Edwards v. Dothan City Schools

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

PHYLLIS EDWARDS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CIVIL ACT. NO. 1:21cv248-ECM

v. ) [wo]

)

DOTHAN CITY SCHOOLS, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER

Now pending before the Court is a motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Dothan

City Schools and Dothan City Board of Education (together referred to as “the Board”),

and Michael Shmitz, Brenda Guilford, Franklin Jones, Susan Vierkandt, Brett Strickland,

Amy Bonds, and Chris Maddox (collectively referred to as “the Board members”). (Doc.

22).

Plaintiff Phyllis Edwards (“Edwards”) filed a complaint in this Court bringing a

claim for violation of due process (count one), for conspiracy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1985

(count two), and a state-law breach of contract claim (count three). Edwards is alleged to

be a citizen of Florida and the Defendants citizens of Alabama. The complaint seeks a

specific amount, $584,032.67, in damages, and invokes diversity subject matter

jurisdiction.1

1 While the Defendants question the propriety of the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claim,

Edwards has invoked diversity subject matter jurisdiction. The Defendants do not dispute their citizenship in Alabama

or the amount in controversy.

Based upon a review of the record and the applicable law, and for the reasons that

follow, the motion to dismiss is due to be GRANTED.

I. LEGAL STANDARDS

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the complaint against the

legal standard set forth in Rule 8: “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). “To survive a motion to dismiss,

a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] ... a context-

specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and

common sense.” Id. at 663 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). The plausibility

standard requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Conclusory allegations that are merely “conceivable” and fail to

rise “above the speculative level” are insufficient to meet the plausibility standard.

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570. This pleading standard “does not require ‘detailed factual

allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-

me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Indeed, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and

conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’”

Id.

A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, may be a factual or facial attack on subject matter

jurisdiction.2 Barnett v. Okeechobee Hosp., 283 F.3d 1232, 1238 (11th Cir. 2002). A

factual attack permits the district court to weigh evidence outside the pleadings to satisfy

itself of the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact. Id. at 1237. However, a facial

attack merely questions the sufficiency of the pleading. Id. Under a facial attack, as here,

the district court accepts the plaintiff's allegations as true and need not look beyond the

face of the complaint to determine whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction. Id.

II. FACTS

The facts as alleged in the complaint are as follows:

Edwards was hired on January 16, 2018, as the Superintendent of the Dothan City

Schools in Dothan, Alabama. Her employment contract with the Board was for a term of

five years and four months, until June 30, 2023.

The complaint alleges that during her tenure, Edwards was subject to criticism and

accusations by Board members outside of called Board meetings. Therefore, the complaint

alleges, on September 8, 2020, Edwards submitted an “intent to resign” letter to the Board,

consistent with her employment contract. (Doc. 1 para. 17).

The Defendants have attached Edwards’ employment agreement to the motion to

dismiss. It provided in relevant part as follows:

Dr. Edwards may terminate this contract with or without cause

by giving the Board notice in writing of her desire and election

not to continue this contract at least 120 days before the

effective date of the termination. In that event Dr. Edwards

shall be entitled to compensation, remuneration and/or benefits

2 Although in their motion the Defendants specifically cite only Rule 12(b)(6), they also invoke sovereign

immunity, which is a jurisdictional issue, as a basis for dismissal.

that have been accrued or earned as of the effective date of

termination.

(Doc. 22-1 at 13).3

The Defendants also have attached Edwards’ intent to resign letter to the motion to

dismiss. In the letter Edwards stated, “I intend to tender my resignation to the Dothan City

School Board. Please let me know who I should deal with to iron out the details.” (Doc.

22-2). The complaint alleges that because this was only an intent to resign, Edwards did

not give a date on which she planned to leave. (Doc. 1 para. 18).

The complaint alleges that on September 14, 2020, the Board voted to terminate

Edwards’ contract. The complaint further alleges that the Defendants terminated Edwards’

contract “well within the 120 days required for termination under the contract.” (Id. para.

19). The complaint refers to the minutes of the Board meeting, which have been provided

by the Defendants. The minutes of the meeting do not include a motion to terminate the

contract, but instead set out the following:

Addressing Resignation of Superintendent

Motion to Address the Resignation of Dr. Phyllis

Edwards on this day September 14, 2020. Motion made

by: Mrs. Brenda Guildford, Motion seconded by: Mrs.

Amy Bonds.

Amend the motion to accept the resignation of Dr.

Phyllis Edwards as Superintendent of Dothan City

Schools on this day September 14, 2020. Motion made

by: Mrs. Brenda Guildford, Motion seconded by: Mrs.

Amy Bonds, Voting: Mr. Mike Schmitz—Yes, Mrs.

3 Although courts generally only consider the language of a complaint in deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion

to dismiss, they may consider an extrinsic document when a plaintiff refers to a document in its complaint,

the document is central to its claim, its contents are not in dispute, and the defendant attaches the document

to its motion to dismiss. See Fin. Sec. Assur., Inc. v. Stephens, Inc., 500 F.3d 1276, 1284 (11th Cir. 2007).

Brenda Guilford—Yes, Mrs. Amy Bond—Yes, Mr.

Franklin Jones—No, Mr. Chris Maddox—Yes, Mr.

Brett Strickland—Yes, Mrs. Susan Vierkandt—Yes.

(Doc. 22-3 at 2).4 The complaint alleges that the Board did not give Edwards a statement

of cause or give her an opportunity to be heard.

Edwards seeks $584,032.67 as compensation for lost income and benefits for the

remainder of her contract term.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Federal Claims

Edwards argues that after she submitted her notice of intent to resign letter, as

required by her contract, the Board terminated her employment without notice and

opportunity to be heard, in violation of the due process clause. The Defendants’ position

is that Edwards voluntarily left her employment, implicating no due process interest.

As a public employee dismissible only for cause, Edwards had “a constitutionally

protected property interest in [her] tenure and [could not] be fired without due process.”

Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 928–29 (1997). Edwards alleges that she was wrongfully

terminated by the Board. While in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(b)(6) motion, this Court must

accept the facts alleged in the complaint, the Court does not have to accept labels or

conclusory allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The factual content pleaded by Edwards to

support the conclusory allegation that the Board acted by “wrongfully terminating” her

4 Harris v. Pierce Cty., Ga., 2014 WL 3974668, at *3 (S.D. Ga. 2014)(finding that minutes of a meeting

were a document which could be considered in deciding a motion to dismiss).

employment is the allegation that the Board voted to terminate her contract, with explicit

reference to the minutes of the September 14, 2020 Board meeting. (Doc. 1 para. 19). The

minutes of the September 14, 2020 meeting, however, which are incorporated by reference

into her complaint, set out that the Board members voted on a motion to accept Edwards’

resignation. (Doc. 22-3 at 2). The minutes reflect no motion to terminate Edwards’

contract.

The Defendants take the position that under the contact the difference between an

intent to resign and a resignation was the 120-day notice provision, which was waivable

by the Board. (Doc. 28 at 5).5 Under that view of the alleged facts, the Board accepted

Edwards’ letter as a resignation, so there is no deprivation of a protected interest. See Blake

v. City of Montgomery, Alabama, 492 F. Supp. 3d 1292, 1311 (M.D. Ala. 2020) (“[I]f a

person, otherwise entitled to due process, voluntarily resigns from employment, he

foregoes any due process protection.”), aff'd sub nom. Blake v. City of Montgomery, 2021

WL 5177429 (11th Cir. Nov. 8, 2021).

The Defendants alternatively argue that even if this view of the facts is incorrect,

and Edwards did not resign, the availability of recourse in state court forecloses liability,

citing McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir. 1994).

The Supreme Court has held that “[i]n situations where the State feasibly can

provide a predeprivation hearing before taking property, it generally must do so regardless

5 Edwards has only alleged that she had a protected interest in her employment (doc. 26 at 7) and has not

claimed that the contract provision requiring compensation until the effective date of termination is a

separately protected interest. See Ingalls v. U.S. Space and Rocket Center, 2015 WL 4528687, at *13 (M.D.

Ala. 2015) (reasoning that an interference with a benefit of employment rather than employment itself is

not constitutionally protected).

of the adequacy of a postdeprivation tort remedy to compensate for the taking.” Zinermon

v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 132 (1990). In McKinney, the Eleventh Circuit held that even if a

plaintiff suffered a procedural deprivation at the hands of a biased board at his termination

hearing, he did not suffer a violation of his procedural due process rights unless and until

the State refused to make available a means to remedy the deprivation. Id. at 1563. This

holding was based on Supreme Court precedent which has recognized that State action

which impairs a protected property interest may require a predeprivation hearing, but there

are exceptions to this general rule where predeprivation process is not feasible. See id. One

such exception was recognized in Parratt v. Taylor, when the Court determined that failure

to provide predeprivation process where a state actor was negligent, “not the result of some

established state procedure,” was not a violation of due process. 451 U.S. 527, 541 (1981),

overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 333 (1986). In Hudson

v. Palmer, the Court reasoned that the state also “can no more anticipate and control in

advance the random and unauthorized intentional conduct of its employees than it can

anticipate similar negligent conduct.” 468 U.S. 517, 521 n.2.

In analyzing a due process claim, therefore, “a distinction is drawn between cases

in which a state process itself is challenged, and cases in which the procedures as applied

are challenged.” Hill v. Manning, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1298 (M.D. Ala. 2002) (citing

McKinney and Bell v. City of Demopolis, 86 F.3d 191, 192 (11th Cir. 1996)). This Court

has found in another case that a due process violation is complete where the procedures

themselves failed to provide due process. See Ron Grp., LLC v. Azar, 2021 WL 5570309,

at *13 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 29, 2021)(finding a complete due process violation where “the

Commissioner's actions in depriving Blue Sky of its reimbursements via recoupment were

neither random nor unauthorized . . . .”). This district also has concluded that where a

public employee challenges the failure to provide a hearing before termination of his

employment as required by established procedure, the due process violation is not complete

unless and until there is an inadequate postdeprivation remedy. See, e.g., Kilpatrick v.

Crenshaw Cty. Comm'n, 2016 WL 3251605, at *4 (M.D. Ala. 2016), judgment entered sub

nom. Kilpatrick v. Crenshaw Cty. Comm'n, 2016 WL 3234562 (M.D. Ala. 2016).

In analyzing the nature of the alleged deprivation in this case, this Court heeds the

Eleventh Circuit’s caution against “gutting any notions of predeprivation due process and

blanketly holding that a state can effectuate any and all deprivations under a ‘shoot first,

ask questions later’ mentality, so long as it offers ex post facto recourse.” Barr v. Johnson,

777 F. App'x 298, 303 (11th Cir. 2019).

When the allegation in the complaint that Edwards’ employment was “terminated”

by the Board is considered along with the supporting facts from the incorporated minutes,

namely, that the Board members voted on a motion to accept her resignation, the complaint

alleges that the Board terminated Edwards’ employment when it misinterpreted her intent

to resign letter as a resignation and voted to accept it. In other words, although Board

action terminated her employment, the action was a result of a misinterpretation. The Court

finds that this alleged action by the Board, therefore, was random and unauthorized

conduct. Cf. San Geronimo Caribe Project, Inc. v. Acevedo-Vila, 687 F.3d 465, 490 (1st

Cir. 2012) (en banc) (holding that an erroneous judgment based on a mistake “was exactly

the type of ‘random and unauthorized conduct’ encompassed by Parratt–Hudson.”).

Therefore, there only must be an adequate postdeprivation remedy to satisfy due process.

Edwards has not responded to the Defendants’ argument regarding the adequacy of

postdeprivation remedies. It has been established that Alabama provides an adequate

postdeprivation remedy through recourse to its judicial system. See Bell, 86 F.3d at 192

(holding Alabama courts review employment termination proceedings both to determine

whether they are supported by substantial evidence and to see that the proceedings comport

with procedural due process). Accordingly, this Court concludes that Edwards has failed

to state a claim of violation of procedural due process and that the claim is due to be

DISMISSED with prejudice.

2. Conspiracy

The Defendants move to dismiss Edwards’s federal conspiracy claim on the grounds

that there is no underlying violation and that the claim is barred by the intra-corporate

conspiracy doctrine.

For the reasons stated above, Edwards has failed to state a claim for an underlying

constitutional violation. “[T]here can be no conspiracy where there is no underlying

wrongful act.” Mays v. U.S. Postal Serv., 928 F. Supp. 1552, 1561 (M.D. Ala. 1996), aff'd,

122 F.3d 43 (11th Cir. 1997). Alternatively, Edwards has failed to state a claim because

the intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine provides that a public entity cannot conspire with

its employees. See Dickerson v. Alachua County Comm'n, 200 F.3d 761, 768 (11th Cir.

