Opinion

J. Aguirre v. Alejandro Villanueva

Court
District Court, C.D. California
Filed
Oct 7, 2022
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 16.4%

“We may review the merits of Petitioner’s habeas petition only if he exhausted state court remedies’’

How later courts described this case

  • “We may review the merits of Petitioner’s habeas petition only if he exhausted state court remedies’’
  • “[s]ponsors of the PLRA were especially concerned with courts setting ‘population caps’ and ordering the release of inmates as a sanction for prison administrators’ failure to comply with the terms of consent decrees designed to eliminate overcrowding”
  • applying the PLRA in Los Angeles jails
  • petitioner entitled to habeas relief for failure to receive constitutionally sufficient process during setting of bail after “properly exhaust[ing] his state remedies as to his bail hearing’’

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Case 2:22-cv-05391-MWF-JEM Document 19 Filed 10/07/22 Page 1 of 11 Page ID #:59

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JS-6

CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL

Case No. CV 22-2538-MWF(JEMx) Date: October 7, 2022

Title: People of Los Angeles County Who Are Being Penally Confined in Pre-

Trial Detention Because of and Dependent Upon Their Inability To Pay

Bail, et al. v. Alejandro Villanueva, et al.

Related Cases:

CV 22-5315-MWF(JEMx), Rolan v. Alejandro Villanueva, et al.

CV 22-5316-MWF(JEMx), Stanley v. Alejandro Villanueva, et al.

CV 22-5391-MWF(JEMx), Aguirre v. Alejandro Villanueva, et al.

CV 22-5394-MWF(JEMx), Almeraz v. Alejandro Villanueva, et al.

CV 22-5396-MWF(JEMx), Cabrera v. Alejandro Villanueva, et al.

CV 22-5411-MWF(JEMx), Cano v. Alejandro Villanueva, et al.

CV 22-5414-MWF(JEMx), Hutchins v. Alejandro Villanueva, et al.

CV 22-5416-MWF(JEMx), Munoz v. Alejandro Villanueva, et al.

CV 22-5417-MWF(JEMx), Ramirez v. Alejandro Villanueva, et al.

CV 22-5419-MWF(JEMx), Sanchez v. Alejandro Villanueva, et al.

CV 22-5421-MWF(JEMx), Smith v. Alejandro Villanueva, et al.

CV 22-5426-MWF(JEMx), Shannon v. Alejandro Villanueva, et al.

CV 22-5428-MWF(JEMx), Wilgus v. Alejandro Villanueva, et al.

CV 22-5436-MWF(JEMx), Rains v. Alejandro Villanueva, et al.

CV 22-5449-MWF(JEMx), Guzman v. Alejandro Villanueva, et al.

CV 22-5450-MWF(JEMx), Brown v. Alejandro Villanueva, et al.

CV 22-5453-MWF(JEMx), Gilbert v. Alejandro Villanueva, et al.

CV 22-5459-MWF(JEMx), Guzman v. Alejandro Villanueva, et al.

CV 22-5466-MWF(JEMx), Lavan v. Alejandro Villanueva, et al.

CV 22-5468-MWF(JEMx), Shivers v. Alejandro Villanueva, et al.

CV 22-5470-MWF(JEMx), Lopez v. Alejandro Villanueva, et al.

CV-90 (10/08) CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case 2:22-cv-05391-MWF-JEM Document 19 Filed 10/07/22 Page 2 of 11 Page ID #:60

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL

Case No. CV 22-2538-MWF(JEMx) Date: October 7, 2022

Title: People of Los Angeles County Who Are Being Penally Confined in Pre-

Trial Detention Because of and Dependent Upon Their Inability To Pay

Bail, et al. v. Alejandro Villanueva, et al.

AND RELATED CASES

Present: The Honorable MICHAEL W. FITZGERALD, U.S. District Judge

Deputy Clerk: Court Reporter:

Rita Sanchez Not Reported

Attorneys Present for Plaintiff: Attorneys Present for Defendant:

None Present None Present

Proceedings (In Chambers): ORDER SUMMARILY DISMISSING ACTION

WITHOUT PREJUDICE

The Court Ordered Plaintiffs People of Los Angeles County Who Are Being

Penally Confined in Pre-Trial Detention Because of and Dependent Upon Their

Inability to Pay Bail, by Mark Munoz, et al., to show cause 1) Why this action should

not be dismissed in light of the lack of exhaustion of Plaintiffs’ claims in state court;

and 2) why the requested relief would not violate the PLRA. (Docket No. 87).

Plaintiffs filed a Response to the Order to Show Cause on August 31, 2022. (Docket

No. 88). Defendant Alejandro Villanueva filed a Reply on September 7, 2022.

(Docket No. 90). Plaintiffs filed an Ex Parte Application for an Order that Court

Consider Reply Memorandum Attached Hereto on September 11, 2022. (Docket No.

91). The Court granted Plaintiffs’ Ex Parte Application on September 12, 2022.

(Docket No. 92).

The Court has read and considered the briefs and held a hearing on October 4,

2022.

For the reasons discussed below, the Action is DISMISSED without prejudice.

______________________________________________________________________________

CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL 2

Case 2:22-cv-05391-MWF-JEM Document 19 Filed 10/07/22 Page 3 of 11 Page ID #:61

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL

Case No. CV 22-2538-MWF(JEMx) Date: October 7, 2022

Title: People of Los Angeles County Who Are Being Penally Confined in Pre-

Trial Detention Because of and Dependent Upon Their Inability To Pay

Bail, et al. v. Alejandro Villanueva, et al.

AND RELATED CASES

This Court (the Honorable Dolly M. Gee, United States District Judge)

previously denied Plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction for lack of a sufficient showing to

obtain a mandatory injunction. (Docket No. 41). The Court determined that Plaintiffs

had standing but did not set forth adequate evidence to show that their bail was set

improperly under current law.

Plaintiffs submitted additional facts and filed a second Motion for Preliminary

Injunction on July 8, 2022. (Docket No. 54). This Court denied the requested

injunction in an Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction on

August 30, 2022. (Docket No. 87). The Court again determined that Plaintiffs did not

set forth adequate evidence to show that their bail was set improperly under current

law. Further, the Court concluded that that this action is properly brought as a habeas

action and ordered Plaintiffs to show cause 1) why this action should not be dismissed

in light of the lack of exhaustion of Plaintiffs’ claims in state court; and 2) why the

requested relief would not violate the PLRA.

The Court now concludes that federal courts may not grant habeas relief to a

person held in state custody unless the petitioner has exhausted his available state court

remedies as to the issue presented. Plaintiffs’ claims have not been properly exhausted

and are not excused from exhaustion. In the alternative, this dismissal can be viewed

as a dismissal for want of jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).

The facts are discussed in the two prior orders denying the requested preliminary

injunction.

LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District

______________________________________________________________________________

CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL 3

Case 2:22-cv-05391-MWF-JEM Document 19 Filed 10/07/22 Page 4of11 Page ID #:62

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL

Case No. CV 22-2538-MWE(JEMx) Date: October 7, 2022

Title: People of Los Angeles County Who Are Being Penally Confined in Pre-

Trial Detention Because of and Dependent Upon Their Inability To Pay

Bail, et al. v. Alejandro Villanueva, et al.

AND RELATED CASES

Courts (Habeas Rules) provides that a petition for writ of habeas corpus “must” be

summarily dismissed “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits

that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.”

II. DISCUSSION

A. Exhaustion of State Remedies for Habeas Corpus Action

The Court incorporates its prior analysis on the nature of the relief sought by

Plaintiffs. (Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion For Preliminary Injunction dated August

30, 2022, at 8-10 (Docket No. 87)). There, the Court concluded that Plaintiffs’

challenge to bail determinations for pretrial detainees is properly brought as a habeas

action. Cf Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 764, 767 (9th Cir. 2018) (petitioner

entitled to habeas relief for failure to receive constitutionally sufficient process during

setting of bail after “properly exhaust[ing] his state remedies as to his bail hearing’’).

Because Plaintiffs seek the exact form of relief afforded by a habeas petition, Plaintiffs

must first exhaust state remedies before a federal court may grant relief. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(b)(1)(A), Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982), Fields v. Waddington, 401

F.3d 1018, 1020 (9th Cir. 2005) (“We may review the merits of Petitioner’s habeas

petition only if he exhausted state court remedies’’).

Plaintiffs do not contend that they have exhausted state remedies. (Response at

3-4). Instead, Plaintiffs argue that exhaustion requirements should be excused because

state court remedies are either unavailable, inadequate, or futile. (Response at 3-4

(citing White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Dismissal of a federal

habeas petition for failure to exhaust is appropriate only if the prisoner ha[s] a

currently available state remedy at the time of the federal petition’’)).

CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL

Case 2:22-cv-05391-MWF-JEM Document 19 Filed 10/07/22 Page 5 of 11 Page ID #:63

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL

Case No. CV 22-2538-MWF(JEMx) Date: October 7, 2022

Title: People of Los Angeles County Who Are Being Penally Confined in Pre-

Trial Detention Because of and Dependent Upon Their Inability To Pay

Bail, et al. v. Alejandro Villanueva, et al.

AND RELATED CASES

Plaintiffs argue that filing and litigating a habeas petition in Superior Court,

appealing a denial to the Court of Appeal, and then petitioning the Supreme Court for

review would take longer than Plaintiff pretrial detainees would be pretrial detainees.

(Response at 4).

Defendant disputes Plaintiffs’ contention that state remedies are unavailable,

inadequate, or futile. (Response at 1-3). Defendant argues that courts from the

criminal division of the Los Angeles Superior Court regularly hear challenges to bail

determinations. (Reply at 2 (Citing Docket Nos. 25 and 66)). Similarly, Defendant

highlights California statutes and case law establishing the existence of state remedies

for challenges to bail determination. E.g., Cal. Pen. Code § 1289 (criminal court “may,

upon good cause shown, either increase or reduce the amount of bail”, with a criminal

defendant’s request for reduction being made by “application”). Defendants also cite

recent habeas cases where inmates were able to contest their bail through state

remedies and ultimately win appropriate relief. (Response at 3 (citing In re Humphrey,

11 Cal. 5th 135, 143, 276 Cal. Rptr. 3d 232 (2021) and In re Brown, 76 Cal.App.5th

296, 291 Cal. Rptr. 3d 461 (2022)).

The Ninth Circuit implicitly acknowledged that California state remedies are

available, adequate, and not futile when it found that pretrial detainees properly

exhausted state remedies by “fil[ing] two motions with the superior court, a habeas

petition with the California Court of Appeal, and a petition for a writ of habeas corpus

with the California Supreme Court.” Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 767 (9th Cir.

2018). Plaintiffs have provided no evidence to suggest otherwise.

Plaintiffs provide no authority to support their contention that pretrial detainees

must be excused from state remedies because state remedies may take a long time.

And perhaps they cannot, for if Plaintiffs contention was true then every pretrial

______________________________________________________________________________

CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL 5

Case 2:22-cv-05391-MWF-JEM Document 19 Filed 10/07/22 Page 6 of 11 Page ID #:64

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL

Case No. CV 22-2538-MWF(JEMx) Date: October 7, 2022

Title: People of Los Angeles County Who Are Being Penally Confined in Pre-

Trial Detention Because of and Dependent Upon Their Inability To Pay

Bail, et al. v. Alejandro Villanueva, et al.

AND RELATED CASES

detainee challenging the fact of their confinement could bypass state remedies.

Accordingly, the Court determines that Plaintiffs are not excused from exhaustion of

state remedies.

After the hearing, Plaintiffs filed a Reply In Response To Tentative arguing that

their request for damages should remain because administrative exhaustion is not

applicable to requests for damages. (Docket No. 94). The filing is untimely and in

violation of the Central District local rules. See L.R. 7-3. Nevertheless, the Court is

unpersuaded. If a civil rights claim seeking damages necessarily implies the invalidity

of a conviction or sentence, a “§ 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or

sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared

invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into

question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck v. Humphrey,

512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994). Dismissal without prejudice is appropriate because

Plaintiffs have not alleged that the reasons for their confinement have been reversed,

expunged, invalidated, or called into question. See id.; see also Williams v. Bailey,

Williams & Trujillo, Case No. C-92-1603-BAC, 1994 WL 238330 at *5 (N.D. Cal.

May 17, 1994) (citing Young v. Kenny, 907 F.2d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1990)) (where

“monetary and declaratory relief which raises constitutional issues that directly relate

to the fact or duration of confinement and are cognizable in habeas, competing

interests underlying habeas relief, including exhaustion requirements, must prevail”);

Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 584 (9th Cir. 1995) (“The danger of

preventing a prisoner from ever having a federal court address his habeas claims is not

present…when a district court treats a 42 U.S.C.S. §1983 claim as a habeas petition

and then dismisses it for lack of exhaustion of state remedies”).

______________________________________________________________________________

CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL 6

Case 2:22-cv-05391-MWF-JEM Document 19 Filed 10/07/22 Page 7 of 11 Page ID #:65

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL

Case No. CV 22-2538-MWF(JEMx) Date: October 7, 2022

Title: People of Los Angeles County Who Are Being Penally Confined in Pre-

Trial Detention Because of and Dependent Upon Their Inability To Pay

Bail, et al. v. Alejandro Villanueva, et al.

AND RELATED CASES

Because Plaintiffs do not contend that they have exhausted state remedies,

Plaintiffs’ habeas action is fully unexhausted. Therefore, this action must be

summarily DISMISSED without prejudice.

Because Plaintiffs have not plead a plausible excuse for exhaustion, the Court

DENIES Plaintiffs’ request to propound discovery to determine the average length of

confinement for pretrial detainees in Defendants’ jails. The Court similarly DENIES

Plaintiffs’ request to propound discovery to determine the length of habeas proceedings

in state courts. The Court also DENIES Plaintiffs’ request that this Order be converted

into a motion of summary judgment.

B. Prison Litigation Reform Act

The Court ordered Plaintiffs to show cause why their requested relief would not

violate the Prison Litigation Reform Act. (Docket No. 87).

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) establishes standards for the entry

and termination of prospective relief in civil actions challenging prison conditions. See,

Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 333 (2000). The PLRA’s definition of “prospective

relief” encompasses “all relief other than compensatory monetary damages.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 3626(g)(7). The statute mandates that prospective relief “shall extend no further than

necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or

plaintiffs.” Id. at § 3626(a)(1). The PLRA further provides that a federal court “shall

not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief is

narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the

Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the

Federal right.” Id.

______________________________________________________________________________

CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL 7

Case 2:22-cv-05391-MWF-JEM Document 19 Filed 10/07/22 Page 8 of 11 Page ID #:66

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL

Case No. CV 22-2538-MWF(JEMx) Date: October 7, 2022

Title: People of Los Angeles County Who Are Being Penally Confined in Pre-

Trial Detention Because of and Dependent Upon Their Inability To Pay

Bail, et al. v. Alejandro Villanueva, et al.

AND RELATED CASES

The PLRA also imposes strict prerequisites before a federal court may issue a

“prisoner release order,” which is broadly defined as “any order, including a temporary

restraining order or preliminary injunctive relief, that has the purpose or effect of

reducing or limiting the prison population, or that directs the release from or non-

admission of prisoners to a prison.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(4). Those prerequisites

include the failure of some other, earlier-imposed remedy to address the deprivation of

the federal right, reasonable amount of time for Respondents to comply with such

orders, and the convening of a three-judge court, which is given the exclusive authority

to enter a prison release order. Id. § 3626(a)(3)(A).

Plaintiffs argue that the PLRA does not apply to this action for two reasons:

first, the PLRA applies to “prisons” and not “jails,” and second, the PLRA applies only

to “conditions” in prisons and not bail. (Response at 7; Plaintiffs’ Reply at 5).

Defendant responds that the PLRA defines “prison” to mean “any Federal, State,

or local facility that incarcerates or detains juveniles or adults accused of, convicted,

or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(5)

(emphasis added); see also Albino v. Baca, 747 F. 3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2014) (applying

the PLRA in Los Angeles jails). Therefore, the Court agrees with Defendants that

pretrial detainees are not categorically excluded from the PLRA.

Defendant does not directly address Plaintiffs’ argument that the PLRA only

applies to challenges to “prison conditions.” The parties both point out that the PLRA

applies to “any civil action with respect to prison conditions.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(4)

(emphasis added).

It appears that the PLRA has been interpreted to limit only a court’s ability to

reduce or limit prison populations where overcrowding violated prisoners’ rights. See

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CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL 8

Case 2:22-cv-05391-MWF-JEM Document 19 Filed 10/07/22 Page 9 of 11 Page ID #:67

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL

Case No. CV 22-2538-MWF(JEMx) Date: October 7, 2022

Title: People of Los Angeles County Who Are Being Penally Confined in Pre-

Trial Detention Because of and Dependent Upon Their Inability To Pay

Bail, et al. v. Alejandro Villanueva, et al.

AND RELATED CASES

Gilmore v. People of the State of California, 220 F.3d 987, 999, n.14 (9th Cir. 2000)

(“[s]ponsors of the PLRA were especially concerned with courts setting ‘population

caps’ and ordering the release of inmates as a sanction for prison administrators’

failure to comply with the terms of consent decrees designed to eliminate

overcrowding”).

In Plata v. Brown, a single judge ordered the California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation “to transfer all inmates who are classified as ‘high-

risk’” of contracting infectious disease coccidioidomycosis (common referred to as

Valley Fever) from two prisons that reported high rates of the disease. 427 F. Supp. 3d

1211 (N.D. Cal. 2013). The defendants there argued that the court lacked authority to

issue such an order under the PLRA because a “prisoner release order” could only be

issued by a three-judge court. Id. at 1222. The court concluded that it was not issuing

a “prisoner release order” because the plaintiffs were seeking “only transfer and not

release.” Id.

The Plata court further rejected the defendants’ arguments based on general

principles of statutory construction. Id. Looking at the statute as a whole, the court

reasoned that the definition of “prisoner release order” must be read in conjunction

with the requirements for entering one, including the provision which requires that a

three-judge court determine that “crowding is the primary cause of the violation of a

Federal right.” Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(E)).

Moreover, the court noted that “[a]lthough ‘Congress is free to alter the standard

that determines the scope of prospective relief for unconstitutional prison conditions,’

it can do so only ‘so long as the restrictions on the remedy do not prevent vindication

of the right.’” Id.at 1223 (citing Gilmore, 220 F.3d at 1002-03). The district court

explained that “[i]t is easy to imagine circumstances – not caused by crowding – where

______________________________________________________________________________

CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL 9

Case 2:22-cv-05391-MWF-JEM Document 19 Filed 10/07/22 Page 10o0f11 Page ID #:68

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL

Case No. CV 22-2538-MWE(JEMx) Date: October 7, 2022

Title: People of Los Angeles County Who Are Being Penally Confined in Pre-

Trial Detention Because of and Dependent Upon Their Inability To Pay

Bail, et al. v. Alejandro Villanueva, et al.

AND RELATED CASES

a transfer would be necessary to protect inmates’ constitutional rights: for example, if

specialized medical care were not available at a particular prison, or if one or more

inmates were illegally transferred in retaliation for exercising their First Amendment

rights.” Id. “In all of these cases, crowding would not be the cause (let alone the

primary cause) of the constitutional violation, and adopting [the d]efendants’

interpretation of ‘prisoner release order’ would thus prevent any court — single-judge or

three-judge — from entering a transfer order.” /d. Because “that would prevent

vindication of the inmates’ constitutional rights,” the court concluded that the

defendants’ proposed interpretation of “prisoner release order” was impermissible.

