Doe v. Huntsville City Schools Board of Education

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

JOHN DOE, }

}

Plaintiff, }

}

v. } Case No.: 5:21-cv-00110-MHH

}

HUNTSVILLE CITY SCHOOLS }

BOARD OF EDUCATION, }

SHARISSA CAGLE-BAILEY, }

ROBERT PERSON, HEATHER }

BARDWELL, BELISSA }

HOWARD, AND LESLIE }

ZUROWSKI, }

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This case arises out of a public school’s failure to protect its student, John

Doe, from bullying by other students. Several teachers, the school principal, two

assistant principals, and the school board of education have filed a partial motion to

dismiss. (Doc. 10). The defendants argue that John Doe has not pleaded a claim for

a substantive due process violation and that they are immune from John Doe’s state

law claims. For the reasons stated below, the Court will deny the motion as to John

Doe’s substantive due process claim and will grant the motion as to John Doe’s state

law claims.

MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD

Rule 12(b)(6) enables a defendant to move to dismiss a complaint for “failure

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Pursuant

to Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain, “a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Generally, to

survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and meet the requirement of FED. R. CIV.

P. 8(a)(2), “a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, but the allegations

must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Speaker v. U.S.

Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, 623

F.3d 1371, 1380 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

555, 570 (2007)). “Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only ‘give

the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it

rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at

555).

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a district court must view the

allegations in a complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Sun

Life Assurance Co. v. Imperial Premium Fin., LLC, 904 F.3d 1197, 1207 (11th Cir.

2018). A district court must accept well-pled facts as true. Little v. CRSA, 744 Fed.

Appx. 679, 681 (11th Cir. 2018). Therefore, the Court construes all factual

allegations and the reasonable inferences from those allegations in the light most

favorable to John Doe, the non-movant.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

During the 2016-2017 school year, John Doe was an eight-year-old student at

Mountain Gap School in Madison County, Alabama. (Doc. 1, p. 4, ¶ 13). The

Huntsville City Board of Education administers Mountain Gap School, and the

school receives federal funds for the education of students. (Doc. 1, p. 4, ¶ 14).

Heather Bardwell was the principal of the school, and Belissa Howard and Leslie

Zurowski were the assistant principals. (Doc. 1, pp. 4–5, ¶¶ 16–18). Sharissa Cagle-

Bailey was John Doe’s primary teacher, and Robert Person was his physical

education teacher. (Doc. 1, p. 5, ¶¶ 19–20).

John Doe has Asperger’s Syndrome and Charcot-Marie-Tooth Syndrome.

(Doc. 1, p. 1, ¶ 1).1 In August of 2016, John Doe became the target of frequent

bullying and physical assaults from his classmates, including C.G., D.S., and M.J.

(Doc. 1, pp. 4–5, ¶¶ 13, 22). D.S. and M.J. held John Doe on the ground while C.G.

punched him in the genitals. (Doc. 1, p. 5, ¶ 22). These assaults occurred in the

bathroom, during Mr. Person’s physical education class, and on the playground.

1 Asperger’s Syndrome is “a developmental disorder characterized by significant difficulties in

social interaction and nonverbal communication,” and Charcot-Marie-Tooth Syndrome is “a

neurological chromosomal disability affecting [John Doe’s] motor and sensory abilities.” (Doc.

1, p. 1, ¶ 1).

(Doc. 1, p. 5, ¶ 22). John Doe told his teachers, Ms. Cagle-Bailey and Mr. Person,

seven or eight times about the assaults, but neither teacher stopped the bullying.

(Doc. 1, pp. 5–6, ¶¶ 23–24).

After Ms. Cagle-Bailey and Mr. Person refused to intervene, on December 13,

2016, John Doe told his mother, Mary Doe, that he “was being punched in the nuts

by the meanest toughest bully,” which had made John Doe bend over in pain. (Doc.

1, p. 6, ¶ 25). Mary Doe immediately emailed Ms. Cagle-Bailey to demand that she

stop the assaults, but Ms. Cagle-Bailey did not respond, and the bullies continued to

hit John Doe. (Doc. 1, p. 6, ¶ 26). Mary Doe sent a second email to Ms. Cagle-

Bailey. Again, she received no response, so, on December 14, 2016, she went to the

school to speak with Ms. Zurowski. (Doc. 1, p. 6, ¶ 27). That same day, the bullies

punched John Doe again. (Doc. 1, p. 6, ¶ 28).

John Doe’s family contacted Ms. Zurowski, Ms. Bardwell, and Ms. Howard

several times in the days that followed—writing emails, calling their phone numbers,

and leaving voicemails—but they did not receive a response. (Doc. 1, p. 7, ¶¶ 29–

31). M.J. punched John Doe on the arm on December 15, 2016. (Doc. 1, p. 7, ¶ 32).

John Doe went to his family physician over the winter holiday break for an

examination of the injuries he received at the hands of the bullies. (Doc. 1, p. 7, ¶

32). The doctor concluded that John Doe had suffered significant trauma to his

genitals, including a “loss of viability” of a testicle. (Doc. 1, p. 7, ¶ 33). Mary Doe

provided the school a letter from the doctor in which he explained the extent of John

Doe’s permanent physical injuries, and the doctor said, “I trust you will do all you

can to ensure the safety of [John Doe] and his good health.” (Doc. 1, pp. 7–8, ¶¶

33–34).

Mary Doe and her father met with Ms. Bardwell and Ms. Howard before the

spring semester began to discuss a plan for keeping the bullies completely away from

John Doe. (Doc. 1, pp. 7–8, ¶ 34). But when John Doe returned to school on January

4, 2017, the defendants did not separate John Doe from the bullies or transfer John

Doe to different classes. (Doc. 1, p. 8, ¶ 35). Instead, Ms. Howard had John Doe

meet in her office with C.G. (Doc. 1, p. 8, ¶ 35). She required them to shake hands

to make them “become friends.” (Doc. 1, p. 8, ¶ 35). After this meeting, C.G. told

John Doe that it was “ok” for him to hit John Doe and that he should not tell the

teachers when C.G. hit him because “friends don’t tell on friends.” (Doc. 1, p. 8, ¶

35).

The meeting with Ms. Howard did not deter the bullies. Approximately a

week after the meeting, Ms. Cagle-Bailey emailed Mary Doe that John Doe had

gotten in trouble at school for spitting at the bullies. (Doc. 1, p. 8, ¶ 36). The bullies

were trying to make him “say bad words” and would not leave John Doe alone.

(Doc. 1, p. 8, ¶ 36). John Doe alleges he was disciplined for this incident, but he

does not allege whether the bullies were disciplined. (Doc. 1, p. 8, ¶ 36).

Eventually, the school provided an aide to supervise John Doe, but the bullies’

physical assaults during P.E. continued. (Doc. 1, p. 8, ¶ 37). Mary Doe withdrew

John Doe from the school after the bullies shoved him during class. (Doc. 1, p. 8, ¶

37). On February 3, 2017, John Doe had surgery to repair his viable testicle and

remove the testicle permanently damaged by the physical assaults. (Doc. 1, p. 8, ¶

38). As he ages, John Doe may need surgery to remove his other testicle due to the

physical trauma he received. (Doc. 1, pp. 1–2, ¶ 1).

Based on these events, John Doe, who sues by and through his guardian and

next of friend, Mary Doe, alleges various federal and state law claims against the

Huntsville City Board of Education, Ms. Bardwell, Ms. Howard, Ms. Zurowski, Mr.

Person, and Ms. Cagle-Bailey. (Doc. 1). Against all defendants, John Doe alleges

violations of his 14th Amendment due process and equal protection rights under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 and a claim under Alabama law for outrage. John Doe brings claims

against the Board for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, codified at

42 U.S.C § 12132; violations of Title IX, codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq.; and

negligent, reckless, or wanton hiring training, retention, and supervision of its

teacher-employees. John Doe brings claims of negligence and recklessness or

wantonness against the teachers in their individual capacities. (Doc. 1, pp. 9–16).

ANALYSIS

I. Substantive Due Process

In Count II of his complaint, John Doe alleges, pursuant to 42 U.S. Code §

1983, that the defendants violated his substantive due process and equal protection

rights under the Fourteenth Amendment because they did not protect him the

bullying by other students at Mountain Gap. (Doc. 1, pp. 10–11). “Section 1983

allows persons to sue individuals or municipalities acting under the color of state

law for violations of federal law.” Hill v. Cundiff, 797 F.3d 948, 976 (11th Cir.

2015). Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution

provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law.” U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1. “The substantive

component of the Due Process Clause protects those rights that are ‘fundamental,’

that is, rights that are ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’” McKinney v. Pate,

20 F.3d 1550, 1556 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,

325 (1937), overruled on other grounds by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784

(1969)).

The defendants argue that John Doe cannot make a claim for a substantive

due process violation because they did not have a constitutional duty to protect John

Doe from the bullies’ assaults at school. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh

Circuit has “said repeatedly that the Fourteenth Amendment is not a ‘font of tort

law’” that can support federal causes of action. Neal ex rel. Neal v. Fulton Cnty. Bd.

of Educ., 229 F.3d 1069, 1074 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v.

Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 848 (1998)). “[N]othing in the language of the Due Process

Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens

against invasion by private actors. The Clause is phrased as a limitation on the

State's power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimum levels of safety and

security.” DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189,

195 (1988). Therefore, the circumstances in which government actors can be held

liable for substantive due process violations are limited.

Government actors usually do not have a duty to protect individuals from third

parties unless the individual is in state custody. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195; see

also L.S., et al. v. Peterson, et al., 982 F.3d 1323, 1329 (11th Cir. 2020).2 Absent a

custodial relationship, a claim for a substantive due process violation is viable only

when a government official acts arbitrarily or in a conscience-shocking way. See

L.S., et al., 982 F.3d at 1329 (quoting Waddell v. Hendry Cnty. Sheriff's Off., 329

F.3d 1300, 1305 (11th Cir. 2003)). Therefore, to maintain a substantive due process

claim, John Doe must adequately allege that the defendants acted in an arbitrary or

conscience-shocking way.

2 Students are not in custody for due process purposes while at school. Nix v. Franklin Cnty. Sch.

Dist., 311 F.3d 1373, 1378 (11th Cir. 2002) (“This court has ruled that schoolchildren are not in a

custodial relationship with the state.”); see also L.S., et al., 982 F.3d at 1329–30.

The shock-the-conscience standard is context specific. See Nix, 311 F.3d at

1376–77 (“The somewhat nebulous ‘shocks the conscience’ phrase has taken on

different meanings in different cases, depending on a given case's factual setting.”).

The United States Supreme Court has held that acts “intended to injure in some way

unjustifiable by any government interest” are those “most likely to rise to the

conscience-shocking level.” Lewis, 523 U.S. at 836, 846–47. On the other hand,

negligent acts are categorically insufficient to rise to the level of a substantive due

process violation. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 848; Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348

(1986) (“The guarantee of due process has never been understood to mean that the

State must guarantee due care on the part of its officials.”). When a government

official’s acts “fall between the poles of negligence and malign intent,” which

includes acts that are reckless or grossly negligent, the Court must make a “close

call” to determine if the act, considering the totality of the circumstances at the time

of the act and without the benefit of hindsight, shocks the conscience. Nix, 311 F.3d

at 1376 (citing Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849).

Deliberate indifference falls between those two poles; deliberate indifference

is a higher level of culpability than negligence, but it is lower than intentional

conduct. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has “doubt[ed] that

deliberate indifference can ever be arbitrary or conscience shocking in a non-

custodial setting,” see L.S., et al., 982 F.3d at 1330 (internal quotations omitted), but

the Court of Appeals has suggested that “deliberate indifference to an extremely

great risk of serious injury” may give rise to a substantive due process violation in a

non-custodial setting when the government actor had sufficient time to deliberate

and consider its actions. Waddell, 329 F.3d at 1306. A government official acts

with deliberate indifference when she “know[s] of and disregard[s] an excessive—

that is, an extremely great—risk to the victim’s health or safety.” Waddell, 329 F.3d

at 1306.

In the public school context, situations involving intentional, excessive

corporal punishment are sufficient to support a substantive due process claim. See,

e.g., Kirkland ex rel. Jones v. Greene Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 347 F.3d 903, 904–05 (11th

Cir. 2003) (finding a substantive due process violation when the principal hit a

student in the head, ribs, and back with a metal cane as a form of discipline); Neal

ex rel. Neal v. Fulton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 229 F.3d 1069, 1074 (11th Cir. 2000)

(finding a substantive due process violation when a high school coach struck a

student with a heavy metal lock, blinding the student in one eye as punishment for

fighting). As in other contexts, negligent conduct that causes harm to public school

students will not support a substantive due process claim. For example, in Nix, the

Court of Appeals held that a high school teacher did not violate a student’s

substantive due process rights of a student who passed away after touching an

electrified wire during a science experiment in the teacher’s electromechanical class.

311 F.3d at 1377–79. The Court of Appeals concluded that the student’s death was

an unfortunate accident caused by the teacher’s negligence, and the teacher’s actions

did not rise to the level of an intentional act to harm the student. 311 F.3d at 1377–

79. The Court of Appeals explained that its “holding is a narrow one; it would not

necessarily control, say, a similar accident in a 4th-grade classroom, or even other

types of seriously harmful behavior occurring in a high-school class.” Nix, 311 F.3d

at 1379 n.2.

The defendants cite cases in which courts in this circuit have found that public

school employees did not act in an arbitrary or conscience shocking way in failing

to stop bullying or assaults to students, despite the employees’ awareness of

bullying. See, e.g, Moore v. Chilton Cnty. Bd. Of Educ., 936 F. Supp. 2d 1300 (M.D.

Ala. March 27, 2013) (holding no substantive due process violation when school

teachers failed to prevent bullying, which caused a high school student to commit

suicide); L.L. ex rel. Linda L v. Tuscaloosa City Board of Educ., No. 7:08–cv–2051–

LSC, 2013 WL 169612 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 15, 2013) (no substantive due process

violation when teachers failed to protect eighth grade student from sexual assault by

another student with known sexual aggression); Long v. Murray Cnty. Sch. Dist.,

Civil Action File No. 4:10–CV–00015–HLM, 2012 WL 2277836 (N.D. Ga. May

21, 2012) (granting summary judgment on the grounds that high school

administrators did not violate a deceased student’s substantive due process rights by

failing to train employees and provide adequate protection from bullies).

In contrast, a court in this circuit has found that a plaintiff sufficiently pleaded

that public school employees acted in a conscience-shocking manner in failing to

protect an elementary school student from assault. In Doe v. Hoover City Board of

Educ., a first-grade student in the Hoover public school system alleged that she

frequently was sexually assaulted by classmates. Doe v. Hoover City Board of

Educ., Case No.: 2:19-cv-243-AMM, 2020 WL 5548804, at *1–2 (N.D. Ala. Sept.

16, 2020). After telling her teacher, the teacher did not stop the classmates from

going into the bathroom with Jane Doe. Doe v. Hoover City Board of Educ., 2020

WL 5548804, *11–12. The principal punished the classmates for the assaults by

making them run laps, and the classmates were not removed from Jane Doe’s class.

Doe v. Hoover City Board of Educ., 2020 WL 5548804, *11–12. The district court

rejected the defendants’ arguments that they did not commit a substantive due

process violation in failing to protect Jane Doe from the sexual assaults. After

distinguishing other cases cited by the defendants in that case, including Nix v.

Franklin Cnty. Sch. Dist., the district court concluded, “[a]lthough the court cannot

know whether Doe ultimately will adduce evidence that will satisfy the demanding

‘shock-the-conscience’ test, the Individual Defendants have not identified any

binding precedent holding that the conduct alleged in Doe’s complaint as a matter

of law cannot shock the conscience.” Doe v. Hoover City Board of Educ., 2020 WL

5548804, *12.

With these examples in mind, and cognizant of the fact that the defendants

rely on some summary judgment opinions to support of their motion to dismiss, the

Court turns to John Doe’s substantive due process claim. John Doe’s substantive

due process claim more closely resembles Jane Doe’s claim than the claims of the

plaintiffs in the cases on which the defendants rely. John Doe, like Jane Doe, is a

particularly vulnerable student because of his age. John Doe also has developmental

disabilities. John Doe was eight years old when he suffered permanent physical

injury from bullies, and he has Charcot-Marie-Tooth Syndrome and Asperger’s

Syndrome. (Doc. 1, p. 1, ¶ 1). Though they involve significant abuse, the cases the

defendants cite concern junior high or high school students. The defendants’ alleged

failure to protect a young, vulnerable student pushes this case toward the conscious-

shocking end of the spectrum of substantive due process cases. See Hatfield v.

O’Neill, 534 Fed. Appx. 838, 847 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting M.S. ex rel. Soltys v.

Seminole Cnty. Sch. Board, 636 F. Supp. 2d 1317 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (“The

conscience-shocking threshold is more quickly reached in cases where the victim is

particularly vulnerable to abuse and is otherwise defenseless.”).

So does the defendants’ alleged failure to respond to repeated notifications of

John Doe’s abuse. John Doe alleges that he repeatedly notified his teachers that his

classmates were bullying him, and his mother tried to contact his teachers and school

administrators, but the teachers and administrators turned a deaf ear. John Doe

alleges he told Mr. Person “at least seven or eight times” from August to December

2016 about the bullies’ assaults, and John Doe asked for help from Ms. Cagle-Bailey.

(Doc. 1, pp. 5–6, ¶¶ 23–24). In December of 2016, Mary Doe attempted to contact

Ms. Cagle-Bailey and the school administration several times about John Doe, but

she received no response from the defendants. (Doc. 1, pp. 6–7, ¶¶ 25–31). Mary

Doe eventually spoke with Ms. Zurowski and demanded that the school take steps

to protect John Doe. (Doc. 1, p. 6, ¶ 27). Mary Doe met with Ms. Bardwell and Ms.

Howard in January of 2017 before the beginning of the spring semester, and she

gave them a note from John Doe’s doctor that explained that John Doe had suffered

permanent injury to his testicles because of the bullies. (Doc. 1, pp. 7–8, ¶ 34). Still,

John Doe alleges, the defendants did not intervene to protect him until later in the

spring semester when the school provided him an aide. (Doc. 1, p. 8, ¶ 37).

When Ms. Howard eventually intervened, instead of separating John Doe

from the classmates who were bullying him, she required John Doe to meet with one

bully, C.G., to encourage John Doe and C.G. to “become friends.” (Doc. 1, pp. 7–

8, ¶¶ 34–35). After the meeting, C.G. told John Doe that it was “ok” for friends to

hit friends and that he should not tell the teachers because “friends don’t tell on

friends.” (Doc. 1, p. 8, ¶ 35). Thus, Ms. Howard disregarded the danger the bullies

posed for John Doe and acted in a way that “render[ed] [John Doe] . . . more

vulnerable” to the bullying. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201.

On this record, John Doe has adequately pleaded that the defendants violated

his substantive due process rights by refusing to intervene to stop classmates from

bullying and injuring him. The defendants may present their legal arguments again

on an evidentiary record, but John Doe’s factual allegations in his complaint permit

his substantive due process claim to survive the defendants’ motion to dismiss.3

II. State Law Claims

Regarding John Doe’s state law claims, the Huntsville City Board of

Education and the individual defendants argue they are entitled to immunity under

Article I, Section 14 of the Alabama Constitution, which states, “[t]he State of

Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity.” ALA.

CONST. art I, § 14. “Section 14 immunity is more than a defense; when applicable,

it divests the trial courts of this State of subject-matter jurisdiction.” Alabama State

3 The Huntsville City Board of Education cannot be held liable for the individual state defendants’

actions unless the actions are “fairly deemed to represent government policy, or a custom or

practice so pervasive and well-settled that it assumes the force of law.” Denno v. Sch. Bd. of

Volusia Cnty., Fla., 218 F.3d 1267, 1276 (11th Cir. 2000). John Doe does not allege that the

individual defendants acted pursuant to an official policy when they ignored his requests for help

or required him to meet in Ms. Howard’s office with C.G. But John Doe’s allegations concerning

the repeated failure of multiple school employees to intervene to prevent bullying of an eight-year-

old student, despite notice of physical harm to the student, suggests a well-settled custom or

practice of utter disregard for student safety. Therefore, the Court will not dismiss John Doe’s

substantive due process claim against the Board. As with the individual defendants, the Board

may raise its legal arguments again on an evidentiary record.

