The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION
RACHEL DENITA BENFIELD, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action Number
) 5:20-CV-1500-AKK
MATTHEW WELSH, RONNIE )
GREY, CRAIG KARNES, AND )
JEROME MILLER-WHYTE, )
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Rachel Denita Benfield, proceeding pro se, commenced this action against
Matthew Welsh, Ronnie Grey, Craig Karnes, and Jerome Miller White. Doc. 1.
Allegedly, the defendants collectively subjected her to electronic harassment and, as
to Grey only, Benfield alleges that he implanted something in her body and took her
hair without consent. Id. at 3-4. Consequently, Benfield asserts constitutional and
“natural law[]” claims against the defendants for emotional and psychological
damages and requests that the court issue an order mandating “the removal of any
technologies designed to affect our minds, emotions, or behavior.” Id. at 4. For the
reasons stated below, the court finds that it does not have jurisdiction to hear this
dispute. 1
1 Benfield contends that this court has jurisdiction over this dispute because her claims
involve constitutional or federal questions. See doc. 1 at 3. Benfield also checked the box
In conjunction with her lawsuit, Benfield also filed a motion for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis and appoint counsel.2 Doc. 2. This motion triggers the
court’s obligation under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 to review Benfield’s complaint to
ascertain whether it warrants proceeding to the discovery phase. In that respect, the
court must dismiss the complaint if it “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state
a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii). “A
claim is frivolous if it is without arguable merit either in law or fact.” Bilal v. Driver,
251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). And because the standard
governing dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) applies equally to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), see Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249,
indicating that jurisdiction is proper due to the United States being a defendant. Id. However, the
United States is not named as a party in the complaint, and it does not appear that Benfield is
asserting any claims against the Government. Moreover, because federal courts are courts of
limited jurisdiction and can only hear claims arising under the Constitution or federal statutes, or
between citizens of different states – a situation that does not apply here, the court can only hear
this dispute if it involves a claim arising under the Constitution or federal laws. Exon Mobil Corp.
v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S.Ct. 2611, 2616-17 (2005).
2 Benfield’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is due to be granted to the extent
that she seeks to commence this action without prepayment of fees. The request for appointment
of counsel is due to be denied, however. “Appointment of counsel in a civil case . . . is a privilege
that is justified only by exceptional circumstances, such as where the facts and legal issues are so
novel or complex as to require the assistance of a trained practitioner.” Fowler v. Jones, 899 F.2d
1088, 1096 (11th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). Indeed, “there is no constitutional or statutory
right to effective assistance of counsel on a civil case.” Mekdeci v. Merrell Nat. Labs., 711 F.2d
1510, 1522 (11th Cir. 1983) (internal quotations omitted). Based on the court’s review of
Benfield’s complaint, doc. 1, the factual and legal questions in this case are insufficiently complex
to require appointment of counsel.
1252 (11th Cir. 2008), the court must dismiss the complaint if it lacks “sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Finally, while generally “[p]ro se pleadings
are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will,
therefore, be liberally construed,” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262,
1263 (11th Cir. 1998), “this leniency does not give a court license to serve as de
facto counsel for a party . . . or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order
to sustain an action . . . .,” GJR Investments, Inc. v. Cty. of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d
1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted) (overruled on other grounds by Iqbal,
556 U.S. 1937). In other words, the court cannot disregard the pleading standard
because of Benfield’s pro se status. See Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th
Cir. 1990).
A review of the complaint shows that Benfield has failed to state a plausible
federal claim for which relief can be granted. In support of her contention that her
claims involve constitutional or federal statutory questions, Benfield cites
“Electronic Harassment, [t]o commit bodily injury or threaten to” as the purported
federal causes of action. Doc. 1 at 3. Liberally construed, it appears Benfield is
asserting harassment, theft, and battery claims against the defendants under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
To state a plausible claim under § 1983, Benfield must allege “(1) a violation
of a constitutional right; and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person
acting under the color of state law or a private individual who conspired with state
actors.” Melton v. Abston, 841 F.3d 1207, 1220 (11th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted).
Benfield cannot make this showing because, based on the allegations in her
complaint, it seems the defendants are private individuals who acted on their own
accord and were not in conspiracy with state actors. Thus, they are not subject to §
1983. But, even if the defendants are subject to challenge under § 1983, dismissal
is still warranted because Benfield has not plausibly alleged that the defendants
violated her constitutional rights. As Benfield describes it, “Ronnie Grey, without
consent implanted and stole my hair strands without permission to threaten and cause
bodily injury.”3 Doc. 1 at 4. Benfield further alleges that she is “one of thousands”
and requests that the court “shut down the fraudulent FISA/ Fusion Center/ Infragard
Persecution War machine.” Id. at 7. While they may plead a battery or other tort
claim under Alabama law, these allegations fall short of rising to the level of a
deprivation of a constitutional right. Therefore, as currently pleaded, the accusations
fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted in this court and are thus due to
3 Benfield pleads no specific facts against the other defendants, see generally doc. 1, and
indicates in conclusory fashion that they were involved in the alleged nefarious conduct, id. at 11-
12, 14 (accusing Craig Karns of being “a perpetrator,” writing “Perp!” on a photo of a person
labeled “John Montgomery,” and writing “[t]his is who to sue” beside the name Matthew Welsh).
be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The court will issue a separate order
contemporaneously with this Memorandum Opinion.
DONE the 29th day of October, 2020.
— Ape bh tne
ABDUL K. KALLON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE