Opinion

Morris v. Bessemer City Board of Education

Court
District Court, N.D. Alabama
Filed
Apr 22, 2020
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 16.6%

holding that the plaintiff did not have a protected property interest in continued employment because the employer had “unfettered discretion” over whether to rehire the employee

How later courts described this case

  • holding that the plaintiff did not have a protected property interest in continued employment because the employer had “unfettered discretion” over whether to rehire the employee

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

CONNIE L. MORRIS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

BESSEMER CITY BOARD OF ) Case No. 2:19-cv-01231-AKK

EDUCATION; and DR. KEITH )

A. STEWART, individually and )

in his official capacity as )

Superintendent of the Bessemer )

Board of Education, )

)

Defendants. )

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Connie Morris used to be the Athletic Director for the Bessemer City School

System. Last year, at the recommendation of Dr. Keith Stewart, the former

superintendent, the Bessemer City Board of Education abolished the Athletic

Director position and transferred Morris to the middle school. In response, Morris

initiated this action claiming discrimination, retaliation, and a violation of due

process. The Board and Dr. Stewart move to dismiss these claims. Docs. 18, 20.

For the reasons explained below, these motions are due to be granted in part and

denied in part.

I.

Morris has had a long and successful career working for the Bessemer City

School System.1 From 1993 until 2010, she served as the head coach of the varsity

girls basketball team, where she amassed a record as the most winning girls

basketball coach in the school’s history. Doc. 11 at 3. For the next five years, she

was a physical education teacher at Bessemer City High School, before she became

the Athletic Director for the entire Bessemer City School System in 2015. Id.

As Athletic Director, Morris claims that the defendants paid her less than her

male counterparts in similar positions. Id. at 5. Specifically, she says that the

Director of Maintenance and Facilities and the Technology Coordinator, both of

whom are male, are paid a higher salary than Morris. Id. Morris also raised the

disparity issue in her previous lawsuit, Morris IV, which resulted in a settlement.

She also alleges that she was subjected to different terms and conditions as

Athletic Director than her male predecessors. Doc. 11 at 5. For example, a few

years into Morris’ tenure as Athletic Director, there was an opening for the position

of head football coach at Bessemer City High School. Id. at 6. School policy

1 Her career has not been without controversy. She has sued the school board for gender

discrimination on four prior occasions. See Morris v. Bessemer City Bd. of Educ., No. 2:01-cv-

01355-UWC (N.D. Ala. dismissed May 10, 2004) (“Morris I”); Morris v. Bessemer City Bd. of

Educ., No. 2:08-cv-01086-JHH, 2009 WL 10688079 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 5, 2009) (“Morris II”);

Morris v. Bessemer Bd. of Educ., No. 2:10-cv-02402-S, 2013 WL 549896 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 13,

2013) (“Morris III”); Morris v. Bessemer City Bd. of Educ., 2:16-cv-00626-KOB (N.D. Ala.

dismissed Jan. 17, 2018) (“Morris IV”).

provides that the principal and the Athletic Director are responsible for making

recommendations for open coaching positions to the superintendent, who then

makes the final decision. See id. at 5. According to Morris, she and the principal

both recommended one person for the position, but Stewart hired another. Id. at 6.

Dr. Stewart later instructed his hand-selected coach to keep the principal informed,

but not Morris. See id. When the coach proposed to Dr. Stewart hiring two

individuals as assistant coaches, Dr. Stewart told the coach to run it past the principal

first, but, again, not Morris. Id. at 7.

Later, Morris informed Dr. Stewart that the coach had been conducting

practices in violation of the Alabama High School Athletic Association’s

(“AHSAA”) rules. Id. at 8. Morris urged Dr. Stewart to self-report the violation to

the AHSAA. Id. Dr. Stewart at first declined, until Morris repeated her plea a week

or so later. Id. In response, the AHSAA placed the football team on probation

(among other penalties), and the Board did not renew contracts for any of the football

coaches. Id. at 8–9. Dr. Stewart then notified Morris and the principal that he alone

would handle the interview process for the next head football coach. Id. at 9.

Morris argues that these actions—ignoring her recommendations,

encouraging her subordinates to bypass her, and stripping her ability to participate

in hiring decisions—were taken in retaliation for her prior litigation and/or because

she is a woman.

Shortly after these events, Dr. Stewart sent a letter to Morris informing her

that he planned to recommend to the Board that it abolish the Athletic Director

position and transfer Morris to the position of “teacher/school athletic director at

Bessemer City Middle School.” Id. at 10. Morris requested a hearing before the

Board to contest the recommendation. Id. at 11. The Board allowed Morris to make

a statement, but did not permit her to present witnesses or to examine Dr. Stewart.

Id. The Board accepted Dr. Stewart’s recommendation and transferred Morris to her

new position with the same pay and benefits. Id. at 10–11. Morris viewed the

transfer as a demotion to an “elementary school teacher’s position.” Id. at 11.

Three weeks before the Board transferred Morris and abolished the Athletic

Director position, the Board hired Andrew Zow, the former starting quarterback for

the University of Alabama, as the new head football coach at Bessemer High School.

Id. at 12. The Board also hired Thaddeus Fitzpatrick as the head coach for the men’s

basketball team. Id. Morris was not offered either position. Id. Nor was she offered

a position in the Board’s central office. Id.

On July 8, 2019, Morris filed a charge of gender discrimination and retaliation

with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), doc. 29-1, and

received the right-to-sue notice five months later, doc. 29-2. In the interim, Morris

filed this action. Doc. 1.

Morris asserts four counts: (1) gender discrimination in violation of Title VII,

42 U.S.C. § 2000e, and, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, of her right to equal protection

of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment, id. at 14; (2) age discrimination in

violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621,

id. at 15; (3) retaliation in violation of Title VII, id. at 16; and (4) pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983, an alleged violation of her right to due process by failing to afford

her a proper hearing when it transferred her to another position. Id.

To remedy these alleged injuries, Morris asks the court (1) to declare that the

defendants’ conduct violated Title VII and § 1983; (2) to “[p]ermanently enjoin the

Defendants, their agents, employees, successors, and those in active concert or

participation with them, from discriminating” or retaliating against her; (3) to award

compensatory damages for “the embarrassment, humiliation, ridicule,

disparagement, and other mental anguish she has suffered”; (4) to award punitive

damages against Stewart in his individual capacity “for his willful conduct”; and (5)

to award costs and a reasonable attorney’s fee to Morris. Doc. 11 at 19.

The Board and Dr. Stewart move to dismiss Morris’ claims pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Docs. 18, 20.

II.

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). If the complaint fails

“to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,” the defendant may move to

dismiss it. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint

must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is

plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted).

The complaint must establish “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has

acted unlawfully.” Id. (citation omitted). Mere “labels and conclusions” or “a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” are insufficient. Id.

(citation omitted). In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court

“must accept all facts in the complaint as true and view those facts in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff.” Sun Life Assurance Co. v. Imperial Premium Fin., LLC,

904 F.3d 1197, 1207 (11th Cir. 2018).

Furthermore, to establish discriminatory intent at the motion to dismiss stage,

Massey does not have to allege a prima facie case under McDonnel Douglas. See

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Instead, Massey

need only “provide enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest intentional

[gender] discrimination.” Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found., 789 F.3d 1239, 1245

(11th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).

III.

A.

The Board and Dr. Stewart argue that all of Morris’ claims under Title VII

should be dismissed because she failed to satisfy the procedural prerequisites under

the statute. The defendants are correct that Morris filed her claims before she

received her right-to-sue notice. But she now has the notice and even if the court

dismisses her Title VII claims, she would have the opportunity to move to amend to

replead them. Therefore, in lieu of dismissal, the court will afford Morris an

opportunity to replead the claims in an amended complaint that references the right-

to-sue notice.

But the Title VII claims against Dr. Stewart specifically are due to be

dismissed for another reason. “The relief granted under Title VII is against the

employer, not individual employees whose actions would constitute a violation of

the Act.” Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir. 1991) (emphasis

in original). Dr. Stewart may have been Morris’ supervisor, but the Board was her

employer. As a result, granting Morris an opportunity to replead as to Dr. Stewart

would be futile. Consequently, her Title VII claims against Dr. Stewart are due to

be dismissed.

B.

The Board and Dr. Stewart argue also that the ADEA claim should be

dismissed for failure to satisfy the procedural prerequisites under the statute. The

ADEA has a similar exhaustion requirement as Title VII. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1).

The court cannot afford Morris an opportunity to amend this claim, however,

because Morris’ charge did not mention age discrimination. See doc. 29-1. A

“plaintiff’s judicial complaint is limited by the scope of the EEOC investigation

which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.”

Gregory, 355 F.3d at 1280 (citation omitted). Though “the scope of an EEOC

[charge] should not be strictly interpreted,” the judicial complaint must be

reasonably related to the charge. Id. (citation omitted). In her charge, Morris

checked the boxes for gender discrimination and retaliation, and she repeatedly

described being discriminated against “due to my sex.” Doc. 29-1. Morris did not

check the box for age discrimination on the charge, and she made no allegations in

the charge so much as suggesting age discrimination.2 Id. The ADEA claim (Count

II) is thus beyond the scope of the EEOC charge and is due to be dismissed.3

C.

Morris claims that she was entitled to the protections of procedural due

2 Allegations related to age discrimination are also missing from the complaint. The ADEA

prohibits employers from discriminating against an employee who is at least 40 years old because

of that employee’s age. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), 631(a). To adequately state a claim under the

ADEA and survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must “provide enough factual matter to

plausibly suggest intentional discrimination.” Buchanan v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 727 Fed. App’x

639, 641 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found., 739 F.3d 1239, 1246 (11th

Cir. 2015) (per curiam)). Morris does not allege any facts suggesting that age affected the decision

not to offer her one of the coaching positions. She does not even allege that she is a member of

the protected class. Her allegations add up to: “the Board hired a 40-year-old who is less qualified

than me without offering me the position.” That is plainly not enough. Thus, even if the ADEA

claims were properly before the court, Morris falls far short of plausibly stating a claim of age

discrimination.

3 The ADEA claims are also due to be dismissed against Stewart specifically, because, like Title

VII, ADEA claims must be brought against employers—there is no individual liability under the

statute. See Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 830 (11th Cir. 2007); Mason v. Stallings, 82 F.3d

1007, 1009 (11th Cir. 1996).

process before the Board abolished her position and Dr. Stewart transferred her to

the middle school.4 Under the Fourteenth Amendment, procedural due process

guarantees a “right to some kind of prior hearing” only when a protected property or

liberty interest is implicated. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,

569–70 (1972). The issue is whether a protected interest is implicated in this case.

1.

For a property interest to be protected, a person must have “a legitimate claim

of entitlement it.” Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. Property interests are created and defined,

not by the Constitution, but by an “independent source” of law, “such as state law.”

Id. Accordingly, a person’s property interest in employment could be created and

defined by the terms of the employment contract, by the employer’s policy, or by a

state statute governing employment. Id. at 578.

Here, the Alabama Code governs the employment of public-school officials.

The statute says that tenured teachers may only be terminated for good cause. Ala.

Code § 16-24C-6(a). In contrast, a teacher may be transferred “at any time as the

needs of the employer require.” § 16-24C-7(a). The transfer “must be without [a]

4 Of course, the Board granted Morris a hearing of sorts when it permitted her to make a statement

opposing the transfer. Morris contends that she was entitled to more process than this, complaining

that the Board denied her the opportunity to present witnesses or to question Stewart. The Supreme

Court has said that, even when procedural due process applies, a party is not always entitled to a

“full evidentiary hearing.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 545 (1985).

However, because the Board does not raise the issue of whether the hearing satisfied the

requirements of due process, the court assumes that it did not.

reduction in compensation,” and the teacher must be qualified for the new position,

but otherwise the employer has unfettered discretion over when and whether to

transfer teachers.5 § 16-24C-7(c). Thus, an employee facing transfer is entitled to

the same pay and to a position for which he or she is qualified, but so long as the

employer complies with these conditions, the employee is not entitled to stay in the

same position. See Ala. Code § 16-24C-4(3)(c) (providing that tenure does not

“create or confer[] any enforceable right or protected interest in or to a specific

position, rank, . . . assignment, [or] title”).

The defendants complied with the terms of the statutes. The court thus

concludes that Morris does not have a protected property interest in remaining in her

former position when the statute gives the employer discretion over whether to

transfer her. Cf. Roth, 408 U.S. at 567, 578 (holding that the plaintiff did not have a

protected property interest in continued employment because the employer had

“unfettered discretion” over whether to rehire the employee).

2.

The Supreme Court has said that the right to engage in common occupations

is a protected liberty interest. Roth, 408 U.S. at 572. But it would stretch “the

5 The statute also provides teachers facing transfer with some procedural protections. For example,

the teacher must receive “written notice of the proposed transfer” and “must be afforded an

opportunity to meet with” the board. § 16-24C-7(c). But these protections do not impose any

restriction on the board’s discretion.

concept too far to suggest that a person is deprived of liberty when he simply [loses]

one job but remains as free as before to seek another.” Id. at 575. Instead, to

implicate the liberty interest, the public employer must obstruct a person’s “freedom

to take advantage of other employment opportunities.” Id. at 573. One way the

public employer could do this is by defaming the “person’s good name, reputation,

honor, or integrity.” Id. In that event, the person would be entitled to “an

opportunity to refute the charge” for the purpose of clearing his name. Id. at 573 &

n.12.

Alleging that a public employer deprived a person of liberty by discharging

and defaming him is referred to as a stigma-plus claim. That is what Morris alleges

in this case. To establish a stigma-plus claim, the employee must prove that:

(1) a false statement (2) of a stigmatizing nature (3) attending a

governmental employee’s discharge (4) was made public (5) by the

governmental employer (6) without a meaningful opportunity for

employee name clearing.

Cannon v. City of W. Palm Beach, 250 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001).

Morris has failed to allege a protected liberty interest. First, she does not

allege that the Board or Dr. Stewart made a false, stigmatizing charge against her.

A person is not deprived of liberty if there is no charge against the employee “that

might seriously damage his standing” in the community, such as that he is “guilty of

dishonesty or immorality.” Roth, 408 U.S. at 573. For the same reason, a protected

liberty interest is not implicated by “the discharge of a public employee whose

position is terminable at the will of the employer when there is no public disclosure

of the reasons for the discharge.” Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348 (1976). In

short, if no charge against the employee is made, and the charge is not made public,

the employee’s reputation is not harmed in such a way that it forecloses his or her

freedom to pursue other employment.6

Moreover, Morris was not discharged—she was transferred to another

position. The Eleventh Circuit has explicitly held, and reaffirmed, that “a ‘discharge

or more’ is required in order to satisfy the ‘plus’ element of the stigma-plus test.”

Cannon, 250 F.3d at 1303 (quoting Oladeinde v. City of Birmingham, 963 F.2d 1481,

1486 (11th Cir. 1992). “A transfer or a missed promotion is not enough.” Id.

The court thus finds that the defendants did not violate a protected liberty

interest when they transferred Morris to another position without making any charge

against her. Because Morris does not allege a protected property or liberty interest,

her due process claim (Count IV) is due to be dismissed.

D.

Morris seeks relief via § 1983 for alleged gender discrimination. Section 1983

6 Morris attempts to overcome this settled law by alleging that the mere fact of the discharge (or

demotion) harms the employee’s reputation. But the Supreme Court has rejected this contention:

“Mere proof” that non-retention in one job would make an employee “somewhat less attractive to

some other employers would hardly establish the kind of foreclosure of opportunities amounting

to a deprivation of liberty.” Roth, 408 U.S. at 574 n.13. In other words, the implied stigma incident

to most, if not all, terminations is not enough. Otherwise, the law would require public employers

to hold a hearing before discharging every employee.

creates a cause of action against state and local officials who violate federal rights.7

In this case, the federal right asserted is the “constitutional right” under the equal

protection clause “to be free from unlawful sex discrimination and sexual

harassment in public employment.” Cross v. State of Ala., State Dep’t of Mental

Health, 49 F.3d 1490, 1507 (11th Cir. 1995). Specifically, Morris alleges that the

Board and Dr. Stewart discriminated against her on the basis of sex in four ways: (1)

by paying her less than male employees; (2) by subjecting her to different terms and

conditions than her male predecessors, thus creating a hostile work environment;8

(3) by abolishing her position and demoting her because of her gender; and (4) by

failing to promote her to two vacant coaching positions because of her gender.

As an initial matter, Morris sues Dr. Stewart in both his individual and official

capacities. The claims against Stewart in his official capacity are redundant. When

a plaintiff sues a government official in his or her official capacity, “the suit is simply

another way of pleading an action against [the] entity of which [the official] is an

agent.” Busby, 931 F.2d at 776 (citation omitted). Since the claims against Dr.

7 Section 1983 of Title 42 of the U.S. Code states:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or

usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to

be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction

thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in

equity, or other proper proceeding for redress[.]

8 Neither the Board nor Dr. Stewart makes any argument for why the hostile-work-environment

claim should be dismissed. This claim thus survives the defendants’ motion to dismiss.

Stewart in his official capacity are “functionally equivalent” to the claims against

the Board, the claims against Dr. Stewart in his official capacity are due to be

dismissed. Id. Thus, only the individual capacity claims against Dr. Stewart remain.

1.

Morris alleges that she was paid less as Athletic Director than similarly

situated male counterparts. As examples, she identifies two male employees who

make a higher salary: the Director of Maintenance and Facilities, and the

Technology Coordinator. Doc. 11 at 5.

Dr. Stewart argues that the unequal pay claim should be dismissed against him

specifically because he had nothing to do with Morris’ compensation. Under the

Alabama Code, the Board “shall fix the salaries of all employees.” § 16-11-17. The

superintendent has no role in determining the compensation of employees such as

Morris. Consequently, Dr. Stewart could not be responsible for any alleged gender

disparity in Morris’ pay. Because Morris has not alleged that Dr. Stewart caused her

allegedly unequal pay, this claim is due to be dismissed against Dr. Stewart.

For its part, the Board argues that Morris is equitably estopped from asserting

the unequal pay claim, because Morris settled the same claim in her previous lawsuit,

Morris IV. Doc. 19 at 12. Equitable estoppel “provides relief for parties who have

been induced into behavior through another party’s false representation.” In re

Atlanta Retail, Inc., 456 F.3d 1277, 1291 (11th Cir. 2006). The doctrine has five

elements:

(1) the party to be estopped misrepresented material facts; (2) the party

to be estopped was aware of the true facts; (3) the party to be estopped

intended that the misrepresentation be acted on or had reason to believe

the party asserting the estoppel would rely on it; (4) the party asserting

the estoppel did not know, nor should it have known, the true facts; and

(5) the party asserting the estoppel reasonably and detrimentally relied

on the misrepresentation.

Busby v. FRHBW Realty, Inc., 513 F.3d 1314, 1326 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation

omitted). But the Board does not argue that Morris made a false representation.

Instead, the Board’s argument is that the earlier settlement should have preclusive

effect. The court thus looks to the ordinary rules of res judicata.

Generally, there must be a judgment to invoke res judicata. 18A Wright &

Miller, Fed. Pract. & Proc. § 4443 (3d ed. 2008). A settlement agreement is simply

a contract. In re Home Depot Inc., 931 F.3d 1065, 1080 (11th Cir. 2019). But after

the parties reached a settlement agreement, the court, with the parties’ consent,

entered a judgment of dismissal with prejudice. Morris v. Bessemer City Bd. of

Educ., 2:16-cv-00626-KOB (N.D. Ala. dismissed Jan. 17, 2018). The question thus

becomes, what is the preclusive effect of a consent judgment.9

The preclusive effect of a consent judgment is determined by the intent of the

parties. See Norfolk S. Corp. v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 371 F.3d 1285, 1288–89 (11th

9 Consent judgments can result in claim preclusion, but they cannot result in issue preclusion, since

the issues have not been actually litigated. Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 414 (2000).

Cir. 2004). This is so because a consent judgment “receives its legitimizing force

from the fact that the parties consented to it.” Id. at 1288. “The best evidence” of

the parties’ intent “is, of course, the settlement agreement itself.” Id. at 1289. Thus,

the preclusive effect of the consent judgment should be determined by the terms of

the settlement agreement, rather than “by the claims specified in the original

complaint.” Id.

Here, the Board has not provided the court with the terms of the settlement

agreement. Consequently, the court cannot say whether the parties intended to

preclude the unequal pay claim. The party asserting preclusion bears the burden of

proving its elements. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 907 (11th Cir. 2008).

Therefore, in the absence of the information the court needs to decide this issue, the

unequal pay claim survives the motion to dismiss. But the Board is free to raise the

issue again at the summary judgment stage.

2.

Morris claims that gender bias motivated the decision to abolish the Athletic

Director position and to transfer her to a position at the middle school. The Board

makes no argument for why the demotion claim should be dismissed. The claim

thus survives against the Board. For his part, Dr. Stewart responds that only the

Board had the authority to abolish the Athletic Director position, so “only the Board

can provide the relief that [Morris] seeks.” Doc. 20 at 9.

But as alleged, Dr. Stewart’s role in these events was more significant than he

admits. Though Dr. Stewart is correct that the Board made the final decision, it

abolished the position of Athletic Director allegedly based on Dr. Stewart’s

recommendation. Additionally, the Alabama Code vests the power to transfer

school employees with the superintendent. § 16-12-16 (“The city superintendent of

schools . . . shall transfer [all employees of the board] as the needs of the schools

require.”). Thus, it would appear that Dr. Stewart must have made the decision to

transfer Morris to the middle school position. As such, he allegedly caused the injury

that Morris pleads.

Dr. Stewart’s argument that dismissal is warranted because he cannot provide

the relief that Morris seeks is unavailing. First of all, “even if [the plaintiff] is

seeking relief to which he’s not entitled, this would not justify dismissal of the suit.”

Bontkowski v. Smith, 305 F.3d 757, 762 (7th Cir. 2002). Moreover, Morris requests

relief that that court could grant. Though the court may not be able to order Dr.

Stewart to reinstate Morris as Athletic Director, she requests other relief as well. She

asks for a declaratory judgment that Dr. Stewart violated her rights by demoting her,

compensatory damages for her mental anguish, and punitive damages against

Stewart. Doc. 11 at 19. Dr. Stewart does not argue that the court could not grant

these requests. Accordingly, the demotion claim against Dr. Stewart survives the

motion to dismiss as well. To the extent that Morris prevails, the court will then

ascertain the proper relief she is entitled to against Dr. Stewart and will reject any

that in fact cannot be granted.

3.

Morris claims that the defendants refused to offer her the vacant positions of

head football coach or head basketball coach because of her gender. The defendants

argue this failure-to-promote claim should be dismissed because Morris failed to

allege (1) that she applied for or expressed interest in the positions, doc. 19 at 3 n.5;

(2) that she is in fact more qualified than the candidates the Board hired, id. at 5; and

(3) that Andrew Zow is a similarly situated comparator to Morris, id. at 6.

Essentially, the Board argues that Morris failed to allege a prima facie case.10

The defects pointed out by the Board would indeed be fatal to Morris’ claim

at the summary judgment stage. But at the motion to dismiss stage, Morris need not

allege a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas framework. Surtain, 789

F.3d at 1245. Instead, Morris simply must allege facts plausibly suggesting

intentional gender discrimination. Id. At this stage of the litigation, Morris has done

10 To establish a prima facie case for a failure-to-promote claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate

that:

(i) he or she belonged to a protected class; (ii) he or she was qualified for and

applied for a position that the employer was seeking to fill; (iii) despite

qualifications, he or she was rejected; and (iv) the position was filled with an

individual outside the protected class.

Vessels v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 408 F.3d 763, 768 (11th Cir. 2005).

so. Therefore, the failure-to-promote claim survives for now.

IV.

To close, the ADEA and due process claims are due to be dismissed against

both defendants in their entirety. The Title VII claims against Dr. Stewart is also

due to be dismissed. The Title VII claims against the Board may proceed subject to

an amended complaint that adds language related to the right-to-sue notice. The

equal protection claims are resolved as follows: all claims brought against Dr.

Stewart in his official capacity are due to be dismissed as redundant; the unequal pay

claim is due to be dismissed against Dr. Stewart, but survives against the Board; the

hostile-work-environment claim, the demotion claim, and the failure-to-promote

claim survive against both defendants. A separate order will be entered.

DONE the 22nd day of April, 2020.

— Ade bho the

ABDUL K. KALLON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

19

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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