The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
TIMOTHY M. SEAGLE, }
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Plaintiff, }
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}
v. Case No.: 2:19-cv-01338-MHH
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BAPTIST MEDICAL CENTER }
PRINCETON, et al., }
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Defendants. }
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Timothy Seagle, who is proceeding without an attorney, sued Baptist Medical
Center Princeton, Tenet Healthcare Corp., and employees of each under Alabama
Code §§ 6-5-170, 13A-8-1, 13A-6-23, and the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. (Doc. 8, pp. 2–3). Mr.
Seagle’s allegations stem from his November 8, 2018 trip to Baptist Medical Center
Princeton Hospital for hand surgery. (Doc. 8, p. 5, ¶ 16).
The Court permitted Mr. Seagle to proceed in forma pauperis, meaning
without the prepayment of a filing fee. (Doc. 5). When a plaintiff proceeds in forma
pauperis, a district court must review the plaintiff’s complaint and dismiss it if it is
frivolous. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). For purposes of § 1915, “[a]n issue is
frivolous when it appears that ‘the legal theories are indisputably meritless.’” Ghee
v. Retailers Nat. Bank, 271 Fed. Appx. 858, 859 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Carroll
v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993)).
Dismissal under § 1915 is governed by the same standard as dismissal under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490
(11th Cir. 1997). Rules 8 and 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern a
motion to dismiss. Rule 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P.
8(a)(2). Rule 12(b)(6) enables a defendant to move to dismiss a complaint for
“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of a complaint against the
“liberal pleading standards set forth by Rule 8(a)(2).” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89, 94 (2007). “Generally, to survive a [Rule 12(b)(6)] motion to dismiss and meet
the requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), a complaint need not contain ‘detailed
factual allegations,’ but rather ‘only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Maledy v. City of Enterprise, 2012 WL 1028176, *1 (M.D.
Ala. March 2012) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570
(2007)).
“Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted
by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Tannenbaum v. United
States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). But “[t]his leniency . . . does not
require or allow courts to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain
an action.” Thomas v. Pentagon Fed. Credit Union, 393 Fed. Appx. 635, 637 (11th
Cir. 2010). When evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a district court
accepts as true the allegations in the complaint and construes the allegations in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Brophy v. Jiangbo Pharms. Inc., 781 F.3d
1296, 1301 (11th Cir. 2015). Accordingly, the Court accepts as true Mr. Seagle’s
factual allegations.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Mr. Seagle was scheduled for a November 8, 2018 surgery at BMC Princeton
Hospital. (Doc. 8, p. 5, ¶ 16). After arriving, a hospital clerk told Mr. Seagle that
he owed a $100 copay for the surgery. Mr. Seagle, who is a Medicare beneficiary,
told the clerk Medicare informed him he already met his “required deductibles,
and/or co-pays for the year” and refused to make the payment. (Doc. 8, p. 5, ¶ 18).
Mr. Seagle and Sharon Bell then called Medicare. According to Mr. Seagle, the
Medicare employee with whom he spoke on November 8, 2018 told him he had
overpaid by $100 on each of two prior surgeries, and BMC owed him a $200 refund.
(Doc. 8, p. 5, ¶ 19).
Mr. Seagle relayed this information to the hospital clerk and another hospital
employee. (Doc. 8, p. 5, ¶¶ 18–20). According to Mr. Seagle, he and the two hospital
employees had an extended discussion about whether Mr. Seagle owed a co-pay; the
second hospital employee called Dr. Avery—the surgeon scheduled to perform Mr.
Seagle’s surgery—while Dr. Avery was in surgery; Dr. Avery left the operating
room to cancel Mr. Seagle’s surgery based on his refusal to make the required copay;
and the second employee called security and told Mr. Seagle if he did not leave, she
would have him arrested. (Doc. 8, p. 6, ¶ 21).
Because of this interaction, Mr. Seagle’s his blood pressure rose, causing him
to experience severe anxiety, depression, and mental anguish. (Doc. 8, p. 7, ¶ 24).
A nurse had to help him to a patient waiting room. (Doc. 8, p. 7, ¶ 24). After his
blood pressure stabilized, a security guard brought him to patient services. (Doc. 8,
p. 7, ¶ 24). There, Mr. Seagle met with financial counselor Sandy Cobb and another
hospital employee. (Doc. 8, p. 8, ¶ 25). According to Mr. Seagle, the unidentified
employee became argumentative and began shouting expletives at him. (Doc. 8, p.
8, ¶ 25). Another hospital employee entered the room, gave Mr. Seagle her business
card, and informed him “she had come to help resolve all of [Mr. Seagle’s]
problems.” (Doc. 8, p. 8, ¶ 25). Mr. Seagle cannot locate the business card and
cannot remember the woman’s name. (Doc. 8, p. 8, ¶ 25). The hospital security
guard then told Mr. Seagle that if he did not leave the hospital, he would be arrested
for trespassing. (Doc. 8, p. 9, ¶ 27). The guard grasped his gun while he escorted
Mr. Seagle and Ms. Bell from the hospital property. The security guard “informed
him . . . that if [he] ever returned to the hospital, [he] would be arrested[] and jailed
for trespassing . . . .” (Doc. 8, p. 9, ¶ 27).
After returning home, Mr. Seagle received a phone call from Dr. Avery’s
nurse. The nurse “informed [Mr. Seagle] that Dr. Avery was very concerned that
[Mr. Seagle] had not reported to BMC Princeton for his hand surgery . . . . and
wanted to know if [Mr. Seagle was] ill or had missed his appointment by mistake.”
(Doc. 8, p. 10, ¶ 29). The nurse scheduled Mr. Seagle for another appointment with
Dr. Avery, and while Mr. Seagle “cannot remember the actual date of this
appointment . . . it was sometime after November 8th, 2018.” (Doc. 8, p. 10, ¶ 30).
When Mr. Seagle saw Dr. Avery, Dr. Avery indicated he was unaware of the
events of November 8, 2018. (Doc. 8, p. 10, ¶ 30). Dr. Avery told Mr. Seagle he
never accepts phone calls while in the operating room. (Doc. 8, p. 10, ¶ 30). Dr.
Avery rescheduled Mr. Seagle’s surgery for April 2, 2019. (Doc. 8, pp. 10–11, ¶¶
30–31). Dr. Avery performed the rescheduled surgery, and his office billed Mr.
Seagle for $195 in costs not covered by Medicare. (Doc. 8, p. 11, ¶ 31).
During one of his follow-up visits with Dr. Avery at BMC Princeton, Mr.
Seagle visited the hospital’s “Office of the Administrator.” (Doc. 8, p. 11, ¶ 32).
An office employee, Paula Brown, told Mr. Seagle she would investigate his claims
stemming from the events of November 8, 2018. (Doc. 8, p. 11, ¶ 32). During his
second post-surgery appointment, Mr. Seagle walked down to speak with Ms.
Brown. Ms. Brown was not there, and Mr. Seagle instead spoke with Lavon Beard.
Mr. Beard said he would investigate Mr. Seagle’s claims. (Doc. 8, p. 11, ¶ 33). Mr.
Beard sent Mr. Seagle a letter dated May 17, 2019, informing Mr. Seagle he had
begun his investigation and would contact Mr. Seagle once the investigation
concluded. (Doc. 8, p. 11, ¶ 34).
On June 13, 2019, Mr. Seagle received a second letter from Mr. Beard. The
letter apologized for the events surrounding Mr. Seagle’s surgery and stated the
hospital had not found evidence of improper billing. (Doc. 8, pp. 11–12, ¶ 35). Mr.
Seagle has unsuccessfully attempted to contact Mr. Beard since then. (Doc. 8, p. 12,
¶ 36).
Based on these alleged facts, Mr. Seagle brings the following claims:
violation of Fourteenth Amendment due process rights; excessive force by hospital
security; threats of illegal seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment; false
imprisonment in violation of the Fourth Amendment; violation of the First
Amendment right to free association; “deliberate indifference through custom”; and
retaliation under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. (Doc. 8, pp. 13–17, ¶¶ 43–
68). He also claims that, in violation of Alabama law, the defendants falsely
imprisoned him, extorted him, and menaced him. (Doc. 8, p. 2, ¶ 2).
Mr. Seagle requests an order enjoining future conduct and requiring the
defendants to adopt policies to prevent a repeat of Mr. Seagle’s experience;
compensatory and punitive damages; costs and fees; and any other appropriate costs,
fees, or relief. (Doc. 8, p. 18).
ANALYSIS
With respect to his federal law claims, Mr. Seagle must proceed under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. “To obtain relief under § 1983, [a party] must show that he was
deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law.” Patrick v.
Floyd Med. Center, 201 F.3d 1313, 1315 (11th Cir. 2000). In his complaint, Mr.
Seagle has not asserted a claim against a state actor. Mr. Seagle alleges that BMC
is a 501(c)(3) Alabama nonprofit corporation. (Doc. 8, p. 3, ¶ 7). He pleads that
Tenet is a “multinational, investor-owned, for-profit, healthcare services company,
based in Dallas, Texas.” (Doc. 8, p. 4, ¶ 11) (emphasis in original).
A private entity is a “state actor” if either:
(1) the State has coerced or at least significantly encouraged the action
alleged to violate the Constitution, (2) the private parties performed a
public function that was traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the
State, or (3) the State had so far insinuated itself into a position of
interdependence with the [private parties] that it was a joint participate
in the enterprise[].
Rayburn ex re. Rayburn v. Hogue, 241 F.3d 1341, 1347 (11th Cir. 2001). Mr. Seagle
alleges that BMC and Tenet were performing a public function that “was
traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State.” He states: “‘private parties
may be deemed state actors for the purposes of a Section 1983 action, when the
private party, (Sandy Cobb), fulfilled a role that is traditionally a public function
performed by a state.’” (Doc. 8, pp. 12-13, ¶ 38) (emphasis in Doc. 8).
Although states sometimes provide healthcare, healthcare is not a public
function traditionally reserved as the exclusive prerogative of states. “[T]he short
list of activities that have been held” to be public functions traditionally performed
by the state “includes ‘the administration of elections, the operation of a company
town, eminent domain, peremptory challenges in jury selection, and, in at least
limited circumstances, the operation of a municipal park.’” Perkins v. Londonderry
Basketball Club, 196 F.3d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1999); see also, Newsome v. Vanderbilt
Univ., 653 F.2d 1100, 1114 (6th Cir. 1981) (“Many functions have been traditionally
performed by governments, but few have been exclusively reserved to the states,
such as conducting elections and providing all the municipal services of a town.”).
Receiving Medicare or other federal funds does not transform a private
hospital into a state actor. Modaber v. Culpeller Mem. Hosp., Inc., 674 F.2d 1023,
1026-27 (4th Cir. 1982) (“[A]cceptance of patients receiving Medicare and
Medicaid benefits does not make the accepting hospital’s actions attributable to the
state.”).
Because Mr. Seagle has not sued a state actor, he may not pursue his federal
constitutional claims for alleged violation of his due process rights, use of excessive
use of force, threats of illegal seizure, false imprisonment, freedom of association,
and deliberate indifference. Therefore, the Court will dismiss Mr. Seagle’s federal
law claims without prejudice.
That leaves Mr. Seagle’s state law claims. Mr. Seagle does not allege that the
Court has jurisdiction over his claims based on diversity of citizenship under 28
U.S.C. § 1332, and the record indicates that there likely is not complete diversity of
citizenship. (See Doc. 8, pp-4. 3, ¶¶ 3-12). Mr. Seagle asserts that the Court may
exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims under 28 U.S.C. §
1367. (Doc. 8, p. 3, ¶ 4). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the Court declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Mr. Seagle’s remaining state law claims because “the
district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28
U.S.C. § 1367(b)(3). If he wishes to pursue state law claims, Mr. Seagle should file
a complaint in state court within 30 days. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d).
CONCLUSION
Because Mr. Seagle has not named a state actor as a defendant, by separate
order, the Court will dismiss his federal constitutional claims without prejudice. The
Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over his state law claims. The Court asks the
Clerk to please mail a paper copy of this opinion and the final order to Mr. Seagle.
DONE and ORDERED this 29th day of January, 2021.
Aadeles HUGHES HAIKALA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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