Lowe v. Day & Zimmerman

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

MICHAEL L. LOWE,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 2:21-cv-1070-CLM

DAY & ZIMMERMAN, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Michael L. Lowe, proceeding pro se, sues Day & Zimmerman,

Kalkreuth Roofing, Plant Vogtle, Plant Farley, Savannah River Site,

Michael Steins Local 136 Roofing & Cable Proofers, Laborers Local Union

559, C.E. Bourne, Equifax Workforce Solution, National Labor Relations

Board, and Champion Roofing Company. In his Complaint, Lowe asserts

that one or more defendants: (1) violated his Equal Protection rights in

hiring, promotions, equal pay, and on-the-job training; (2) conspired to

deprive him of his right to equal employment under the law; (3) retaliated

against him for his union activities; and (4) discriminated against him

because of his age. (Doc. 1.) These defendants moved to dismiss:

Kalkreuth Roofing (doc. 11), C.E. Bourne (doc. 14), Day & Zimmerman

(doc. 16), Laborers Local Union 559 (doc. 17), and Michael Steins (doc. 32).

These defendants have not appeared in the lawsuit: Plant Vogtle, Plant

Farley, Savannah River Site, Equifax Workforce Solution, National Labor

Relations Board, and Champion Roofing Company.

Lowe also filed a document titled “Notice of Sovereign Motion to

Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction.” (Doc. 40.) Kalkreuth Roofing moved to

Strike this filing (doc. 41).

For the reasons stated within, the court will GRANT Kalkreuth

Roofing’s Motion to Strike Lowe’s extraneous filing (doc. 41) and will

GRANT the Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (docs. 11, 14, 16, 17, 32).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the court will also DISMISS the claims against

the defendants who have not appeared in the case. (“Notwithstanding any

filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the

action . . . fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.”)

BACKGROUND

Through his membership with the United Union of Roofers,

Waterproofers, and Allied Workers Local 136, AFL-CIO, Lowe obtained

employment with Kalkreuth Roofing, working on a roofing project at the

Vogtle Nuclear Plant in Waynesboro, Georgia. Lowe began working for

Kalkreuth Roofing at the Vogtle Plant in January 2020. In February 2020,

Lowe complained to a manager that a fire-watch employee should be

overseeing the safety of employees engaged in torching the roof. The

project ended in April 2020. Lowe was the only union member that worked

on the job until the project ended.

Around July 2020, Lowe learned that every other employee who had

worked on the Plant Vogtle project was called back to work on other

projects; Lowe was not called back. In fall of 2020, the Union filed a

grievance against Kalkreuth Roofing, asserting that Kalkreuth Roofing

refused to return Lowe to work. Around December 16, 2020, Lowe

attended a grievance meeting where Nick Fiore—a company

representative—told him that the grievance was untimely. The Union

argued that the grievance was not untimely. In February 2021, the

company formally denied the grievance. Michael Steins, the Union’s

International Vice President, informed Lowe that he (Steins) and the

International President determined that the grievance was untimely, and

they declined to proceed with the grievance process.

In early October 2020, Laborers Local Union 559 referred Lowe to

Day & Zimmerman. Lowe sought employment with Day & Zimmerman to

work on a project at the Farley Nuclear Plant in Alabama.

Day & Zimmerman made Lowe a conditional offer of employment. But

Day & Zimmerman terminated Lowe’s employment on October 13, 2020,

citing the results of Lowe’s background check as the reason for

termination. Laborers Local Union 559 did not pursue a grievance on

Lowe’s behalf. Lowe filed a claim with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), asserting Title VII, Age

Discrimination, and Retaliation claims against Day & Zimmerman and

Laborers Local Union 559. The EEOC issued a right to sue letter on April

13, 2021, granting Lowe the right to file a Title VII, Age Discrimination,

and Retaliation lawsuit against Day & Zimmerman and Laborers Local

Union 559 within 90 days of receipt of the notice. (Doc. 1, p. 15.) Lowe filed

this lawsuit on August 4, 2021.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

On Rule 12 motions to dismiss, the court accepts the allegations in

Lowe’s complaint as true and construes them in the light most favorable

to Lowe. Lanfear v. Home Depot, Inc., 697 F.3d 1267, 1275 (11th Cir.

2012). Lowe is a pro se litigant, so his pleadings are to be “liberally

construed.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citation omitted).

But the court need not accept legal conclusions or unwarranted factual

inferences as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).

The ultimate question is whether all of Lowe’s allegations, when

accepted as true, “plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief.” Id. at

678–79. If the facts as pleaded could entitle Lowe to relief, then the court

must deny the defendants’ motions to dismiss. If, however, the court

accepts all of Lowe’s pleaded facts as true, and Lowe still would not be

entitled to relief, then the court must grant the motions.

ANALYSIS

I. Motion to Strike Pleading

Lowe filed a document titled “Notice of Sovereign Motion to Dismiss

for Lack of Jurisdiction,” asserting that Kalkreuth Roofing’s attorneys

lack jurisdiction to file a motion to dismiss. (Doc. 40.) Kalkreuth Roofing

moved to strike Lowe’s filing as an impermissible sur-reply. (Doc. 41.)

Sur-replies “can only be filed with leave of court and are ordinarily

stricken if no such leave is requested or received.” Fisher v. Ciba Specialty

Chemicals Corp., 2007 WL 2995525, at *2 (S.D. Ala. Oct. 11, 2007); see

also Staten v. Federal Ins. Co., 2021 WL 4458875, at *1 (N.D. Ala. Sept.

29, 2021) (concluding that the court “will not consider” arguments

presented in a sur-reply filed without seeking leave of court). Lowe filed

this notice without leave of the court. Though not labelled a sur-reply,

Lowe’s filing is an impermissible sur-reply. So the court will grant

Kalkreuth Roofing’s motion to strike this filing.

II. Motions to Dismiss

The court will now address the defendants’ motions to dismiss.

Rather than address the motions separately, the court will discuss the

common bases for the motions to dismiss. The defendants argue that the

court should dismiss Lowe’s Complaint because: (A) Lowe’s Complaint

fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; (B) Lowe’s

Complaint is an impermissible shotgun pleading; (C) the court lacks

personal jurisdiction over some defendants; (D) this is not the proper

venue; (E) the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action;

(F) Lowe failed to timely file his Complaint; and (G) Lowe cannot hold a

union official personally liable. (Docs. 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 32, 33.) As

described below, there are several independent bases sufficient to dismiss

this case. The court will address the defendants’ arguments in favor of

dismissal. The court will also address the validity of the claims against

the defendants who have not appeared in this action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

But the court will not address the claims and factual allegations that Lowe

raised for the first time in his response to the defendants’ motions to

dismiss. See Boyd v. Peet, 249 F. App’x 155, 157 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing

St. George v. Pinellas Cty., 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002)).

A. Lowe’s Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted.

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the

grounds for the court’s jurisdiction” and “a demand for the relief sought.”

FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff’s complaint

must also provide “a short and plain statement of the claim . . . [to] give

the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon

which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citing

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). The complaint must include

“enough [factual allegations] to raise a right to relief above the speculative

level. Id. (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure

§ 1216, pp. 235–36 (3d ed. 2004)). “[A]n unadorned, the-defendant-

unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” is insufficient. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

Lowe labelled his Complaint “Certificate of Service.” The Complaint

lists Lowe as the claimant and lists the defendants as wrongdoers. Then

it states:

(1) This certifies that I will serve a copy of this claim against

all parties of violating Equal Protection Rights In Hiring &

Promotions & Equal Pay, & On The Job Training.

(2) Also conspiring to deprive Lowe under 18 USC § 241 &

242 by injuring, oppressing & threatening him to the free

exercise of his rights to Equal Employment under the

Common Law & U.S. Fed & State Const.

For Retaliation of Him For His Union Activities. See Also

Title VII Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Age Discrimination In

Employment).

(Doc. 1, pp. 1–3) (no alterations made to original text).

Then Lowe’s Complaint lists the defendants’ mailing addresses. The

Complaint does not state causes of action, plead elements, include factual

allegations, or include a prayer for relief. The court will dismiss Lowe’s

Complaint in its entirety because it “fail[s] to plead any of the essential

elements” of a cause of action. See Lane v. Bayview Loan Servicing LLC,

2018 WL 6446643, at *7 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 10, 2018); Perry v. Matrix Fin.

Servs. Corp., 2019 WL 1597883, at *6 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 15, 2019).

Lowe also included several attachments to his Complaint: (1) a

“Confidential Witness Affidavit”; (2) two “Affidavits of Facts/Statements

of Facts”; (3) correspondence between Lowe and the EEOC; (4) a document

titled “Notice of Attachment & Amendment to Supreme Ct. Title VII

Retaliation Proof But-For Causation”; (5) Day & Zimmerman’s electronic

Personal History Questionnaire Notice; (6) the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission’s (“EEOC”) dismissal and right-to-sue letter;

and (7) Day & Zimmerman’s Employee Information Form. Even if the

court were to consider the documents that Lowe attached to the

Complaint and try to decipher claims from the attached documents, Lowe

still fails to state a claim against the defendants:

• Lowe identifies defendants C.E. Bourne, Equifax Workforce

Solutions, and Champion Roofing Company as wrongdoers in the

Complaint. After that initial identification, neither the Complaint

nor any of the attached documents mention these defendants at all.

So the court will dismiss all claims against C.E. Bourne, Equifax

Workforce Solutions, and Champion Roofing Company.

• Lowe identifies the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) as a

wrongdoer in the Complaint. But other than identifying the NLRB

as a wrongdoer in the initial caption, Lowe only refers to the NLRB

in one other place throughout his submitted documents. Lowe

submitted a Confidential Witness Affidavit that states, “I have been

given assurance by an agent of the National Labor Relations Board

(NLRB) that this Confidential Witness Affidavit will be considered

a confidential law enforcement record by the NLRB and will not be

disclosed unless it becomes necessary to produce this Confidential

Witness Affidavit in connection with a formal proceeding.” (Doc. 1,

p. 4.) Lowe does not make any claims or provide any factual

allegations to support that the NLRB engaged in any wrongful

conduct. So the court will dismiss all claims against the NLRB.

• Lowe identifies Plant Vogtle, Plant Farley, and Savannah River Site

as wrongdoers in the Complaint. In Lowe’s document titled “Notice

of Attachment & Amendment To Supreme Ct. Title VII Retaliation

Proof But-For Causation,” Lowe states that he was “blackballed to

never be allowed to work at . . . Plant[] Farley, Savannah River Site,

Plant Vogtle or any other sites.” (Doc. 1, p. 13.) This is the only

reference—other than the initial identification—to Savannah River

Site. This statement does not suggest who allegedly blackballed

Lowe from working at these sites and is insufficient to state a claim

against any of the plants. In the other documents, Lowe also states

that Kalkreuth Roofing hired him to work on a roofing project at

Plant Vogtle and that Day & Zimmerman conditionally hired him

to work on a roofing project at Plant Farley. (Doc. 1, pp. 4, 9.) Lowe

does not make any claims or factual assertions to support that the

plants took any discriminatory action against him, retaliated

against him, or engaged in any other wrongful conduct. So the court

will dismiss all claims against Plant Vogtle, Plant Farley, and

Savannah River Site.

• Lowe identifies Kalkreuth Roofing, Michael Steins, Day &

Zimmerman, and Laborers Local Union 559 as wrongdoers in his

Complaint. These claims fail because even though Lowe’s additional

documents do reference these parties: (1) Lowe does not identify any

claims or causes of action; and (2) Lowe fails to plead facts to

support the claims that the court thinks Lowe may have intended

to claim.

o Courts construe pro se pleadings liberally, but a court need

not rewrite a deficient pleading to sustain an action. GJR

Invs., Inc. v. County of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369

(11th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–80 (2009) (“Yet even in the case of

pro se litigants this leniency does not give a court license to

serve as de facto counsel for a party, or to rewrite an otherwise

deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.”). Lowe’s

Complaint and attached documents identify no claims or

causes of action, and the court declines to rewrite Lowe’s

Complaint to identify causes of action.

o “[C]omplaints in all [civil] cases . . . [must] contain either

direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material

elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable

legal theory.” Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 707, n. 2 (11th

Cir. 2010) (quoting Bryson v. Gonzales, 534 F.3d 1282, 1286

(10th Cir. 2008)) (internal quotations omitted). It seems to the

court that Lowe may have intended to assert claims for

national origin, race, sex, or age discrimination, and that

Lowe may have intended to assert claims for retaliation

against some or all of these defendants. In the Eleventh

Circuit, a discrimination plaintiff must provide factual detail

in the complaint that, if true, would establish that the

plaintiff was treated less favorably than comparator

employees based on the protected characteristic(s) at issue.

Uppal v. Hospital Corp. of Am., 482 F. App'x 394, 396 (11th

Cir. 2012). Even if Lowe intended to assert discrimination

claims, Lowe failed to allege any facts about how he was

treated less favorably than non-Native American, non-black,

younger, or female employees. To state a claim for retaliation,

a plaintiff must plead that he engaged in protected activity—

i.e., that he opposed race-based, age, sex, or national origin

discrimination. Andrews v. Lakeshore Rehab. Hosp., 140 F.3d

1405, 1412–13 (11th Cir. 1998). Lowe failed to allege any facts

that he engaged in protected activity.

Because Lowe’s Complaint and associated documents fail to identify

claims or causes of action and contain no factual allegations to support

the elements of the presumed claims, the court will dismiss all claims

against the defendants.

B. Lowe’s Complaint is an impermissible shotgun pleading.

Both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures and Eleventh Circuit

precedent prohibit the use of shotgun pleadings. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2);

FED. R. CIV. P. 10(b); Jackson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 898 F.3d 1348, 1356

(11th Cir. 2018); Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313,

1321 (11th Cir. 2015). A complaint must contain “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED.

R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). The Eleventh Circuit has identified four types of shotgun

pleadings: (1) a complaint that contains multiple counts where each

adopts the allegations of all preceding counts, (2) a complaint that is

“replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously

connected to any particular cause of action,” (3) a complaint that does not

separate “into a different count each cause of action or claim for relief,”

and (4) a complaint that asserts “multiple claims against multiple

defendants without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for

which acts or omissions, or which of the defendants the claim is brought

against.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321–23.

Even if the court considers the documents that Lowe attached to his

Complaint and tries to decipher claims from the attached documents, the

Complaint is an impermissible shotgun pleading that fails to “give the

defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds

upon which each claim rests.” Id. at 1320. Lowe’s Complaint and attached

documents are not separated into distinct counts or causes of action. The

attached documents are filled with conclusory language—e.g., “[B]eing of

Origee African American descent [Lowe] was discriminated against by his

White employer’s [sic] . . . .” (Doc. 1, p. 12.) Further, the Complaint and

attached documents do not specify which defendant took which action,

which facts apply to which defendant, and which claims are brought

against which defendant. Thus, Lowe’s Complaint—even if construed to

include the attached documents—is an impermissible shotgun pleading.

Because there are other independent bases on which the court will dismiss

this action, the court need not grant Lowe an opportunity to amend his

Complaint to remedy the shotgun-pleading issues.

C. The court lacks personal jurisdiction over several

defendants.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(1) requires the plaintiff to

include a jurisdictional statement that sets forth the grounds for

jurisdiction. Lowe failed to include a jurisdictional statement in his

Complaint. Day & Zimmerman, Plant Farley, and Laborers Local Union

559 appear to be based in Alabama. But as far as the court can tell, all

other defendants are nonresident defendants. “[T]he plaintiff must

establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident

defendant.” Id. (citing Morris v. SSE, Inc., 843 F.2d 489, 492 (11th Cir.

1988)).

Not only did Lowe fail to establish a prima facie case of personal

jurisdiction over the nonresidents, but some defendants provided their

residency information and stated that they lack sufficient contacts with

Alabama to support personal jurisdiction. Lowe did not refute these

assertions, so these facts are not in dispute:

• Kalkreuth Roofing participated in a construction project at Plant

Vogtle in Georgia. Kalkreuth Roofing is a West Virginia corporation

with its principal place of business in Wheeling, West Virginia.

Kalkreuth Roofing does not have office or warehouse space in

Alabama, does not own real property in Alabama, did not do

business in Alabama, and committed no acts in Alabama related to

Lowe’s claims.

• C.E. Bourne is incorporated and has its principal place of business

in South Carolina. C.E. Bourne does not do business in Alabama,

has no employees in Alabama, and has no contacts with Alabama

related to Lowe’s claims.

• Michael Steins resides in Georgia. He has never performed work in

Alabama. Steins does not have a presence in Alabama or contacts

with Alabama related to Lowe’s claims.

Lowe’s Complaint does not show (or even allege) that the court has

personal jurisdiction over any of the nonresident defendants. Because

Lowe fails to establish a prima facie case that this court has personal

jurisdiction over any of the nonresident defendants, the court must

dismiss the claims against the defendants who provided evidence to show

that the court does not have personal jurisdiction over them. Accordingly,

the court will dismiss the claims against Kalkreuth Roofing, C.E. Bourne,

and Michael Steins for lack of personal jurisdiction.

D. This is not the proper venue for claims associated with

work at Plant Vogtle.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391, venue is proper in these districts:

(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all

defendants are residents of the State in which the district is

located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of

the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or

a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action

is situated; or (3) if there is no district in which an action

may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any

judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the

court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.

Here, all defendants are not residents of Alabama. It appears to the

court that Lowe is complaining about two distinct sets of transactions or

occurrences: (1) that he was not called back for additional work on projects

after he completed the project at Plant Vogtle in Georgia; and (2) that he

was terminated because he failed a background check after being granted

conditional employment status at Plant Farley in Alabama. Though a

substantial part of the events or omissions related to Lowe’s termination

from employment at Plant Farley occurred in Alabama, the events or

omissions related to Lowe not being called back for work after completing

the project at Plant Vogtle occurred outside Alabama.

Because Lowe’s grievances are about two unrelated sets of events,

they should not be combined into one lawsuit. The court agrees that claims

related to Lowe’s dispute following his work at Plant Vogtle in Georgia

are not in the proper venue. But the court need not consider a transfer of

venue because the court is dismissing the action on other grounds.

E. The court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the

action.

There are two primary sources for subject-matter jurisdiction:

diversity jurisdiction and federal question jurisdiction. Diversity

jurisdiction exists where every plaintiff is a citizen of a different state than

every defendant and the claim exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Federal

question jurisdiction exists when a litigant brings a claim that arises

under federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. “Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure requires a complaint to include a ‘short and plain

statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction.’” Miccosukee Tribe of

Indians v. Kraus-Anderson Const. Co., 607 F.3d 1268, 1275 (11th Cir.

2010). Lowe’s Complaint does not include information about his

citizenship and the citizenship of all Defendants and does not state

whether the relief he is seeking exceeds $75,000. So Lowe failed to

establish diversity jurisdiction.

