Jones v. Sheffield City Schools

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHWESTERN DIVISION

CHAUNCEY G. JONES, JR., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No.: 3:21-cv-1296-LCB

)

SHEFFIELD CITY SCHOOLS, et al. )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

Chauncey G. Jones, Jr., proceeding pro se, filed a complaint on September

28, 2021, alleging that the Defendants, Sheffield City Schools and its then-

Superintendent Dr. Keith Davis, engaged in discriminatory conduct related to his

employment. Jones initiated the case using the Court’s standard form for a pro se

employment discrimination complaint, and checked the boxes indicating that his

claims were being brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c-2000e-17, and the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act of 1967, codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634. (Doc. 1, at 3-4).

Jones also indicated that he was bringing his claims under “the Civil Rights Act of

1866 (Equal Protection).” Id, at 4. Jones checked the boxes indicating that the

alleged discriminatory conduct includes unequal terms and conditions of his

employment and retaliation. Id. He also alleged that the discriminatory conduct

included “provid[ing] favorable work schedule to white employees.” Id. Before

the Court is the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and motion to strike

Jones’s response to that motion. (Docs. 17 and 25). For the reasons that follow,

the motion for summary judgment is due to be granted and Jones’s case dismissed

with prejudice. The motion to strike is moot.

I. Background and Undisputed Facts

Jones began working for the Sheffield City Schools in the summer of 2000

as an “ISS/alternative school teacher.” (Plaintiff’s deposition, at 48)1. The precise

duties of “ISS teacher” do not appear in the record, but the Court understands

“ISS” to refer to in-school suspension where students with disciplinary issues are

separated from other students but allowed to remain in the school. In his

deposition, Jones explained that “Alternative School” fulfilled a similar purpose

but was more of a long-term placement. See also (Doc. 18-1, at 112) (job

description of Alternative Education Teacher). He remained in that position until

2017 when he applied for and was hired as an “Alternative Education/Attendance

Clerk.”2 Id. at 117, 124. His new duties as Attendance Clerk required him to,

1 The transcript of Jones’s deposition is contained in the record at (Doc. 18-1, at 2-78). The

citations to page numbers in the Plaintiff’s deposition refer to the page numbers assigned by the

court reporter in the deposition transcript as opposed to the page numbers assigned by the

Court’s CM/ECF system.

2 In his deposition, Jones described a period of time beginning in the spring of 2016 in which his

job description was changed such that he was required to split his time between his typical duties

and teaching two high school history classes. Jones filed EEOC complaints regarding this

change. However, because the present complaint was filed in 2021, any allegations relating to

among other things, contact parents of students with serious attendance issues and,

in certain cases, conduct home visits.

When Jones began his position as “Alternative Education/Attendance

Clerk,” the Alternative School classroom was physically located at the Sheffield

City Schools central office. When the Defendant, Dr. Keith Davis was hired as

Superintendent in 2019, he decided to move the program, and thus Jones’s

classroom, to Sheffield High School and did so in August of that year. On August

26, 2019, Jones filed a written grievance to the School Board against Dr. Davis.

(Doc. 1, at 13). Around the same time, Jones’s sister-in-law3, who was also

employed by the Sheffield City Schools, filed a grievance as well. The Board

hired a person outside the school system, Belinda Williams4, to investigate the

allegations in both grievances.

Jones’s written grievance listed the following complaints against Dr. Davis:

-Intentional refusal to assist me by assigning me PLU[5] work in

sufficient time.

that time period would be outside the relevant statute of limitations. The allegations are

mentioned only as necessary for context.

3 Jones’s sister-in-law is not a party to this case and is mentioned only because the Board cited

her grievance as part of the reason it decided to hire an outside investigator. Jones disputes that

this was the sole reason for hiring an outside investigator.

4 Williams, an African-American female, was formerly employed as the Human Resources

Director and Compliance Director for the Huntsville City Schools.

