Prince v. City of Northport, Alabama

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

WESTERN DIVISION

EMMITT PRINCE, )

)

Plaintiff,

)

) 7:19-cv-01854-LSC

vs.

)

CITY OF NORTHPORT, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Emmitt Prince (“Plaintiff” or “Prince”), a fifty-two year old African-

American, brings this action against his employer, the City of Northport

(“Defendant” or “Northport”). Prince asserts claims for race discrimination under

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”), and

42 U.S.C. § 1981 brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Prince also brings a claim

against Northport for age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (“ADEA”).

Before the Court is Northport’s Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 16).

This motion is fully briefed and ripe for review. For the reasons stated below,

Northport’s motion is due to be granted.

II. BACKGROUND1

Prince began working for Northport in April 2002 as a laborer in the Public

Works Department. In 2016, Prince applied for and was promoted to the position of

Traffic Technician I. In this position, Prince was responsible for “[m]aintaining

street signs, building signs,” operating various equipment on trucks, such as pulleys,

“grinding, painting,” and helping Brad Akin (“Akin”) as needed. (Doc. 18-1 at 69.)

At that time, Akin held the position of Traffic Technician II. In late 2018, Akin was

promoted to the position of Traffic Signal Technician, which created an opening for

Traffic Technician II.

After Akin was promoted, Brooke Starnes (“Starnes”), the Director of Public

Works, chose to make the Traffic Technician II position more technical. Northport

had to rely on the Alabama Department of Transportation (“ALDOT”) to service

traffic cabinets, which was costly. Starnes believed that Northport should be able to

handle this work within its own Traffic Department. In order to achieve this goal,

1 The facts set out in this opinion are gleaned from the parties’ submissions of facts claimed

to be undisputed, their respective responses to those submissions, and the Court’s own

examination of the evidentiary record. These are the “facts” for summary judgment purposes

only. They may not be the actual facts. See Cox v. Adm'r U.S. Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1400

(11th Cir. 1994). The Court is not required to identify unreferenced evidence supporting a party’s

position. As such, review is limited to exhibits and specific portions of the exhibits specifically cited

by the parties. See Chavez v. Sec’y Fla. Dept. of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1061 (11th Cir. 2011)

(“[D]istrict court judges are not required to ferret out delectable facts buried in a massive

record . . . .”)

Northport changed the qualifications for the Traffic Technician II position,

requiring a heightened level of electrical knowledge. To assess an applicant’s

electrical knowledge, Starnes and Joey Olive (“Olive”), the Assistant Director of

Public Works, developed a series of questions that would be asked during interviews

to determine whether an applicant could use electrical equipment as well as read

electrical schematics.2 Additional requirements for Traffic Technician II listed in the

written job description included one year of experience in electronics and the ability

to read a voltmeter.

Prince applied for the Traffic Technician II position in December 2018. He

listed previous experience on his application, which included work in his position as

Traffic Technician I, and high school electrical classes, which he had taken at least

thirty-three years ago. Prince did not have one year of experience in electronics. Jesse

Hallman (“Hallman”), a twenty-seven-year-old Caucasian male, also applied for the

open position. At that time, Hallman was employed by Northport as a Wastewater

Operator. Hallman listed previous experience on his application, which included

working with relevant electrical equipment, and an associate’s degree in applied

science with a focus in electrical technology. Consistent with Northport’s

2 While these interview questions were implemented for the first time in 2018, Northport

continued to use the same questions in subsequent years during interviews for the Traffic

Technician II position.

procedures for filling open positions, Northport’s Civil Service Board evaluated

potential applicants and allowed Prince, Hallman, and two other candidates to apply

for the Traffic Technician II position. By permitting the candidates to apply,

Northport’s Civil Service Board certified that each was minimally qualified for the

position. While four candidates were permitted to apply for the position, only three

proceeded with the interview process.

The interviews were structured such that each applicant would be asked the

same series of questions using an interview guide. This included eight standard

interview questions, and five questions tailored to the technical job requirements of

Traffic Technician II. The questions relevant to Traffic Technician II focused on the

applicant’s knowledge of electricity, including whether the applicant could

distinguish between different colors on a wire sample; identify different settings on

a voltmeter; measure ohms and determine continuity in a wire sample; utilize a tape

measure; and determine the function of different wires on a diagram. Northport

sought both external and internal applicants for the open position. Consistent with

Northport’s policies for jobs open to external candidates, the interview would

represent 100% of a candidate’s score.3

3 Prince disputes this, stating that Northport should have considered seniority in calculating

each candidate’s score in addition to the interview. However, Northport followed its own policies

and procedures for jobs that are posted externally, which Prince concedes, and Prince has

presented no evidence to suggest that Northport deviated from its own policies and procedures.

All interviews were conducted by the same panel of interviewers: Starnes,

Olive, Akin, and Joseph Rose (“Rose”), the Director of Human Resources. These

interviewers were all Caucasian. During Prince’s interview, he received scores of 27,

32, and 29 for an average score of 29.34 These were the lowest scores of the three

candidates who interviewed. Prince could not identify four of five symbols on a

voltmeter. He did not demonstrate that he could measure the continuity of the wire

sample, and he had difficulty identifying the function of wires in the diagram. Prince

recognized that the interview had gone poorly, admitting as much to Akin and

Starnes shortly thereafter.

During Hallman’s interview, he received scores of 38, 51, and 46, for an

average score of 45. These were the highest scores of the three candidates who

interviewed. Hallman correctly identified all of the symbols on the voltmeter;

measured the continuity of the wire sample; and identified the function of wires in

the diagram. At Starnes’s recommendation, Northport hired Hallman for the Traffic

Technician II position because of his superior performance during the interview.

4 Although there were four interviewers, each candidate received three scores, as Rose did

not possess the technical knowledge to provide a score.

After Hallman was hired, he became Prince’s supervisor. Prince testified that he had

to train Hallman on certain nontechnical tasks, such how to build signs.

After Prince did not receive the promotion to Traffic Technician II, he asked

Akin if it was due to his race and age. Prince states that Northport never had an

African-American hold the position of Traffic Technician II. Akin passed along

Prince’s concerns, and ultimately Starnes sent a letter to Prince stating that the

selected candidate had more experience in the electrical field, recent education in

electronics technology, and a higher interview score. Starnes later testified that the

reason Hallman was hired over Prince was because of his superior performance

during the interview.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact5 and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute is genuine if “the record taken as a

whole could lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party.” Hickson

Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004). A genuine dispute as

to a material fact exists “if the nonmoving party has produced evidence such that a

5 A material fact is one that “might affect the outcome of the case.” Urquilla-Diaz v. Kaplan

Univ., 780 F.3d 1039, 1050 (11th Cir. 2015).

reasonable factfinder could return a verdict in its favor.” Greenberg v. BellSouth

Telecomms., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (quoting Waddell

v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001)). The trial judge

should not weigh the evidence, but should determine whether there are any genuine

issues of fact that should be resolved at trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 249 (1986).

In considering a motion for summary judgment, trial courts must give

deference to the nonmoving party by “view[ing] the materials presented and all

factual inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Animal Legal

Def. Fund v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 789 F.3d 1206, 1213–14 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing

Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970)). However, “unsubstantiated

assertions alone are not enough to withstand a motion for summary judgment.”

Rollins v. TechSouth, Inc., 833 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1987). Conclusory

allegations and a “mere scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving party will

not suffice to overcome a motion for summary judgment.” Melton v. Abston, 841 F.3d

1207, 1219 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (quoting Young v. City of Palm Bay, 358 F.3d

859, 860 (11th Cir. 2004)). In making a motion for summary judgment, “the moving

party has the burden of either negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s

case or showing that there is no evidence to prove a fact necessary to the nonmoving

party’s case.” McGee v. Sentinel Offender Servs., LLC, 719 F.3d 1236, 1242 (11th Cir.

2013) (per curiam). Although the trial courts must use caution when granting

motions for summary judgment, “[s]ummary judgment procedure is properly

regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the

Federal Rules as a whole.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986).

IV. DISCUSSION

Prince brings two types of claims against Northport. First, Prince asserts that

he was discriminated against because of his race when he was denied a promotion to

Traffic Technician II. Second, Prince asserts he was discriminated against because

of his age when he was denied a promotion to Traffic Technician II. Northport has

moved for summary judgment on both claims.

A. Race Discrimination

Title VII prohibits, among other conduct, “discriminat[ion] against any

individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of

employment, because of such individual’s race.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Title

VII and § 1981 “have the same requirements of proof and use the same analytical

framework.” Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1330 (11th Cir. 1998).

While Title VII and § 1981 utilize the same framework, “§ 1981 does not provide an

implicit cause of action against state actors; therefore § 1983 constitutes the

exclusive federal remedy for violation[s] by state actors of the rights guaranteed

under § 1981.” Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1288 n.1 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Butts

v. Cnty. of Volusia, 222 F.3d 891, 984–95 (11th Cir. 2000)).

“[A] plaintiff may use three different kinds of evidence of discriminatory

intent: direct evidence, circumstantial evidence or statistical evidence.” Standard,

161 F.3d at 1330. Absent direct evidence of racial discrimination, such as specific

statements made by the employer’s representatives, a plaintiff may demonstrate

circumstantial evidence of disparate treatment through the McDonnell Douglas

burden-shifting framework. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973); see also Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).6 Under this

framework, the aggrieved employee creates a presumption of unlawful

discrimination by first establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. See Lewis v.

City of Union City, 918 F.3d 1213, 1220–21 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc). The burden

then shifts to the employer “to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

its actions.” Id. at 1221 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253). If the employer proffers a

6 “Direct evidence of discrimination would be evidence which, if believed, would prove the

existence of a fact without inference or presumption.” Carter v. City of Miami, 870 F.2d 578, 581–

82 (11th Cir. 1989). Because Prince has not offered any direct evidence of discrimination, the Court

addresses his claims under the standards applicable to circumstantial evidence of discrimination.

See Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Devs., Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1264 (11th Cir. 2010).

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the burden returns to the employee to prove

that the employer’s reason is a pretext for unlawful discrimination. Crawford v.

Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 976 (11th Cir. 2008). Although the McDonnell Douglas

framework is one way of showing discriminatory intent, it is not the only way to show

discriminatory intent in a Title VII or § 1981 discrimination claim. See Smith v.

Lockheed–Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011). “[T]he plaintiff will

always survive summary judgment if he presents circumstantial evidence that creates

a triable issue concerning the employer’s discriminatory intent.” Id. As Title VII and

§ 1981 claims are analyzed in the same manner, the Court will address both claims

together.

1. Prima Facie Case

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination in the context of a failure to

hire or promote claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) he is a member of a protected class,

(2) he was qualified and applied for the position, (3) he was rejected, and (4) the

position was filled by a person outside of his protected class. See Vessels v. Atlanta

Ind. Sch. Sys., 408 F.3d 763, 768 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (citing McDonnell

Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). To establish that a plaintiff is qualified, he “need only

show that he . . . satisfied an employer’s objective qualifications.” Id. at 769. The

plaintiff does not need to address the “relative qualifications” of other applicants as

part of his prima facie case. Walker v. Mortham, 158 F.3d 1177, 1193 (11th Cir. 1998).

It is undisputed that Prince is a member of a protected class, that he applied

for the position of Traffic Technician II and was rejected, and that the position was

filled by a person outside of his protected class. Northport, however, contends that

Prince was not qualified. Northport argues that Prince’s poor performance during

his interview established that he was not qualified for the position; however, this

determination is subjective and cannot be used to show a candidate is not qualified

at the prima facie stage. See Vessels, 408 F.3d at 769 (“[S]ubjective criteria have no

place in the plaintiff’s initial prima facie case.”). Prince provides evidence that he

was objectively qualified for the position because Northport’s Civil Service Board

permitted him to apply, certifying that he was minimally qualified. Viewing the facts

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Prince has established he was

qualified for the position of Traffic Technician II, thus he has established a prima

facie case of discrimination.

2. Legitimate, Nondiscriminatory Reason

As Prince has stated a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to

Northport to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for promoting Hallman

instead of Prince. See Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1221 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253). The

burden at this stage “is exceedingly light.” Perryman v. Johnson Prods. Co., 698 F.2d

1138, 1142 (11th Cir. 1983). It is merely a burden of production, not a burden of proof.

Id.

Northport states that it chose to promote Hallman instead of Prince because

Hallman had relevant experience for Traffic Technician II and was the highest

scoring candidate who interviewed for the position. Prince’s average interview score

was 29.3, which was the lowest of three candidates, compared with Hallman, whose

average interview score was 45. This is sufficient for Northport to meet its burden of

production at this stage.

3. Pretext

As Northport has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its

decision, “the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to produce evidence that the

employer’s proffered reason [is] a pretext for discrimination.” Alvarez, 610 F.3d at

1264. A “plaintiff can show pretext ‘either directly by persuading the court that a

discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing

that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence,’” Kragor v.

Takeda Pharms. Am., Inc., 702 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Burdine, 450

U.S. at 256), such that a rational trier of fact could disbelieve the employer’s

proffered nondiscriminatory reason, Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079,

1088 (11th Cir. 2004). “When a plaintiff chooses to attack the veracity of the

employer’s proffered reason, the inquiry is limited to whether the employer gave an

honest explanation of its behavior.” Kragor, 702 F.3d at 1310–11 (internal quotation

marks omitted). A prima facie case plus sufficient evidence of pretext may permit the

factfinder to find unlawful discrimination, making summary judgment inappropriate.

See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000). In

determining whether the proffered reason is pretextual, courts are not in the

“business of adjudging whether employment decisions are prudent or fair,” but

rather “whether unlawful discriminatory animus motivates a challenged

employment decision.” Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Fla., Inc., 196 F.3d 1354,

1361 (11th Cir. 1999).

Prince has failed to present sufficient evidence to rebut Northport’s claim that

it promoted Hallman because he was more qualified than Prince. To successfully

challenge an employer’s explanation that it promoted the better qualified candidate,

the plaintiff must show that “the disparities between the successful applicant’s and

his own qualifications were ‘of such weight and significance that no reasonable

person, in the exercise of impartial judgment, could have chosen the candidate

selected over the plaintiff.’” Springer v. Convergys Customer Mgmt. Grp. Inc., 509

F.3d 1344, 1349 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (quoting Cooper v. S. Co., 390 F.3d 695,

732 (11th Cir. 2004), overruled in part by Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454 (2006)

(per curiam)); see also Ash, 546 U.S. at 457 (approving of this language from Cooper).

Furthermore, the plaintiff cannot prove pretext by merely arguing or even showing

that he was better qualified than the individual who received the promotion, rather,

the plaintiff must show that the “defendant’s employment decisions . . . were in fact

motivated by race.” Springer, 509 F.3d at 1349.

Here, Northport provided an honest explanation for its decision to promote

Hallman, and Prince has not presented any evidence to suggest otherwise. Northport

made a business decision to increase the technical qualifications for Traffic

Technician II in an effort to reduce reliance on ALDOT for basic maintenance of

traffic cabinets. To that effect, Starnes and Olive created neutral interview questions

designed to test whether a candidate had the requisite electrical knowledge given the

change in job requirements. Prince characterizes this decision as related to a “vague

issue with ALDOT” and that “it just sounds like an excuse or pretext.” (Doc. 22 at

26.) However, it is Prince’s burden to demonstrate that Northport’s legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons were pretextual for discriminating against Prince because

of his race. This Court is not tasked with the job of second-guessing Northport’s

business decisions. See Damon, 196 F.3d at 1361.

Prince argues that because Northport had never relied on these interview

questions in the past, then reliance on the questions during his interview process was

pretextual for discriminating against him because of his race. Additionally, Prince

argues that because the interview was subjective, that the entire process is “called

into question.” (Doc. 22 at 26.) Neither argument is persuasive. Northport changed

the technical requirements for the Traffic Technician II position, which was

reflected in the interview questions. And, Northport continued to use the same set

of interview questions in subsequent interviews for the same position. Prince has not

provided any evidence to suggest that the interview questions were a vehicle for

discrimination because of his race.

As to Prince’s argument that subjective interview questions call the entire

process into question, a subjective interview may be “a legally sufficient, legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason if the defendant articulates a clear and reasonably specific

factual basis upon which it based its subjective opinion.” Chapman v. AI Trans., 229

F.3d 1012, 1034 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Here, Northport has articulated a clear

and reasonably specific factual basis for asking interview questions as they were

directly relevant to the candidates’ ability to do the job. The fact that Prince thinks

that the job could be completed without the requisite electrical knowledge is

insufficient to create a question for a jury to resolve regarding Northport’s

discriminatory intent. See Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1265–66 (A plaintiff “cannot succeed

by simply quarreling with the wisdom of [the defendant’s] reason.” (quoting

Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1030)).

Prince also asserts that Northport’s reasons for failing to promote him to the

position of Traffic Technician II were inconsistent, and thus demonstrate pretext.

Prince cites to Starnes’s deposition testimony, in which she states that Hallman was

selected because of his superior performance during the interview process. The

parties also submitted different versions of the letter provided to Prince explaining

why he was not selected for the open position. In both versions of the letter, Starnes

states that Hallman was promoted instead of Prince because of his superior interview

as well as his heightened level of electrical experience. These reasons are not

inconsistent in that Hallman’s level of electrical experience was apparent in the

interview when he had to answer questions regarding his electrical knowledge. Thus,

Starnes’s deposition testimony in which she states Hallman was hired because of his

superior interview is not inconsistent with the reasons provided in the letters to

Prince.

Finally, Prince argues that Northport’s reasons for promoting Hallman were

pretextual because there had never been an African-American in the position of

Traffic Technician II, and all of his interviewers were Caucasian. The fact that

Northport had never hired an African-American for the position of Traffic

Technician II does not support an inference of intentional discrimination in that

Prince has not provided any context for this assertion. “Anecdotal information is no

substitute for a meaningful statistical analysis.” Howard v. BP Oil Co., 32 F.3d 520,

524 (11th Cir. 1994) (stating that in order for “statistical evidence of discriminatory

intent” to be relevant, the plaintiff must “present evidence as to how many blacks

applied and were rejected and evidence of the success rate of equally qualified white

applicants”). Prince has not provided any evidence regarding the application and

rejection rate of other African-American applicants; therefore, the fact that

Northport had never hired an African-American for the Traffic Technician II

position does not support an inference of intentional discrimination.

Thus, Prince is left with the fact that all of his interviewers were Caucasian to

attempt to demonstrate that Northport’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for

hiring the better qualified applicant were pretextual for discriminating against Prince

because of his race. This, standing alone, is insufficient to meet Prince’s burden. In

short, Prince has failed to show that no reasonable employer would have selected

Hallman for the position over Prince. Accordingly, Prince has failed to demonstrate

that Northport’s reasons for failing to promote him were pretextual; therefore,

Northport’s motion is due to be granted on Prince’s race discrimination claim.

B. Age Discrimination

Prince also asserts that he was discriminated against based on age when he was

denied a promotion to Traffic Technician II. The ADEA prohibits discrimination

“against an individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or

privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).

Municipalities are considered employers under the ADEA, and thus may be subject

to liability under the statute. Id. § 630(b). ADEA claims that rely upon circumstantial

evidence are analyzed using the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. See

Liebman v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 808 F.3d 1294, 1298 (11th Cir. 2015). In order to

establish a claim under the ADEA, the plaintiff must show that his age was the “but-

for” cause of the adverse employment action. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs. Inc., 557 U.S.

167, 176 (2009).

1. Prima Facie Case

To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, the plaintiff must

demonstrate: “(1) that he was a member of the protected group . . . between the ages

of forty and seventy; (2) that he was subject to an adverse employment action; (3)

that a substantially younger person filled the position that he sought . . . ; and (4) that

he was qualified to do the job for which he was rejected.” Turlington v. Atlanta Gas

Light Co., 135 F.3d 1428, 1432 (11th Cir. 1998).

It is undisputed that Prince is a member of the protected group, that he was

subject to an adverse employment action, and that a substantially younger person

filled the position for which Prince had applied. Again, Northport disputes whether

Prince was qualified for the position of Traffic Technician II. However, for the same

reasons discussed relative to Prince’s race discrimination claim, Prince was qualified

as he was permitted to apply for the position by Northport’s Civil Service Board. As

such Prince has established a prima facie case of discrimination.

2. Legitimate, Nondiscriminatory Reason

Having stated a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden then shifts back

to Northport to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for promoting

Hallman instead of Prince. Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1221 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253).

Northport’s reasons for promoting Hallman over Prince are the same for Prince’s

age discrimination claim as his race discrimination claim. Thus, for the reasons

previously discussed, Northport has met its burden of production and provided

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for promoting Hallman over Prince.

3. Pretext

As Northport has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its

decision, “the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to produce evidence that the

employer’s proffered reason [is] a pretext for discrimination.” Alvarez, 610 F.3d at

1264. Prince has presented no evidence to suggest that Northport’s legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for failing to promote Prince were pretextual for

discrimination because of Prince’s age. Much of Prince’s pretext argument is

focused on his race discrimination claims, not his age discrimination claims. Prince

has presented no discrete argument as to why Northport’s reasons were pretextual

regarding his age discrimination claim. In sum, Prince has not presented any

evidence that his age was the but-for reason that he did receive the promotion to

Traffic Technician II. Accordingly, Northport’s motion is due to be granted on

Prince’s age discrimination claim.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(doc. 16) is due to be granted. An order consistent with this opinion will be entered

contemporaneously herewith.

DONE and ORDERED on June 25, 2021.

L. Scott Cf

United States Dist¥ict Judge

202892

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