Matthews v. Jackson County Healthcare Authority

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

ELNA MATTHEWS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No.: 5:19-cv-02029-LCB

)

JACKSON COUNTY )

HEALTHCARE AUTHORITY, )

)

Defendant. )

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This employment discrimination case is before the Court on Defendant’s

Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 16). Plaintiff Elna Matthews claims she

suffered gender- and age-based discrimination in violation of Title VII, the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Alabama Age Discrimination in

Employment Act while employed by Defendant Jackson County Healthcare

Authority. (Doc. 1). Defendant’s Motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for

review. For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment.

I. Summary of the Facts

The Jackson County Healthcare Authority is a public healthcare authority

authorized to operate a public hospital in Jackson County, Alabama.1 Plaintiff Elna

Matthews is a female who was 66 years old at the relevant hiring time.2 Matthews

worked for JCHCA for two separate periods. First, she was employed as a practice

manager from 2003 to 2005. She was re-employed in 2011 and remained at JCHCA

until March of 2019.3 During the first few years of her second stint at JCHCA,

Matthews worked in a couple different JCHCA practice areas. In August of 2016,

JCHCA transferred Matthews to Dr. Paul Avenel’s practice to become his Office

Assistant.4

Separate from Dr. Avenel’s practice, JCHCA operated a practice for Dr.

Lawrence J. Herberholz.5 JCHCA contends that they chose to merge Dr. Avenel’s

and Dr. Herberholz’s practices to reduce overhead and secure economic savings.6

When the practices merged, Dr. Herberholz had a larger practice. Accordingly,

JCHCA contends they chose to merge Dr. Avenel’s practice into Dr. Herberholz’s.7

1 (Doc. 17 at 1-2).

2 (Doc. 1 at 2; Doc. 17 at 2).

3 (Doc. 17 at 2).

4 Id. at 3

5 Id.

6 Id. at 4.

7 Id.

Because Dr. Herberholz had an Office Assistant, JCHCA alleges that there was no

position for Matthews in the new combined practice.8

According to JCHCA, its CEO, Dr. Lonnie Albin, decided to eliminate

Matthews’s position along with the merger. Dr. Albin was 59 years old at the time

of the decision, and Ramona Collins, the Office Assistant that remained with the

merged practice, was 53 years old at the time of the merger.9 On March 1, 2019,

Matthews met with JCHCA representatives who informed Matthews that her

position was being eliminated.10 The representatives offered Matthews a position

with the Highlands Foundation, operated by JCHCA.11 Five days later, Matthews

informed JCHCA that she would not accept the Foundation position and requested

an exit before the merger was complete.12

Before her termination, Matthews had a conversation with JCHCA’s Board

Chair, Bob Matthews, about potentially becoming the Authority’s Corporate

Compliance Officer.13 JCHCA contends that the position was eliminated entirely

through a larger reduction in force in 2017, and that JCHCA’s Chief Financial

Officer had assumed all the Corporate Compliance Officer duties.14 Matthews argues

that she was being considered by JCHCA for the Corporate Compliance Officer

8 Id.

9 Id. at 5.

10 Id. at 6.

11 Id.

12 Id.

13 Id. at 7.

14 Id.

position.15 Further, JCHCA contends that several positions within the merged

practice became available after the merger and Matthews’s termination.16 But,

according to JCHCA, Matthews failed to apply for any open position, so she was not

considered by JCHCA.17 Matthews argues that JCHCA had an informal policy of

reaching out to candidates directly to fill open positions, so a formal application was

not necessary for consideration for the subsequent open positions.18

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is proper “if

the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of any material

fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The party asking for summary judgment

always bears the initial responsibility of informing the Court of the basis for its

motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings or filings which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. Once the

moving party has met its burden, Rule 56(c) requires the non-moving party to go

beyond the pleadings and—by pointing to affidavits, or depositions, answers to

15 (Doc. 22 at 4-5).

16 (Doc. 17 at 7-8).

17 Id. at 8.

18 (Doc. 22 at 5).

interrogatories, and/or admissions on file—designate specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324.

The substantive law identifies which facts are material and which are

irrelevant. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). All

reasonable doubts about the facts and all justifiable inferences are resolved in favor

of the non-movant. See Allen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. for Bibb Cty., 495 F.3d 1306, 1314

(11th Cir. 2007); Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993).

A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. If the evidence is

merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be

granted. See id. at 249.

When faced with a “properly supported motion for summary judgment, [the

non-moving party] must come forward with specific factual evidence, presenting

more than mere allegation.” Gargiulo v. G.M. Sales, Inc., 131 F.3d 995, 999 (11th

Cir. 1997). As Anderson teaches, under Rule 56(c), a plaintiff may not simply rest

on his allegations made in the complaint; instead, as the party bearing the burden of

proof at trial, he must come forward with at least some evidence to support each

element essential to his case at trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. “[A] party

opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment ‘may not rest upon the

mere allegations or denials of [her] pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 248 (citations omitted).

Summary judgment is mandated “against a party who fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and

on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S.

at 322. “Summary judgment may be granted if the non-moving party’s evidence is

merely colorable or is not significantly probative.” Sawyer v. Sw. Airlines Co., 243

F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1262 (D. Kan. 2003) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250-51).

“[A]t the summary judgment stage the judge’s function is not himself to weigh

the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is

a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. “Essentially, the inquiry is

‘whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to

the jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.’”

Sawyer, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 1262 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52); see also

LaRoche v. Denny’s, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1371 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (“The law is

clear . . . that suspicion, perception, opinion, and belief cannot be used to defeat a

motion for summary judgment.”).

III. Discussion

In any age- or gender-based employment discrimination claim, the plaintiff

“bears the ultimate burden of proving discriminatory treatment by a preponderance

of the evidence.” Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 975 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal

quotation marks omitted). To do so, the plaintiff must present either “direct evidence

of an intent to discriminate or circumstantial evidence using McDonnel Douglas’s

burden-shifting framework.” Id. at 975. As explained by the Crawford court:

Under [the McDonnell Douglas] framework, if the plaintiff establishes a

prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to “articulate some

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the adverse employment action. If

the employer does this, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the

employer's stated reason was a pretext for discrimination. The inquiry into

pretext requires the court to determine, in view of all the evidence, “whether

the plaintiff has cast sufficient doubt on the defendant's proffered

nondiscriminatory reasons to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that

the employer's proffered legitimate reasons were not what actually motivated

its conduct.”

Id. at 975-976 (citations omitted) (alteration supplied). Matthews concedes that the

present record contains no direct evidence of age- or gender-based animus by

JCHCA. Thus, Matthews proceeds under the McDonnell Douglas Corporation v.

Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), framework.

A. Age-Based Discrimination

The parties agree the Court should evaluate Matthews’s age-based claim

under the Eleventh Circuit’s modified reduction-in-force McDonnell Douglas

framework.19 Under the modified framework, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie

case by showing: (1) she was a member of a protected group and was adversely

19 Similarly, the parties do not dispute that the Court should evaluate Matthews’s claim under the Alabama Age

Discrimination in Employment Act under the same McDonnell Douglas framework. Accordingly, the Court’s analysis

under the framework applies to both claims.

affected by an employment decision; (2) she was qualified for the position or another

position when she was laid off; and (3) there exists evidence of an intent to

discriminate. Lawver v. Hillcrest Hospice, Inc., 300 Fed. Appx. 768, 772-73 (11th

Cir. 2008). JCHCA concedes that Matthews has satisfied the modified framework’s

first and second prongs. (Doc. 17 at 12).

A plaintiff must establish intent to discriminate by showing: (1) the defendant

consciously refused to consider retaining plaintiff because of her protected trait, or

(2) the defendant regarded her protected trait as a negative factor in those

circumstances. Allison v. Western Union Tel. Co., 680 F.2d 1318, 1321 (11th Cir.

1982). Because, as explained below, Matthews fails to establish the modified

framework’s third prong, JCHCA is entitled to summary judgment.

JCHCA advances one simple but persuasive argument about why Matthews

has failed to establish a prima facie case of age-based discrimination: Matthews has

produced no evidence showing discriminatory intent. JCHCA contends that the

record shows only that JCHCA decided to combine the two practices, and that

JCHCA determined that Matthews’s position was redundant. (Doc. 17 at 13-14).

Additionally, JCHCA points to evidence that Dr. Albin, the decisionmaker, was 59

years old and protected by the ADEA. Id. at 14. Further, JCHCA argues that because

JCHCA offered Matthews a new position it did not refuse to retain Matthews

because of her age. Id. at 14-15.

Matthews responds with three arguments. First, Matthews alleges that JCHCA

terminated her through an entirely subjective decision process. In support, Matthews

directs the Court to evidence that Dr. Albin did not perform employee evaluations

when deciding who to terminate. (Doc. 22 at 22-24). Matthews additionally points

out that Matthews was 73 years old while Collins was 53 years old, and that

Matthews had a higher payrate than Collins. Id. at 24. This argument falls short.

Importantly, Matthews does not argue against the merger’s merits. Rather, Matthews

contends that deciding to terminate her instead of Collins was discriminatory. But,

in support of that contention, Matthews produces no evidence that Dr. Albin

considered her age in any way.

Even if the decision-making process was entirely subjective, that fact alone is

insufficient to show intent to discriminate. Matthews cites one Fifth Circuit case for

the proposition that a subjective process itself is evidence of discriminatory intent.

But the case does not support that proposition. In fact, the court held that using

subjective criteria is “at least as consistent with discriminatory intent as it is with

nondiscriminatory intent”. Patrick v. Ridge, 394 F.3d 311, 317 (5th Cir. 2004). That

is, using subjective criteria is not dispositive and is not alone evidence of

discriminatory intent. Ultimately, Matthews must show either that JCHCA

consciously refused to consider retaining her because of her age, or JCHCA regarded

her age as a negative factor. Allison, 680 F.2d at 1321. At best, Matthews has

produced evidence that what JCHCA considered is unknown. Therefore, because

Matthews has not met her burden to show discriminatory intent, she has failed to

properly prove a prima facie case.

Second, Matthews argues that JCHCA’s failure to place her in the Corporate

Compliance Officer position is evidence of age-based animus. In addition, Matthews

contends that JCHCA’s offer of part-time employment with the Foundation was “a

slap in the face” and evidence that JCHCA did not want to employ Matthews because

of her age. (Doc. 22 at 26). These arguments fail for two reasons. First, and most

obviously, evidence that an employer has offered an employee a position is not

evidence that the employer does not want to hire the employee. How the Foundation

position offer amounts to evidence that JCHCA did not want to hire Matthews is, at

best, unclear. Second, regarding the Corporate Compliance Officer position,

Matthews does not dispute that the position was never vacant, nor did JCHCA ever

fill the position with another candidate. Id. Ultimately, at best, Matthews produced

evidence that board members considered her for a position that was not vacant and

that JCHCA never filled with another candidate. That is insufficient to show that

JCHCA terminated her employment with discriminatory intent.

Third, Matthews contends with regularity that JCHCA terminated her with

discriminatory intent but cites no evidence in support. These blanket statements of

discrimination are insufficient to prove her prima facie case. This Circuit has

consistently held that “[c]onclusory allegations of discrimination, without more, are

not sufficient to raise an inference of . . . intentional discrimination where [an

employer] has offered . . . extensive evidence of legitimate, non-discriminatory

reasons for its actions.” Mayfield v. Patterson Pump Co., 101 F.3d 1371, 1376 (11th

Cir. 1996) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Simply, to avoid summary

judgment, a plaintiff must produce evidence. Merely “asserting” and “contending”

that a claim’s ultimate fact is true is plainly insufficient to create a genuine issue of

material fact.

Because Matthews has produced no evidence that shows either that JCHCA

consciously refused to consider retaining her because of her age, or JCHCA regarded

her age as a negative factor, Matthews has failed to show discriminatory intent, and

thus has failed to establish a prima facie case of age-based discrimination. Therefore,

JCHCA is entitled to summary judgment.

B. Gender-Based Discrimination

The parties agree the Court should evaluate Matthews’s gender-based

discrimination claim under the McDonnell Douglas framework. (Doc. 17 at 21-22;

Doc. 22 at 30-31). To successfully establish her prima facie case, Matthews must

show: (1) she was a member of a protected class; (2) she was subject to an adverse

employment action; (3) she was treated worse than similarly situated individuals

outside of her protected class; and (4) she was qualified for the position. Maynard v.

Bd. of Regents of the Div. of Univs. of Fla. Dep’t of Educ., 342 F.3d 1281, 1289

(11th Cir. 2003). JCHCA concedes that the only prong at issue is whether JCHCA

treated Matthews less favorably than similarly situated individuals who were not

female. (Doc. 17 at 22).

JCHCA argues that Matthews cannot establish her prima facie case because

there are no comparators. Specifically, JCHCA points to evidence showing that

every employee—in both practices—before and after the merger was female, and

that the merger did not result in JCHCA treating Matthews less favorably than a

male employee because no male employee existed. (Doc. 17 at 22). Frankly,

Matthews fails to rebut this argument in her brief. In one paragraph at the end of her

argument section, Matthews argues JCHCA did not offer her the Corporate

Compliance Officer position and that Bob Matthews insinuated it was because she

is female. (Doc. 22 at 31).

In the Eleventh Circuit, “a meaningful comparator analysis must be conducted

at the prima facie stage of McDonnell Douglas’s burden-shifting framework, and

should not be move[d] to the pretext stage.” Lewis v. City of Union City, 918 F.3d

1213, 1218 (11th Cir. 2019). Despite its necessity to her case, Matthews does not

identify a single comparator nor engage in the comparator analysis in any way. (Doc.

22 at 31). This alone is enough for the Court to find that Matthews has not established

a prima facie case of gender-based discrimination. How the Corporate Compliance

Officer position relates to Matthews’s claim that JCHCA terminated her because of

her gender is, at best, unclear. Regardless, the evidence cited by Matthews in no way

shows that JCHCA terminated her because of her gender.

Because Matthews has failed to identify a comparator or engage in the

necessary comparator analysis, she has failed to establish a prima facie case of

gender-based discrimination. Therefore, JCHCA is entitled to summary judgment.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. 16) is GRANTED. Plaintiff's claims are hereby DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE. A separate order will be entered contemporaneously with this

memorandum opinion.

DONE and ORDERED this November 22, 2021.

Ko SFB Sh.

LILES C. BURKE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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