5 Jones described “PLU work” as a form of continuing education required to maintain certain

certificates related to his career. It is undisputed that Jones successfully completed all his PLUs

during the relevant time period, and his certifications were not affected.

-Failure to notify me of transfer from SBOE [Sheffield Board of

Education] office to SHS [Sheffield High School].

-Assigned me a classroom that was substandard and not equal to other

teachers in the school system (aesthetics).

-Sent harassing and intimidating email concerning my schedule and

location.

-Refused to provide any of the school district resources to assist in my

relocation from SBOE to SHS (refrigerator, chairs, portable water

cooler, file cabinets etc.)

-Adverse schedule change (from 7am-230pm approx. to 715am -

330pm approx.)

-Complications to master schedule, phone service, code to change Fob

key entry.

-Suspect my transfer is due to filling a racial quota (only black male

teacher at either SHS and SJHS [Sheffield Junior High School]).

-My sister-in-law are currently experiencing similar problems.

-I am certain her harassment, retaliation and discrimination is directly

connected to me.

-I am also certain there are discrimination practices in place to

minimize black employment, promotion and retention.

-I have concluded that Dr. Davis is responsible for disparate work

environment for myself and my sister-in law.

-By making certain changes to accommodate certain white employees.

-Excessive transfers (Chauncey Jones) over a period of 5 years (6).

(Doc. 18-1, at 95). Williams conducted an investigation into each of these

grievances and ultimately prepared a report on October 10, 2019, finding no

discrimination, disparate work environment, or harassment. (Doc. 18-4, at 27).

She did, however, find that Dr. Davis should have provided Jones with written

notice of his transfer from the central office to the high school and recommended

that the Board put in place procedures to ensure proper notice in the future. Id.

Williams did not find any discriminatory motive in the transfer. Id.

On June 10, 2021, Jones filed a complaint with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) alleging that he was moved from the central

office to Sheffield High School because of his race; that he was improperly

required to cover the duties of a 28-year-old white teacher during the 2020-21

school year; that he was required to work in the classroom of a teacher who had

been quarantined because of COVID without the classroom being disinfected as he

requested; that he was later required to quarantine with pay because of a COVID

exposure while other teachers were not so required; and that he was not selected to

teach summer school based on his race. (Doc. 18-1, at 100-01). The EEOC

dismissed the charge on June 29, 2021, and issued a right-to-sue letter. Id. at 109.

On September 28, 2021, Jones filed the instant complaint. Although the

allegations are somewhat disjointed, the Court will afford Jones a certain amount

of leniency given his pro se status. See Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d

1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard

than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.”).

The Court interprets Jones’s complaint to allege as follows: that Dr. Davis had

both race- and age-based discriminatory motives in transferring the alternative

school program, and thus Jones, from the Board’s central office to Sheffield High

School without providing written notice; that the transfer was retaliatory; that Dr.

Davis harassed him “in numerous forms;” that the high school principal interfered

with Jones’s and Jones’s students’ schedules; that his students were subjected to

academic harm “related directly to [Jones];” that white students and their parents

made unfounded complaints against him; that the Defendants engaged in

“deception in job description” and “violations of the terms of the position [he]

received in May 2017;” that the transfers and changes in job description were

because of “systemic racism;” that he lost pay by not being selected to teach

summer school, alternative school, Friday school, and Saturday school; and that his

professional credentials are being devalued and unappreciated because of this

discrimination. According to Jones, he is “one of the five most qualified [teachers]

in the school district” and should therefore be a 12-month employee instead of a 9-

month employee. For these alleged violations of his civil rights, Jones seeks

compensatory and punitive damages in the amount of $875,930.00.

Jones also attached to his complaint a copy of the above-referenced EEOC

charge and what appear to be documents that he attached to that charge. In one

such document, Jones elaborates on the issue related to his transfer and claims that

Williams’s investigation was not fair. (Doc. 1, at 11-12).

The Defendants moved for summary judgment on July 22, 2022. (Doc. 19).

Attached to their motion were sworn affidavits from Belinda Williams (Doc. 18-4)

and three school officials: Dr. Davis (Doc. 18-3), Dr. Carlos Nelson, the current

Superintendent of Sheffield City Schools (Doc. 18-2), and Stephanie Wieseman,

the principal of Sheffield High School. (Doc. 18-5). Those affidavits and attached

exhibits rebutted Jones’s contentions and set forth the Defendants’ reasoning for

taking the various actions Jones complained about. The Defendants also submitted

Jones’s deposition as an exhibit. (Doc. 18-1).

Based on the Court’s initial order, Jones’s response to the motion for

summary judgment was due August 12, 2022. (Doc. 10). On August 5, 2022, the

Court granted Jones’s motion for an extension of that deadline, and gave him until

August 19, 2022, to file his response. However, Jones did not file his response

until September 22, 2022, over a month later, and did not request any further

extensions.

The Court’s initial order provides mandatory instructions regarding

dispositive motion practice. Specifically, the initial order notes that its instructions

“must be followed explicitly” and that, “except for good cause shown, briefs and

evidentiary materials that do not conform to” those requirements may be stricken.

(Doc. 10, at 15). Noting that provision, the Defendants moved to strike Jones’s

untimely response. However, given Jones’s status as a pro se litigant, the Court

will exercise discretion and consider his untimely response.

However, Jones’s response did not address the substance of any of the

Defendants’ contentions. Rather, he simply claims that two of the affidavits, those

of Dr. Davis and Dr. Nelson, “are false and misleading.” (Doc. 22, at 2). Jones

then appears to attack the validity of Belinda Williams’s investigation by claiming

that Dr. Nelson also began an investigation but discontinued it at the Board’s

direction after finding evidence favorable to Jones’s discrimination claim. Jones

claimed that Dr. Nelson obeyed the Board “in order to get the position of

Superintendent of Sheffield City Schools.”6 Id. However, Jones did not say what

those alleged favorable findings were.

He also made a series of somewhat confusing allegations about Dr. Nelson

by claiming that he “tampered with [him] regarding providing false and misleading

information as [his] employer.” Id. Jones also claimed that he was harassed and

intimidated; that Dr. Davis and another school administrator “were conspiring to

assign students to Alternative School for the purpose of limiting [Jones’s]

movement during school hours;” that Dr. Nelson told him not to have contact with

an unidentified white female educator; and that defense counsel, the Defendants’

6 Dr. Nelson is the current Superintendent of Sheffield City Schools. (Doc. 18-2, at 1).

witnesses, and the School Board conspired against him by hiring Dr. Nelson as the

new Superintendent. He then cites two statutes that “may have [been] violated in

[his] complaint.” Id. Those statutes are 8 U.S.C. 1324(c), which involves the

authority to arrest illegal aliens, and 18 U.S.C. § 201, which involves bribery of

public officials. However, Jones does not elaborate on how either of those statutes

may have been implicated in his case.

On October 17, 2022, Jones filed what appears to be an unauthorized sur-

reply to the Defendants’ reply in support of its motion for summary judgment.

(Doc. 26). The Court’s initial order provides that “[s]ur-replies are not permitted

without leave of court.” (Doc. 10, at 15). Jones did not seek leave of Court before

filing his sur-reply. However, given his status as a pro se litigant, the Court will

exercise its discretion and consider the filing as a part of Jones’s response.

But like his first response, this filing also fails to substantively address any

of the Defendants’ contentions. In Jones’s sur-reply, which he titled “Plaintiff’s

Motion to Deny Summary Judgment,” he briefly discussed his unsuccessful

attempts to obtain legal counsel and generally stated that the Defendants’

contentions are without merit. He also reiterated his complaint about being

transferred to the high school without written notice and stated that “the basis of

racial discrimination exist in the Racial Discrimination Complaint.” (Doc. 26, at

2). This appears to refer to the written grievance he filed against Dr. Davis, which

he claimed to have read in its entirety at a school board meeting. Jones again

alleged that Dr. Nelson was the first official to begin a “crucial investigation” into

his grievance and that Dr. Nelson’s investigation “provide[d] significant evidence

racial discrimination happened against [Jones] as a member of a protected class.”

Id. at 3. He attached emails between him and Dr. Nelson that appear to schedule a

meeting between the two men and to discuss resources that Jones requested for his

classroom. Id. at 9-12. Jones then summarizes a conversation he allegedly had

with Dr. Nelson regarding the investigation. However, as in his first response,

Jones did not say what any of these alleged favorable findings were. Finally, he

attached what appears to be a response addressed to the Board criticizing various

aspects of Williams’s investigation. Nevertheless, nothing in the sur-reply directly

addresses the Defendants’ contentions.

II. Legal Standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is proper

“if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The party asking for summary

judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis

for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings or filings which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323.

Once the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56(c) requires the non-moving

party to go beyond the pleadings and -- by pointing to affidavits, or depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and/or admissions on file -- designate specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324.

The substantive law will identify which facts are material and which are

irrelevant. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)

(“Anderson”). All reasonable doubts about the facts and all justifiable inferences

are resolved in favor of the non-movant. See Allen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. For Bibb

Cty., 495 F.3d 1306, 1314 (11th Cir. 2007); Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d

1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477

U.S. at 248. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative,

summary judgment may be granted. See id. at 249.

When faced with a “properly supported motion for summary judgment, [the

non-moving party] must come forward with specific factual evidence, presenting

more than mere allegations.” Gargiulo v. G.M. Sales, Inc., 131 F.3d 995, 999 (11th

Cir. 1997). As Anderson teaches, under Rule 56(c) a plaintiff may not simply rest

on her allegations made in the complaint; instead, as the party bearing the burden

of proof at trial, she must come forward with at least some evidence to support

each element essential to her case at trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. “[A]

party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment ‘may not rest

upon the mere allegations or denials of [her] pleading, but . . . must set forth

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 248 (citations

omitted).

Summary judgment is mandated “against a party who fails to make a

showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s

case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp.,

477 U.S. at 322. “Summary judgment may be granted if the non-moving party’s

evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative.” Sawyer v. Sw.

Airlines Co., 243 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1262 (D. Kan. 2003) (citing Anderson, 477

U.S. at 250-51).

“[A]t the summary judgment stage the judge’s function is not himself to

weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether

there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. “Essentially, the

inquiry is ‘whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require

submission to the jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a

matter of law.” Sawyer, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 1262 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at

251-52); see also LaRoche v. Denny’s, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1371 (S.D. Fla.

1999) (“The law is clear . . . that suspicion, perception, opinion, and belief cannot

be used to defeat a motion for summary judgment.”).

As to the substantive law in question, a plaintiff may generally establish a

prima facie case of discrimination by showing that: (1) he is a member of a

protected class; (2) he was qualified for his job; (3) he was subjected to adverse

employment action; and (4) his employer treated similarly situated employees

outside of the protected class more favorably. Jefferson v. Burger King Corp., 505

Fed.Appx. 830, 833 (11th Cir. Jan. 29, 2013).

Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the employer may rebut the

presumption of discrimination by articulating at least one non-discriminatory

reason for its action. Jefferson, 505 Fed. Appx. at 833. Once the employer does so,

the plaintiff must show that the proffered reason is pretext for discrimination. Id.

The analysis is the same for both age- and race-based discrimination. See Phillips

v. Aaron Rents, Inc., 262 F. App'x 202, 207 (11th Cir. 2008), citing Turnes v.

AmSouth Bank, NA, 36 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th Cir.1994) and Pennington v. City of

Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1269 (11th Cir.2001).

Similarly, for a plaintiff to prove a retaliation claims, he must first establish

a prima facie case by proving the following elements: (1) he participated in

protected activity; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there is a

causal connection between participation in the protected activity and the adverse

employment action. Brown v. City of Opelika, 211 Fed. Appx. 862, 863 (11th Cir.

Dec. 14, 2006).

Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the employer may rebut the

presumption of retaliation by articulating at least one non-retaliatory reason for its

action. Jefferson, 505 Fed. Appx. at 833. Once the employer does so, the plaintiff

must show that the proffered reason is pretext for discrimination. Id.

III. Discussion

All of Jones’s claims fail for several reasons. First, as will be discussed

below, it is questionable whether any of his allegations establish a prima facie case

of discrimination or retaliation. But even if they did, the Defendants have

articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for each of the alleged improper

actions, and Jones failed to point out anything in the record to rebut them or even

suggest that they were a pretext for discrimination.

As to whether Jones has made out a prima facie case of discrimination or

retaliation, the Court notes that it does not appear Jones suffered any adverse

employment actions related to any of his claims. Further, the affidavits attached to

the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment provide legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for all of the complained-of actions. As noted above,

Jones’s responses to those assertions do not address any of the Defendants’

contentions. Thus, the proffered reasons are essentially unchallenged.

Accordingly, those affidavits, along with Jones’s own deposition, demonstrate that

there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that summary judgment is due to be

granted in favor of the Defendants. The Court will address each of Jones’s claims

in turn.

A. Jones failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination or

retaliation relating to his transfer from the central office to the high

school because he has shown no adverse employment action nor has

he rebutted the Defendants’ legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

transferring him.

As noted, Jones alleged that he suffered discrimination and retaliation when

Dr. Davis transferred the Alternative School program, and thus Jones, from the

Board’s central office to Sheffield High School. There is no dispute that Jones

meets the first two elements of a prima facie case as to his race- and age-based

discrimination claims: he is African American and was born in 1963. Further, the

Defendants do not dispute that he is qualified for his job. However, Jones has not

pointed to any evidence demonstrating that the transfer was an adverse

employment action.

The Eleventh Circuit has held that “adverse employment actions include

‘tangible employment actions,’ which are those actions ‘that affect continued

employment or pay—things like terminations, demotions, suspensions without pay,

and pay raises or cuts—as well as other things that are similarly significant

standing alone.” Davis v. Legal Servs. Alabama, Inc., 19 F.4th 1261, 1266 (11th

Cir. 2021), quoting Monaghan v. Worldpay US, Inc., 955 F.3d 855, 860 (11th Cir.

2020). “To establish an adverse employment action, ‘an employee must show a

serious and material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment

... as viewed by a reasonable person in the circumstances.’ Moreover, the ‘asserted

impact cannot be speculative and must at least have a tangible adverse effect on the

plaintiff's employment.’” Porterfield v. Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 20-10538, 2021 WL

3856035, at *5 (11th Cir. Aug. 30, 2021), quoting Davis v. Town of Lake Park, 245

F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds by Burlington

Northern v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006).

At the time of his deposition, Jones was still employed in the same capacity

with the Sheffield City Schools, and he admitted in his deposition that his salary

never decreased. In fact, Dr. Davis alleged in his affidavit that Jones’s pay has

increased during the relevant time periods. Although Jones alleged that the

classroom he was moved to at the high school was substandard7, he admitted in his

deposition that the issues he identified were remedied within a few months.

(Plaintiff’s deposition, at 153). Jones also claimed that the transfer to the high

school was a demotion because his supervisor changed from the Superintendent to

the high school principal.

7 In his deposition, Jones claimed that the room had water damage, a foul smell, and that the

blinds were “folded”, and the teacher’s desk was old. (Plaintiff’s deposition, at 154).

However, Jones does not articulate how this change in supervisors was a

demotion nor does he respond to Dr. Davis’s contention that the transfer actually

benefitted him because if gave him additional support from other teachers, a

planning period, and eliminated the need for Jones to use his personal vehicle to

shuttle his students’ lunches from the high school to the central office. Jones’s

proffered reasons for his transfer being an adverse employment action are

speculative at best and do not show any tangible adverse effect on his employment.

Accordingly, Jones failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination or

retaliation regarding his transfer from the central office to the high school. To the

extent Jones has argued that the lack of written notice is the discriminatory

conduct, that argument fails for the same reasons.

The Defendants also articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

the decision to transfer Jones from the central office to the high school. In his

sworn affidavit, Dr. Davis explained the transfer as follows:

I was concerned that the Alternative School students were not

receiving sufficient subject matter or content specific instruction.

While Chauncey Jones was a Social Studies teacher, there were no

other content specific teachers located at the Central Office.

Therefore, the other subject matter/content specific teachers would

have to drive from Sheffield High School to the Central Office to

teach the Alternative School students. I observed that the teachers

were not always able to travel to the Central Office on a consistent

basis. When they did, they lost classroom teaching time by having

travel back and forth. Moreover, I believed that it was difficult to

serve special needs students with Individualized Education Plans

(IEP) at the Central Office when the special education teachers were

based at the high school. Additionally, there is no cafeteria at the

Central Office. Therefore, Chauncey Jones would have to travel to

Sheffield High School to pick up food and bring it back to the Central

Office for the students. Not only did this take away from Chauncey

Jones’ time with the students, but it also led to food being transported

in a personal vehicle.

(Doc. 18-3, at 3-4). Dr. Davis also specifically denied that Jones’s age or race

played a part in his decision. The Court finds this to be a reasonable, legitimate,

and nondiscriminatory reason for the transfer. As noted above, neither Jones’s

response nor his unauthorized sue-reply offered anything to rebut the Defendants’

assertion or to demonstrate that it was a mere pretext. Thus, Jones has failed to

identify specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial as to this issue.

B. Jones failed to demonstrate an adverse employment action regarding

the allegedly harassing email Dr. Davis sent him and failed to rebut

Davis’s explanation.

Jones alleged in his complaint that Dr. Davis harassed him in “numerous

forms.” (Doc. 1, at 6). However, at his deposition, he identified only a single

email, sent by Dr. Davis on August 21, 2019, that he claims was harassing. That

email, in its entirety, reads as follows:

Good morning. I noticed yesterday that you were spending time in

the PASS room while a teacher was in the alternative school room.

This is a reminder that, with the exception of your planning time, you

should remain in the alternative school room. Let me know if you

have any questions. Thank you.

(Doc. 18-1, at 97). In his affidavit, Dr. Davis asserted that the email was not

intended to harass Jones, nor was it related to his age or race. Rather, he said, it

was a job-related concern.

Jones’s responses do not address this email at all. Thus, he has failed to

point to any evidence rebutting Dr. Davis’s explanation or demonstrating that it

was a mere pretext for a discriminatory motive.

The Court notes that, at his deposition, Jones could not clearly articulate

why this email constituted harassment and intimidation. Rather, he stated that he

showed the email to another teacher who told him that Dr. Davis “was absolutely

wrong, you were doing what you were supposed to do.” (Plaintiff’s deposition, at

158-59). This testimony, even if it had been referenced by Jones in his response,

in no way demonstrates that Dr. Davis’s explanation was a mere pretext for

discriminatory motives. Further, Jones points to no adverse employment action

stemming from this email. Accordingly, he has failed to demonstrate any factual

dispute regarding this issue, and summary judgment is therefore due to be granted.

C. Jones failed to point to any evidence demonstrating that his schedule

change was related to a discriminatory motive or that it constituted

an adverse employment action.

Jones next claimed that he was discriminated against when his schedule was

changed from approximately 7:00 am-2:30 pm to approximately 7:15am-3:30 pm.

In his affidavit, Dr. Davis explained that this change was because of the

aforementioned transfer. When Jones was transferred to the high school, his

schedule was slightly modified so that it aligned with the students’ schedules. The

Court finds this to be a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation. As noted above,

Jones did not offer any rebuttal to this assertion in his responses that would call

this into question in any way. Additionally, Jones has not pointed to any evidence

that this change in schedule had any tangible effect on his employment. Therefore,

he has not shown any factual dispute as to whether it constituted an adverse

employment action. Accordingly, Jones has failed to identify a dispute of material

fact that would defeat summary judgment on this claim.

D. Jones’s claims regarding harm that his students experienced,

unfounded complaints about him from white parents, and alleged

“deception in job description” are unsupported by the record.

Jones alleged in his complaint that certain students were “subjected to

academic harm related directly to [him].” (Doc. 1, at 6). Although Jones did not

elaborate on this in his complaint, he explained at his deposition that he believes

some students were harmed by being placed in virtual classes as opposed to being

physically at the school. The Court notes that no student is a party to this case, so

it is unclear how any alleged harm to a student affected Jones’s employment.

Nevertheless, Jones did not explain how those students’ alleged academic harm

was related to the school’s or Dr. Davis’s alleged discriminatory or retaliatory

motives. It follows that there would be no adverse employment action related to

that allegation. Thus, even if there were some connection, Jones has failed to carry

his burden of demonstrating a prima facie case of discrimination.

Additionally, Jones did not rebut the Defendants’ proffered reasoning for

placing students in virtual classes. In his affidavit, Dr. Davis explained that certain

students were placed in virtual classes to allow those who had committed serious

disciplinary infractions to continue their education instead of being expelled and

totally cut off from school. Dr. Davis also denied that the decision to place any

student in virtual classes was related to Jones, Jones’s race, or Jones’s age. The

Court finds this to be a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason and again notes that

Jones offered nothing in response to this proffered reasoning that would

demonstrate Davis’s explanation was a mere pretext. Accordingly, summary

judgment is proper as to this claim.

As to the alleged complaints from white parents or white students, Jones

admits in his deposition that he was never disciplined for anything related to such

complaints. (Plaintiff’s deposition, at 260). Accordingly, he has failed to

demonstrate that he suffered any adverse employment action as a result of these

complaints. Therefore, summary judgment is due to be granted as to this claim as

well.

Jones next alleged that the Defendants engaged in “deception in job

description” and “violations of the terms of the position [he] received in May

2017.” As with the previous claim, Jones did not provide much detail in his

complaint. However, at his deposition, he appears to reference a change in his

duties that occurred after he was transferred from the central office to the high

school. Specifically, he claims that at some point, the duties of Attendance Clerk

were removed, and his supervisor changed from the Superintendent to the high

school principal.

This claim appears to be somewhat related to Jones’s claim regarding his

transfer. In his affidavit, Dr. Davis explained that after Jones was transferred to the

high school, it made no sense to have him supervised by the Superintendent

because he was now in a different location. Rather, he was supervised by the

senior administrator in the same building, i.e., the principal. Similarly, because

Jones was no longer physically located at the central office, it no longer made

sense for him to continue his Attendance Clerk duties. However, his pay was not

reduced as a result of this change.

At his deposition, Jones gave a confusing explanation for how he believed

the results of his transfer and change in job description demonstrated institutional

racism. (Plaintiff’s deposition, at 237-245). However, as with his other claims,

Jones has failed to point to any specific evidence in his response that would rebut

the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons given by the Defendants. And, as with

his claim regarding the transfer discussed above, Jones has shown no adverse

employment action as a result of this change in duties. Accordingly, he has

demonstrated no genuine factual disputes that could be resolved by a jury, and

summary judgment is therefore appropriate as to these claims.

E. Jones failed to point to any evidence that would rebut the

Defendants’ explanation for why he was not chosen to teach summer

school, Friday school, or Saturday school.

Jones next alleged that he was discriminated against and lost extra income

by not being selected to teach summer school, Friday school, or Saturday school.

Similar to his other claims, Jones’s complaint is short on detail regarding these

allegations. However, the gist of his claims is that he was not selected to teach

these extra programs based on his race, age, and/or in retaliation for complaining

about such treatment in the past. Jones claimed that a younger white female was

given a summer school teaching position instead of him.

In Dr. Davis’s affidavit, he explained that Friday school was used as an

after-school detention for elementary students who committed certain disciplinary

infractions. (Doc. 18-3, at 11). Saturday school was a similar program for high

school students. Id. According to Dr. Davis, teachers assigned to these programs,

including Jones in the past, were given supplemental assignments that were not

part of any job description. However, the elementary school principal discontinued

Friday school in 2019, and no in-person school was held during much of 2020 due

to the COVID pandemic. Dr. Davis asserted that when it was resumed in the 2021-

22 school year, he decided to use it to help students with their course work as

opposed to it being a mere detention. Therefore, Dr. Davis said, he wanted an

elementary school teacher who was familiar with that curriculum. Id. Since Jones

was not an elementary school teacher, he was not given the assignment.

Dr. Davis testified that Saturday school was discontinued in 2019 because of

low attendance and cost concerns and was only held sparingly during 2021-22. Dr.

Davis asserted that, “to the extent it was held, Chauncey Jones was given an

opportunity to serve.” Id. at 12. Jones offered nothing in his response to show that

these proffered reasons were pretextual.

As to the issue of summer school, Dr. Davis stated that the Board posted a

position announcement on its website around May 4, 2021. (Doc. 18-3, at 7).

Teachers were selected by May 17, 2021, and contracts were executed by May 26,

2021. Dr. Davis asserted that Jones did not respond to the job positing until two

days before the classes were to begin on June 7, 2021. Id. By that time, Dr. Davis

said, teachers had already been selected and contracts had already been executed.

As to the white female Jones claims was hired in his place, Dr. Davis asserted that

she was actually a teacher’s aide who was hired by a staffing agency and that it

was not the Board’s practice to hire certified teachers, like Jones, as teachers’

aides. Id. According to Dr. Davis, race, age, and previous discrimination

complaints played no part in the selection of teachers to fill these roles. Id.

The Court finds these to be legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for not

selecting Jones to teach Friday school, Saturday school, and summer school. As

with his other claims, Jones failed to substantively respond to the Defendants’

purported reasons. Therefore, he has not carried his burden to demonstrate a

factual dispute as to whether these reasons are a mere pretext. Accordingly,

summary judgment is therefore due to be granted.

Jones makes other vague allegations of discrimination in his complaint. For

example, he claims that his professional credentials are being devalued and

unappreciated because of discrimination. He also makes other ill-explained

allegations of institutional racism and how he believes it has negatively affected

him and other African Americans. However, he has pointed to no actual evidence

that any of it is so. Having read his complaint, its attachments, and his deposition,

it appears that Jones has merely surmised from conversations with various co-

workers over the years that there are racist and agist motives behind many of the

things he finds objectionable in the school system’s political environment.

However, he has not articulated any specific facts to buttress his allegations.

The Defendants have provided specific, articulable reasons for every action

or inaction that Jones claims is based on discrimination or retaliation, and Jones

has not substantively responded to any of them. Rather, he merely claims that they

are false and misleading. This type of conjecture is not sufficient to defeat a

motion for summary judgment. Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir.

2005) (“[M]ere conclusions and unsupported factual allegations are legally

insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.”).

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that there are no genuine issues of

material fact remaining for trial. Accordingly, the Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment (Doc. 17) is GRANTED, and this case is DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE. Further, the Defendants’ motion to strike (Doc. 25) is MOOT. A

separate final judgment will be entered.

DONE and ORDERED March 27, 2023.

LILES C. BURKE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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