The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 KYLE HANDLEY, Case No. 8:22-cv-01423-MCS-GJS
12 Petitioner,
ORDER ACCEPTING IN PART
13 v. AND REJECTING IN PART
FINDINGS AND
14 SEAN MOORE, RECOMMENDATIONS OF
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE
15 Respondent. JUDGE
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17 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, the Court has reviewed the operative habeas
18 petition, (Pet., ECF No. 1), all relevant documents filed and lodged in this action,
19 the Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge, (Report, ECF
20 No. 14), and Petitioner’s Objections to the Report, (Objs., ECF No. 17). Pursuant to
21 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), the Court has
22 conducted a de novo review of those portions of the Report to which objections have
23 been stated.
24 Having completed its review, the Court accepts in part and rejects in part the
25 findings and recommendations set forth in the Report. Specifically, the Court rejects
26 the Magistrate Judge’s determination that “Petitioner received fair notice of the
27 charges against him.” (Report 16.) The charging document did not allege the distinct
28 elements of a charge of aggravated kidnapping for ransom, and the charging
1 document was only informally amended at a jury instruction conference held during
2 trial—and even then, the court and the prosecutor misarticulated the elements of the
3 crime. The Court doubts this comported with the notice and pleading requirements
4 of the United States Constitution. U.S. Const. amend. VI; see Cole v. Arkansas, 333
5 U.S. 196, 201 (1948); Gautt v. Lewis, 489 F.3d 993, 1004 (9th Cir. 2007).
6 That said, relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is available only if the state
7 court’s resolution of Petitioner’s due process claim on direct appeal “was contrary
8 to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
9 determined by the Supreme Court,” or “was based on an unreasonable determination
10 of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” The
11 Court concurs with the Magistrate Judge that the state court’s resolution of the claim
12 on direct appeal “was not objectively unreasonable factually or under the clearly
13 established federal law.” (Report 17.) In its reasoned decision, the California Court
14 of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s argument that a longstanding state precedent that
15 undermines his claim, People v. Britton, 6 Cal. 2d 1 (1936), conflicts with Supreme
16 Court precedent. (Pet. Ex. G, at 1986, ECF No. 1-3.) The state court noted that the
17 Supreme Court of the United States had declined to resolve whether punishment-
18 enhancing facts must be included in a charging document, and that the California
19 Supreme Court’s interpretation of that precedent bound the state court. (Id. at 1986–
20 87 (citing, inter alia, Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and People v.
21 Contreras, 58 Cal. 4th 123 (2013)).) Petitioner does not explicitly challenge the
22 Magistrate Judge’s finding that this analysis was not objectively unreasonable;
23 instead, citing Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 109–11 (2013), he argues that
24 it was clearly established that the notice provision of the Sixth Amendment applies
25 to state proceedings and that the common law as codified in the Sixth Amendment
26 requires every fact essential to the punishment to be pleaded. (Objs. 2–3.) The
27 principles articulated in Alleyne on which Petitioner relies are dicta supporting the
28 Court’s conclusion that “facts that increase mandatory minimum sentences must be
1 || submitted to the jury.” 570 U.S. at 116. Alleyne did not speak directly to criminal
2 || pleading requirements. Accordingly, Petitioner has not demonstrated the principles
3 || on which his petition relies are clearly established for the purpose of § 2254(d)(1).
4 || Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000).
5 The Court also concurs with the Magistrate Judge that Petitioner has not
6 || demonstrated that any constitutional error was structural or resulted in any prejudice
7 || to his defense. (Report 17.) Notwithstanding Petitioner’s persuasive arguments why
8 || the type of error here might require automatic reversal, (Objs. 19-20), this Court
9 || takes a cue from the Ninth Circuit and “hesitate[s] to pronounce the constitutional
10 || violation in question structural in nature, without an explicit ‘green light’ from the
11 || [Supreme] Court,” Gautt, 489 F.3d at 1015. And Petitioner still has not
12 || demonstrated how the purported “error had a ‘substantial and injurious effect or
13 || influence’ on the outcome of his trial.” Brown v. Davenport, 596 U.S. 118, 126
14 || (2022) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)). He argues that
15 || “the state cannot prove that the error” was harmless, (Objs. 21), but he bears the
16 || burden on this issue, not Respondent, Brown, 596 U.S. at 126.
17 The Court accepts the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that habeas relief is
18 || unwarranted. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the Petition is DENIED; and
19 || judgment shall be entered dismissing this action with prejudice.
Mak L Lon
21 || DATE: January 16, 2024 “ oo“
9 MARK C. SCARSI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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