The Court is persuaded by the reasoning in Plata and concludes that the

definition of “prisoner release order” is limited to orders where crowding is the

primary cause of the violation. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs

requested relief, challenging the fact of their confinement, does not amount to a request

for a prisoner release order and would not violate the PLRA. See also Fernandez-

Rodriguez v. Licon-Vitale, S.D.N.Y.2020, 470 F.Supp.3d 323 (Phrase “civil action with

respect to prison conditions” in provision of PLRA restricting a court's ability to issue

so-called “prisoner release orders” did not extend to actions that challenged both the

conditions of confinement and the fact of confinement through a petition for writ of

habeas corpus, where first clause by its very terms, exempted from the PLRA habeas

petitions challenging fact of confinement as well as conditions of confinement).

Ill. CONCLUSION

The Court determines that the OSC is not discharged. This action is

DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies. Likewise, the

following related cases are also DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to exhaust

state remedies and shall be administratively closed by the Clerk:

CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL) i (ssti‘C;OC;*‘«*d

Case 2:22-cv-05391-MWF-JEM Document 19 Filed 10/07/22 Page 11 of 11 Page ID #:69

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL

Case No. CV 22-2538-MWF(JEMx) Date: October 7, 2022

Title: People of Los Angeles County Who Are Being Penally Confined in Pre-

Trial Detention Because of and Dependent Upon Their Inability To Pay

Bail, et al. v. Alejandro Villanueva, et al.

AND RELATED CASES

J. Roldan v. Alejandro Villanueva, CV 22-5315-MWF(JEMx)

J. Stanley v. Alejandro Villanueva, CV 22-5316-MWF(JEMx)

J. Aguirre v. Alejandro Villanueva, CV 22-5391-MWF(JEMx)

M. Almeraz v. Alejandro Villanueva, CV 22-5394-MWF(JEMx)

J. Cabrera v. Alejandro Villanueva, CV 22-5396-MWF(JEMx)

S. Cano v. Alejandro Villanueva, CV 22-5411-MWF(JEMx)

J. Hutchins v. Alejandro Villanueva, CV 22-5414-MWF(JEMx)

M. Munoz v. Alejandro Villanueva, CV 22-5416-MWF(JEMx)

O. Ramirez v. Alejandro Villanueva, CV 22-5417-MWF(JEMx)

E. Sanchez v. Alejandro Villanueva, CV 22-5419-MWF(JEMx)

D. Smith v. Alejandro Villanueva, CV 22-5421-MWF(JEMx)

D. Shannon v. Alejandro Villanueva, CV 22-5426-MWF(JEMx)

C. Wilgus v. Alejandro Villanueva, CV 22-5428-MWF(JEMx)

W. Rains v. Alejandro Villanueva, CV 22-5436-MWF(JEMx)

J. Guzman v. Alejandro Villanueva, CV 22-5449-MWF(JEMx)

K. Brown v. Alejandro Villanueva, CV 22-5450-MWF(JEMx)

T. Gilbert v. Alejandro Villanueva, CV 22-5453-MWF(JEMx)

E. Guzman v. Alejandro Villanueva, CV 22-5459-MWF(JEMx)

T. Lavan v. Alejandro Villanueva, CV 22-5466-MWF(JEMx)

T. Shivers v. Alejandro Villanueva, CV 22-5468-MWF(JEMx)

V. Lopez v. Alejandro Villanueva, CV 22-5470-MWF(JEMx)

IT IS SO ORDERED.

This Order shall constitute notice of entry of judgment pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 58. Pursuant to Local Rule 58-6, the Court ORDERS the Clerk to

treat this Order, and its entry on the docket, as an entry of judgment.

______________________________________________________________________________

CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL 11

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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