Opinion

Gholston v. Franklin County Board of Education

Court
District Court, N.D. Alabama
Filed
Nov 17, 2021
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 16.6%

“On reconsidering the procedure required in Saucier, we conclude that, while the sequence set forth there is often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory.”

How later courts described this case

  • “On reconsidering the procedure required in Saucier, we conclude that, while the sequence set forth there is often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory.”
  • “Given that, particularly in middle school and high school, students will be aware enough to hide their bigoted language from authority figures,” plaintiffs’ first-hand reports could demonstrate actual notice.
  • “This Court has previously explained that public schools generally do not have the requisite level of control over children to give rise to a constitutional duty to protect them from third-party actors.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHWESTERN DIVISION

BRANDI GHOLSTON, as )

guardian and next friend of M.G., )

a minor, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Civil Action No. 3:20-CV-00013-CLS

)

FRANKLIN COUNTY BOARD )

OF EDUCATION, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDERS

Brandi Gholston commenced this action on behalf of her minor son, Malachi,

who is generally identified in the pleadings by the initials “M.G.” the Franklin

County, Alabama, Board of Education for race discrimination under Title VI of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. Her complaint also alleged

claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against: Greg Hamilton, Superintendent of the

Franklin County School System; Gary Odom, Principal of the high school located in

Phil Campbell, Alabama;1 and, Darit Riddle, Assistant Principal of the same school.

1 Phil Campbell is a small town located in the southeastern portion of Franklin County,

Alabama. Its population according to the 2020 Census was 992 persons. See, e.g., https://en.

wikipedia.org/wiki/Phil_Campbell,_Alabama (last visited Nov. 11, 2021).

When responding to defendants’ motions for summary judgment,2 however, plaintiff

conceded that all of her claims — except for her Title VI claim against the Franklin

County Board of Education, and, her Section 1983 claim against Darit Riddle — were

due to be dismissed, “including any separate claim relating to disparate treatment, and

all claims against [defendants Greg] Hamilton and [Gary] Odom.” Doc. no. 44

(Plaintiff’s Consolidated Response to Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment),

at ECF 6 (alterations supplied).3

I. FACTS

The events forming the basis of plaintiff’s claims occurred in the Phil Campbell

High School during the 2017 and 2018 academic years. Plaintiff’s minor son then was

a student in the seventh and eighth grades.4 Assistant Principal Darit Riddle was

responsible for disciplinary issues, but he was not the sole disciplinarian; rather, he

also relied upon teachers, coaches, and other personnel to take appropriate action for

disciplinary infractions.5

2 Doc. nos. 36 (motion of defendants Greg Hamilton, Gary Odom, and Darit Riddle) and 37

(motion of Franklin County Board of Education).

3 “ECF” is an acronym formed from the initial letters of the “Electronic Case Filing” system

that allows parties to file and serve documents electronically. See The Bluebook, A Uniform System

of Citation,, Rule 7.1.4, at 21 (Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al. eds., 19th ed. 2010). When this

court cites to pagination generated by the ECF header, it will, as here, precede the page number(s)

with the letters “ECF.”

4 Phil Campbell High School then housed students enrolled in grades seven through twelve.

Doc. no. 38-29 (Darit Riddle Affidavit) ¶ 4.

5 Id. ¶ 11.

2

Plaintiff, Brandi Gholston, was a counselor (and later an English teacher) at

Phil Campbell High School during those academic years.6 Her father (and, therefore,

M.G.’s maternal grandfather), Gary Williams, had been Superintendent of the

Franklin County School System from 2009 until his retirement in 2016.7

Brandi Gholston is White (Caucasian), and Jay Gholston, M.G.’s father, is

African-American. During the academic years at issue, the student body of Phil

Campbell High School was predominately white.8 Only six to eight of its 436

students were African-American or, like M.G., of biracial heritage.9 Plaintiff

complained of several incidents that she believed to be racial harassment of her son

during his enrollment in the school.

A. The Student Code of Conduct

Students of Phil Campbell High School are subject to a “Code of Conduct”

containing a section entitled “Student Harassment/Bullying Prevention.” Relevant

portions read as follows:

I. No student shall be engaged in or be subjected to harassment,

violence, threats of violence, or intimidation by any other student

that is based on any of the specified characteristics that have been

6 Id. ¶ 29; doc. no. 38-1 (Brandi Gholston Deposition), at 7-8.

7 Doc. no. 38-1 (Brandi Gholston Deposition), at 95-98; doc. no. 38-29 (Darit Riddle

Affidavit) ¶ 7.

8 Doc. no. 38-22 (Darit Riddle Deposition), at 34-35.

9 Id. at 34.

3

identified by the Franklin County Board of Education in this

policy. Students who violate this policy are subject to

disciplinary sanctions.

. . . .

III. Description of Behavior Expected by Children

A. Students are expected to treat other students with the

courtesy, respect and dignity and comply with the rules

governing student behavior [sic]. Students are expected

and required (1) to comply with the requirements of law,

policy, regulation, and rules prohibiting harassment,

violence or intimidation; (2) to refrain from inflicting or

threatening to inflict violence, injury, or damage to the

person or property of another student; and (3) to refrain

from placing another student in fear of being subjected to

violence, injury, or damage when such actions or threats

are reasonably perceived as being motivated by any

personal characteristic of the student that is identified in

this policy.

B. Threats of violence, harassment, and intimidation are

prohibited and will be subject to disciplinary consequences

and sanctions if the perpetrator of such action is found to

have based the prohibited action on one or more of the

following personal characteristics of the victim of such

conduct:

• The student’s race;

• The student’s sex;

• The student’s religion;

• The student’s national origin; or

• The student’s disability[.]

IV. A series of graduated consequences for any violation of this

policy will be those outlined in the rules governing student

4

behavior or any rule or standard in the rules under authority of

this policy.

Doc. no. 38-29 (Darit Riddle Affidavit), Exhibit C (alteration supplied). The

“Student Harassment/Bullying Prevention” section also outlines a procedure for

registering written complaints, but adds that, “[a]t the request of the complaining

student or the student’s parent or legal guardian, incidental or minor violations may

be presented and resolved informally.”10

B. M.G.’s School Record

M.G. is an excellent student who earned stellar grades and won many awards.11

As a seventh-grader, he was identified as an exceptional student by Duke University’s

Talent Identification Program.12 He was a skillful basketball player, as demonstrated

by the fact that he was a member of the ninth grade team while still in the seventh

grade.13 His attendance was nearly perfect,14 and only two disciplinary infractions

were noted in his school records — one for a lunchroom fight; and another for

damaging a piece of computer equipment.15

10 Id., Exhibit C.

11 Doc. no. 38-1 (Brandi Gholston Deposition), at 65; doc. no. 38-29 (Darit Riddle Affidavit)

¶ 26.

12 Doc. no. 38-29 (Darit Riddle Affidavit), Exhibit D.

13 Doc. no. 38-22 (Darit Riddle Deposition), at 155.

14 Doc. no. 38-29 (Darit Riddle Affidavit) ¶ 27.

15 Doc. no. 38-22 (Darit Riddle Deposition), at 220, 215.

5

C. Mr. Stacy’s Music Class

M.G. was a student in Mr. Stacy’s music class during the seventh grade.16 A

male student called him the “N-word” during class.17 M.G. reported the incident to

Assistant Principal Darit Riddle,18 who took no disciplinary action.19 There is no

evidence that M.G. reported the slur to his music teacher.20

D. The “42” Movie

During March of 2018, M.G. was a student in Tina King’s “enrichment class,”

which included “average to above-average students.”21 Ms. King occasionally

supplemented the curriculum with movies.22 During one such occasion, she showed

a portion of the 2013 movie entitled “42,” which depicted events leading to Jackie

Robinson’s selection as the first African-American to integrate Major League

baseball.23 The film dialogue included racist slurs, and visually depicted

discriminatory incidents as Robinson was forced to withstand the trial by fire posed

16 Doc. no. 38-2 (M.G. Deposition), at 23-25.

17 Id.

18 Id. at 24-25.

19 Id.

20 During his deposition, M.G. could not recall the name of the student who uttered the racial

epithet. Further, the student did not continue to use that racially-derogatory term, but seemed instead

to have “corrected himself.” Id. at 25-26.

21 Doc. no. 38-33 (Tina King Affidavit) ¶ 7.

22 Id. ¶ 8.

23 Id. ¶ 9.

6

by teammates who did not want to play with him, and a society that often would not

allow him to travel, eat, or lodge with the rest of the team, because of his race.24 M.G.

testified that he was the only student of color in the class, and that some of the white

students looked at him and laughed during those scenes.25 M.G. spoke to his mother

about that incident,26 and she related her concern about the content of the movie and

the students’ reaction to Darit Riddle.27 He and Principal Gary Odom asked Ms. King

to cease showing the movie (she complied),28 but no students were disciplined by

either Odum or Riddle. Ms. King recalled that when some of her students had

“snickered — at the content of the movie, not [M.G.],” she paused the film and

“corrected the behavior.”29

E. The “Alabama ‘N-Word’ Song”

During M.G.’s seventh-grade year, while he was a member of the ninth-grade

basketball team, some of his teammates sang in the locker room a song that is referred

to in the record as the “Alabama ‘N-word’ song.” The words of that song were not

24 See, e.g., https://www/hollywoodreporter.com/movies/movie-reviews/42-film-review-

434880/amp/; and https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/42_(film) (both last visited Nov. 14, 2021).

25 Doc. no. 38-2 (M.G. Deposition), at 86-87.

26 Id. at 89-90.

27 Doc. no. 38-1 (Brandi Gholston Deposition), at 62-63; doc. no. 38-29 (Darit Riddle

Affidavit) ¶ 25.

28 Doc. no. 38-29 (Darit Riddle Affidavit) ¶ 25; doc. no. 38-33 (Tina King Affidavit) ¶ 15.

29 Doc. no. 38-33 (Tina King Affidavit) ¶ 14.

7

disclosed to this court, and plaintiff said only that the lyrics included “derogatory,

racially slamming terminology made to intimidate” her son.30

M.G. told his mother about the incident and she, in turn, reported the conduct

to Darit Riddle,31 who took no corrective action.32 Griffin Harris, the basketball

coach, testified that when plaintiff told him about the incident, he confronted the

members of the team, but they denied playing or singing the song.33

That same season, M.G.’s team participated in the finals of the county

basketball tournament. Following the game, M.G. told his father, Jay Gholston, that

one of the players, Boone Swinney, had directed racist remarks toward him.34 Mr.

Gholston related that information to Melinda Swinney, Boone’s mother, and both she

and Mr. Gholston spoke to M.G. and Boone. Boone denied making racist remarks,

but admitted that he had played a recording of the “Alabama ‘N-word’ song” on his

cell telephone for another student to hear.35 Ms. Swinney “chewed him out,” and Mr.

30 Doc. no. 38-1 (Brandi Gholston Deposition), at 55-56. If the lyrics of that song were even

remotely similar to those sung by an American songwriter and musician who sometimes used the

stage name of “Johnny Rebel” (i.e., Clifford Joseph Trahan), and who performed songs supportive

of white supremacy — the adjective “despicable” would not be adequate to describe their deplorable

nature. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Johnny_Rebel_(singer); and https://www/paroles-

musique.com/eng/Johnny-Rebel-Alabama-Nigger-lyrics,p1027551 (both last visited Nov. 14, 2021).

31 Doc. no. 44-2 (Brandi Gholston Declaration) ¶ 7.

32 Id. Mr. Riddle testified that he did not learn about the song until after the final basketball

tournament. Doc. no. 38-22 (Darit Riddle Deposition), at 81.

33 Doc. no. 38-20 (Griffin Harris Deposition), at 9.

34 Doc. no. 38-2 (M.G. Deposition), at 42.

35 Id. at 43.

8

Gholston confronted the team members about the use of racist language.36 Ms.

Swinney also confronted the white players in the bleachers, outside the locker room.37

(The father of one basketball team member later accused Mr. Gholston of threatening

the team.38)

Following that incident, Darit Riddle, who did not attend the basketball game,

collected statements from several persons in attendance,39 but no team members were

disciplined.40

F. Sage Raper Altercation

M.G. had an altercation with a fellow student at the end of a seventh-grade

physical education class,41 which he described as follows:

A. I remember one situation being at the end of P.E. The bell had

rung and we were — we always played like two minutes after the

bell had rung. We always continue[d] our basketball game for

about two minutes.

. . . .

A. And like there was a kid [Sage Raper] that drove in for a layup

and the score was close, I didn’t want him to make it. So like I

kind of — I fouled him, but it wasn’t like just, you know, just a

36 Id. at 42-43; doc. no. 38-3 (Jay Gholston Deposition), at 26.

37 Doc. no. 38-2 (M.G. Deposition), at 43.

38 Id. at 46; doc. no. 38-3 (Jay Gholston Deposition), at 30.

39 See doc. no. 38-12, at ECF 2-8.

40 Doc. no. 38-22 (Darit Riddle Deposition), at 90-91.

41 Doc. no. 38-2 (M.G. Deposition), at 52.

9

brutal foul. It was just a foul to make sure he didn’t make it. And

he got mad. And it’s just like he took both his hands and he just

like shoved my face in almost and I didn’t retaliate. I just walked

away because that was what I was told to do.

Q. Well, did you think there was — did that incident — did

anything about that incident suggest to you that it was racially

motivated?

A. Yes.

Q. What – tell us why you thought that.

A. Whenever he went to push me he was calling me racial names like

you cotton picking “N word,” you better watch your fouling, you

know, things.

Doc. no. 38-2 (M.G. Deposition), at 50-51 (alteration supplied).

M.G. reported the incident to Darit Riddle, who questioned Raper,42 and later

viewed a gym surveillance video with M.G. and his mother.43 Riddle said that he

would handle the situation,44 and imposed one day of in-school suspension on Sage

Raper, but no mention of racial slurs was included in Raper’s records.45 Instead, the

day of in-school suspension was recorded in the school system’s electronic database

as simply a sanction for “fighting,” with the annotation “pushed another student in the

42 Doc. no. 38-29 (Darit Riddle Affidavit) ¶ 18(b).

43 Doc. no. 38-2 (M.G. Deposition), at 53. The video did not record audio. Id. at 54.

44 Id. at 53.

45 Riddle filed an affidavit stating that he did not recall M.G. “making any mention of racial

slurs when he reported the incident to me.” Doc. no. 38-29 (Darit Riddle Affidavit), ¶ 18(b).

10

gym.”46

G. Seventh-Grade Awards Day

M.G. received several awards for academic achievements during the awards

ceremony held at the end of his seventh-grade, 2017-18 school year.47 When he

walked to the front of the auditorium to receive one of the awards, another student

placed chewing-gum on the seat of M.G.’s chair, which stuck to his pants when he

returned to his seat.48 M.G. complained to his mother, who reported the incident to

Darit Riddle.49 Ms. Gholston suspected Hunter Bishop of being the student who had

placed the gum on M.G.’s seat, because Bishop had said “you’re still a stupid N-

word” each time M.G. returned to his seat after receiving an award.50 Riddle

interviewed Bishop and, even though there was no proof that he was the culprit,

Riddle levied a one-day, out-of-school suspension.51

H. Braxton Lawrence’s Harassment

M.G. testified that another student, Braxton Lawrence, regularly directed racial

46 Doc. no. 38-13, at ECF 7.

47 Doc. no. 38-2 (M.G. Deposition), at 101.

48 Id. at 101-02.

49 Doc. no. 38-29 (Darit Riddle Affidavit) ¶ 18(e).

50 Doc. no. 38-1 (Brandi Gholston Deposition), at 76. Note that when M.G. was questioned

about the gum incident during his deposition, and asked whether “anything else happen[ed] on that

occasion of a racial nature,” he replied: “Not that I remember.” Doc. no. 38-2 (M.G. Deposition),

at 101-03.

51 Doc. no. 38-29 (Darit Riddle Affidavit) ¶ 18(e).

11

slurs at him during the eighth grade.52 He described their interaction as follows:

Q. What were those incidents?

A. For one, I remember there were a couple of days where I would

be like walking from one class to another, specifically 1st and 2nd

period.

There was one student [Braxton Lawrence] that would always

walk by me in this particular spot and he always had something

to say.

On a couple — on most of those occasions he would call me an “A”

wipe like —

Q. An “A” wipe?

A. An “A” wipe.

And others he would say the “N word.” It was always something

referring to skin color.

He — he — one day he even called me just simply [the] “S” word.

Just pointing at me saying, [“H]ey, there’s walking shit.[”]

Doc. no. 38-2 (M.G. Deposition), at 127 (alterations supplied).

M.G. did not recall during his deposition whether he had reported any of those

incidents to school personnel,53 but he later submitted a declaration stating: “On

multiple occasions my mother and I reported to Mr. Riddle that Braxton Lawrence

52 Doc. no. 38-2 (M.G. Deposition), at 127-28.

53 Id. at 128.

12

was harassing me by calling me names that referenced my skin color.”54

Plaintiff confirmed that she reported these incidents to Darit Riddle, but she did

not know whether Lawrence had been disciplined.55

Riddle testified that he believed Lawrence may have directed racial slurs at

M.G.,56 but nothing in the record indicates that Lawrence was disciplined for his

offensive comments.

I. Clayton DeMartin

M.G. testified that another student, Clayton DeMartin, “jumped” him in the

hallway at the end of a school day.57 While DeMartin was “hitting [M.G.] in the head,

he was saying F’ing ‘N word,’ you’re going to watch what you say to me.”58 Other

students assisted M.G., and separated the two.59 M.G. immediately reported the

incident to Mr. Riddle,60 who spoke to DeMartin and M.G., both of whom

acknowledged “having exchanged disparaging words.”61 Even so, Riddle did not

recall that M.G. had reported racial slurs being uttered by DeMartin during the

54 Doc. no. 44-3 (M.G. Declaration) ¶ 3.

55 Doc. no. 38-1 (Brandi Gholston Deposition), at 91; doc. no. 44-2 (Brandi Gholston

Declaration) ¶ 8.

56 Doc. no. 38-22 (Darit Riddle Deposition), at 41-42.

57 Doc. no. 38-2 (M.G. Deposition), at 56-57.

58 Id. at 58.

59 Id. at 59.

60 Id.

61 Doc. no. 38-29 (Darit Riddle Affidavit) ¶ 18(d).

13

incident.62 The corresponding electronic entry, recorded by Riddle on February 15,

2018, characterized the altercation as “other incident,” and noted that DeMartin

received a two-day, in-school suspension for “hitting another student.”63

J. Rhett Jackson

As M.G. was leaving a classroom at the end of a school day during his eighth-

grade year, he had an argument with Rhett Jackson,64 who “put his hands on” M.G.

When M.G. pushed Jackson away, it caused him to fall.65 M.G. told Jackson to stop

bothering him. Jackson then came up behind M.G. and began hitting him in the side

of the head.66 M.G. reported the incident to Riddle.67 Jackson was disciplined with

an in-school suspension for “hit[ting] another student after class.”68 M.G. did not

contend that there was a racial component to this incident.69

62 Id.

63 Doc. no. 38-12 at ECF 44 and doc. no. 38-29 (Darit Riddle Affidavit) ¶ 18(d). There is

also an electronic disciplinary entry relating to DeMartin and dated April 10, 2019, recording the

infraction as “other incident,” along with the “occurrence note” that “Clayton came by the office and

said [M.G.] was trying to start trouble with him during PE. Clayton said [M.G.] was making

comments about his sister. He said he never made racial comments toward [M.G.].” Doc. no. 38-25,

at ECF 3. According to the school’s records, Riddle issued a warning to DeMartin. Id.

64 Doc. 38-2 (M.G. Deposition), at 65.

65 Id. at 65.

66 Id. at 66.

67 Id. at 67.

68 Doc. no. 38-12, at ECF 14.

69 Plaintiff’s brief states that “Rhett Jackson assaulted [M.G.] while calling him racial

names.” Doc. no. 44 (Plaintiff’s Consolidated Response to Defendants’ Motions for Summary

Judgment) ¶ 46. The deposition cites provided by plaintiff do not bear out this contention. See doc.

no. 38-2 (M.G. Deposition), at 65-68 & 79.

14

K. Locker Room Incident

M.G. also testified about the following incident that occurred during his eighth-

grade year:

A. I remember one time in the locker room at P.E. I remember a kid

— there were multiple kids in there. I was walking in there to use

the bathroom during the class while it was going on.

And there was like one or two kids that were calling me the “N

word.” As I ignored it — and then as I walked out of the

bathroom they — they were pushing me into lockers calling me

that. And I just — I didn’t retaliate because that’s what I was told

to do is not retaliate.

Q. And who told you to not retaliate?

A. Mr. Riddle.

Q. Do you know why he told you that?

A. He told me that if I was going to stay in trouble at Phil Campbell,

that I’m not going to be able to be a part of the basketball team

anymore.

Doc. no. 38-2 (M.G. Deposition), at 61-62 (emphasis supplied). M.G. apparently

heeded Riddle’s warning, because there is no indication in the record that M.G.

reported the locker room incident to anyone.

L. Seth Bullock

In November of 2018, prior to the school’s Thanksgiving break, Seth Bullock

and other students, including Sage Raper, threw basketballs at M.G. during a physical

15

education class.70 As M.G. was walking to the locker room, Bullock said that “he was

going to hang [M.G.] like [his] ancestors. Like how they use to hang African-

American people and — like a long time ago.”71 Bullock also told M.G. that “he was

going to run over [him] with a truck.”72 M.G. learned that Bullock was talking to

other students about what he intended to do to M.G., and showed them pictures of

what he had planned, including a picture of a noose.73 M.G. related the incidents to

his mother, but he did not specify when he did so.74

On the Sunday before the students were scheduled to return to school following

the Thanksgiving break, rumors were circulating among students and parents that

Seth Bullock had threatened to “shoot up the school” on the anniversary of his

father’s suicide.75 Plaintiff was one of the parents who learned of the rumors, and she

expressed her concern to Greg Hamilton, the Superintendent of the Franklin County

School System.76 School administrators notified law enforcement and the following

day, when students returned to school, Bullock was searched, interviewed, and

70 Doc. no. 38-2 (M.G. Deposition), at 74-75.

71 Id. at 75 (alterations supplied).

72 Id. at 75-76 (alteration supplied).

73 Id. at 106-07.

74 Id. at 68.

75 Doc. no. 38-22 (Darit Riddle Deposition), at 167-68.

76 Doc. no. 38-1 (Brandi Gholston Deposition), at 52-53.

16

detained.77 Law enforcement officials ultimately determined that no charges were

warranted.78 Even so, Bullock’s mother withdrew her son from Phil Campbell High

School.79

Plaintiff testified that she learned about Bullock’s threats to M.G. from students

in her English class that day.80 She notified Mr. Riddle and other school officials

about the students’ reports, and some of the students provided statements to Riddle.81

Because Bullock had been withdrawn from school, however, school administrators

did not impose disciplinary sanctions for the alleged threats against M.G.82

Nevertheless, there is an entry in the school’s electronic disciplinary records relating

to the threat to “shoot up the school,” and indicating that Bullock was placed on out-

of-school suspension pending the arrival of law enforcement officers.83

Plaintiff individually reported Bullock’s threats against her son to law

enforcement, and criminal proceedings were initiated.84

77 Doc. no. 38-22 (Darit Riddle Deposition), at 191-93.

78 Id. at 50.

79 Id. at 58.

80 Doc. no. 38-1 (Brandi Gholston Deposition), at 31-36.

81 Id. at 33-34.

82 Doc. no. 38-22 (Darit Riddle Deposition), at 49.

83 Id., Exhibit 4.

84 Doc. no. 38-1 (Brandi Gholston Deposition), at 51. The disposition of those proceedings

is not contained in the record, but apparently a hearing was held, at which M.G. testified. Doc. no.

38-3 (Jay Gholston Deposition), at 38.

17

M. Transfer to Russellville High School

Due to “the accumulation of everything” sketched above, plaintiff and her

husband transferred their son to Russellville High School at the beginning of his

ninth-grade year.85

II. DISCUSSION

A. Title VI

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq., prohibits

discrimination based on race, color, or national origin in programs or activities that

receive federal financial assistance.86 The standard for evaluating student-on-student

hostile environment claims is found in the Supreme Court’s opinion in Davis ex rel.

LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Board of Education, 526 U.S. 629 (1999), holding

that “funding recipients” like the Franklin County Board of Education

are properly held liable in damages only where they are deliberately

indifferent to [racial] harassment, of which they have actual knowledge,

that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said

to deprive the victim[] of access to the educational opportunities or

benefits provided by the school.

Id. at 650 (alterations supplied).

85 Doc. no. 38-1 (Brandi Gholston Deposition), at 93. See also doc. no. 38-2 (M.G.

Deposition), at 90-91.

86 The Act provides, in pertinent part, that: “No person in the United States shall, on the

ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits

of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program, or activity receiving Federal financial

assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.

18

Even though the Davis case arose from a sex-based, student-on-student, hostile

environment claim under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C.

§ 1681 et seq., the Eleventh Circuit has concluded that both Title VI race-based and

Title IX sex-based hostile environment claims should be evaluated under the

“deliberate indifference” standard established by the Supreme Court’s opinion in

Davis, supra. See, e.g., Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 911 F.2d 617,

619 (11th Cir. 1990) (“Hereinafter we discuss Title VI and Title IX cases somewhat

interchangeably, because we believe it is settled that analysis of the two statutes is

substantially the same.”), rev’d on other grounds, 503 U.S. 60 (1992); see also, e.g.,

Fennell v. Marion Independent School District, 804 F.3d 398, 408 (5th Cir. 2015);

Bryant v. Independent School District Number I-38 of Garvin County, 334 F.3d 928,

934 (10th Cir. 2013).

The Eleventh Circuit, applying the Davis standard in Williams v. Board of

Regents of University System of Georgia, 477 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2007), also has

held that a plaintiff must satisfy the following elements in order to establish a claim

for student-on-student hostile environment against a Title VI funding recipient:

First, the defendant must be a Title [VI funding] recipient. Second, an

“appropriate person” must have actual knowledge of the discrimination

or harassment the plaintiff alleges occurred. “[A]n ‘appropriate person’

. . . is, at a minimum, an official of the recipient entity with authority to

take corrective action to end the discrimination. Third, a funding

19

recipient is liable for student-on-student harassment only if “the funding

recipient acts with deliberate indifference to known acts of harassment

in its programs or activities.” In considering this element, we analyze

the conduct of the funding recipient, not the alleged harasser; we do this

to ensure that we hold the funding recipient liable only if the funding

recipient’s deliberate indifference “subjected the plaintiff to

discrimination.” Therefore, we will not hold a funding recipient liable

solely because a person affiliated with the funding recipient

discriminated against or harassed the plaintiff. Fourth, the

discrimination must be “so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive

that it effectively bars the victim’s access to an educational opportunity

or benefit.”

Id. at 1293 (alterations supplied and internal citations omitted); see also Stinson as

next friend of K.R. v. Maye, 824 F. App’x 849, 856-57 (11th Cir. 2020).

1. Recipient of federal funds and “appropriate person”

The Franklin County Board of Education does not dispute that it is a recipient

of federal funds, or that Darit Riddle is an “appropriate person” for purposes of Title

VI. As Assistant Principal of Phil Campbell High School, he was charged with taking

corrective action in disciplinary matters.

2. Actual notice

Turning to the issue of actual notice of the allegedly racially-hostile incidents,

Riddle stated in an affidavit that he could

only remember learning about a handful of incidents allegedly involving

use of a racial slur or other racially-motivated conduct, all of which I

learned about after-the-fact. Some involved an exchange of insults

between students in which both participants bore some responsibility,

20

and some grew out of basketball-related disputes with teammates. A

review of school records confirms that several white students who were

involved in confrontational incidents or altercations with [M.G.] were

disciplined with suspensions, even when they denied the use of such

terminology.

Doc. no. 38-29 (Darit Riddle Affidavit) ¶ 18 (alteration supplied). With that

introduction, Mr. Riddle recalled the following incidents:

a. In November, 2017, [M.G.] and another basketball player, John

Randall Herring, got into a verbal altercation on a school bus that

involved mutual name calling while returning to PCHS from a

charity basketball event. I personally intervened to strongly

lecture both students regarding the importance of supporting each

other as team members. (The underlying dispute began with

finger-pointing over who was responsible for turnovers at the

game.) Neither student received formal discipline that instance

[sic], but my counseling appeared to have the desired effect.

b. In January, 2018, [M.G.] reported that one of his classmates, Sage

Raper (the son of another PCHS teacher and coach), had pushed

him after [M.G.] committed a hard foul on Sage during a pickup

basketball game in P.E. class. I do not recall [M.G.] making any

reference to the use of racial slurs when he reported the incident

to me. Nonetheless, I interviewed Sage and attempted to identify

any third-party witnesses before viewing surveillance video of the

incident with [M.G.] and Ms. Gholston. Ultimately, I

administered one day of [in-school suspension] to Sage.

c. In January 2018, I received a report that members of [M.G.]’s

basketball team had played a song called “Alabama N-word”

following the team’s victory in the county basketball tournament

championship game. I spoke with [M.G.] and the coaches present

at the game, as well as the players who were accused of playing

the song and Ms. Gholston. Each of the accused players denied

playing or singing the song or otherwise making any racially

21

insensitive comments toward [M.G.]. While I administered no

formal discipline, I have received no subsequent reports that any

players continued playing or singing the song.

d. [M.G.] reported in February, 2018, that another classmate,

Clayton DeMartin, had physically “jumped” him in a hallway

after class. I investigated this incident by speaking with Clayton

and [M.G.], reviewing any available surveillance video, and

attempting to identify any third-party witnesses. My recollection

is that both students acknowledged having exchanged disparaging

words, but I do not recall any specific reference having been

made to the N-word. In any case, I administered two days of [in-

school suspension] to Clayton as punishment.

e. At an awards day function in the PCHS gym near the end of the

2017-2018 school year, Ms. Gholston complained that another

student, Hunter Bishop, had put chewing gum on [M.G.]’s seat.

Upon receiving the report, I interviewed Hunter. He denied

committing the offense; the proof that he did it was not

conclusive, and there was no discernible proof that the prank was

motivated by [M.G.]’s race. I nonetheless punished Hunter with

a one day, out-of-school suspension.

Id. ¶¶ 18(a)–(e) (alterations supplied).

Riddle also was aware that the reaction of M.G.’s classmates to those portions

of the movie “42” containing racial slurs, or those scenes that depicted racially-

discriminatory acts, were hurtful to M.G.

Moreover, Riddle acknowledged “two arguably racially motivated incidents

involving [M.G.]” during his eighth-grade year: a physical altercation with Rhett

Jackson; and, threatening racial comments by Seth Bullock.

22

Additionally, Riddle believed that Braxton Lawrence may have used racially

derogatory language toward M.G.87

Nevertheless, Riddle emphasized that he learned about each of the incidents

“after the fact”; and, in some instances, he does not recall M.G. telling him that the

student involved used racially derogatory language. While Riddle did not witness the

offensive remarks that were directed toward M.G. during the physical attacks, the

testimony of plaintiff and M.G. that they reported the use of such terms to Riddle may

show that Riddle had actual notice of the harassing conduct. See, e.g., N.K. v. St.

Mary’s Springs Academy of Fond du Lac Wisconsin, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1035

(E.D. Wis. 2013) (“Given that, particularly in middle school and high school, students

will be aware enough to hide their bigoted language from authority figures,”

plaintiffs’ first-hand reports could demonstrate actual notice.).

3. Severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive conduct

Plaintiff also must show that the race discrimination to which M.G. was

subjected, and of which the Board had actual knowledge, was so “severe, pervasive,

and objectively offensive” as to effectively deprive M.G. of “equal access to an

institution’s resources and opportunities.” Davis, 526 U.S. at 651; see also Hill v.

Cundiff, 797 F.3d 948, 972 (11th Cir. 2015). The Supreme Court recognized that

87 Doc. no. 38-22 (Darit Riddle Deposition), at 42.

23

students “regularly interact in a manner that would be unacceptable among adults,”

and “often engage in insults, banter, teasing, shoving, pushing, and [race]-specific

conduct that is upsetting to the students subjected to it.” Davis, 526 U.S. at 651-52

(alteration supplied). “[S]imple acts of teasing and name-calling” are not actionable.

Id. at 652. Even so,

[i]t does not take an educational psychologist to conclude that being

referred to by one’s peers by the most noxious racial epithet in the

contemporary American lexicon, being shamed and humiliated on the

basis of one’s race, and having the school authorities ignore or reject

one’s complaints would adversely affect a Black child’s ability to obtain

the same benefit from schooling as her white counterparts.

Monteiro v. Tempe Union High School District, 158 F.3d 1022, 1034 (9th Cir. 1998).

Indeed, “use of the reviled epithet ‘nigger’ raises a question of severe harassment

going beyond simple teasing and name-calling.” DiStiso v. Cook, 691 F.3d 226, 242-

43 (2d Cir. 2012).

The “constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and

relationships” must be considered when assessing whether the complained-of conduct

reaches the level of severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive. Davis, 526 U.S. at

651 (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998)

(Title VII case)). Those considerations include, but are not limited to, “the ages of

the harasser and the victim and the number of individuals involved.” Davis, 526 U.S.

24

at 651.

Following Davis’ lead in looking to the law developed in the context of Title

VII hostile-work-environment claims, other considerations that might be taken into

account include “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether

it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether

it unreasonably interferes with” the victim’s academic experience.” Harris v. Forklift

Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993). See also, e.g., Fennell v. Marion Independent

School District, 804 F.3d 398, 409-10 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Walker v. Thompson,

214 F.3d 615, 626 (5th Cir. 2000), abrogated on other grounds, Burlington Northern

& Santa Fe Railway v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006)).

Here, plaintiff has presented evidence of numerous incidents of racial

harassment, several of which involved physical attacks, throughout M.G.’s seventh-

and eighth-grade years at Phil Campbell High School. In addition to the incidents

detailed in this opinion, M.G. testified that he was subjected to racial epithets on a

daily basis, and added that those incidents were not “the only racial things that

happened to me. . . . Being called the ‘N word’ was like the minimum thing that

happened. It happened on a daily instance.”88

The Franklin County Board of Education contends that, even if the racial

88 Doc. no. 38-2 (M.G. Deposition), at 81.

25

harassment of M.G. is deemed to have been “severe, pervasive, and objectively

offensive,” plaintiff cannot show that her son was deprived of “equal access to” the

“resources and opportunities” available to him at Phil Campbell High School.89 The

Board argues that M.G.’s outstanding academic and attendance record, as well as the

fact that he remained at Phil Campbell High School for the remainder of his eighth-

grade year without incident, show that he was not adversely affected by the

harassment. That view of the evidence is too narrow, however, because it does not

take into account any mental health effects, which are less capable of quantifying, that

the physical attacks and frequent “use of the reviled epithet ‘nigger’”90 may have had

upon M.G.

Furthermore, plaintiff responds by arguing that the fact that she and M.G.’s

father decided to transfer their son to a different school because of the unaddressed

harassment should satisfy this element. She also contends that M.G. was deprived of

“a supportive, scholastic environment free of racism and harassment.”91 As the

Eleventh Circuit observed in Hawkins v. Sarasota County School Board, 322 F.3d

1279 (11th Cir. 2003),

89 Doc. no. 37-1 (Franklin County Board of Education Brief in Support of Motion for

Summary Judgment), at 20-21.

90 DiStiso v. Cook, 691 F.3d 226, 242-43 (2d Cir. 2012).

91 Doc. no. 44 (Plaintiff’s Consolidated Response to Defendants’ Motions for Summary

Judgment), at 27 (quoting Zeno v. Pine Plains Central School District, 702 F.3d 655, 667 (2d Cir.

2012)).

26

A demonstration of physical exclusion . . . is not the sole means

by which a plaintiff can demonstrate deprivation of an educational

opportunity. Rather, a plaintiff need [only] establish that the behavior so

undermines and detracts from the victim’s educational experience, that

the student has effectively been denied access to an institution’s

resources and opportunities.

The behavior must also be severe enough to have a “systemic”

effect of denying the victim equal access to an educational program or

activity. We take this to mean that [race] discrimination must be more

widespread than a single instance of one-on-one harassment and that the

effects of the harassment touch the whole or entirety of an educational

program or activity.

Id. at 1289 (alterations supplied, footnote omitted).

Plaintiff testified that it was obvious to her that her son had been adversely

affected by the racial harassment he experienced during the seventh and eighth grades

at Phil Campbell High School: “I observed him get quiet, withdrawn, and angry.

When I would question him, commonly I would eventually learn about some racial

incident at school or on the basketball team.”92

It is common sense that a middle-school student would be more likely to be

harmed by racial insults than an adult faced with the same conduct. A jury could

reasonably conclude from the fact that M.G. and his parents decided that he should

transfer to Russellville High School at the beginning of his ninth-grade year because

of “the accumulation of everything,” combined with plaintiff’s reports of her son’s

92 Doc. no. 44-2 (Brandi Gholston Declaration) ¶ 4.

27

behavioral changes, shows that the conduct to which he was subjected, involving

multiple incidents and multiple students, satisfies this element.

Accordingly, the court concludes that there is a genuine issue of material fact

on the question of whether the racially harassing conduct to which M.G. was

subjected was so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive as to unreasonably

interfere with his academic experience.

4. Deliberate indifference

In addition, the court has examined the question of whether the Board of

Eduction’s action or inaction in response to the known acts of harassment amounted

to deliberate indifference. “[F]unding recipients are deemed ‘deliberately indifferent’

to acts of student-on-student harassment only where the recipient’s response to the

harassment or lack thereof is clearly unreasonable in light of the known

circumstances.” Davis, 526 U.S. at 648. “A clearly unreasonable response causes

students to undergo harassment or makes them more vulnerable to it.” Hill v. Cundiff,

797 F.3d 948, 973 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Williams, 477 F.3d at 1295-96). “The

deliberate indifference standard is rigorous and hard to meet.” Hill, 797 F.3d at 975.

Here, M.G. and/or his mother reported to Riddle several instances of racial

slurs directed toward M.G. Riddle was told by M.G. that a student had called him the

“N-word” during music class, but Riddle took no action. When plaintiff related her

28

concerns about student reaction to the racial language and scenes in the “42” movie

shown during M.G.’s enrichment class, Riddle took no action other than requesting

that the teacher refrain from showing the movie.

Following the final county basketball tournament game, Riddle learned that

M.G. had complained that Boone Swinney had referred to him as a “N-word,” and

that the “Alabama ‘N-word’ song” song had been played in the locker room. While

Riddle obtained statements from several people, and talked to members of the team

about M.G.’s complaint, he ultimately did not address the racially-offensive conduct.

After M.G. reported to Riddle the altercation during his physical education

class in which Sage Raper had pushed M.G. into a locker, and called him a “cotton

picking ‘N-word,’” Riddle only reviewed a surveillance video of the incident with

M.G. and his mother, and disciplined Raper for pushing M.G., but did not address the

racial slur.

Braxton Lawrence was another student who regularly aimed racial epithets at

M.G. Both M.G. and his mother reported Lawrence’s abuse to Riddle, but Lawrence

was not disciplined.

Clayton DeMartin accosted M.G. and said “F’ing ‘N word,’ you’re going to

watch what you say to me.” M.G. told Riddle what had happened. Riddle spoke with

both students, and DeMartin received a two-day in-school suspension for “hitting

29

another student,” but not for his racist comment.

Lastly, Seth Bullock and other students, including Sage Raper, harassed M.G.

during November of 2018, throwing basketballs at him during physical education

class. Bullock also made comments to M.G. that he intended to “hang [him] like his

ancestors” and run him over with a truck. Riddle learned of this incident a few days

after it occurred, in connection with Bullock’s threats to “shoot up the school.”

Riddle took no action with respect to M.G.’s report, ostensibly because Bullock’s

mother had withdrawn him from school. Even so, he failed to address the other

students’ involvement.

Given the foregoing, the court concludes that a genuine dispute of material fact

exists as to whether the Franklin County Board of Education, acting through an

“appropriate person” (i.e., Assistant Principal Darit Riddle), was deliberately

indifferent to M.G.’s complaints of racial harassment. Riddle disciplined students

who physically abused M.G., but there is scant evidence that he acted on M.G.’s

complaints of verbal harassment. In view of the numerous “reviled epithets” that

M.G. was frequently forced to endure, a reasonable jury could conclude that Riddle’s

failure to specifically impose appropriate disciplinary sanctions for incidents of

verbal racial slurs was clearly unreasonable. Accordingly, the Board’s motion for

summary judgment is due to be denied.

30

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Plaintiff contends that Darit Riddle deprived her son of rights protected by the

Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Her claim is based upon

42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides, in part, that:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of

Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United

States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and

laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity

or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .[93]

Notwithstanding, whenever a state, county, or municipal official is sued

personally, or in an “individual capacity,” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the official is

entitled to invoke the so-called “doctrine of qualified immunity” as a defense. See,

e.g., Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985); Busby v. City of Orlando, 931

F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir. 1991). The doctrine protects state governmental officials

whose conduct violated “no clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,

93 The origins of this statute lie in the bloodshed of the Civil War and the brief era of

“Reconstruction” that followed. The Reconstruction-era Congress enacted legislation to protect the

freedoms granted to those who were recently enslaved. One such piece of legislation was the Ku

Klux Klan Act of 1871, which “targeted the racial violence in the South undertaken by the Klan, and

the failure of the states to cope with that violence.” Jamison v. McClendon, 476 F. Supp. 3d 386,

399 (S.D. Miss. 2020) (citation omitted). The first section of that Act was codified as the statute

quoted in text.

31

818 (1982); see also, e.g., Thomas ex rel. Thomas v. Roberts, 261 F.3d 1160, 1170

(11th Cir. 2001) (same); Lassiter v. Alabama A. & M. University, 28 F.3d 1146, 1149

(11th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (same).94

It has been said that doctrine attempts to strike a balance between “the need to

hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the

need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform

their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).

The doctrine initially requires that a defendant “prove that ‘he was acting

within the scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts

occurred.’” Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Courson

v. McMillian, 939 F.2d 1479, 1487 (11th Cir. 1991)). Plaintiff does not contest this

element. Even so, there are two additional requirements.

The first requires a court to ask whether the facts, viewed “in the light most

favorable to the party asserting the injury,” show that “the [defendant]’s conduct

violated a constitutional right?” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). If that

question is answered affirmatively, the court will proceed to analyze the second

94 Stated differently, qualified immunity shields state, county, and municipal officials from

suit for money damages if a reasonable officer could have believed that his action was lawful, in

light of clearly established law and the information possessed by the officer. Anderson v. Creighton,

483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987). “Even law enforcement officials who ‘reasonably but mistakenly

conclude that [their challenged actions were lawful]’ are entitled to immunity.” Hunter v. Bryant,

502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641) (alteration supplied).

32

aspect of the two-part inquiry: i.e., “whether the right was clearly established.” Id.

Strict adherence to the order of those two inquiries is not required, however. See

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (“On reconsidering the procedure

required in Saucier, we conclude that, while the sequence set forth there is often

appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory.”). Instead, in appropriate

cases, it is within a district court’s discretion to assume that a constitutional violation

occurred in order to address, in the first instance, the question of whether such a

presumed violation was “clearly established” on the date of the incident leading to

suit. Id.

Riddle characterizes plaintiff’s complaint of unlawful treatment as asserting the

right to be protected from the actions of his fellow students.95 He correctly states that

there is no constitutional duty to protect students from third parties. See Worthington

v. Elmore County Board of Education, 160 F. App’x 877, 881 (11th Cir. 2005) (“This

Court has previously explained that public schools generally do not have the requisite

level of control over children to give rise to a constitutional duty to protect them from

third-party actors.”). Even so, this court finds that plaintiff’s claim is more properly

characterized, as plaintiff states it, as the right to an education free from racially-

discriminatory slurs and actions. For purposes of the qualified immunity inquiry, the

95 Doc. no. 36-1 (Memorandum Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment by

Defendants Greg Hamilton, Gary Odom, and Darit Riddle), at 19-20.

33

court will assume that a constitutional violation occurred.

When determining whether the unlawfulness of an official’s actions was

“clearly established,” the pertinent question is whether the state of the law on the date

of the defendant’s alleged misconduct gave the defendant “fair warning” that his

“alleged treatment of [the plaintiff] was unconstitutional.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S.

730, 741 (2002) (alteration supplied); see also Williams v. Consolidated City of

Jacksonville, 341 F.3d 1261, 1270 (11th Cir. 2003) (same).

The Supreme Court has rejected the requirement that the facts of previous cases

must always be “materially similar” to those facing the plaintiff. Hope, 536 U.S. at

739. Instead, in order for a constitutional right to be deemed as having been “clearly

established,”

its contours “must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would

understand that what he is doing violates that right. This is not to say

that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very

action in question has previously been held unlawful, see Mitchell [v.

Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,] 535, n. 12, 105 S. Ct. 2806, 86 L. Ed. 2d 411;

but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must

be apparent.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S. Ct.

3034, 97 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1987).

Hope, 536 U.S. at 741 (alteration in original). Even so, the Supreme Court has

reiterate[d] the longstanding principle that “clearly established law”

should not be defined “at a high level of generality.” As this Court

explained decades ago, the clearly established law must be

“particularized” to the facts of the case. Otherwise, “[p]laintiffs would

34

be able to convert the rule of qualified immunity . . . into a rule of

virtually unqualified liability simply by alleging violation of extremely

abstract rights.”

White v. Pauly, ___ U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017) (first alteration supplied,

second alteration in original, citations omitted).

An official can receive “fair warning” of his or her unlawful conduct in various

ways.

First, the plaintiffs may show that a materially similar case has already

been decided. Second, the plaintiffs can point to a broader, clearly

established principle that should control the novel facts of the situation.

Finally, the conduct involved in the case may so obviously violate the

constitution that prior case law is unnecessary. Under controlling law,

the plaintiffs must carry their burden by looking to the law as interpreted

at the time by the United States Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit, or

the [Alabama] Supreme Court.

Terrell v. Smith, 668 F.3d 1244, 1255-56 (11th Cir. 2012) (citations and quotation

marks omitted, alteration supplied). See also Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340,

1350-52 (11th Cir. 2002) (same); Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (“We

do not require a case directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the

statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.”). “The second and third methods

are generally known as ‘obvious clarity’ cases. . . . Cases do not often arise under the

second and third methods.” Gaines v. Wardynski, 871 F.3d 1203, 1209 (11th Cir.

2017) (collecting cases). Courts “very occasionally encounter the exceptional case

35

in which a [defendant’s] acts are so egregious that preexisting, fact-specific precedent

was not necessary to give clear warning to every reasonable . . . [defendant] that what

the [defendant] was doing must be [unlawful].” Rodriguez v. Farrell, 280 F.3d 1341,

1350 n.18 (11th Cir. 2002) (alterations supplied).

Taking the third method first, the court cannot find that Riddle’s conduct in this

case was so egregious as to violate the Fourteenth Amendment on its face. There is

no evidence that Riddle took appropriate disciplinary action to stem the flow of racial

slurs aimed at M.G., but his conduct did not rise to the level of “egregiousness.”

Likewise, under the second method, plaintiff’s statement of the constitutional right

at issue — the right to an education free from free from racially-discriminatory slurs

and actions — is overly broad, and violates the Supreme Court’s admonition in White

that “clearly established law” should not be defined “at a high level of generality.”

“A reasonable official’s awareness of the existence of an abstract right . . . does not

equate to knowledge that his conduct infringes the right.” Smith v. Mattox, 127 F.3d

1416, 1419 (11th Cir. 1997).

That leaves the court with the primary method for determining whether a

defendant is entitled to qualified immunity under clearly established law: i.e.,

whether there is a materially similar case that had been decided prior to the dates of

the relevant incidents.

36

The parties agree that neither the Supreme Court nor Eleventh Circuit have

rendered opinions addressing the contours of student-on-student racial harassment.

Nevertheless, plaintiff points to several cases in an attempt to persuade this court that

M.G.’s constitutional rights were clearly established.

First, plaintiff cites the seminal case of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.

483 (1954). While that case established that state laws requiring racial segregation

of students in public schools are unconstitutional, it is out of place here.

Plaintiff also cites Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, 544 U.S. 167

(2005). That case also is inappropriate, because it addressed a claim of retaliation

against a high-school girls’ basketball coach for complaining that his team did not

receive equal funding and equal access to athletic equipment and facilities under Title

IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972. The case has no bearing on plaintiff’s

contention that Riddle is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Next, plaintiff points to Watkins v. Bowden, 105 F.3d 1344 (11th Cir. 1997),

which arose under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the employment context. Apart from stating

that “claims under the Equal Protection Clause based on sexual and racial harassment

claim [sic] have long been recognized,”96 plaintiff fails to show how that opinion

would have given defendant Riddle fair warning of a constitutional violation in the

96 Doc. no. 44 (Plaintiff’s Consolidated Response to Defendants’ Motions for Summary

Judgment), at 29.

37

context of this case.

Finally, plaintiff invokes Hill v. Cundiff, 797 F.3d 948 (11th Cir. 2015), as

support for the claim that clearly established law gave Riddle fair warning that his

actions (or inactions) were unconstitutional. In that case, a female eighth-grade

student (referred to in the court’s opinion as “Jane Doe”) was raped in a school

bathroom by another student. Id. at 956. She had previously complained to school

officials about the perpetrator’s sexual advances toward her, and other students had

complained about his behavior as well. Id. at 961. Moreover, during the eighteen-

month period preceding the rape, the perpetrator had been disciplined five times for

sexual misconduct, and four times for fighting or threatening behavior. Id. at 959.

On the day of the rape, Jane Doe was propositioned by the perpetrator as she was

reporting to gym class. Id. at 961. She did not respond to him, but told a teacher’s

aide what he had said. Id. The teacher’s aide asked Doe whether she wanted to get

the student in trouble and she replied that she did. Hill, 797 F.3d at 961. The

teacher’s aide told Doe that she would have to go meet him and set him up, so that he

would be caught. Id. Doe initially expressed reluctance to execute this plan, but

eventually told the teacher’s aide that she would participate. Id. The teacher’s aide

then escorted Doe to the assistant principal’s office and, according to the teacher’s

aide, told the assistant principal of the plan to use Doe as “bait.” Id. at 962. In

38

accordance with instructions by the teacher’s aide, Doe told the perpetrator that she

would have sex with him, and he responded by telling her to meet him in the boys’

bathroom. Id. She did so, and tried to stall him, believing that a teacher would arrive.

Id. That did not happen, however, and Doe was subjected to anal rape. Hill, 797 F.3d

at 963. Teachers entered the bathroom after the assault and removed both students.

Id. An investigation of the incident ensued, but the principal took no action to reform

the high school’s sexual harassment or recordkeeping policies in response to the rape.

Id. at 965. The Eleventh Circuit held that no reasonable official in the principal’s

position could believe that doing nothing was lawful. Id. at 979.

Likewise, the Circuit held that the participation by the assistant principal and

teacher’s aide in the plot to entrap the perpetrator was egregious, and reversed the

district court’s grant of summary judgment, stating: “It is not surprising the district

court could not find similar case law,” because every reasonable official would know

the scheme violated the Equal Protection Clause. Hill, 797 F.3d at 979.

Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Hill is “materially similar” to this case. As

defendant Riddle points out, the teacher’s aide and assistant principal in that case

personally participated in the plan to apprehend the perpetrator, which is

distinguishable from Riddle’s conduct here. The Hill principal’s failure to take

corrective action to reform the school’s sexual harassment and disciplinary

39

recordkeeping policies are somewhat similar to Riddle’s inaction in response to the

racist slurs inflicted upon M.G., but the court cannot find that his administrative

deficiencies were clearly unreasonable, unlike in Hill, such that he should be denied

qualified immunity. Accordingly, Riddle’s motion for summary judgment is due to

be granted.

III. CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that the motion for summary

judgment filed by the Franklin County Board of Education be, and the same hereby

is, DENIED. It is further CONSIDERED, ORDERED, and ADJUDGED that the

motion for summary judgment filed by defendant Darit Riddle with respect to

plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim asserted against him is due to be, and the same

hereby is, GRANTED, and that claim is dismissed on the basis of the doctrine of

qualified immunity.

Finally, in accordance with plaintiff’s admission that all claims, other than her

Title VI claim against the Franklin County Board of Education and her 42 U.S.C.§

1983 claim against Darit Riddle are due to be dismissed,97 it is CONSIDERED,

ORDERED, and ADJUDGED that all other claims be, and the same hereby are,

DISMISSED with prejudice. Costs are taxed to the party who incurred them.

97 See doc. no. 44 (Plaintiff’s Consolidated Response to Defendants’ Motions for Summary

Judgment), at ECF 6.

40

DONE and ORDERED this 17th day of November, 2021. |

ys United States District Judge

4]

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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