2000). The conspiracy claim, therefore, is due to be DISMISSED with prejudice.

B. State-law Claim

The Defendants move to dismiss the breach of contract claim brought against the

Board and the Board members in their official capacities on the basis of sovereign

immunity. They also move to dismiss the breach of contract claim brought against the

Board members in their individual capacities on the basis of Edwards’ failure to state a

claim.

Pursuant to Art. I, section 14 of the Alabama Constitution, the State of Alabama has

absolute immunity from lawsuits, which extends to arms or agencies of the state. Ex parte

Tuscaloosa County, 796 So. 2d 1100, 1103 (Ala. 2000). Under Alabama law, boards of

education are “local agencies of the state,” and thus immune from suit. Ex parte Hale Cty.

Bd. of Educ., 14 So. 3d 844, 848 (Ala. 2009). “That immunity extends to all legal claims,

including those for breach of contract, against all State agencies and local agencies of the

State, including local boards of education.” S.C. v. Huntsville City Sch., 441 F. Supp. 3d

1228, 1239 (N.D. Ala. 2020); see also Ex parte Phenix City Bd. of Educ., 67 So. 3d 56, 60

(Ala. 2011) (“City boards of education are local agencies of the State.”). Therefore, the

Board is immune from Edwards’ breach of contract claim.

In arguing that she can proceed on her breach of contract claim against the Board

members in their official capacities, Edwards relies on Burch v. Birdsong, 181 So. 3d 343

(Ala. Civ. App. 2015). In Burch, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals explained that

“although actions seeking backpay are not permitted under § 14, actions seeking

prospective relief like enforcement of a policy or reinstatement are not barred by § 14.” Id.

at 351. The court held that because the plaintiff “did not specifically seek backpay in her

complaint, and, in her brief to this court, Burch admits that she did not seek damages or

backpay because she was aware that § 14 immunity barred any recovery of such damages,”

her claim seeking an order to compel the school board members to prospectively comply

with the legal duties under the employment contract was not barred. Id.

In contrast to Burch, in this case, the only relief Edwards has sought in her complaint

is an award of money damages. (Doc. 1). Her claim against the Board members in their

official capacities, therefore, also is barred by sovereign immunity. Accordingly, the

breach of contract claims against the Board and the Board members in their official

capacities are due to be DISMISSED without prejudice on the basis of sovereign

immunity.6

Although individual capacity claims against the Board members are not barred by

sovereign immunity, “agents cannot be held liable for a principal's breach of contract.”

Harrell v. Reynolds Metals Co., 495 So. 2d 1381, 1389 (Ala. 1986). Edwards’ contract

was with the Board, not the Board members in their individual capacities. (Doc. 1); see

also Ogburia v. Alabama Agric. & Mech. Univ., 2008 WL 11379978, at *16 (N.D. Ala.

Jan. 7, 2008)(finding “any claim for breach of contract is a claim against Alabama A&M

because Alabama A&M was, as alleged by Plaintiff, Plaintiff's employer and, under

Alabama law, an agent cannot be held liable for his principal's breach of contract.”).

6 Because the dismissal of the breach of contract claim is not on the merits, but for lack of jurisdiction,

Edwards may be able to pursue some other form of relief for breach of contract in another case or different

forum. See S.C., 441 F. Supp. 3d at 1239 (noting, “[c]laimants who cannot pursue a state law breach of

contract claim against state entities in a judicial forum could seek relief from the Alabama Board of

Adjustment.”).

Therefore, the breach of contract claims against the Board members in their individual

capacities are due to be DISMISSED with prejudice.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion to dismiss (doc.

22) is GRANTED as follows:

1. The federal due process and conspiracy claims in counts one and two of the

complaint are DISMISSED with prejudice.

2. The breach of contract claim in count three against the Board and the individual

Defendants in their official capacities is DISMISSED without prejudice on the

basis of sovereign immunity.

3. The breach of contract claim in count three against the individual Defendants in

their individual capacities is DISMISSED with prejudice.

DONE this 28th day of February, 2022.

/s/ Emily C. Marks

EMILY C. MARKS

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE