The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
EASTERN DIVISION
BETTY STREET,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 1:22–cv–614–CLM
TALLADEGA CITY BOARD OF
EDUCATION, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Betty Street was a Kindergarten teacher in the Talladega City
School System. During that time, Street alleges that she was harassed,
defamed, retaliated against, and denied a fair opportunity to publicly
speak against her mistreatment. So Street has sued four defendants: the
Talladega City Board of Education, Superintendent Tony Ball, Principal
Phillip Jenkins, and fellow Kindergarten teacher Caitlyn Freemon.
Principal Jenkins was only recently served (doc. 22) and has yet to
respond to Street’s complaint against him. The other three defendants
have moved to dismiss Street’s claims against them. (See Docs. 12, 13).
The court grants their motions to dismiss some claims, and denies their
motions on others:
Count 1 (defamation): the court denies Ball and
Freemon’s motion to dismiss;
Count 2 (false light): the court denies Ball and
Freemon’s motion to dismiss;
Count 3 (First Amendment prior restraint): the
court grants all Defendants’ motions to dismiss;
Count 4 (First Amendment retaliation): the court
grants all Defendants’ motions to dismiss;
Count 5 (hostile work environment): the court grants
the Board’s motion to dismiss but denies Ball and
Freemon’s motion;
Count 6 (Equal Protection disparate treatment):
the court grants Ball and Freemon’s motion to dismiss
but denies the Board’s motion; and,
Count 7 (Equal Protection retaliation): the court
grants all Defendants’ motions to dismiss.
The court explains its rulings, after it recounts the facts alleged by Street.
STATEMENT OF THE ALLEGED FACTS
Betty Street, a white female, was hired by Talladega City Schools
to teach Kindergarten. While teaching, Street says she was harassed,
bullied, and subjected to inappropriate sexual comments. So Street filed
an EEOC complaint against her school principal, the Superintendent of
the school system, and the Talladega City Board of Education.
Street says that her plight got worse from there.
1. The resignation letter: Two weeks after the EEOC issued its right
to sue letter, new Superintendent Tony Ball told Street that he was
concerned about her teaching, even though Street had no negative
employment or performance records. Superintendent Ball told Street that,
because he was concerned, he wanted to observe her in the classroom.
Street requested that a witness be present for that observation, which she
says upset Ball. Even though the observation revealed no poor
performance, Ball required Street to observe other teachers in a different
system.
Superintendent Ball told the parent of a student that he wanted to
fire Street, but it was difficult because she had tenure. He also told that
parent that he wanted to hire black teachers because most students were
black.
At the same time, Superintendent Ball had Street’s fellow
Kindergarten teacher, Caitlyn Freemon, collect information on Street.
Freemon, in turn, enlisted students to spy on Street and report what was
happening in Street’s classroom. Freemon then falsely reported to
Superintendent Ball that Street had no control of her classroom.
Other teachers told Street that Freemon said she was going to “get”
Street on the last day of school. The school principal, Phillip Jenkins,
knew about the threats, but refused to act or tell Street about them. In
any event, Street took the threat of physical violence seriously because,
she says, Freemon had a record of threatening others with violence.
Freemon never attacked Street; instead, she resigned. With
Superintendent Jenkins’ help, Freemon wrote a resignation letter that
said she (Freemon) suffered “emotional anguish and mental harassment,
refusal of collaboration, and continuous verbal abuse from Street.” She
also wrote that “as long as Street is an employee underneath Talladega
City School Systems, her constant harassment towards myself and others
will keep happening.”
Street says that Freemon, Superintendent Ball, and Principal
Jenkins all knew these statements were false. Yet the trio shared the
letter with Street’s co–workers, employees at other Talladega City
Schools, and the Administration.
Principal Jenkins didn’t stop there. He warned Street’s co-workers
to stay away from Street because she was a troublemaker, even though
Street had no negative employment history in her file. Altogether, this
caused Street to seek mental health treatment and request to transfer to
another school, which was ignored.
2. The School Board Meeting: Street wanted to publicly tell the
School Board about these incidents and discuss the mental health and
physical safety of employees in the district. In compliance with Board
policy, Street wrote a letter to the Board that detailed what she wanted to
say during the meeting.
The Board subsequently restricted what topics Street could discuss
and prevented her from bringing a witness. Superintendent Ball
threatened to sue Street if she named anyone during her remarks.
Later, Superintendent Ball admitted to Street that he knew
Freemon’s letter was backwards; that Freemon was the bully, not Street.
Ball asked Street not to speak at the meeting because her remarks would
reflect badly on him.
But Street was determined to speak. So Superintendent Ball left
Street off the agenda and closed the meeting to public entry. Despite
Board meetings usually being broadcast on Zoom, the Board streamed this
meeting on YouTube instead. The YouTube stream failed, so members of
the public couldn’t watch it.
When Street started to read her preapproved letter, the Board chair
stopped her and did not allow her to continue speaking. Street requested
to read her full letter at a future board meeting, but the Board, through
Superintendent Ball, denied that request.
3. The complaint: The next month, Street complained to the
Alabama Department of Education that Ball, Jenkins, and Freemon
harassed her. Nothing has come of that complaint. In the months that
followed, three of Street’s black co-workers told Street that Principal
Freemon told them to “throw out the race card” if anything happened
between them and Street. And a new teacher told Street that she was
instructed not to talk to Street.
So Street sued the School Board, Ball, Freemon, and Jenkins. She
alleges Libel, Slander, and Invasion of Privacy/False light claims against
Ball, Freemon, and Jenkins in their individual capacities. She brings one
First Amendment claim for prior restraints against the Board and Ball in
his official and individual capacities, and another First Amendment
Claim for retaliation against Ball, Jenkins, and the Board. She brings a
hostile work environment claim against the Board, and Ball, Jenkins, and
Freemon in their individual capacities. And she brings two Equal
Protection claims—one for disparate treatment against the Board and
Ball in his individual capacity, and another for retaliation—against Ball,
Jenkins, Freemon, and the Board.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a plaintiff must
provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief.” To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the “[f]actual allegations [in the complaint] must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted). This
“requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (citation omitted). “To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 556).
DISCUSSION
A. Official Capacity Claims Against Ball
Superintendent Ball argues that the official capacity claims against
him should be dismissed as redundant of the claims against the Board.
“Because suits against a municipal officer sued in his official capacity and
direct suits against municipalities are functionally equivalent, there no
longer exists a need to bring official-capacity actions against local
government officials, because local government units can be sued
directly.” Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 776 (11th Cir. 1991). As
the circuit court reasoned in Busby, “[t]o keep both the City and the
officers sued in their official capacity as defendants in this case would
have been redundant and possibly confusing to the jury.” Id.
The court agrees. The official capacity claims against Ball are
“functionally equivalent” with the claims against the Board, so keeping
Ball as a defendant would be redundant and could cause future confusion.
As a result, circuit precedent requires the court DISMISS all claims
against Ball in his official capacity.
B. Individual Counts
The court now turns to the individual counts.
Count 1: Libel & Slander (Ball and Freemon)
Street alleges defamation against the individual defendants in their
individual capacities—libel against Freemon for writing the resignation
letter, and slander against Freemon and Superintendent Ball for the
comments they made to others about Street’s job performance.
According to Street, Freemon’s resignation letter says that Freeman
suffered “emotional anguish and mental harassment, refusal of
collaboration, and continuous verbal abuse . . . from Street” and that “as
long as Mrs. Street is an employee underneath Talladega City School
Systems, her constant harassment towards myself and others will keep
happening.” (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 107, 108). And Street says that Freemon and Ball
talked to others about the letter, telling other employees to stay away from
Street because she is a troublemaker and that she had performance issues
with her job. Ball even told the parent of a student he was trying to get
Street fired but that it was difficult because she was tenured.
To state an ordinary claim for defamation under Alabama law, the
plaintiff must plausibly allege: (1) “a false and defamatory statement
concerning the plaintiff”; (2) “an unprivileged communication of that
statement to a third party”; (3) “fault amounting at least to negligence on
the part of the defendant”; and (4) “either actionability of the statement
irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the
publication of the statement.” Dolgencorp, LLC v. Spence, 224 So. 3d 173,
186 (Ala. 2016).
Taking Street’s allegations as true, Street has sufficiently pleaded
a defamation claim. She alleged that the letter of resignation and
statements made about her were false, (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 108, 109), that the letter
and the statements were communicated to other school system employees
and the parent of a student (Id. ¶¶ 112, 113, 115, 116, 126), that the
defendants acted with malice because they knew the statements were
false (Id. ¶¶ 111, 124), and that the statements caused special harm by
subjecting Street to public ridicule and contempt, among other things (Id.
¶ 127).
Ball and Freeman argue that the second element—publication to a
third party—is not met because the statements were only shared with
other employees of the school system. It’s true that communication “by a
corporate employee to a fellow corporate employee in the course of
transacting the corporation’s business and in the line of their duty as
employees of the corporation . . . is not sufficient publication to sustain an
action for libel.” Nelson v. Lapeyrouse Grain Corp., 534 So. 2d 1085, 1093
(Ala. 1988). But Street has sufficiently pleaded facts to distinguish this
case from that rule—i.e., that Freemon’s statements were communicated
to teachers at different schools and that Ball’s statements were
communicated to the parent of a student. So the court DENIES the
defendants’ motion to dismiss Count 1.
Count 2: False Light Invasion of Privacy (Ball and Freemon)
Street next sues Ball and Freemon in their individual capacities for
invasion of privacy stemming from Freemon’s resignation letter and the
statements they made about Street’s job performance. Street alleges those
statements placed Street in a false light in violation of Alabama law.
In Alabama, “false light” invasion of privacy is defined as:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that
places the other before the public in a false light is subject to
liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if (a) the false
light in which the other was placed would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the actor had
knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of
the publicized matter and the false light in which the other
would be placed.
Schifano v. Greene Cnty. Greyhound Park, Inc., 624 So.2d 178, 180 (Ala.
1993) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652E (1977)).
Defendants argue that Street has failed to plead a viable false light
claim because she did not allege the defendants communicated the alleged
false information to the public at large—i.e., give the statements sufficient
publicity. But Street alleges that the resignation letter was given to her
co-workers, employees at other schools, and the administration. Street
alleges that she even received a copy of the letter from someone the
defendants gave the letter to. Street also alleges that other teachers
discussed the letter, and that it made them believe Street was the
problem. (Doc. 1 ¶ 114). Plus, Superintendent Ball discussed Street’s
performance with the parents of a student. (Id. ¶¶ 63–65, 69, 43).
These statements, taken as true, state a claim that the statements
were widely disseminated and became public knowledge. Discovery will
help determine whether the false statements were communicated “to the
public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarding
a substantially certain to become one of public knowledge.” Ex parte
Birmingham News, Inc., 778 So. 2d 814, 818 (Ala. 2000). But at this stage,
Street has sufficiently pleaded a claim for false light invasion of privacy.
So the court DENIES the defendants’ motion to dismiss Count 2.
Count 3: First Amendment, prior restraint (Board and Ball)
Street alleges that the Board and Ball restricted and prohibited her
attempts to address the Board in violation of her First Amendment rights,
and those restrictions acted as a prior restraint.
For a public employee to sue their government employer under the
First Amendment, “the employee must show that he or she spoke as a
citizen on a matter of public concern.” Borough of Duryea, Pa. vs.
Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 386 (2011); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147
(1983). “If an employee does not . . . address a matter of public concern, ‘a
federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom
of a personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to
the employee's behavior.’” Id.
Both defendants argue that Street has failed to state a claim
because her speech did not address or implicate a matter of public concern.
And Ball argues that even if it did, the claim against him should be
dismissed because he lacked the authority to deprive her of her claimed
First Amendment rights.
1. Public Concern: Speech involves a matter of public concern if it
can “be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or
other concern to the community.” Connick, 461 U.S. at 146. Courts
consider the “content, form, and context” of the employee’s speech to
determine whether the speech addresses a matter of public concern.
Rankin, 483 U.S. at 384–85. “In assessing the content of a public
employee’s speech, we look to whether the speech communicates a ‘subject
of legitimate news interest, a subject of general interest and of value and
concern to the public at the time.’” Mitchell v. Hillsborough Cnty., 468
F.3d 1276, 1284 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting City of San Diego v. Roe, 543
U.S. 77, 84 (2004)). As to form, “[t]he mere fact that [] speech was made
to coworkers or to supervisors rather than directed at the general public
does not remove the speech from the category of public concern.” Cook v.
Gwinnett Cnty. Sch. Dist., 414 F.3d 1313, 1319 (11th Cir. 2005).
Street argues that her statements involved more than complaints
about workplace conditions; they instead implicated broader public
concerns. For example, she argues that her EEOC claim “sought to combat
discrimination, bullying, and harassment” by the Administration and her
co–workers. (Doc. 17 at 6). She also says that the statement she sought to
read to the Board addressed unlawful conduct by the Administration and
her co–workers, not just private grievances. (Id.). And Street points out
that she tried to read her letter to the board in a meeting open to the
public but was prevented from doing so.
Her EEOC charge states that “I and other teachers [sic] were
subjected to harassment, bullying, intimidation, threats, and
inappropriate sexual language . . . .” (Doc. 12–1). In that charge, she
described her environment as “unsafe” and “retaliatory.” (Id.). She alleges
she wanted to speak to the Board “on the matter of the mental health and
physical safety of Talladega City School Board employees.” (Doc. 1, ¶ 81).
She alleged that Jenkins and Ball involved other teachers and employees,
telling them not to associate with Street. (Id. ¶¶ 70, 103, 105). And she
alleges students spied on her. (Id. ¶¶ 53–54). She also notes that Ball,
Jenkins, and Freemon shared Freemon’s resignation letter with other
people in the school, other schools, and the administration, pushing the
matter into the public sphere. (Id. ¶¶ 63–65).
But even taking those allegations as true, they fail to invoke a
matter of public concern that rises to the level required to state a claim.
The First Amendment “does not empower [employees] to ‘constitutionalize
the employee grievance.’” Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 420 (2006)
(citing Connick, 461 U.S., at 154). That’s what Street’s complaint amounts
to: an employee grievance. Despite her allegations that some members of
the public were involved, the root of her complaints to the Board and to
the EEOC were that she was mistreated by the Board and its employees.
While that may be true and sufficient to establish other claims, the
content, form, and context of her speech fail to establish that she was
speaking on a matter of public concern.
2. Ball’s authority: Even if Street were speaking on a matter of
public concern, her claim against Ball would fail because he lacked the
authority to deprive her of her claimed First Amendment rights. Under
Alabama law, the Superintendent lacks the authority to dictate how the
Board conducted its meetings, the Superintendent serves at the pleasure
of the Board, and the Superintendent has no vote on matters that come
before the Board for its consideration. See Ala. Code § 16–12–1(a); 16– 12–
3(f). And according to Ball, the Board may even go around him to allow
individuals to speak who did not properly file a request with the
Superintendent. Ball also points to Street’s complaint, which says that the
Board Chairman, not Ball, prevented her from completing her
presentation—and it was the Board, not Ball, who denied her later
request to read her letter. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 93–94, 97).
In response, Street argues that the Superintendent is the CEO of
the Board and acts in concert with the Board. Ala. Code § 16–12–3(a); 16–
12–3(b). She says that Ball threatened legal action based on the content
of her speech, tried to otherwise persuade Street not to speak, and
ultimately made the decision to deny Street access to speak again. But
there is nothing to suggest that Ball could act alone as Superintendent to
restrain Street from speaking at the Board meeting or at future Board
meetings. Instead, both the complaint and Alabama law establish that it
was the Board as a whole who could make that call.
So the court will dismiss Count 3 against the Board and Ball.
Count 4: First Amendment, retaliation (Board and Ball)
Next, Street alleges that Superintendent Ball and the Board
violated her First Amendment right by retaliating against her for filing
an EEOC complaint and writing a letter to the Board about her
mistreatment. But to state a valid claim that the defendants retaliated
against her for exercising her First Amendment rights, Street must
establish that she was speaking on a matter of public concern. See
Borough of Duryea, Pa. vs. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 386 (2011); Connick,
461 U.S. at 147. As explained in Count 3, neither Street’s letter to the
Board nor her EEOC complaint involved matters of public concern, so this
First Amendment claim must also fail. As also explained in Count 3, Ball
did not have the authority to deprive Street of her ability to speak at the
Board meeting.
As a result, the court will GRANT the defendants’ motions to
dismiss Count 4.
Count 5: Hostile Work Environment (all defendants)
Street next brings a hostile work environment claim under §1981
and §1983, alleging that the Board, plus Ball and Freemon in their
individual capacities, subjected her to a hostile work environment based
on her race.1 She also alleges that Ball and Freemon worked in concert to
fire her and replace her with a black applicant, spied on her, told other
employees lies about her, told other employees to stay away from her, and
told other employees that she was racist.
1. The Board
The Board argues that Street’s hostile work environment claim fails
because Street did not allege that the Board established or maintained a
hostile work environment under Board policy, which is required to state
a claim against it. The Board is correct that a hostile work environment
claim against the Board must be made under a policy and may not depend
on a respondeat superior theory. See Yates v. Cobb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 687
F. App’x. 866, 872 (11th Cir. 2017) (unpublished) (holding that a school
board may not be held liable under §1983 based on a respondeat superior
theory). Because Street has not alleged the Board established,
maintained, or endorsed the alleged hostile work environment via Board
policy, the court GRANTS the Board’s motion to dismiss the hostile work
environment claim against it.
2. The Individual Defendants
A plaintiff may bring two types of hostile work environment claims:
one based on discrimination, the other based on retaliation. Babb v. Sec'y,
1 Claims brought under 42 U.S.C § 1981 through 42 U.S.C § 1983 are subject to the
same requirements of proof and analytical framework as Title VII claims. See Standard
v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1330 (11th Cir. 1998) (Title VII and § 1981 have
the “same requirements of proof and use the same analytical framework”); Cross v.
State of Ala., State Dep’t. of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 49 F.3d 1490, 1508
(11th Cir. 1995) (“When [S]ection 1983 is used as a parallel remedy for violation of [Title
VII], the elements of the two causes of action are the same.”).
Dep't of Veterans Affs., 992 F.3d 1193, 1206–07 (11th Cir. 2021).2 These
claims differ in one primary way—for a discrimination-based claim, the
plaintiff must prove his employer was responsible for “severe or
pervasive” harassment based on the plaintiff’s protected characteristic.
Adams v. Austal, 754 F.3d 1240, 1249 (11th Cir. 2014); Miller v. Kenworth
of Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that to
establish a hostile work environment claim, the plaintiff must show that
“the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule,
and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions
of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment.”).
To prove the “severe or pervasive” element, Street must show her
work environment was both subjectively and objectively hostile. Smelter
v. Southern Home Care Services, Inc., 904 F.3d 1276, 1285 (11th Cir.
2018). That is, she must first establish that she “subjectively perceive[d]
the environment to be abusive,” and then prove that her work
environment was objectively one “that a reasonable person would find
hostile or abusive.” Harris v. Forklift systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
Ball and Freemon argue that this claim must fail because Street
does not allege that any of actions they took were based on race. But at
least two of Street’s allegations directly implicate her race. She alleges
that Ball told a parent he was trying to have Street fired and wanted to
replace her with someone who is black. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 43–46). And she alleges
that Freemon told black employees to use the race card with Street. (Id.
¶¶ 32, 36–38, 101). Taking these allegations as true, a reasonable juror
could find that Ball and Freemon’s actions were based on race.
As for pleading that the harassment was severe and pervasive,
Street alleges that Ball had Freemon spy on Street (Id. ¶ 40); Ball made
up performance problems to schedule a time to observe Street teach and
became angry when Street requested a witness for the observation (Id. ¶¶
32–37); Ball forced Street to observe other classes and rejected her
requests to observe in a different school system (Id. ¶¶ 32, 36–39); and
2 Street does not plead a retaliatory hostile work environment claim.
that Ball knew the letter Freemon and Jenkins wrote about Street was
false, but did nothing about it (Id. ¶¶ 106–109, 111).
Street also alleges that Freemon said she was going to “get” Street
on the last day of school (Id. ¶ 49), that Freemon had threatened other
employees with violence in the past, that Street took Freemon’s treatment
as a threat and that she was in fear of an imminent battery (Id. ¶ 50), and
that Freemon prepared and wrote a false letter about Street (Id. ¶¶ 106–
109, 111).
Street alleges that these acts collectively made her feel defamed and
that her privacy was invaded (Id. ¶¶ 57–61, 66), that she was isolated
from her co-workers to the point of crying (Id. ¶¶ 73–74), that she would
stay in her classroom to avoid negative treatment from her coworkers (Id.
¶¶ 75–76), and that ultimately, she sought mental health treatment for
their actions. (Id.) All in all, Street alleges these acts occurred for more
than one calendar year.
Taken as true, a reasonable juror could find that Street both
“subjectively perceived the environment to be abusive,” and that her work
environment was objectively one “that a reasonable person would find
hostile or abusive.” Harris, 510 U.S. at 21.
As a result, the court DENIES Ball and Freemon’s motion to dismiss
this count.
Count 6: Equal Protection, disparate treatment (Board and
Ball)
Street next bring §1983 claims based on §1981 and Equal Protection
against the Board and Superintendent Ball in his individual capacity for
denying Street the opportunity to speak based on her race, while allowing
a similarly situated black employee to speak at a later meeting.
As the court discussed above, Superintendent Ball lacked the
authority to deprive Street the opportunity to speak at Board meetings,
so this claim against him must fail.
As for the Board, Street’s “class of one” claim requires Street to
“allege[] that she has been intentionally treated differently from others
similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in
treatment.” Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).
There is “no reason that a plaintiff in a ‘class of one’ case should be
subjected to a more lenient ‘similarly situated’ requirement that [the
Eleventh Circuit] ha[s] imposed in other contexts.” Griffin Industries, Inc.
v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1204–05 (11th Cir. 2007). To establish a prima
facie case of discrimination, Street must establish that she is “similarly
situated in all material respects” with her proffered comparator. Lewis v.
City of Union City, Georgia, 918 F.3d 1213, 1218 (11th Cir. 2019). But at
the pleading stage, she need not plead a prima facie case of discrimination.
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002); Surtain v. Hamlin
Terrace Found., 789 F.3d 1239, 1246 (11th Cir. 2015). Instead, Street’s
complaint only needs to “set out enough factual content to allow a court to
draw the reasonable inference” of disparate treatment. Equal Emp.
Opportunity Comm'n v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d 1018, 1023
(11th Cir. 2016). To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must state,
“more than the mere possibility of misconduct.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
While Street was allowed to speak, she was not listed on the agenda,
the meeting was listed as “closed” instead of “public,” it was broadcast
over YouTube instead of Zoom (the normal platform), and she could not
have a witness speak on her behalf. Members of the public were denied
entry to the meeting and the YouTube stream malfunctioned, so other
members of the public could not view it. Then when Street began to read
her preapproved letter, the Board chair stopped her and did not allow her
to continue speaking.
Street contrasts her experience with a black system employee,
Darius Williams, who was allowed to speak at a future meeting with no
restrictions. Williams was allowed to go over his allotted time for
speaking, members of the public were allowed to attend, and a person
could speak on his behalf.
The Board argues that the differences in Williams and Street
prevent Williams from being a valid comparator. First, the Board points
out that Williams was a principal who was speaking about his right to
continued employment, which could implicate due process concerns, while
Street was a teacher who sought to speak about her alleged mistreatment
by the Board and her co-workers. Second, they point out that Williams
and Street had different histories with the Board; Street had a multi-year,
multi-faceted dialogue with the Board and its administrators, but nothing
in the complaint references the same relationship for Williams. And
finally, the Board points out the two employees sought to speak at
different meetings with different agendas, and that there were different
technical conditions.
All that may be true. But at this early stage, Street only needs to
allege “enough factual content to allow a court to draw the reasonable
inference” of disparate treatment. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n, 852
F.3d at 1023. Street has met that burden, so the court denies the Board’s
motion to dismiss Count 6.
As stated previously, the court will grant Superintendent Ball’s
motion to dismiss Count 6 because he lacked the authority to prevent
Street from speaking at the Board meeting.
Count 7: Equal Protection, retaliation (all defendants)
Finally, Street brings a claim under §1983 against all defendants
for retaliating against her for filing an EEOC complaint of gender
discrimination. This claim differs from her First Amendment Retaliation
claim, because that claim centered on speech that she alleged was a
matter of public concern in her EEOC complaint, while this claim turns
on the gender discrimination she complained about in her EEOC
complaint. The defendants correctly note that a claim of gender-based
retaliation “simply does not implicate the Equal Protection Clause.”
Watkins v. Bowden, 105 F.3d 1344, 1354 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Ratliff
v. DeKalb Cnty., Ga., 62 F.3d 338, 340 (11th Cir.1995) (“[N]o clearly
established right exists under the equal protection clause to be free from
retaliation.”). So the court grants the defendants’ motions to dismiss
Count 7.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the courts rules as follows on the pending
motions to dismiss:
e Count 1 (defamation): the court denies Ball and
Freemon’s motion to dismiss;
e Count 2 (false light): the court denies Ball and
Freemon’s motion to dismiss;
e Count 3 (First Amendment prior restraint): the
court grants all Defendants’ motions to dismiss;
e Count 4 (First Amendment retaliation): the court
grants all Defendants’ motions to dismiss;
e Count 5 (hostile work environment): the court grants
the Board’s motion to dismiss but denies Ball and
Freemon’s motion;
e Count 6 (Equal Protection disparate treatment):
the court grants Ball and Freemon’s motion to dismiss
but denies the Board’s motion; and,
e Count 7 (Equal Protection retaliation): the court
grants all Defendants’ motions to dismiss.
The court will enter a separate order that carries out this opinion.
DONE and ORDERED on March 14, 2023.
See fi Hy
COREY. MAZE <
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
17