Moeinpour v. Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

FARIBA MOEINPOUR, ]

]

Plaintiff, ]

]

v. ] 2:21-cv-01302-ACA

]

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE ]

UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA, et al., ]

]

Defendants. ]

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Fariba Moeinpour used to work for the University of Alabama at

Birmingham (“UAB”). She alleges that for years, her coworker, Defendant Mary Jo

Cagle, harassed her based on her race and national origin. On the last occasion on

which Ms. Moeinpour complained to a supervisor about Ms. Cagle’s conduct, the

supervisor physically attacked Ms. Moeinpour and had UAB police arrest her,

ultimately leading to her termination. She filed suit against the Board of Trustees of

the University of Alabama; Kelly Mayer, the Director of Employee Relations for

UAB’s Human Resources Department; and Ms. Cagle. The only claim against

Ms. Cagle is for race and national origin harassment, in violation of 42 U.S.C.

§ 1981. Ms. Moeinpour seeks to hold Ms. Cagle liable either as a private individual

or, in the alternative, as a state actor under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Ms. Cagle moves to dismiss the claim against her for failure to state a claim.

(Doc. 14). Because Ms. Cagle’s only argument with respect to the substance of the

§ 1981 claim fails to address whether she could have interfered in Ms. Moeinpour’s

performance of her contract and because Ms. Moeinpour has alleged facts that

plausibly support the inference that Ms. Cagle was acting under color of state law,

the court DENIES the motion to dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

At this stage, the court must accept as true the factual allegations in the

complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Butler v.

Sheriff of Palm Beach Cnty., 685 F.3d 1261, 1265 (11th Cir. 2012).

Ms. Moeinpour is a Middle Eastern woman of Iranian national origin. (Doc.

1 at 3 ¶ 6). UAB hired her in 2011 to work as a research scientist in Dr. Clinton

Grubbs’ laboratory. (Doc. 1 at 6 ¶ 19). Dr. Grubbs functioned as Ms. Moeinpour’s

supervisor. (Doc. 1 at 7 ¶ 25).

Ms. Cagle was an “Administrator” for UAB. (Doc. 1 at 5 ¶ 17). From

Ms. Moeinpour’s first day, Ms. Cagle harassed Ms. Moeinpour about her race and

national origin. (See id. at 7–9 ¶¶ 23–29, 9–10 ¶ 31, 11–12 ¶¶ 34–38). Although

Ms. Moeinpour complained to Dr. Grubbs and to a human resources employee,

UAB took no action. (Id. at 9 ¶ 30, 10 ¶¶ 32–33, 11–13 ¶ 37). During

Ms. Moeinpour’s final complaint to Dr. Grubbs, he attacked her and then called

UAB police to report her for assault. (Id. at 14–15 ¶¶ 41–44). UAB ultimately fired

Ms. Moeinpour. (Id. at 16 ¶ 46).

II. DISCUSSION

Ms. Moeinpour asserts one claim against Ms. Cagle: that Ms. Cagle, either in

her individual capacity or while acting under color of state law, harassed

Ms. Moeinpour based on her race and national origin.1 (Doc. 1 at 28).

As an initial matter, Ms. Cagle moves to dismiss the part of the claim alleging

that she acted under color of state law. (Doc. 14 at 6). When a plaintiff seeks to

assert a § 1981 claim against a private individual, the plaintiff may do so based on

§ 1981 alone. See Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 731 (1989) (“[W]e

have read § 1 of the 1866 Act to reach private action and have implied a damages

remedy to effectuate the declaration of rights contained in that provision . . . .”). But

when a plaintiff asserts a § 1981 claim against a state actor, the plaintiff must do so

through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which requires the plaintiff to establish that the defendant

acted under color of state law. Butts v. Cnty. of Volusia, 222 F.3d 891, 894 (11th

Cir. 2000).

1 Ms. Moeinpour purports to assert a claim for national origin discrimination under § 1981.

(See doc. 1 at 28 & 29 ¶ 102). Section 1981 does not provide a cause of action for national origin

discrimination; that statute relates only to race discrimination. See 28 U.S.C. § 1981. However,

because the same count states a claim for race discrimination under § 1981, the court will not

address the national origin claim. See Bullard v. OMI Georgia, Inc., 640 F.2d 632, 634 (5th Cir.

Unit B Mar. 23, 1981); see also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981)

(en banc) (adopting as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down

before October 1, 1981).

At the dismissal stage, Ms. Moeinpour has adequately alleged, in the

alternative, that Ms. Cagle was either acting as a private individual or was acting

“with authority possessed by virtue of [her] employment with the state.” Griffin v.

City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001). At this stage, a plaintiff

need not provide “detailed factual allegations,” as long as the non-conclusory factual

allegations provide plausible grounds to infer the elements of the claim. Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007). Ms. Moeinpour’s allegations

provide plausible grounds to infer that Ms. Cagle, by harassing Ms. Moeinpour at

work and while employed as an Administrator for UAB, was “abus[ing] the position

given to [her] by the State” and was therefore acting under color of state law. Griffin,

261 F.3d at 1303.

Ms. Cagle also moves to dismiss the claim against her on the ground that,

regardless of whether she was acting as a private individual or a state actor, she had

no ability to interfere with Ms. Moeinpour’s right to make and enforce contracts

because Ms. Moeinpour does not allege that Ms. Cagle had any supervisory or

decisionmaking authority over Ms. Moeinpour’s employment with UAB. (Doc. 14

at 4–5)

Plaintiffs frequently rely on § 1981 to sue an employer for race discrimination.

But § 1981 is not limited to employers; it provides that “[a]ll persons within the

jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right . . . to make and enforce

contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). The statute

defines “mak[ing] and enforc[ing] contracts,” to include the “performance . . . of

contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the

contractual relationship.” Id. § 1981(b).

In the Eleventh Circuit, “a third party’s interference with those rights

guaranteed under Sections 1981 and 1982 will subject such a person to personal

liability.” Faraca v. Clements, 506 F.2d 956, 959 (5th Cir. 1975). In a more recent

case, the Eleventh Circuit again addressed whether a party who had no contractual

relationship with the plaintiff could be liable for interfering in the plaintiff’s contract

with another. Moore v. Grady Mem’l Hosp. Corp., 834 F.3d 1168, 1172–74 (11th

Cir. 2016); see also Jimenez v. Wellstar Health Sys., 596 F.3d 1304, 1310 (11th Cir.

2010) (describing in dicta the Tenth Circuit’s holding that “racially motivated

interference with a contract can serve as the basis for a § 1981 claim”). The plaintiff,

a physician, had an employment contract with a medical school that required him to

obtain surgical privileges at a nearby hospital. Moore, 834 F.3d at 1169. After

giving the plaintiff surgical privileges, the hospital engaged in discriminatory

conduct, including “summarily suspending his privileges, diverting cases to white

physicians outside of [the hospital], and failing to provide operating rooms for

surgery to the African-American doctors of [the medical school].” Id. at 1174. The

plaintiff sued the hospital and several individual physicians employed by the

hospital. Jd. at 1171. The Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiff stated § 1981

interference claim against all the defendants because their actions interfered with his

performance of the contract between himself and the medical school. Jd. at 1172—

74.

Ms. Cagle’s argument in support of dismissal is that she had no supervisory

or decisionmaking authority over Ms. Moeinpour and therefore could not interfered

with Ms. Moeinpoutr’s right to make or enforce a contract. (Doc. 14 at 4-5). But

the statutory definition of making and enforcing contracts includes performance of

the contract. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b).. Ms. Moeinpour does not address whether

her alleged harassment could have interfered in Ms. Moeinpour’s performance of

her contract with UAB. As such, dismissal is inappropriate at this time and the court

DENIES Ms. Cagle’s motion to dismiss.

DONE and ORDERED this January 18, 2022.

fu

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE