Letricia Lavern Brown v. The State of California

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. CV 23-1966 ODW (PVC) Date: April 21, 2023

Title Letricia Lavern Brown v. State of California, et al.

Present: The Honorable Pedro V. Castillo, United States Magistrate Judge

Marlene Ramirez None

Deputy Clerk Court Reporter / Recorder

Attorneys Present for Plaintiff: Attorneys Present for Defendants:

None None

PROCEEDINGS: [IN CHAMBERS] ORDER DENYING WITHOUT

PREJUDICE PLAINTIFF’S DUPLICATE MOTIONS FOR

HEARING ON DEFAULTS (Dkt. Nos. 44 & 47)

This pro se civil action was removed from the Los Angeles County Superior Court

on March 16, 2023. On April 12 and 13, 2023, Plaintiff filed duplicate Motions for

Hearing on Defaults.1 (Dkt. Nos. 44 & 47). On April 20, 2023, the State of California

1 The Motions are identical photocopies except that the copy of the Motion filed at Dkt.

No. 47 includes two pages that appear to have been inadvertently omitted from Dkt.

No. 44 (see Dkt. No. 47 at 9 & 27); reproduces photos in black and white that were in

color in Dkt. No. 44 (compare, e.g., Dkt. No. 44 at 36 (Santiago Himenez), 44 (“Julie”),

50 (Rick Licciardello), and 55 (Brianna J. Garcia) with Dkt. No. 47 at 38 (Himenez), 46

(“Julie”), 53 (Licciardello), and 64 (Garcia)); and erroneously attaches two photographs

and three proofs of service as part of Exhibit 5.2 that were properly grouped with the

other proofs of service in Exhibit 4 in Dkt. No. 44. (Compare Dkt. No. 44 at 55-62 with

Dkt. No. 47 at 64-71).

Because the entirety of Dkt. 44 is encompassed by Dkt. No. 47, the Court will cite to the

Motion docketed at Dkt. No. 47 in the discussion below and will refer to the Motions in

the singular. The Court will cite to Plaintiff’s filings as though they were consecutively

paginated using the CM/ECF-generated page numbers on the Court’s docket.

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. CV 23-1966 ODW (PVC) Date: April 21, 2023

Title Letricia Lavern Brown v. State of California, et al.

and Palos Verdes Peninsula Unified School District filed oppositions to the Motion.

(Dkt. Nos. 80 (State of California Opp.); 83 (Palos Verdes Opp.)). The Court concludes

that this matter may be resolved without further briefing or a hearing. C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-

15. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s Motion for Hearing on Defaults is DENIED

without prejudice.2

Overview of the Motion

The Motion consists of a request for entry of default, (Motion at 1-2), supported

by several exhibits. Exhibit 1 is a copy of the state form request for entry of default and

default judgment filed in the Los Angeles County Superior Court on February 21, 2023,

(id. at 3-6), including a lengthy certificate of service. (Id. at 7-12). That request seeks

the default of the following defendants: (1) State of California, (2) Riverside County

Sheriff Department [sic], (3) Cloud Escrow Incorporation, (4) Palos Verdes Peninsula

Unified School District, (5) County of Los Angeles, (6) South Central Los Angeles

Regional Center,3 (7) Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, and

(8) Torrance Memorial Medical Center. (Id. at 4). Exhibit 2 is another state form request

for entry of default and default judgment, signed on March 13, 2023, though not file-

stamped by the Superior Court. (Id. at 13-16). It seeks the default of (1) “United States

2 Although the Motion is captioned only as a Motion for Hearing on Defaults, in the body

of the Motion, Plaintiff states: “This case should be moved back to the Superior Court of

California, County of Los Angeles, and, or [sic] default entered in this Court.” (Motion

at 2). However, while the Motion attaches state-form requests for entry of default and for

default judgment in Exhibits 1 and 2, Plaintiff does not explain anywhere why remand to

state court is appropriate. The request for remand is entirely unsupported and does not

merit further discussion here. Accordingly, the Court will address the Motion solely as a

motion for entry of default and for default judgment.

3 The Court construes the reference to “South Central Los Angeles Regional Center” in

the Motion to refer to South Central Los Angeles Regional Center for Developmentally

Disabled Persons, Inc. (See Complaint, Dkt. No. 1-2, at 6 #39).

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. CV 23-1966 ODW (PVC) Date: April 21, 2023

Title Letricia Lavern Brown v. State of California, et al.

of America, et al.,” (2) Palos Verdes Peninsula Unified School District, and (3) Weingart

YMCA Wellness and Aquatic Center. (Id. at 14). It, too, includes a lengthy certificate of

service. (Id. at 17-22).

Exhibit 3 is a largely incomprehensible document captioned “Statement of

Damages.” (Id. at 23-31). Exhibit 4 (id. at 32-56, 64-71) consists of the proofs of service

of the complaint on the following defendants: (1) State of California (id. at 33-34);

(2) South Central Los Angeles Regional Center (id. at 35-39, including photographs);

(3) Cloud Escrow Incorporation (id. at 40-41); (4) Torrance Memorial Center (id. at 42-

46, including business card and photograph); (5) Torrance Memorial Center, 2d Service

(id. at 47-48); (6) Palos Verdes Peninsula Unified School District (id. at 49-53, including

business card and photograph); (7) County of Los Angeles (id. at 54-56, 64-65, including

photographs);4 (8) Edmund D. Edelman Children’s Court, Superior Court of California,

County of Los Angeles (id. at 66-67, exact duplicate at id., 70-71); and (9) County of Los

Angeles, 2d Service (id. at 68-69).5 Exhibit 5 consists of a certificate of compliance with

the meet and confer requirements of Local Rule 7-3 (id. at 58), including handwritten

notes of Plaintiff’s attempts to contact counsel for the State of California, the County of

Los Angeles, and the Superior Court of California, Los Angeles County (id. at 59); a

meet and confer letter announcing Plaintiff’s intention to seek the defaults of specific

parties (“Exhibit 5.1,” id. at 60-62); and screen shots of call logs reflecting calls to Mark

4 As noted earlier, in the copy of the Motion at Dkt. No. 47, Plaintiff appears to have

inadvertently placed the documents at pages 64-71 after the cover page for Exhibit 5.2,

even though they are logically part of Exhibit 4 and were presented as such in the copy of

the Motion filed at Dkt. No. 44. (See Dkt. No. 44 at 55-62).

5 The Court makes no findings at this time as to whether service was properly effected.

(See Dkt. No. 80 at 4 (State of California opposition to Motion contending that service

was not properly effected on the State because the summons and complaint were not

served on the Attorney General’s Office in Sacramento)). Furthermore, in the unique

circumstances of this case, the Court does not construe a Defendant’s decision to file a

motion to dismiss as a waiver of any service defects.

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. CV 23-1966 ODW (PVC) Date: April 21, 2023

Title Letricia Lavern Brown v. State of California, et al.

Ashley Brown (State of California), Rebecca Chmura (County of Los Angeles), Sarah

Overton (Superior Court), and Collins & Collins (County of Los Angeles) (“Exhibit 5.2,”

id. at 63, 72-78).

In Plaintiff’s meet and confer letter, Plaintiff asserts that the following parties are

in default: (1) State of California; (2) South Central Los Angeles Regional Center;

(3) Cloud Escrow Incorporation; (4) Torrance Memorial Center; (5) Palos Verdes

Peninsula Unified School District; (6) County of Los Angeles; and (7) Superior Court of

California, County of Los Angeles. (Motion at 61-62). Although the Motion is far from

clear, the Court presumes for purposes of this Order only that Plaintiff is seeking entry of

default against these Defendants by the present Motion.

Standard

The Court Clerk must enter default when a defendant fails to plead or otherwise

defend a case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). In general, once default has been entered by the

Clerk, all factual allegations in the complaint against the defaulting Defendant, except

those relating to the amount of damages, will be taken as true. Televideo Sys., Inc. v.

Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1987).

Following entry of default under Rule 55(a), the plaintiff may then apply to the

court for default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). The Central District’s Local Rule 55-1

requires that applications for default judgment be supported by a declaration that includes

the following attestations: (1) when and against what party the default was entered;

(2) the pleading to which default was entered: (3) whether the defaulting party is an

infant or incompetent person, and if so, whether the person is represented by a general

guardian, committee, conservator or other representative; (4) that the Servicemembers

Civil Relief Act does not apply; and (5) that notice has been served on the defaulting

party, if required by Rule 55(b)(2). C.D. Cal. L.R. 55-1; see also Fed. R. Civ. P.

55(b)(2).

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. CV 23-1966 ODW (PVC) Date: April 21, 2023

Title Letricia Lavern Brown v. State of California, et al.

Entry of default, however, does not automatically entitle a plaintiff to a court-

ordered judgment. See Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 924-25 (9th Cir. 1986).

Instead, the decision to grant or deny a request for default judgment is within the court’s

sound discretion. Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980); see also Bonita

Packing Co. v. O’Sullivan, 165 F.R.D. 610, 614 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (courts have broad

discretion to grant or deny entry of default, and may do so even “when a defendant is

technically in default for failing to answer or otherwise appear”). The Ninth Circuit has

identified several factors (collectively, the “Eitel factors”) that the court should consider

in determining whether to grant default judgment:

(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) the merits of the

plaintiff’s substantive claim; (3) the sufficiency of the complaint; (4) the

sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute

concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable

neglect; and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.

Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). Default judgments are

“ordinarily disfavored,” as “[c]ases should be decided upon their merits whenever

possible.” Id. at 1472.

Discussion

Plaintiff’s Motion must be denied for numerous overlapping reasons. First, even

after spending an extensive amount of time attempting to decipher the Motion, the Court

is still unsure precisely which entities Plaintiff claims are in default and whether Plaintiff

is seeking a clerical entry of default (Rule 55(a)) or a court-ordered default judgment

(Rule 55(b)), or both, against those entities. Second, the state court form requests

attached as Exhibits 1 and 2, which appear to seek both entry of default and default

judgment under the provisions of the California Code of Civil Procedure, are inapplicable

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. CV 23-1966 ODW (PVC) Date: April 21, 2023

Title Letricia Lavern Brown v. State of California, et al.

here. Federal procedural law governs this action, and as such, to the extent that Plaintiff

is seeking entry of default and default judgment, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

control. Under the Federal Rules, entry of default and default judgment are separate

actions, the requests for which should be directed respectively to the Court Clerk and the

District Judge.6

Third, to the extent that Plaintiff is seeking default judgment, the request is

premature because Plaintiff has not obtained entry of default against any party by the

Court Clerk in accordance with Rule 55(a). See Stephenson v. Lappin, 2007 WL

1113550, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2007), report and recommendation adopted, 2007 WL

1894295 (E.D. Cal. July 2, 2007) (“Entry of a default under Rule 55(a) is a prerequisite to

entry of a default judgment under Rule 55(b).”); Montgomery v. Noll, 2007 WL 2141247,

at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2007) (“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b) contemplates that

a default judgment may be sought after default has been entered against a defendant.”)

(emphasis in original). Additionally, a request for default judgment must be

accompanied by a declaration that complies with the requirements of Local Rule 55-1,

which Plaintiff has not submitted. C.D. Cal. L.R. 55-1.

Fourth, even if the Court were to construe the instant Motion to seek the entry of

default under Rule 55(a), such relief would not be appropriate at this stage of the

proceedings because it appears that many of the Defendants against which Plaintiff might

be seeking entry of default have appeared and are defending this action. Multiple parties

have filed motions to dismiss. (See Dkt. Nos. 14, 21 (Palos Verdes Peninsula Unified

School District); Dkt. No. 24 (South Central Los Angeles Regional Center for

6 Because this matter has been referred to the Magistrate Judge, if Plaintiff files a

procedurally proper Rule 55(b) request for default judgment after entry of default by the

Court Clerk under Rule 55(a), the Court will prepare a Report and Recommendation for

the District Judge recommending that the request be granted or denied. In light of the

manifest deficiencies of the instant Motion, however, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s

Motion without prejudice to re-filing pursuant to the guidelines set forth in this Order.

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. CV 23-1966 ODW (PVC) Date: April 21, 2023

Title Letricia Lavern Brown v. State of California, et al.

Developmentally Disabled Persons, Inc.); Dkt. Nos. 26, 77 (State of California), Dkt. No.

30 (Torrance Memorial Medical Center); Dkt. No. 35, 50 (Superior Court of California,

County of Los Angeles, sued erroneously as Edmund D. Edelman Children’s Court); Dkt.

No. 73 (Riverside County Sheriffs Department). These motions were filed well before

Plaintiff appears to have sought default of these entities. Furthermore, two Defendants so

far have filed oppositions to the Motion for default, also evidencing Defendants’

intention to defend this case. (See Dkt. Nos. 80 & 83). While Plaintiff may believe that

she is entitled to entry of default because these Defendants have not filed an answer to the

Complaint, (see Motion, Exh. 5.1 at 61), the filing of a motion to dismiss, by itself, is

sufficient to preclude entry of default. See Stephens v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 2018 WL

3655659, *18 (C.D. Cal. June 22, 2018) (“[T]he entry of default would not appropriate at

this juncture since each such defendant has now appeared and filed or joined a motion to

dismiss.”); see also Lee v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Emps.-Burlington N. Sys. Fed’n,

139 F.R.D. 376, 381 (D. Minn. 1991) (“Where a defendant appears and indicates a desire

to contest an action, a court may exercise its discretion to refuse to enter default, in

accordance with the policy of allowing cases to be tried on the merits.”) (citing 10

Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary K. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, §

2682 at 411 (2d ed. 1983)); Hudson v. State of North Carolina, 158 F.R.D. 78, 80 (E.D.

N.C. 1994) (the “filing of a Motion to Dismiss constitutes defending an action within the

meaning of Rule 55(a),” and even a late-filed motion to dismiss cures the default such

that “thereafter entry of default would not be appropriate”).

Finally, even if Plaintiff had properly served certain Defendants that did not timely

respond to the pleading and had adequately attempted to meet and confer with those

Defendants prior to filing the Motion, which the Court need not and does not decide, and

even if the request for entry of default did not suffer from the numerous procedural

deficiencies addressed above, the Court would still deny the Motion on this record. As a

preliminary matter, there is no evidence before the Court to suggest that any Defendant

has engaged in any intentional culpable conduct to warrant entry of default or a default

judgment. See FOC Financial Limited Partnership v. Nat’l City Commercial Capital

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. CV 23-1966 ODW (PVC) Date: April 21, 2023

Title Letricia Lavern Brown v. State of California, et al.

Corp., 612 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1083 (D. Ariz. 2009) (“Only intentional conduct is

sufficiently culpable to deny a motion to set aside default.”); see also Butner v.

Neustadter, 324 F.2d 783, 787 (9th Cir. 1963) (any doubts as to defendant’s excusable

neglect must be resolved in favor of setting aside the default).

Furthermore, as evidenced by the motions to dismiss already filed in this action, it

is reasonable to conclude that serious disputes concerning material facts will arise with

each Defendant. Additionally, the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s operative First Amended

Complaint, which, including attachments is 465 pages long and purports to sue at least

eighty separate Defendants for a variety of unrelated, often fantastical, injuries, is

questionable at best, and many allegations are patently frivolous. (See, e.g., FAC at 16

(contending that the state and federal government “implanted devices in [Plaintiff’s] body

that know [her] thoughts without [her] speaking them”); 49 (claiming that LaToya

Jackson used fabricated evidence against Plaintiff that led to the removal of Plaintiff’s

son from her home); 128 (claiming that Beyonce Knowles sent her relative to have a

child with Plaintiff’s niece in order to persuade Plaintiff’s family to betray and keep

surveillance on Plaintiff). Accordingly, even a cursory examination of the Eitel factors

cautions against default in this action until it is clear that Plaintiff has alleged coherent,

cognizable claims against each Defendant for which default is requested.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Hearing on Defaults is therefore DENIED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE. Any further default requests must comply with the procedural and

substantive guidelines set forth in this Order. Plaintiff is cautioned that any requests for

default against a Defendant that has appeared and is actively defending this case will be

summarily rejected.

Plaintiff is further admonished that duplicative motions, such as those filed at Dkt.

Nos. 44 and 47, that require disproportionate expenditures of Court resources to decipher

and compare are improper and will be summarily stricken in the future. If Plaintiff

discovers a material error in a pending motion that must be corrected for the Court to

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. CV 23-1966 ODW (PVC) Date: April 21, 2023

Title Letricia Lavern Brown v. State of California, et al.

fully understand what Plaintiff is requesting, she should file a “Notice of Errata”

describing the error and asking that a correction of the error be substituted.

Finally, as the District Judge counseled in his Order striking Plaintiff’s prior

default motion (Dkt. No. 22),

Plaintiff is advised that the Federal Pro Se Clinic offers free information

and guidance to individuals who are representing themselves in federal civil

actions. The Los Angeles Clinic operates by appointment only.

Appointments are available either by calling the Clinic or by using an

internet portal. The Clinic can be reached at (213) 385-2977, ext. 270 or

through an internet request at the following site:

http://prose.cacd.uscourts.gov/los-angeles. Clinic staff can respond to

many questions with a telephonic appointment or through an email account.

It may be more convenient to email questions or schedule a telephonic

appointment. Staff can also schedule an in-person appointment at their

location in the Roybal Federal Building and Courthouse, 255 East Temple

Street, Suite 170, Los Angeles, California 90012. Plaintiff is encouraged

to visit the Clinic or otherwise consult with an attorney prior to filing a

renewed motion.

(Dkt. No. 28 at 1-2) (emphasis added).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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