Jones v. Hamm (INMATE 2) (MEMBER)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

TOREE JONES, )

AIS # 268125, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CASE NO. 2:20-CV-542-RAH

v. )

)

JOHN Q. HAMM, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

On July 21, 2023, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the Motion for

Summary Judgment filed by the Defendants should be denied and that this case

should be set for a jury trial. On August 4, 2023, the Defendants filed Objections

(Doc. 67) to the Recommendation (Doc. 66) of the Magistrate Judge.

When a party objects to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the

District Court must review the disputed portions de novo. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

The Court “may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive

further evidence; or resubmit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). De novo review requires that the District Court

independently consider factual issues based on the record. Jeffrey S. ex rel. Ernest

S. v. State Bd. of Educ., 896 F.2d 507, 513 (11th Cir. 1990). If the party does not

object to specific factual findings, the court reviews them only for clear error. Garvey

v. Vaughn, 993 F.2d 776, 779 n.9 (11th Cir. 1993).

The Defendants first object to the Magistrate Judge’s determination that “it is

not otherwise clear on this record that the differences in inmate characteristics cited

by Defendants means Jones and his female counterparts are not similarly situated.”

(Doc. 67 at 1 (quoting Doc. 66 at 14-15).) The Defendants assert that they have

presented multiple reasons establishing that male and female inmates are not

similarly situated, including their pathways to criminal behavior. (Doc. 67 at 2.) The

Defendants cite Klinger v. Dep’t of Corr., 31 F.3d 727, 731 (8th Cir. 1994), and an

unpublished opinion, Smith v. Brown, No. 1:12-CV-328-TWT (N.D. Ga. Oct. 1,

2013), for the proposition that male and female inmates are not similarly situated.

The holding in Klinger, however, is not binding in this Circuit and other courts have

declined to extend it. See, e.g., Sassman v. Brown, 73 F. Supp. 3d 1241, 1249-50

(E.D. Cal. 2014) (distinguishing Klinger because it focused on the differences

between prison structures and not on the prisoners themselves). The lower court’s

determination in Smith is likewise distinguishable and unpersuasive. The Defendants

cite no binding authority in support of their position, nor do they otherwise show

that the Magistrate Judge committed any legal or factual error. Accordingly, this

objection is due to be overruled.

The Defendants also object to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that “there

is little evidence . . . that the different treatment of male and female offenders furthers

the [D]efendants’ stated objectives or that those objectives are the driver of the

challenged action.” (Doc. 66 at 16). The Defendants contend that their policy “was

developed in part because of the differences between male and female inmates in

behavior, criminal motivation, and opportunity,” and that they “outlined evidence

that male inmates are far more likely to recidivate, attempt to escape, and commit

violent acts when assigned to community custody or work release programs.” (Doc.

67 at 3). The Defendants also assert that the classification “considers ADOC’s valid

penological interest in ensuring that their female offender population has

classification policies that are gender-based and trauma-informed.” (Id. at 4). This

argument and evidence was presented to the Magistrate Judge and addressed in the

Recommendation, and the Defendants’ objection fails to show that the Magistrate

Judge erred. Moreover, the Magistrate Judge explained that it is unclear on this

record whether the Defendants’ “blanket policy of exclusion . . . advances [their]

stated objectives, or whether the discriminatory means employed are substantially

related to the achievement of those objectives.” (Doc. 66 at 18) (emphasis added).

The Defendants do not even attempt to argue that the challenged policy is

substantially related to the achievement of their stated objectives, which is required

for the policy to survive intermediate scrutiny review. See United States v. Virginia,

518 U.S. 515, 523 (1996). Additionally, the Defendants fail to explain or provide

evidence as to why male offenders must be categorically excluded from eligibility

for minimum-community status based on their purported differences from female

offenders. Accordingly, this objection is due to be overruled.

The Defendants’ third objection is substantially similar to their second

objection. (Compare doc. 67 at 3, with id. at 4). In their third objection, they contend

that their “additional classification regarding male homicide offenders serves an

important governmental interest because it is a response to the higher recidivism

rate, higher rate of violence, and higher escape rate displayed by male inmates in

contrast with female inmates.” (Doc. 67 at 4). This argument and evidence was

presented to the Magistrate Judge and addressed in the Recommendation, and the

Defendants’ objection fails to show that the Magistrate Judge erred. Moreover, the

Defendants fail to explain or provide evidence that the aforementioned data could

not be taken into account in the initial review process or on a case-by-case basis,

which undermines the contention that their proffered justifications are “exceedingly

persuasive.” Consequently, this objection is due to be overruled.

Finally, the Defendants complain that the Plaintiff offered no evidence besides

his own opinion to rebut the Defendants’ evidence. To clarify, the Defendants bore

the initial burden to establish no genuine dispute of material fact, thereby entitling

them to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Therefore, in moving

for summary judgment, the Defendants bore the initial burden to establish that male

and female homicide offenders are not similarly situated, that their gender-based

policy serves important governmental objectives, and that the policy is substantially

related to achieving those objectives. The Court finds that the Defendants failed to

meet their burden. Therefore, the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation is due to be

adopted, with modification that the Defendants failed to meet their initial summary

judgment burden.

Upon this Court’s independent review of the record and consideration of the

the Objections and Recommendation, it is ORDERED as follows:

1. The Objections (Doc. 67) are OVERRULED.

2. The Recommendation (Doc. 66) is ADOPTED, as modified above.

3. The Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 19) is DENIED.

4. This case will be set for a jury trial on Plaintiffs equal protection claim

against Defendants.

DONE, on this the 29th day of September 2023.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE