaintiff Black’s argument, an official does not act within the scope of his

discretionary authority only when he performs his duties correctly. Instead, the

inquiry is “whether the government employee was (a) performing a legitimate job-

related function (that is, pursuing a job-related goal), (b) through means that were

within his power to utilize.” Holloman, 370 F.3d at 1265. The court must “look to

the general nature of the defendant’s action, temporarily putting aside the fact that it

may have been committed for an unconstitutional purpose, in an unconstitutional

manner, to an unconstitutional extent, or under constitutionally inappropriate

circumstances.” Id. at 1266. Viewed in that light, it is clear that Sheriff Sims and

Chief Cooper were performing discretionary functions with respect to the provision

(or withholding) of medical care to Mr. Black.

The burden therefore shifts to Plaintiff Black to establish that the facts he

alleges “make out a violation of a constitutional right” and that “the right at issue

was clearly established at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Maddox v.

Stephens, 727 F.3d 1109, 1120 (11th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted). The court

may address those questions in either order. Id.

In this case, both claims against both defendants revolve around Mr. Black’s

Fourteenth Amendment right, as a pretrial detainee, to adequate medical care. Mann

v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1306 (11th Cir. 2009). Although the right arises

out of the Fourteenth Amendment, the court may also look to cases addressing

convicted prisoners’ Eighth Amendment right to adequate medical care. See id.

The government has an “obligation to provide medical care for those whom it

is punishing by incarceration. An inmate must rely on prison authorities to treat his

medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be met.” Estelle

v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). Accordingly, an official’s “deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners” violates a pretrial detainee’s

Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Id. at 104; Mann, 588 F.3d at 1306. To

state a claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, a plaintiff must

allege “an objectively serious medical need” and “that the prison official acted with

deliberate indifference to that need.” Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1351 (11th

Cir. 2004). Deliberate indifference requires a showing of “(1) subjective knowledge

of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk; and (3) by conduct that is more

than mere negligence.” Id. The subjective knowledge element requires that “the

defendant be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a

substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Nam

Dang by & through Vina Dang v. Sheriff, Seminole Cnty., 871 F.3d 1272, 1280 (11th

Cir. 2017).

There are three ways of showing that a right was clearly established at the

time of the alleged violation. First, the plaintiff can point “to a materially similar

decision of the Supreme Court, of this Court, or of the supreme court of the state in

which the case arose.” Powell v. Snook, 25 F.4th 912, 920 (11th Cir. 2022). Second,

the plaintiff can persuade the court “that a broader, clearly established principle

should control the novel facts of the case.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Or third,

the plaintiff can convince the court “that the case is one of those rare ones that fits

within the exception of conduct which so obviously violates the constitution that

prior case law is unnecessary.” Id. (quotation marks and alteration omitted).

Regardless of the method, the plaintiff must establish that “the state of the law at the

time of the incident gave the officer ‘fair warning’ that his conduct was unlawful.”

Id. at 921 (quotation marks and alteration omitted).

1. Count One: Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs

Plaintiff Black alleges that Sheriff Sims and Chief Cooper violated

Mr. Black’s clearly established rights and caused his death by repeatedly denying

him proper medical care when they knew of his urgent medical needs and the

substantial risks if left untreated. (Doc. 42 at 11–12 ¶¶ 63–74). Sheriff Sims and

Chief Cooper contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity because Plaintiff

Black failed to adequately allege that they were aware of Mr. Sims’ condition or

deterioration in late January 2021. (Doc. 48 at 18–28). Because “[e]ach individual

Defendant must be judged separately and on the basis of what that person knows,”

Burnette v. Taylor, 533 F.3d 1325, 1331 (11th Cir. 2008), the court will address the

allegations against each defendant separately.

a. Sheriff Sims

There can be no dispute that Mr. Black had a serious medical need; indeed,

the only element of this claim in dispute is Sheriff Sims’ knowledge of Mr. Black’s

serious medical need. (See doc. 48 at 17–22; doc. 50 at 4–6). The allegations specific

to Sheriff Sims’s knowledge are that in late January 2021, as Mr. Black’s health was

deteriorating, other inmates told “each of the defendants” (doc. 42 at 6 ¶ 42) that

Mr. Black “could not stand, could not eat, would urinate on himself, and was

otherwise visibly very ill” (id. at 6 ¶ 41). Mr. Black’s mother called “each of the

defendants” (id. at 7 ¶ 44), to express her concerns about her son’s health (id. at 6

¶ 40). And Sheriff Sims knew that Mr. Black had been placed on a “sick-call list of

inmates.” (Id. at 7 ¶ 45).

Plaintiff Black contends that these allegations suffice to establish that Sheriff

Sims was aware of Mr. Black’s medical condition and need for medical care as well

as the lack of care he was receiving. (Doc. 50 at 7). The court agrees that these facts

suffice, at the pleading stage, to establish that Sheriff Sims was aware of Mr. Black’s

medical condition and need for medical care but disagrees that they suffice to show

Sheriff Sims’ knowledge that Mr. Black was not receiving appropriate care. To the

contrary, Plaintiff Black has alleged that Sheriff Sims knew Mr. Black had been

placed on the sick-call list (id. at 7 ¶ 45); the only reasonable inference of that factual

allegation is that Sheriff Sims believed Mr. Black was receiving medical attention

from medical staff at the jail. Accordingly, Plaintiff Black has not carried his burden

of pleading facts showing a constitutional violation.

Likewise, Plaintiff Black has not pleaded a clearly established constitutional

violation. He relies on Harris v. Coweta County, 21 F.3d 388 (11th Cir. 1994). (Doc.

50 at 15–16). But in Harris, a prison doctor who saw the plaintiff called the sheriff

personally decrying the delay in treatment and explaining the need for “immediate

medical attention,” specifically, a nerve conduction study. 21 F.3d at 391, 394.

Instead of ensuring that the study was performed, the sheriff attempted to have

custody of the plaintiff transferred from the county system to the state system, but

that attempt was unsuccessful. Id. at 391–92. Despite the sheriff’s personal

knowledge that the plaintiff could not be transferred to state custody to receive his

medical care, the sheriff did nothing to ensure that the study was performed until six

weeks after a physician initially recommended it. Id. at 394. The Eleventh Circuit

held that these facts overcame the sheriff’s entitlement to qualified immunity. Id.

The facts presented here are too different from Harris for Harris to have put

Sheriff Sims on notice of the need for him to take action about Mr. Black’s medical

need. Although Sheriff Sims knew of Mr. Black’s condition, there are simply no

facts supporting a reasonable inference that Sheriff Sims knew Mr. Black was not

receiving appropriate care. Accordingly, Sheriff Sims is entitled to qualified

immunity from Count One.

b. Chief Cooper

The facts specific to Chief Cooper are that soon after Mr. Black was

incarcerated in January 2020, Plaintiff Black specifically told Chief Cooper about

Mr. Black’s medical history of having a kidney transplant, as well as his

immunocompromised status. (Doc. 42 at 4 ¶ 18, 4–5 ¶ 25–27, 12 ¶ 69 n.4). In

November 2020, after learning of a change or attempted change to Mr. Black’s

medications, Mr. Black’s nephrologist spoke with Chief Cooper about the need to

take care about any such change. (Id. at 5–6 ¶¶ 32–37). Two months later, when

Mr. Black’s health began to deteriorate, inmates told Chief Cooper about

Mr. Black’s inability to stand or eat, his incontinence, and his visible illness. (Id. at

6 ¶ 39–42). Plaintiff Black left multiple messages for Chief Cooper asking him to

“take proper steps to ensure [Mr. Black] received proper healthcare.” (Id. at 6–7

¶ 43). But, although Chief Cooper knew that Mr. Black was on the sick-call list, he

did nothing to ensure that Mr. Black was receiving appropriate care. (Id. 7 ¶ 43, 7

¶ 45). Indeed, Nurse Rigsby did not evaluate Mr. Black until his mother called her

directly. (Id. at 7 ¶ 46).

At the pleading stage, these allegations suffice to show both that Chief Cooper

was aware of Mr. Black’s serious medical need and the rapid decline in his health

and to demonstrate Chief Cooper’s disregard of the risk to Mr. Black. See Brown,

387 F.3d at 1351. Unlike Sheriff Sims, Chief Cooper was explicitly informed of

precise details about Mr. Black’s medical history and fragility, the need to take care

when changing Mr. Black’s medications, and his deterioration. Yet, accepting as

true the allegations made against him, Chief Cooper “failed or refused to do

anything” (doc. 42 at 7 ¶ 43), and it took Mr. Black’s mother reaching out directly

to medical staff to ensure that he received medical attention (id. at 7 ¶ 46). This is

enough to state a claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs at the

pleading stage.

The allegations also suffice to show a violation of a clearly established right.

Plaintiff Black has not presented any cases with materially similar facts but argues

that either a broader, clearly established principle controls, or that the conduct so

obviously violates the Constitution that a previous decision was unnecessary. (Doc.

50 at 17–20); see Powell, 25 F.4th at 920. The court agrees that the broad principle

controls in this case.

The Supreme Court in Estelle established, as a general matter, that “deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and

wanton infliction of pain.” 429 U.S. at 104 (quotation marks omitted). In 2010, the

Eleventh Circuit addressed a claim that two jailers were deliberately indifferent to

the serious medical needs of an alcoholic pretrial detainee. Harper v. Lawrence

Cnty., 592 F.3d 1227, 1230 (11th Cir. 2010). The jailers personally witnessed the

detainee experiencing hallucinations and displaying slurred speech, incoherence,

and difficulty walking. Id. Inmates also told the jailers that the detainee was saying

strange things and having trouble keeping his balance. Id. The jailers told a police

officer about the detainee’s behavior, and the police officer told them he would relay

that message to the police chief to make a decision about medical care. Id. But the

detainee never received care and died four days later. Harper, 592 F.3d at 1230. The

Eleventh Circuit held that these facts sufficiently alleged that the two jailers had

violated the detainee’s constitutional rights because, although they told the police

officer about the situation, they took no “steps to actually secure immediate medical

attention for [the detainee], whose need for prompt treatment appeared dire.” Id. at

1235.

Although the facts in Harper may be somewhat distinguishable from the facts

alleged in this case, the court finds that they are similar enough to put a reasonable

officer on notice of the need to take action when faced with the type of specific

information Chief Cooper had received about Mr. Black’s medical history, ongoing

medical condition, and deterioration. See Powell, 25 F.4th at 920 (explaining that

one method of showing a clearly established violation of constitutional rights is to

point to “a principle or provision so clear that, even without specific guidance from

a decision involving materially similar facts, the unlawfulness of the officer’s

conduct is apparent”). Plaintiff Black has carried his burden, at the pleading stage,

of alleging facts sufficient to show that Chief Cooper violated Mr. Black’s clearly

established right. As a result, the court WILL DENY Chief Cooper’s motion to

dismiss Count One as asserted against him.

2. Count Two: Unconstitutional Custom or Policy

The second federal claim asserts that Sheriff Sims and Chief Cooper had an

unconstitutional custom or policy of deliberate indifference to serious medical

needs. (Doc. 42 at 13–14). Notably, Count Two expressly discusses only Sheriff

Sims’ actions and names Chief Cooper for the first time in the final paragraph of the

count. (Id.). Moreover, although Defendants argue that Chief Cooper appears to have

been included in this count by mistake (doc. 48 at 28 n.1), Plaintiff Black’s response

brief addresses only whether Sheriff Sims had an unconstitutional custom or policy

(doc. 50 at 9–11). Accordingly, the court finds that, even if Plaintiff Black meant to

assert Count Two against Chief Cooper, he has abandoned that claim. See Sapuppo

v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014) (“A party fails to

adequately brief a claim when he does not plainly and prominently raise it, for

instance by devoting a discrete section of his argument to those claims.”) (quotation

marks omitted). The court therefore WILL GRANT the motion to dismiss Count

Two against Chief Cooper.

With respect to Sheriff Sims, Plaintiff Black asserts that he inadequately

staffed the jail; inadequately supervised, trained, controlled, assigned, and

disciplined employees; maintained nonexistent or inadequate procedures to care for

inmates with serious medical conditions; and withheld medical care to inmates.

(Doc. 42 at 13–14 ¶ 77). Sheriff Sims contends that he is entitled to qualified

immunity because the allegations are entirely conclusory. (Doc. 48 at 28–35).

To allege the existence of an unconstitutional policy or custom (or lack of a

policy or custom), the plaintiff must “must point to multiple incidents or multiple

reports of prior misconduct by a particular employee. A single incident of a

constitutional violation is insufficient to prove a policy or custom.” Piazza v.

Jefferson Cnty., 923 F.3d 947, 957 (11th Cir. 2019) (citations and quotation marks

omitted). Here, although Plaintiff Black has alleged specific facts about Mr. Black’s

treatment, he has not alleged any facts showing the existence of any policies or

customs relating to detainees’ medical treatment. (See generally doc. 42). The court

therefore agrees that Sheriff Sims is entitled to qualified immunity and WILL

GRANT the motion to dismiss Count Two against Sheriff Sims on that basis.

HI. CONCLUSION

The court WILL GRANT IN PART and WILL DENY IN PART Sheriff

Sims and Chief Cooper’s motion to dismiss the claims against them. The court

WILL DISMISS Count One and Count Two as asserted against Sheriff Sims. The

court WILL DISMISS Count Two as asserted against Chief Cooper. But the court

DENIES the motion to dismiss Count One against Chief Cooper.

The court will enter a separate order consistent with this opinion.

DONE and ORDERED this March 28, 2023.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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