Paige v. Equity Group Eufaula Division, LLC

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

BILLY PAIGE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

v. ) 2:18cv737-MHT

) (WO)

EQUITY GROUP EUFAULA )

DIVISION, LLC, )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION

Plaintiff Billy Paige filed this lawsuit claiming

that his employer, defendant Equity Group Eufaula

Division, LLC, failed to promote him to two positions

because he is African-American, in violation of Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.

§§ 1981a, 2000e to 2000e-17, and the Civil Rights Act of

1866, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The court’s

jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal

question), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (Title VII), and 28

U.S.C. § 1343 (civil rights).

This case is now before the court on Equity Group’s

motion for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow,

the motion will be granted.

I. Summary-Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is proper where “there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact” and “the moving party is

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(c). Where, as here, the non-moving party bears the

burden of proof at trial, “the moving party, in order to

prevail, must do one of two things: show that the

non-moving party has no evidence to support its case, or

present ‘affirmative evidence demonstrating that the non-

moving party will be unable to prove its case at trial.’”

, 20 F.3d 1137, 1141 (11th Cir. 1994)

(quoting , 941 F.2d

1428, 1437–38 (11th Cir. 1991) (en banc)). Once the

party seeking summary judgment has informed the court of

the basis for its motion, the burden shifts to the

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non-moving party to show that a genuine issue of material

fact exists. In making its determination, the

court must view all evidence and any factual inferences

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.

, 475

U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

II. Factual Background

The facts, viewed in the light most favorable to

Paige, are as follows:

Equity Group runs a plant for turning raw chicken

into fast-food products. Paige is a line worker.

In 2017, Equity Group announced that it was hiring

for two managerial positions: Broiler Flock

Representative and Broiler Housing Coordinator. The

Broiler Flock Representative would be responsible for

providing advice and support to the third-party farmers

with whom the company contracts to supply its chicken.

The Broiler Housing Coordinator would be responsible for

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assisting the third-party farmers to construct and

maintain chicken houses. Hiring Manager David Brown was

responsible for filling both positions. According to

Equity Group policy, Brown was to fill the positions by

promotion from within the company, if possible.

Paige applied for both positions. He had, at most,

seven years of experience relevant to the Broiler Flock

Representative position, and some experience

constructing farm buildings.

Brown spoke with his own supervisor, Kenneth Edwards,

about Paige’s application for the Broiler Flock

Representative position. Edwards informed Brown that

Paige had previously worked as a manager on another farm,

that he had been written up several times, and that he

had been terminated. Edwards told Brown that he “might

need to look long and hard at that resume.” Def.’s Ex.

C, Brown Deposition, at 25 (Doc. 45-4).

Brown did not hire Paige for either position. He

hired Jeremy Flowers for the Broiler Flock Representative

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position. Brown determined that Flowers was more

qualified than Paige because he had some college

education and over 14 years of experience with another

poultry company in a similar position, whereas Paige did

not. Brown also knew Flowers’s family, which he weighed

in his favor. Flowers is white, and had not been

previously employed by Equity Group. Flowers had left

his previous job because he did not get along with

management.

Brown hired Matthew Blankenship for the Broiler

Housing Coordinator position. Brown determined that

Blankenship was more qualified than Paige because he had

seven years of experience as a Broiler Flock

Representative, which Brown deemed relevant to his

qualification for the Broiler Housing Coordinator

position, whereas Paige had no experience as a Broiler

Flock Representative. Brown also considered that

Blankenship had experience building chicken houses on his

family’s farm. Blankenship is white.

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In his tenure as hiring manager, Brown has hired six

or seven Broiler Flock Representatives. All have been

white.

III. Discussion

Title VII states: “It shall be an unlawful

employment practice for an employer ... to fail or refuse

to hire ... any individual ... because of such

individual’s race.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Section

1981 states: “All persons within the jurisdiction of the

United States shall have the same right in every State

and Territory to make and enforce contracts ... as is

enjoyed by white citizens.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). Paige

claims that he was not hired for the Broiler Flock

Representative and Broiler Housing Coordinating

positions because of his race, in violation of both

statutes.

Such claims are analyzed under the burden-shifting

framework established in

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, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

, 644 F.3d 1321, 1324–25 (11th Cir. 2011). Under

, the employee must first demonstrate a

prima-facie case, which consists of “evidence adequate

to create an inference that an employment decision was

based on a[n] [illegal] discriminatory criterion.”

, 431 U.S. 324, 358

(1977). “The methods of presenting a prima facie case

are flexible and depend on the particular situation.”

, 610 F.3d 1253,

1264 (11th Cir. 2010). Once established, a prima-facie

case raises a presumption of illegal discrimination,

, 450 U.S. 248,

254 (1981), and a burden of production is then put on the

employer to rebut the presumption by articulating at

least one legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its

challenged action, , 229 F.3d

1012, 1024 (11th Cir. 2000).

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If this burden of production is met, the burden is

then on the employee to satisfy his ultimate burden of

establishing that the employer’s proffered reason for the

employment decision was a pretext for racial

discrimination, a burden which he may satisfy “either

directly, by persuading the court that a discriminatory

reason more than likely motivated the employer, or

indirectly, by persuading the court that the proffered

reason for the employment decision is not worthy of

belief.” , 326 F.3d

1157, 1166 (11th Cir. 2003). Where the employer has

proffered multiple nondiscriminatory reasons for its

employment decision, the employee must demonstrate that

each is pretextual to avoid summary judgment.

, 229 F.3d at 1037.

Often, the question whether the plaintiff has made

out a prima-facie case is irrelevant when the district

court considers an employer’s motion for summary

judgment. ,

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2012 WL 566820, at *3 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 21, 2012) (Thompson,

J.); , 978 F. Supp. 1008,

1017 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (Thompson, J.) (“[W]here . . . the

court has sufficient evidence to determine whether an

employee has been a victim of discrimination, the court

need not go through the burden-shifting

process and should instead reach the ultimate issue of

discrimination.”). That is because, “[u]nder the

framework, the burden at the first two

steps is light for both the plaintiff and the

defendant-employer.” , 2012 WL 566820, at

*3. Thus, “the real question [often] lies in whether the

employer’s legitimate non-discriminatory reason is

pretextual,” at *4, which, as stated, is the final

inquiry in the analysis. , 326

F.3d at 1166 (“‘If ... the defendant has succeeded in

carrying its burden of production, the

framework--with its presumptions and burdens--is no

longer relevant. ... The presumption, having fulfilled

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its role of forcing the defendant to come forward with

some response, simply drops out of the picture.’”)

(quoting , 509 U.S. 502,

510–11 (1993)).

In this case, Equity Group asserts that it did not

hire Paige for either position because his termination

from his previous farm-manager job was disqualifying, and

because Brown determined that Flowers and Blankenship

were more qualified candidates--a determination that

Brown based on the fact that Flowers had more than twice

as much relevant experience as Paige, and the fact that

Blankenship had seven years of relevant experience as a

Broiler Flock Representative, whereas Paige had none.1

1. Equity Group also asserts that it did not hire

Paige because he did not have enough relevant experience

to be qualified for either job. For the same reason, and

because, according to the company, Brown did not know

Paige’s race when he chose not to hire him, the company

asserts that Paige cannot establish a prima-facie case.

Paige asserts that he was qualified and that Brown did

know his race. The court need not address either matter,

however, because Paige has failed to demonstrate that the

company’s other justifications for not hiring him are

pretextual, as he must to survive summary judgment.

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Paige has not produced sufficient evidence for a

reasonable fact-finder to find either of Equity Group’s

justifications to be a pretext for racial discrimination.

With regard to the company’s assertion that his prior

termination was disqualifying, he emphasizes that the

company hired Flowers despite the fact that he did not

get along with management at his previous job. But he

presents no evidence that Flowers was ever written up or

terminated.

With regard to Equity Group’s assertion that Flowers

and Blankenship were superior candidates, Paige touts his

qualifications for both positions. But where a claim of

discrimination is based on relative qualifications, the

disparities in qualifications must be “of such weight and

significance that no reasonable person, in the exercise

of impartial judgment, could have chosen the candidate

selected over the plaintiff for the job in question.”

, 664 F.3d 883, 889 (11th Cir.

2011) (quoting , 390 F.3d 695, 732

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(11th Cir. 2004)). Here they are not. Indeed, the

evidence is that both Flowers and Blankenship had more

relevant experience than Paige.2

Paige also contends that Equity Group could not have

found Flowers or Blankenship to have been more qualified

than him because Brown asserted in a deposition that he

could not remember whether Paige applied for the Broiler

Housing Coordinator position, and because Brown never

contacted him or his current supervisor regarding his

qualifications for either position. After his

2. With regard to Equity Group’s decision to hire

Flowers, specifically, Paige notes that it was the

company’s policy to “try to fill job openings above entry

level by promoting from within, if qualified applicants

are known to be available internally,” and that Flowers

was an outside candidate. Pl.’s Ex. 1 at 2 (Doc. 49-1).

Equity Group responds: “[T]here is no evidence that

Equity Group failed to follow its hiring policies. While

Paige may believe that he should have been hired because

he was an internal candidate, Equity Group’s policies do

not guarantee that internal candidates are hired in every

instance.” Def.’s Reply Br. at 9 (Doc. 52). The court

agrees that Paige has not presented sufficient evidence

from which a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that

this policy was not applied fairly in the filling of the

two positions. The company did not say it would restrict

itself to qualified internal candidates.

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deposition, however, Brown asserted in an affidavit that

he found Blankenship more qualified for the Broiler

Housing Coordinator than Paige for the reasons given

above. Def.’s Tab E, Decl. of David Brown at 7 (Doc.

45-6). The fact that Brown at one point could not remember

whether Paige applied for the Broiler Housing Coordinator

position does not undermine his later assertion. It is

likewise irrelevant that Brown failed to look beyond

Paige’s resume.

, 196 F.3d 1354, 1361 (11th Cir. 1999) (“We are

not in the business of adjudging whether employment

decisions are prudent or fair.”).

Finally, Paige contends that Brown’s failure to hire

African-Americans for Broiler Flock Representative

positions demonstrates pretext. Brown’s failure to hire

African-Americans, however, is not, on its own,

sufficient to establish that Equity Group did not hire

Paige because of his race. Rather, Paige must also

present evidence that qualified African-American

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candidates applied for the positions, and he must present

at least some circumstantial evidence suggesting that

Equity Group did not hire those African-American

candidates because of their race.

, 447 F.3d 1319, 1325 (11th Cir. 2006)

(finding plaintiff’s statistical evidence insufficient

to support her discrimination claim where she “failed to

establish valid comparators and presented no other

circumstantial evidence suggesting racial

discrimination”); , 220

F.3d 1263, 1287 (11th Cir. 2000) (“A plaintiff may

establish a pattern or practice claim ‘through a

combination of strong statistical evidence of disparate

impact coupled with anecdotal evidence of the employer’s

intent to treat the protected class unequally.’”)

(quoting , 940 F.2d

1036, 1051 (7th Cir. 1991)). Paige has done neither.3

3. Paige suggests that Brown’s reliance on his

knowledge of Flowers’s family is circumstantial evidence

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Accordingly, the court will grant Equity Group’s

motion for summary judgment.

***

An appropriate judgment will be entered.

DONE, this the 16th day of September, 2021.

/s/ Myron H. Thompson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

that Brown did not hire Paige because of his race.

Pl.s’ Br. in Opposition to Summary Judgment at 23–24

(Doc. 48) (“[T]he use of friends and family who are the

same race as you to determine who [ ] to hire can be

evidence of bias against those of another race.”). But

while Brown’s preference for candidates within his social

circle might be consistent with racial bias, it cannot,

on its own, sustain a claim of discriminatory hiring.

Indeed, neither Title VII nor § 1981 prevents an employer

from hiring a candidate because he knows his family.

Rather, Paige must present some evidence that Brown chose

to hire from within his social circle because he did not

wish to hire African-American candidates.

, 247 F.3d 1172, 1185 (11th Cir. 2001)

(“Absent evidence that subjective hiring criteria were

used as a mask for discrimination, the fact that an

employer based a hiring or promotion decision on purely

subjective criteria will rarely, if ever, prove

pretext.”). Paige has presented no such evidence.

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