The court now turns to whether Lowe’s Complaint properly

establishes federal question jurisdiction. Lowe’s Complaint alludes to

federal statutes and the U.S. Constitution. But a plaintiff does not

establish federal question jurisdiction “merely by citing the federal statute

[the defendants have] allegedly violated.” Gardner v. First Am. Title Ins.

Co., 294 F.3d 991, 994 (8th Cir. 2002). “[A] plaintiff's complaint still must

‘claim a right to recover under the Constitution and laws of the United

States.’” Miccosukee Tribe, 607 F.3d at 1273 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327

U.S. 678, 681 (1946). The Defendants assert that though Lowe references

18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242,1 Title VII, and the U.S. Constitution, his

Complaint does not properly plead federal question jurisdiction because

he does not identify which sections of these laws were allegedly violated

or specify how, when, or by whom the laws were allegedly violated. The

court agrees that Lowe failed to state the basis for the court’s subject

matter jurisdiction, as required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

1 Lowe’s effort to state a cause of action based on a purported conspiracy violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242

is misplaced. These statutes are criminal statutes and do not provide a civil cause of action. Butler v. Morgan,

562 F. App'x 832, 835 (11th Cir. 2014); see also Hanna v. Home Ins. Co., 281 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1960).

and Eleventh Circuit precedent. So the court will dismiss the action for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

F. Lowe’s Title VII and Age Discrimination claims against

Zimmerman & Day and Laborers Local Union 559 are

untimely.

“An employee must exhaust administrative remedies before filing a

complaint of discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act . . . .”

Stamper v. Duval Cty. Sch. Bd., 863 F.3d 1336, 1339 (11th Cir. 2017).

“When the employee receives a notice of dismissal from the Commission,

[h]e has 90 days to file a civil action against the employer.” Id. at 1340

(citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)); see also Cornett v. Alabama Dep't of

Transp., 828 F. App’x 565, 567 (11th Cir. 2020) (affirming dismissal of a

pro se litigant’s complaint where his “suit was untimely, as it was filed

long after the 90-day deadline for bringing a civil action had expired”). A

plaintiff is presumed to have received the mailing three days after its

issuance. Baldwin Cty. Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 148 n.1

(1984).

On April 7, 2021, Lowe filed an EEOC charge against Day &

Zimmerman and Laborers Local Union 559, alleging that these

defendants: (1) discriminated against him because of his race, sex, age,

and national origin; and (2) retaliated against him. The EEOC issued

Lowe a notice of dismissal and a right to sue on April 13, 2021; under the

right-to-sue, Lowe had 90 days from receipt of the right to sue letter to file

a lawsuit. (Doc. 1, p. 15.) Lowe filed this lawsuit on August 4, 2021.

Because Lowe did not timely file this lawsuit, the court will dismiss the

claims against Day & Zimmerman and Laborers Local Union 559. See

Robbins v. Vonage Bus., Inc., 819 F. App'x 863, 867 (11th Cir. 2020).

G. The Claims Against Michael Steins Fail Because Union

Officials Cannot Be Held Personally Liable for Union

Activities.

Under 29 U.S.C. §185(b), “[a]ny money judgment against a labor

organization ... shall not be enforceable against any individual member

or his assets.” Lowe sued Steins in his personal capacity as an officer of

Local 186 Roofers and Cable Proofers. As federal law prohibits union

officers from being held personally liable for union actions, the court will

dismiss all claims against Michael Steins. See Atkinson v. Sinclair Refin.

Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons listed above, the court will GRANT Kalkreuth

Roofing’s Motion to Strike Lowe’s Extraneous Filing (doc. 41) and will

GRANT the Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (docs. 11, 14, 16, 17, 32) the

plaintiffs’ complaint (doc. 1). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the court will sua

sponte DISMISS the claims against all Defendants who have not

appeared in the case.

The court will enter a separate order that carries out this ruling.

DONE on April 20, 2022.

Leregl Pe

COREY'L. MAZE ©

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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