Univ. v. Danley, 212 So. 3d 112, 127 (Ala. 2016). Because municipal and county

boards of education are state agencies under Alabama law, the Huntsville City Board

of Education is immune from John Doe’s state law tort claims. See Ex parte Phenix

City Board of Education, 109 So. 3d 631, 632–33 (Ala. 2012); see also Walker v.

Jefferson County Board of Education, 771 F.3d 748, 754–55 (11th Cir. 2014). John

Doe concedes that the Board is immune from his state law claims against it. (Doc.

13, p. 11). John Doe voluntarily dismisses his tort claim for outrage against all

defendants. (Doc. 13, p. 11). That leaves John Doe’s state law claims against the

individual defendants for negligence and recklessness or wantonness. (Doc. 1, pp.

13–15).

State employees sued in their individual capacities are not entitled to Section

14 immunity when a plaintiff alleges that the employees acted fraudulently, beyond

their authority, or under mistaken interpretation of law, unless the claim against the

employees is, in effect, a claim against the State of Alabama. See Barnhart v.

Ingalls, 275 So. 3d 1112, 1225–27 (Ala. 2018); see also Ex parte Moulton, 116 So.

3d 1119, 1141 (Ala. 2013); Taylor v. Troy State Univ., 437 So. 2d 472, 474 (Ala.

1983). To determine if a claim is effectively against the State of Alabama, courts

consider several factors, including:

whether ‘a result favorable to the plaintiff would directly affect a

contract or property right of the State,’ Mitchell [v. Davis], 598 So. 2d

[801,] 806 [ (Ala. 1992) ], whether the defendant is simply a ‘conduit’

through which the plaintiff seeks recovery of damages from the State,

Barnes v. Dale, 530 So. 2d 770, 784 (Ala. 1988), and whether ‘a

judgment against the officer would directly affect the financial status of

the State treasury,’ Lyons [v. River Road Constr., Inc.], 858 So. 2d [257]

at 261 [ (Ala. 2003) ].”

Haley v. Barbour Cnty., 885 So. 2d 783, 788 (Ala. 2004). When a plaintiff must

demonstrate that a government official owed a duty to him, the claim likely is against

the State if the duty arises only from the defendant’s position as a state officer.

Barnhart, 275 So. 3d at 1226–27 (holding that state officials were entitled to Section

14 immunity for negligence and breach-of-fiduciary claims against them concerning

their failure to provide proper benefits to employees because the government

officials “had no duties in their individual capacities to give effect to the benefit

statutes; rather, any duties they had in that regard existed solely because of their

official positions in which they acted for the State.”) (emphasis in Barnhart).

The individual defendants argue that their duty to protect and discipline

students arises only from their position as state officials, either as teachers or

administrators. John Doe alleges that the individual defendants did not “act in a

reasonably prudent manner when executing their duties as employees of Mountain

Gap to supervise, discipline, suspend, and/or expel students who pose a real

and immediate danger to their fellow students, and to protect its students from

harassment, intimidation, and assault.” (Doc. 1, p. 13, ¶ 68; see also Doc. 1, p. 14,

¶ 72. Thus, John Doe’s state law claims against the individual defendants pertain to

those defendants’ duties as public school teachers and administrators. Because those

claims are effectively against Alabama, not the individual defendants, the individual

defendants are entitled to Section 14 immunity for John Doe’s state law claims.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court denies the defendants’ motion to

dismiss as to John Doe’s substantive due process claim and grants the motion as to

John Doe’s state law claims.

DONE and ORDERED this July 1, 2021.

adits Sl aval _

Malis Se Pa

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

18