The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
T.T., as guardian and next friend of )
C.T., a minor, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 2:19-cv-1965-GMB
)
JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD )
OF EDUCATION, )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before the court is Defendant Jefferson County Board of Education’s motion
for judgment on the administrative record. Doc. 19. Plaintiff T.T. brought this action
on behalf of her son, C.T., a student with an intellectual disability. T.T. asserts that
the defendant denied her son the free appropriate public education (“FAPE” or
“appropriate education”) guaranteed him by the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq. This action appeals the decision
of a hearing officer who determined that the defendant did not deny C.T. an
appropriate education during the spring and summer of 2019. The parties have
consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636(c). Doc. 14. Both parties have asked this court to enter judgment in
their favor on the basis of the record compiled during the administrative due process
hearing. Docs. 19 at 30 & 20 at 26. For the reasons explained below, the court will
enter judgment in favor of the defendant.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The purpose of the IDEA is to ensure that all children with disabilities receive
“a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related
services designed to meet their unique needs.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). The
IDEA requires the states to identify, locate, and evaluate students in need of special
education and related services. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(A). The individualized
education program (“IEP”) is the chief tool used to deliver services to students with
disabilities. Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas County Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S.
Ct. 988, 994 (2017). An IEP is a “comprehensive plan prepared by a child’s ‘IEP
Team’ (which includes teachers, school officials, and the child’s parents).” Id. The
detailed procedures governing IEP development “emphasize collaboration among
parents and educators and require careful consideration of the child’s individual
circumstances.” Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1414). Every IEP must describe the child’s
present levels of academic and functional performance, the effect of the disability
on the child’s performance, measurable annual goals (both academic and functional),
how the child’s progress toward those goals will be measured, and the special
education and related services that will be provided to the child. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)–(IV).
“To meet its substantive obligation under the IDEA, the school must offer an
IEP reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of
the child’s circumstances.” Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 999. If a parent believes that a
school has not provided an appropriate IEP, the parent can submit a complaint.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6). The complaint then will be reviewed by a hearing officer
in an impartial due process hearing. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A). “[A]ny party
aggrieved by the findings and decision made” by the hearing officer “shall have the
right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint presented . . . in a district
court of the United States, without regard to the amount in controversy.” 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(i)(2)(A).
A district court reviews a hearing officer’s factual findings for clear error and
reviews questions of law de novo. Draper v. Atlanta Ind. Sch. Sys., 518 F.3d 1275,
1284 (11th Cir. 2008). “When weighing the evidence, the District Court gives ‘due
weight’ to the ALJ decision, and ‘must be careful not to substitute its judgment for
that of the state educational authorities.’” R.L. v. Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd., 757
F.3d 1173, 1178 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Walker County Sch. Dist. v. Bennett ex
rel. Bennett, 203 F.3d 1293, 1297 (11th Cir. 2000)). And “when the District Court
rejects the ALJ’s conclusions, it is ‘obliged to explain why.’” Id. at 1178 (quoting
Loren F. ex rel. Fisher v. Atlanta Ind. Sch. Sys., 349 F.3d 1309, 1314 n.5 (11th Cir.
2003)). “Any review of an IEP must appreciate that the question is whether the IEP
is reasonable, not whether the court regards it as ideal.” Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at
999.
“[T]he usual [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 56 summary judgment
principles do not apply in an IDEA case.” Loren F., 349 F.3d at 1313. Instead, a
district court may “bas[e] its decision on the preponderance of the evidence” even
when facts are in dispute. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii); see Loren F., 349 F.3d at
1313. The party seeking relief bears the burden of demonstrating that the student
was denied an appropriate education. See Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S.
49, 58 (2005). And district courts have broad discretion to “grant such relief as the
court determines is appropriate.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii); see Sch. Comm. of
Burlington v. Dep’t of Ed. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985); R.L., 757 F.3d at
1178.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
T.T. is the parent and legal guardian of her son, C.T. Doc. 1-1 at 1. On January
25, 2019, T.T. enrolled her son at McAdory High School (“McAdory”). Doc. 1-1 at
4. Prior to his enrollment at McAdory, C.T. had been educated in a private school
in Montgomery, Alabama from 2015 to 2018. Doc. 1-1 at 4. C.T. and T.T. then
moved to Jefferson County, where T.T. homeschooled her son for the first semester
of the 2018–2019 academic year. Doc. 1-1 at 4–5. T.T. contacted McAdory staff in
January 2019 to discuss enrolling C.T. Doc. 1-1 at 5. On January 23, Stacy Strozier,
a special education teacher at McAdory, spoke with T.T. by phone. Doc. 1-1 at 5.
T.T. then provided Strozier various records regarding C.T.1 Doc. 19 at 10.
An IEP team—consisting of McAdory faculty and staff, T.T., and C.T.—met
on Friday, January 25 and developed an IEP (the “January IEP”) for C.T. Docs. 1-1
at 5 & 18-7 at 16. As part of the team’s assessment, T.T. and one of C.T.’s former
teachers completed an Adaptive Behavior Assessment System, Third Edition
(“ABAS-3”). Docs. 18-3 at 37 & 18-10 at 43–52. T.T. also completed a Gilliam
Autism Rating Scale-Third Edition (“GARS-3”). Doc. 18-3 at 37 & 18-10 at 53.
The IEP team determined that C.T. would be taught in a self-contained classroom
by a special education teacher and that he would work toward a diploma based on
the Alternate Achievement Standards Pathway. Doc. 18-7 at 6. C.T. started classes
at McAdory on the following Monday. Doc. 1-1 at 5.
On April 5, 2019, T.T. and C.T. met with the IEP team to review C.T.’s IEP
and discuss the need for additional data collection. Doc. 18-9 at 102–03. T.T.
expressed concerns about C.T.’s fine motor skills and language difficulties and
disclosed that C.T. had received occupational therapy and speech and language
therapy at a prior public school, so the team decided to reevaluate C.T. for needs
1 The records included a report by Susan White, Ph.D., summarizing the results of an autism study
for C.T. in April 2018 (Doc. 18-6 at 31–32); a report of a neuropsychological evaluation performed
by Mark Prohaska, Ph.D., in April 2018 (Doc. 18-6 at 38–45); and a report of a psychological
evaluation performed by the office of Clark Psychological Associates in November 2017. Doc.
18-6 at 33–37.
relating to those two services. Docs. 18-7 at 24. Lindsey Davis, an occupational
therapist, performed the occupational therapy assessment on April 17, 2019.
Doc. 18-9 at 107. In her report on the evaluation, Davis indicated that the evaluation
was performed because of parental concerns. Doc. 18-9 at 107. The report
concluded that C.T.’s performance on the visual and motor coordination subtests
met or exceeded expectations based on his current functional level. Docs. 18-3 at 5
& 18-9 at 108. C.T.’s language skills also were tested using the Oral and Written
Language Scales, Second Edition (“OWLS-II”). Doc. 18-9 at 54–55. Kelly Daspit,
C.T.’s speech therapist in the fall of 2019, testified that C.T.’s OWLS-II score is
consistent with his IQ and that C.T. is “very adept at communicating his wants and
needs.” Doc. 18-2 at 83–84.
On May 17, 2019, the IEP team reconvened to discuss the results of C.T.’s
most recent assessments and revisions to his IEP. Doc. 18-7. The discussion resulted
in a revised IEP (the “May IEP”) that provided for both speech and language therapy
and occupational therapy. Doc. 18-7 at 48–49.
Later that month, T.T. filed a due process complaint under the IDEA. Doc.
18-5 at 207. That complaint was dismissed. Doc. 18-5 at 157. T.T. filed a new
complaint in August 2019. Doc. 18-5 at 220–27. The hearing officer dismissed
T.T.’s claims for denial of enrollment and violation of the school board’s child find
duty. Doc. 18-5 at 29–30. Three claims remained: whether C.T. was denied an
appropriate education (1) by the way the IEP team wrote C.T.’s goals and
benchmarks; (2) by the lack of extended school year services; and (3) by the lack or
delay of the related services of speech and language therapy, occupational therapy,
behavioral therapy, and physical therapy. Doc. 18-5 at 30. The hearing officer held
a one-day evidentiary hearing in October 2019 to address these remaining issues.
Docs. 18-2, 18-3 & 18-4. On October 14, 2019, the hearing officer determined that
C.T. had not been denied an appropriate education. Doc. 18-5 at 26. On December
5, 2019, T.T. filed her complaint before this court appealing the hearing officer’s
decision. Doc. 1.
III. DISCUSSION
T.T. brings four claims in this case against the Jefferson County Board of
Education. First, T.T. argues that the Board violated its statutory child find duty by
not testing C.T. and finding him eligible for four related services (speech and
language therapy, occupational therapy, behavioral therapy, and physical therapy)
when developing the January IEP. Doc. 1 at 4–10. This claim largely parallels T.T.’s
claim that the defendant should have provided (or should have provided sooner)
speech and language therapy, occupational therapy, behavioral therapy, and physical
therapy. Doc. 1 at 15–17. Therefore, the court will address these claims together.
T.T.’s second claim is that the goals, objectives, and benchmarks in C.T.’s IEPs were
written in a way that violates the IDEA. Doc. 1 at 10–13. T.T.’s final claim is that
the school should have provided C.T. with extended school year services. Doc. 1 at
14–15. The court addresses these three claims in turn.
A. Related Services
The IDEA requires schools to “conduct a full and individual initial
evaluation.” 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(A). The evaluation must assess all students in
all areas of reasonably suspected disability. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(3)(B); P.P. ex rel.
Michael P. v. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist., 585 F.3d 727, 738 (3d Cir. 2009). A
school’s evaluation decision is reasonable “if the information that a school has
concerning the student gives the school notice of an underlying disability.” Rosaria
M. v. Madison City Bd. of Ed., 325 F.R.D. 429, 438 (N.D. Ala. 2018) (citing Phyllene
W. v. Huntsville City Bd. of Ed., 630 F. App’x 917, 924–25 (11th Cir. 2015)). In this
context, the relevant disabilities include “intellectual disabilities, . . . speech or
language impairments, . . . autism, . . . or specific learning disabilities.” 20 U.S.C.
§ 1401(3)(A)(i).
When assessing a student’s disabilities, a school district must “[d]raw upon
information from a variety of sources, including aptitude and achievement tests,
parent input, and teacher recommendations.” 34 C.F.R. § 300.306(c). “A student is
therefore unlikely to need special education if, inter alia: (1) the student meets
academic standards; (2) teachers do not recommend special education for the
student; (3) the student does not exhibit unusual or alarming conduct warranting
special education; and (4) the student demonstrates the capacity to comprehend
course material.” Durbrow v. Cobb County Sch. Dist., 887 F.3d 1182, 1193–94 (11th
Cir. 2018).
“But even if the failure to conduct [a particular assessment] is a procedural
violation, a ‘[v]iolation of any of the procedures of the IDEA is not a per se violation
of the Act.’” Rosaria M., 325 F.R.D. at 438 (quoting K.A. ex rel. F.A. v. Fulton
County Sch. Dist., 741 F.3d 1195, 1205 (11th Cir. 2013)). And “[e]ven when a
school board does not conduct [a particular assessment], the board nonetheless may
provide the student with [an appropriate education] during the period governed by
the IEP if the program that the IEP team designs adequately addresses the student’s
needs and prepares the student for further education.” Rosaria M., 325 F.R.D. at 438
(citing M.W. ex rel. S.W. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Ed., 725 F.3d 131, 141 (2d Cir. 2013)).
In Rosaria M., id. at 437–39, the school did not conduct a functional behavioral
analysis, but the court found that student still received an appropriate education
because the IEP adequately addressed the student’s behavioral concerns. Ultimately,
“the IDEA does not require the IEP to furnish every special service necessary to
maximize each child’s potential.” J.B. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Ed., 242 F. Supp. 3d 186,
189 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (citing M.H. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Ed., 685 F.3d 217, 224 (2d Cir.
2012)).
T.T. has not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the IEP team
denied C.T. an appropriate education by failing to provide speech and language
therapy in the January IEP. The independent evaluations provided by T.T. indicated
that C.T. had “speech and communication abnormalities” (Doc. 18-6 at 31); “a
moderate deficit in the areas of receptive, expressive and written communication
skills” (Doc. 18-6 at 37); and “significant delays in language development, in part
due to a narrow pallet, for which he started receiving speech therapy in 2005.” Doc.
18-6 at 38. And T.T. told the IEP team that C.T. had speech and language goals in
place since kindergarten. Doc. 18-3 at 17. This is enough information to have put
the IEP team on notice that C.T. should have been assessed for a speech-related
disability. The court finds that the team’s failure to do so was a procedural violation
of the IDEA.
However, this violation does not amount to the denial of an appropriate
education under the IDEA. Susan Wirt, director of exceptional education for the
Jefferson County School Board, testified that the team included an annual goal and
benchmarks for “Functional Language/Communication” in the January IEP to
address C.T.’s needs in that area. Docs. 18-3 at 45 & 18-7 at 11. And Daspit, the
speech therapist, testified that a special education teacher can implement language
goals in the classroom as effectively as a therapist. Doc. 18-2 at 89. Patricia Latham,
C.T.’s special education teacher, testified that C.T. communicates “very well” in her
classroom. Doc. 18-2 at 37. In contrast, T.T. has not pointed to evidence in the
record showing that C.T.’s education suffered without speech and language therapy
during the spring of 2019.
Regarding occupational therapy, one of the independent reports provided by
T.T. indicated that C.T. has “significant delays in motor development,” noting that
he could not tie his own shoes or button or zip his own clothes. Doc. 18-6 at 38. T.T.
also told the IEP team that C.T. had goals related to occupational therapy in place
since kindergarten. Doc. 18-3 at 17. This is enough information to have put the team
on notice that C.T. should have been assessed for occupational therapy. However,
as with speech and language therapy, the team’s failure to do so did not deny C.T.
an appropriate education. T.T. has not produced any evidence that C.T.’s education
suffered for his lack of occupational therapy in the spring of 2019. In fact, when the
school later assessed C.T. for occupational therapy, the therapist concluded that
C.T.’s visual motor integration was on track and that he was actually overachieving
in motor coordination and visual perception relative to his overall functional ability.
Docs. 18-3 at 5 & 18-9 at 108. And the evidence indicates that the May IEP included
occupational therapy in response to T.T.’s request rather than any observed need.
Docs. 18-2 at 37 & 18-7 at 24.
Regarding behavioral therapy, T.T. expresses a concern that the school did
not complete a functional behavior assessment or develop a behavioral intervention
plan. Doc. 1 at 8. In support, T.T. provided independent reports of evaluations that
occurred within the two years before C.T.’s enrollment at McAdory indicating that
he was “restless and stomped his foot repetitively . . . yelled, made odd sounds,
growled, and hissed [and] also rocked back and forth” (Doc. 18-6 at 33); that he had
engaged in head-banging behavior since a young age but that this behavior was
becoming less frequent (Doc. 18-6 at 34); and that he had discipline problems at
school consisting of being “non-compliant, tearing up work, throwing things,
cursing, and pinching himself.” Doc. 18-6 at 35. T.T. also testified that she raised
concerns about C.T.’s behavior during the January IEP meeting. Doc. 18-3 at 17.
This information is enough to have put the IEP team on notice that C.T. potentially
had a behavior-related disability. The team’s failure to assess C.T. regarding his
behavior is a procedural violation of the IDEA.
However, Latham testified that C.T. exhibited no behavioral concerns in her
classroom. Doc. 18-2 at 12. Counsel for T.T. asked Latham about some of C.T.’s
potentially problematic behaviors, but she was able to explain how each of those
behaviors did not disrupt her classroom or teaching. Doc. 18-2 at 12–14. T.T. thus
has pointed to no evidence that C.T.’s behavior disrupted his education. Therefore,
the school’s procedural violation of the IDEA did not deny C.T. an appropriate
education.
Finally, there is almost no evidence suggesting that C.T. had any need for
physical therapy. T.T. did testify that she told the IEP team in January that C.T. had
goals related to physical therapy since kindergarten. Doc. 18-3 at 17. However, there
is no evidence that she or any of the independent reports indicated any current need
for physical therapy. Therefore, the school’s failure to test for or provide physical
therapy did not violate the IDEA.
For these reasons, this court affirms the hearing officer’s decision that the
school did not deny C.T. an appropriate education by not providing (or not providing
sooner) any of these related services.
B. Goals, Objectives, and Benchmarks
T.T. articulates six objections to the goals, objectives, and benchmarks
incorporated into the January and May IEPs. Doc. 1 at 10–13. For the reasons below,
none of the objections establishes a procedural violation of the IDEA or a substantive
denial of an appropriate education to C.T.
1. Goals Copied from the Alternate Achievement Standards
T.T. first argues that the goals in the IEPs were not individualized to C.T.’s
needs because they were copied verbatim from the Alternate Achievement
Standards. Doc. 1 at 11. But, as Wirt explained, the team copied the goals because
state regulations allow for copying goals into an IEP as long as they are
individualized in terms of success or accuracy rate. Doc. 18-3 at 40. To individualize
C.T.’s goals and benchmarks, the team set success and accuracy rates that were
specific to his needs and abilities. Docs. 18-3 at 40 & 18-7 at 11–13 & 43–47. T.T.
has not indicated how the benchmarks and goals could or should have been further
individualized or how the benchmarks and goals in any way denied C.T. an
appropriate education.
2. Benchmarks
T.T. asserts that some goals did not include benchmarks or the benchmarks
were set too far apart. Doc. 1 at 11. All of the subject areas included benchmarks.
Doc. 18-7 at 11–13 & 42–47. One of the subject areas in the January IEP had its
first benchmark set for October 2019. Doc. 1 at 11–12. The other subject areas had
their first benchmark set for May 2019. Doc. 18-7 at 12–13. While setting a
benchmark for less than a ten-month interval may have been preferable, T.T. has not
shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the October 2019 benchmark
amounts to a procedural violation of the IDEA. The IDEA regulations do not specify
how far apart the benchmarks must be dated. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.320(a)(2)(ii).
Even if one of the benchmarks could be have been set differently, “imperfect
calibration of an intermediate step does not make [the] annual goal deficient.”
Rosaria M., 325 F.R.D. at 449. T.T. has not pointed to evidence showing that the
dating of the benchmarks denied C.T. an appropriate education in any way.
3. No Baseline
T.T. next argues that C.T. was denied an appropriate education because the
IEPs lacked baseline data against which the goals and benchmarks could be
compared. Doc. 1 at 12. However, “[t]he IDEA does not explicitly mandate
[baseline] data.” Lathrop R-II Sch. Dist. v. Gray, 611 F.3d 419, 424 (8th Cir. 2010).
The IDEA requires only “a statement of the child’s present levels of academic
achievement and functional performance” and “a statement of measurable annual
goals, including academic and functional goals.” 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)
& (II); 34 C.F.R. § 300.320(a)(2)(ii). C.T.’s IEPs contain all of the required
information. See Doc. 18-7 at 11–13 & 40–47. T.T. has not pointed to any evidence
showing that a lack of specific baseline data has denied C.T. an appropriate
education.
4. Reading Comprehension Goal
Next, T.T. points out that the reading comprehension goal incorporated into
the January IEP would be better framed as a listening comprehension goal. Doc. 1
at 12–13. However, “an IEP does not need to identify annual goals for every deficit
in order to provide a FAPE.” J.B., 242 F. Supp. 3d at 199. T.T. has not pointed to
any evidence indicating that C.T. has not received an appropriate education because
of the reading comprehension goal.
5. Math Goal
T.T. argues that the annual math goal and benchmarks in the May IEP
contradict the description of C.T.’s present level of achievement. Doc. 1 at 13.
However, rather than contradict the present level of achievement, the annual goal
and benchmarks build on it by describing more complex skills. For example, the
description of C.T.’s present level of achievement says he “can interpret data from
a graph or chart.” Doc. 18-7 at 43 (emphasis added). The annual goal states that he
will “construct a simple graph . . . and interpret the data in terms of range, mode,
and median, mean.” Doc. 18-7 at 43 (emphasis added). The goal and benchmarks
simply describe higher levels of skill than C.T.’s present level of achievement. The
math goals and benchmarks did not violate the IDEA or deny C.T. an appropriate
education.
6. Social Studies Goal
Finally, T.T. argues that the social studies goal in C.T.’s May IEP is “neither
helpful nor relevant to his current level of performance.” Doc. 1 at 13. The social
studies goal states that C.T. will be able to “identify 10 major events in Alabama
from 1781 to 1823, including settlement, statehood, and conflicts with American
Indians on 4 of 5 attempts with 80% accuracy.” Doc. 18-7 at 47. T.T. argues that it
is inconceivable that C.T. could meet this goal when he can only answer one out of
eight basic “wh” comprehension questions and can only recognize 37% of Dolch
sight words. Doc. 1 at 13. This argument requires factual assumptions that are not
supported by the record, and T.T. has provided no other evidence that this goal is
inappropriate for C.T. In fact, C.T.’s teacher testified that she chose the goal by
looking at data from the classroom to determine a suitable goal after T.T. requested
that she do so. Doc. 18-2 at 51–52. This court will follow the Eleventh Circuit’s
guidance not to “substitute its own judgment for that of the state educational
authorities.” R.L., 757 F.3d at 1178 (quoting Bennett, 203 F.3d at 1297). T.T. has
not provided sufficient evidence that this goal denied C.T. an appropriate education.
C. Extended School Year Services
T.T.’s final objection to the IEPs is that they did not provide for extended
school year (“ESY”) services. Doc. 1 at 14. Specifically, T.T. argues that the IEP
team failed to use retrospective and predictive data to determine C.T.’s rate of
regression and recoupment in making its decision not to offer ESY to C.T. Doc. 1 at
14. The IDEA regulations require an IEP team to determine whether ESY is
necessary to provide an appropriate education to a student. See 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.106(a)(2). In Todd v. Duneland School Corporation, 299 F.3d 899, 906–07
(7th Cir. 2002), the plaintiff contended that the IEP team violated the IDEA by not
providing ESY for her ninth-grade child. However, the court determined that the
IEP team had not violated the IDEA when the team considered but rejected ESY
because the student had not shown regression during school vacations or an inability
to progress toward his goals. Id. at 907.
Both of C.T.’s IEPs indicate that the team considered the need for ESY. Doc.
18-7 at 20 & 50. Latham testified that the IEP team discussed ESY and decided
against it based on her observations of C.T. throughout the year, particularly after he
returned from spring break. Doc. 18-2 at 39. She also testified that T.T. seemed
pleased with the May IEP and did not comment on the lack of ESY during the May
IEP meeting. Doc. 18-2 at 51–52. T.T. only asked for some of C.T.’s reading
materials so that she could provide them to his reading tutor for that summer. Doc.
18-2 at 52. For her part, T.T. testified that upon her arrival at the May IEP meeting
the team told her that they had discussed ESY but decided C.T. would not regress
enough to require it. Doc. 18-3 at 21. Wirt testified that observation and work
sample are the best means of determining whether to provide ESY for children
whose IQs fall below the mean. Doc. 18-3 at 46.
Neither the federal nor the Alabama regulations relating to ESY require a
specific type of data on which the IEP team must base its decision. This court can
find no reason why the observations of C.T.’s teacher serve as an inadequate or
improper basis for an ESY decision. Therefore, T.T. has not shown that the IEP
team’s decision not to provide ESY denied C.T. an appropriate education.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that the defendant’s motion for
judgment on the administrative record (Doc. 19) is GRANTED and that all claims
in this action are DISMISSED with prejudice.
A final judgment will be entered separately.
DONE and ORDERED on November 23, 2020.
GRAY a a
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
19