The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION
SHELIA HEMPHILL, as personal )
representative of the estate of )
AMANDA JEAN HALL, )
) Civil Action Number
Plaintiff, ) 5:21-cv-01286-AKK
)
v.
)
)
MORGAN COUNTY, ALABAMA,
)
et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Tragically, Amanda Jean Hall died while she was detained at the Morgan
County Jail. Shelia Hemphill, Hall’s mother and the personal representative of her
estate, now brings this suit against Morgan County, Sheriff Ron W. Puckett, and
Quality Correctional Healthcare, Inc., alleging that the defendants violated Hall’s
rights under both the Constitution and Alabama law. The defendants move to
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Docs. 6, 8, 20.
For the reasons that follow, Morgan County and Sheriff Puckett’s motions are due
to be granted, and QCHC’s motion is due to be denied.
I.
In the early morning hours of September 27, 2019, law enforcement arrested
Hall near her home for public intoxication and transported her to the Morgan County
Jail. Doc. 1 at 4. Hemphill received several calls from the jail, presumably from
Hall, but “was unable to speak to the caller due to problems with the audio on the
jail’s phone.” Id. Hemphill went to the jail later that day but “was denied the ability
to see her daughter.” Id.
The next morning, jail staff found Hall unresponsive in her cell. Id. Hall was
transported to a hospital, but “[d]espite the efforts of the physicians . . . Hall’s
condition continued to deteriorate until she passed away.” Id. An autopsy
determined that the cause of Hall’s death was sepsis associated with aspiration
pneumonia. Id. at 5. Hemphill alleges that “jail personnel repeatedly and callously
denied [Hall] the right to medical treatment of any sort, refusing to even see her and
attempt a diagnosis,” and she claims that had Hall “been given even rudimentary
medical treatment when she presented to the jail medical center, her condition would
not have progressed to fatality.” Id.
II.
A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 8 does not require
plaintiffs to plead “detailed factual allegations” fully outlining the merits of their
case, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), but it does demand more
than “unadorned” accusations, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Mere
“labels and conclusions” or “formulaic recitation[s] of the elements of a cause of
action” will not suffice, id.; Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1324 (11th Cir.
2012), and to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint “must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal citations omitted). In other words, construing the
allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the complaint “must include
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct.” Waldman v. Conway, 871 F.3d
1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2017).
III.
Hemphill brings three claims: (1) deliberate indifference to Hall’s serious
medical needs, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, against Morgan County
and Sheriff Puckett; (2) negligence and wrongful death, in violation of Alabama law,
against all three defendants;1 and (3) negligent hiring, training, supervision, and/or
1 Hemphill pleads that “[t]his claim is asserted against QCHC [] under State Law, and against the
County and Puckett, both officially and individually under Federal Law.” Doc. 1 at 6-7. The court
discerns no basis for a “negligence and wrongful death” claim under federal law, and Hemphill
provides no statutory or common law foundation for this purportedly federal claim. Accordingly,
the court will treat Count II as a state-law claim against all three defendants, and to the extent
Hemphill pleads negligence and wrongful death claims under federal law in Count II, those claims
are due to be dismissed.
retention against Morgan County and Sheriff Puckett.2 Doc. 1 at 5-9. The
defendants move to dismiss all claims for failure to state a plausible basis for relief.
See docs. 6, 8, 20. The court will address the claims against each defendant in turn.
A.
Hemphill’s claims against Morgan County, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983, relate to (1) the allegedly unconstitutional actions of jail staff, who are
allegedly agents of Morgan County, (2) an alleged policy or custom maintained by
Morgan County of denying medical care to detainees at the jail, and (3) purported
negligence in hiring, training, and supervising jail staff. See doc. 1 at 5-9.
1.
A county can be held liable under § 1983 “only for acts for which it is actually
responsible.” Turquitt v. Jefferson Cty., Ala., 137 F.3d 1285, 1287 (11th Cir. 1998)
(quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinatti, 475 U.S. 469, 479-80 (1986)). Relevant
here, Alabama counties “have no responsibility for daily operation of county jails
and no authority to dictate how jails are run.” Marsh v. Butler Cty., Ala., 268 F.3d
1014, 1027 (11th Cir. 2001). Rather, a county’s responsibilities “relate only to
maintaining the jail’s physical plant and providing operational funding.” Turquitt,
2 Hemphill does not clarify whether she pleads this count under state or federal law, and she
provides no legal basis for this claim. The court reads this allegation as a § 1983 failure to train
claim brought pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and its
progeny, and will therefore analyze it as such. To the extent Hemphill intends to bring a state law
tort claim against Sheriff Puckett and Morgan County in this count, it is subject to dismissal for
the reasons outlined below, see infra Sections III.A, III.B.2.
137 F.3d at 1291. Alabama sheriffs – not counties – are responsible for the
management of county jails, and, importantly, “they are not subject to county
oversight in their performance of this responsibility.” Id. (citing Ala. Code § 14-6-
1; King v. Colbert Cty., 620 So. 2d 623, 625 (Ala. 1993)). Thus, a county is not
liable for a sheriff’s actions or omissions in relation to the day-to-day management
of a county jail. See id. at 1287-93; McMillian v. Monroe Cty., Ala., 520 U.S. 781,
785-93 (1997).
2.
Hemphill’s claims against Morgan County are based on the jail’s staffing
policies, its procedures for providing medical treatment, and its staff’s alleged
deliberate indifference to Hall’s medical needs. Hemphill argues that “[i]t is unclear
whether [] Sheriff Ron Puckett, Morgan County, or QCHC [] is responsible for
developing” the allegedly unconstitutional policies and procedures. Doc. 13 at 13-
15. Hemphill asserts that the court should thus allow her claims against Morgan
County to proceed to discovery for her to ascertain whether Morgan County itself
promulgated these policies. Id. But this contention overlooks that managerial
responsibilities at the jail are delegated exclusively to Morgan County’s sheriff by
Alabama law.3 Hemphill’s claims against the County are therefore due to be
dismissed.
B.
Hemphill brings her deliberate indifference, negligence and wrongful death,
and negligent hiring, training, supervision, and/or retention claims against Sheriff
Puckett in both his individual and official capacities. Doc. 1 at 5-9.
1.
Suits against state officials in their official capacity are considered suits
against the state itself, and the Eleventh Amendment bars citizens of a state from
suing that state for money damages. Carr v. City of Florence, Ala., 916 F.2d 1521,
1524 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890); Pennhurst State
School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101 (1984)). And “[i]t is well
established in this Circuit that Alabama sheriffs and their deputies are state officials
and are absolutely immune from suit as an officer of the state under the Eleventh
Amendment.” Melton v. Abston, 841 F.3d 1207, 1234 (11th Cir. 2016).
Accordingly, the claims against Sheriff Puckett in his official capacity are due to be
dismissed.
3 To be sure, a county may be held liable for failing to fulfill one of its enumerated duties – such
as providing an adequate jail facility, see Marsh, 268 F.3d at 1027-28, or providing sufficient
operational funding for medical care, see Shaw v. Coosa Cty. Comm’n, 330 F. Supp. 2d 1285,
1288-89 (M.D. Ala. 2004); Gaines v. Choctaw Cty. Comm’n, 242 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1161 (S.D.
Ala. 2003) – but Hemphill makes no such claims here.
2.
Similarly, a state-law suit against an Alabama sheriff in his individual
capacity is “essentially a suit against the state,” and under Alabama law, the state of
Alabama is immune from suits for damages. Parker v. Amerson, 519 So. 2d 442,
445-46 (Ala. 1987) (citing Ala. Const., art. I, § 14; Montiel v. Holcombe, 199 So.
245 (1940)). Alabama sheriffs are therefore entitled to absolute immunity from
state-law tort claims seeking damages. See Tinney v. Shores, 77 F.3d 378, 383 (11th
Cir. 1996); Parker, 519 So. 2d at 445-46.
3.
Left standing are Hemphill’s deliberate indifference and failure to train claims
against Sheriff Puckett in his individual capacity under § 1983. Sheriff Puckett
contends that Hemphill has failed to allege a constitutional violation and that he is
therefore entitled to qualified immunity. See doc. 9 at 7-14. The court agrees.
a.
To establish a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts showing: “(1)
a violation of a constitutional right; and (2) that the alleged violation was committed
by a person acting under the color of state law.” Melton, 841 F.3d at 1220. A
heightened pleading standard applies to § 1983 claims within the Eleventh Circuit
where a defendant raises a qualified immunity defense. Harper v. Lawrence Cty.,
Ala., 592 F.3d 1227, 1233 (11th Cir. 2010). Under this standard, a plaintiff must
allege facts with “sufficient detail for [the d]efendants to understand what alleged
rights were violated . . . and which of their actions allegedly violated those rights.”
Amnesty Int’l, USA v. Battle, 559 F.3d 1170, 1180 (11th Cir. 2009). Such factual
content is necessary to allow the court to conduct a two-step analysis of the
defendant’s qualified immunity defense – i.e. “to determine [1] whether [the
plaintiff’s] facts indeed set out a violation of rights and [2] whether those rights were
clearly established when these incidents occurred.” Harper, 592 F.3d at 1233 (citing
Amnesty Int’l, 559 F.3d at 1180). And where, as here, the parties agree that the
defendant was acting within his discretionary authority, see docs. 9 at 9-11; 13 at 7,
the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the defendant is not entitled to qualified
immunity. Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1264 (11th Cir.
2004). Thus, if the plaintiff fails to show either a constitutional violation or that the
allegedly violated right was clearly established, her claim is subject to dismissal on
qualified immunity grounds. Melton, 841 F.3d at 1221.
b.
A state official violates the Fourteenth Amendment when he acts with
deliberate indifference to a detainee’s serious medical need. Harper, 592 F.3d at
1234. To state a deliberate indifference claim based on supervisory liability,4 and
4 Because Hemphill does not allege that Sheriff Puckett personally participated in the allegedly
unconstitutional denial of medical care, see doc. 1 at 3-6, the court analyzes her claims under the
standard for supervisory liability.
thus to meet the “constitutional violation” part of the test to overcome qualified
immunity, a plaintiff must plead facts showing a causal relationship between the
defendant’s actions and the alleged denial of medical care. Id. at 1236. There are
three ways for a plaintiff to do so: (1) “when a history of widespread abuse puts the
responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and
he fails to do so;” (2) “when a supervisor’s custom or policy . . . result[s] in deliberate
indifference to constitutional rights;” or (3) “when facts support an inference that the
supervisor directed the subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that the subordinates
would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so.” Id. (citing Cottone v.
Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360-61 (11th Cir. 2003)). If a plaintiff fails to plead
sufficient factual content to show causality in any of these three ways, her complaint
fails to state a claim for deliberate indifference. See id. at 1235-37.
Here, Hemphill does not allege a “widespread history of abuse” that would
have placed Sheriff Puckett on notice of the allegedly deficient medical care, nor
does she plead facts suggesting that Sheriff Puckett directed jail staff to deny medical
care or that he knew of the impending deprivation of medical care and failed to stop
it. Even read most favorably to her, Hemphill’s complaint does not include any facts
establishing the existence of a custom or policy that resulted in the deliberate
indifference to Hall’s Fourteenth Amendment rights. Instead, with regard to the
alleged deliberate indifference to Hall’s serious medical needs, Hemphill pleads only
the following:
Upon information and belief, had Ms. Hall been given even
rudimentary medical treatment when she presented to the jail medical
center, her condition would not have progressed to fatality. Sadly
however, jail personnel repeatedly and callously denied her the right to
medical treatment of any sort, refusing to even see her and attempt a
diagnosis.
Doc. 1 at 5. Hemphill pleads no factual content connecting Sheriff Puckett to the
actions of “jail personnel,” and her conclusory allegations5 do not suffice to meet the
pleading standard for alleging a constitutional violation under § 1983. See Harper,
593 F.3d at 1233; Amnesty Int’l, 559 F.3d at 1180. Accordingly, Sheriff Puckett is
entitled to qualified immunity as to Hemphill’s deliberate indifference claim.
c.
A sheriff may be held liable under § 1983 for a failure to train his employees
when that failure “amount[s] to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with
5 Hemphill’s allegations as to this claim are comprised almost entirely of boilerplate language:
“The conduct of Defendants jointly and severally caused and constituted a violation
of the plaintiff’s decedent’s right to medical care under the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution. This conduct also constituted a deprivation of the
plaintiff’s decedent’s rights and privileges as secured by the provisions of 42 USC
§ 1983. . . . The actions of the County and Puckett were performed under color of
state law. The conduct of said defendants, jointly and severally, implements or
executes a custom, policy, policy statement, ordinance, regulation and/or decision
officially adopted, promulgated or followed by the officers, official policymakers
and/or final decision makers of the Morgan County Jail. . . . Puckett and the County
acted with deliberate indifference to Hall’s serious medical condition.”
Doc. 1 at 5-6.
whom the untrained employees come into contact.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S.
51, 61 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing City of Canton, Ohio v.
Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)); see also Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff’s
Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1328-30 (11th Cir. 2015). Such claims are severely limited,
however,6 and “[a] pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained
employees is ordinarily necessary to demonstrate deliberate indifference for
purposes of failure to train.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1328 (citing Connick, 563 U.S.
at 62) (internal quotation marks omitted). And, relevant here, Hemphill does not
allege any pattern of constitutional violations, nor does she provide any factual
content to support her allegation that Sheriff Puckett breached his duty to train. In
fact, Hemphill does not even attempt to defend this claim. See generally doc. 13.7
Accordingly, Hemphill has failed to plead a constitutional violation, and Sheriff
Puckett is entitled to qualified immunity as to Hemphill’s failure to train claim.
* * * * *
6 See Connick, 563 U.S. at 61 (“A municipality’s culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its
most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to train.”); Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808,
822–823 (1985) (plurality opinion) (noting that “a ‘policy’ of ‘inadequate training’” is “far more
nebulous, and a good deal further removed from the constitutional violation, than was the policy
in Monell”).
7 Hemphill also passingly alleges that Sheriff Puckett breached his “duty to properly screen
applicants to the Morgan County Sheriff’s Department,” doc. 1 at 7-8, but the court discerns no
facts in her complaint that would support a failure to screen claim under Board of County
Commissioners of Bryan County, Oklahoma v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997).
Hemphill has suffered an unimaginable loss, and – rightly so – she is searching
for answers about her daughter’s death. However, her conclusory allegations against
Sheriff Puckett are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. And because
Hemphill has failed to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face” and to “nudge[ ] [her] claims across the line from conceivable to
plausible,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, her constitutional claims against Sheriff
Puckett are due to be dismissed.
C.
Hemphill also brings a negligence and wrongful death claim against QCHC,
which contracts with Morgan County to provide health care services to detainees at
the jail. Doc. 1 at 2, 6-7. Allegedly, QCHC “refused to see Hall, or to provide her
with a diagnosis or treatment,” thereby denying her medical care for a serious
condition and ultimately causing her death. Id. at 6-7. QCHC argues that Hemphill’s
claim fails to comply with the relevant state-law pleading standards. See doc. 20.
1.
The Alabama Medical Liability Act governs negligence and wrongful death
claims against healthcare providers. Ala. Code § 6-5-551. The AMLA requires
plaintiffs to plead “a detailed specification and factual description of each act and
omission alleged by plaintiff to render the health care provider liable to plaintiff[,]
and shall include when feasible and ascertainable the date, time, and place of the act
or acts.” Id. Otherwise, “[the complaint] is subject to dismissal for failure to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Id. But, the AMLA does not require
plaintiffs to plead “every element of the cause of action . . . with particularity.”
Mikkelsen v. Salama, 619 So. 2d 1382, 1384 (Ala. 1993). Instead, a complaint
suffices if it “give[s] the defendant health care provider fair notice of the allegedly
negligent act and [] identif[ies] the time and place it occurred and the resulting
harm.” Id. So long as the complaint “affords the defendant health care provider fair
notice of these essential elements, the courts should strive to find” that the complaint
complies with the AMLA. Id.; see also Taylor v. Starr, No. 1:20-CV-00489-CLM,
2021 WL 1610671, at *4 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 26, 2021) ([T]he Alabama Supreme Court
has not been exacting in analyzing complaints under [the pleading requirements of]
§ 6-5-551.”).
Moreover, where the plaintiff alleges harm resulting from an omission or a
failure to provide medical care, “allegations providing date, time, and place are not
required.” Hobbs v. Powell, 138 F. Supp. 3d 1328, 1343 (N.D. Ala. 2015). Rather,
“the obligation [under the AMLA] to address time and location applies to acts, not
omissions.” Betts v. Eli Lilly & Co., 435 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1189 (S.D. Ala. 2006).
Therefore, a negligence and wrongful death claim alleging a failure to provide
medical care satisfies the AMLA’s pleading requirements as long as it specifies an
approximate location and window when the alleged omission occurred. See Taylor,
2021 WL 1610671 at *4-5; Hobbs, 138 F. Supp. 3d at 1343; Mikkelsen, 619 So. 2d
at 1384-85.
2.
Turning to the specifics here, QCHC argues that the complaint “does not set
forth the specific breach of a national standard of care, who breached the standard
of care, and specifically the time and place the alleged breach occurred.” Doc. 24 at
7. This purported failure “makes it impossible to determine which QCHC
employees are alleged to have committed medical malpractice.” Id.
This framing of the AMLA’s requirements, however, misstates the relevant
precedent. To avoid dismissal, Hemphill must only give QCHC fair notice of the
allegedly negligent failure to provide care, the approximate time and place of the
omission, and the harm that Hall suffered as a result. Hemphill has done so; she
alleges that Hall died less than thirty-six hours after her arrest for public intoxication
because “jail personnel repeatedly and callously denied her the right to medical
treatment of any sort, refusing to even see her and attempt a diagnosis.” Doc. 1 at
4-5. Because Hemphill’s complaint gives QCHC fair notice of her claim against it,
and because QCHC can thus ascertain which of its employees were on duty at the
time and which, if any, interacted with Hall, Hemphill’s claim satisfies the pleading
requirements. See Taylor, 2021 WL 1610671 at *4 (finding that the complaint met
AMLA requirements where it “allege[d] that all these acts happened at the Calhoun
County Jail[, aJnd many of the [] allegations point[ed] to the proximate times when
the health care provider defendants should have provided [the decedent] with
proper medical assessments and medical care”).
IV.
To close, Morgan County and Sheriff Puckett’s motions to dismiss, docs. 6
and 8, are due to be granted. QCHC’s motion to dismiss, doc. 20, is due to be denied.
A separate order effectuating this opinion follows.
DONE the 25th day of March, 2022.
— Apap Lo tee
ABDUL K. KALLON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
15