Shawn Dollar v. Goleta Water District

Case 2:22-cv-03723-CAS-MRW Document 41 Filed 10/03/22 Pagelof8 Page ID #:149

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’

Case No. 2:22-CV-03723-CAS (MRWx) Date October 3, 2022

Title SHAWN DOLLAR, ET AL. V. GOLETA WATER DISTRICT, ET AL.

Present: The Honorable CHRISTINA A. SNYDER

Catherine Jeang Laura Elias N/A

Deputy Clerk Court Reporter / Recorder Tape No.

Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs: Attorneys Present for Defendants:

Mariah Gondeiro Daniel Modafferi

Proceedings: MOTION TO DISMISS A PORTION OF PLAINTIFFS’

COMPLAINT (Dkt. 35, filed on SEPTEMBER 2, 2022)

I. INTRODUCTION

On June 1, 2022, plaintiffs Shawn Dollar, John Wayne, Raymundo Barbosa,

Vincent Cerda, and Daniel Durbiano filed this action against defendants Goleta Water

District (“GWD”), Kathleen Werner in her official capacity as the President of the Goleta

Water District Board of Directors (the “Board of Directors”), Farfalla Borah in her

official capacity as the Vice President of the Board of Directors, Bill Rosen in his official

capacity as a member of the Board of Directors, Lauren Hanson in her official capacity as

a member of the Board of Directors, David Matson in his official capacity as the

Assistant General Manager of the Goleta Water District, and John McInnes in his official

capacity as the General Manager of the Goleta Water District. Dkt. 1 (“Compl.”).

Plaintiffs, who are all current or former employees of GWD, allege five causes of action:

(1) violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) violation of California’s Fair Employment Housing Act, Cal.

Gov’t Code § 12940; (3) violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the California

Constitution, Art. 1 Sec. 4; (4) violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment of the U.S. Constitution under § 1983; and (5) deprivation of civil rights

under § 1983 and Monell. Id.

On September 2, 2022, defendants filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs fourth claim

for relief for violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6). Dkt. 35. On September 12, 2022, plaintiffs filed an opposition to

defendants’ motion to dismiss. Dkt. 37. On September 19, 2022, defendants filed a reply

CV-90 (10/18) CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Page 1 of 8

Case 2:22-cv-03723-CAS-MRW Document 41 Filed 10/03/22 Page2of8 Page ID #:150

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL ‘O’

Case No. 2:22-CV-03723-CAS (MRWx) Date October 3, 2022

Title SHAWN DOLLAR, ET AL. V. GOLETA WATER DISTRICT, ET AL.

in support of their motion to dismiss. Dkt. 38. The motion to dismiss is now before the

Court.

On October 3, 2022, the Court held a hearing on defendants’ motion to dismiss.

Having carefully considered the parties’ arguments and submissions, the Court finds and

concludes as follows.

Il. BACKGROUND

This action arises out of a Goleta Water District policy requiring that all GWD

employees be vaccinated against COVID-19. Compl. 2. The vaccine policy was

implemented on or around October 2021 and is still enforced. Id. GWD offers paid time

off for employees to obtain the vaccine. Id. 25. Under the policy, employees can

request exemptions from the vaccine requirement for religious and/or medical reasons.

Id. 27. Exemptions are granted on a case-by-case basis. Id, Plaintiff employees

requested exemptions from the vaccine policy on religious grounds, and their requests

were granted. Id. § 29.

Employees who are exempted from the vaccine requirement are offered

accommodations, which require that unvaccinated employees take COVID-19 tests

approximately twice per week, the cost of which the employees must cover. Id.; see also

Exh. 3 at 3. Unvaccinated employees must additionally wear N95 masks and cannot

enter certain buildings without prior authorization. Id.; see also Exh. 3 at 3-4. If

unvaccinated employees do not accept these accommodations, they may take a temporary

leave of absence. Id.: see also Exh. 3 at 4. Plaintiffs allege that, upon information and

belief, independent contractors are not required to pay for bi-weekly COVID-19 tests. Id.

§|32. According to plaintiffs, GWD did not engage in negotiations with plaintiffs but

rather provided the employees with the policy “on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.” Id. § 33.

Based on these allegations, plaintiffs allege that the vaccine policy, on its face and

as applied, is an unconstitutional abridgment of plaintiffs’ right to equal protection. Id. §

65. Plaintiffs further allege that the policy discriminates against religion by requiring

plaintiffs to wear N95 masks and take bi-weekly tests and restricting their entrance into

certain buildings “because they have a religious exemption.” Id. {] 66. According to

plaintiffs, defendants have no rational, much less compelling, reason to discriminate

against them. Id. § 69.

CV-90 (10/18) CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Page 2 of 8

Case 2:22-cv-03723-CAS-MRW Document 41 Filed 10/03/22 Page 3of8 Page □□ #:151

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’

Case No. 2:22-CV-03723-CAS (MRWx) Date October 3, 2022

Title SHAWN DOLLAR, ET AL. V. GOLETA WATER DISTRICT, ET AL.

Il. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal

sufficiency of the claims asserted in a complaint. Under this Rule, a district court

properly dismisses a claim if “there is a ‘lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence

of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.’” Conservation Force v.

Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t,

901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988)). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to

provide the ‘grounds’ of his “entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[F]Jactual allegations must

be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id.

In considering a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court must accept as true all

material allegations in the complaint, as well as all reasonable inferences to be drawn

from them. Pareto v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998). The complaint must be

read in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Sprewell v. Golden State

Warniors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). However, “a court considering a motion to

dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than

conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can

provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.”

Ashcroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009); see Moss v. United States Secret Service,

572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[F]or a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the

non-conclusory “factual content,’ and reasonable inferences from that content, must be

plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.”). Ultimately,

“{dJetermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will... be a

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience

and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

Unless a court converts a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a motion for summary

judgment, a court cannot consider material outside of the complaint (e.g., facts presented

in briefs, affidavits, or discovery materials). In re American Cont’] Corp./Lincoln Sav. &

Loan Sec. Litig., 102 F.3d 1524, 1537 (9th Cir. 1996), rev’d on other grounds sub nom

Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998). A court

may, however, consider exhibits submitted with or alleged in the complaint and matters

that may be judicially noticed pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201. In re Silicon

CV-90 (10/18) CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Page 3 of 8

Case 2:22-cv-03723-CAS-MRW Document 41 Filed 10/03/22 Page 4of8 Page ID #:152

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’

Case No. 2:22-CV-03723-CAS (MRWx) Date October 3, 2022

Title SHAWN DOLLAR, ET AL. V. GOLETA WATER DISTRICT, ET AL.

Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 986 (9th Cir. 1999); see Lee v. City of Los

Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001).

As a general rule, leave to amend a complaint which has been dismissed should be

freely granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). However, leave to amend may be denied when “the

court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading

could not possibly cure the deficiency.” Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture

Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986).

IV. DISCUSSION

Defendants move to dismiss plaintiffs’ cause of action alleging religious

discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6). Dkt. 35 at 4. Defendants argue that plaintiffs have failed to allege

facts demonstrating that the policy discriminates against religious employees on its face

and that it was implemented with the aim of suppressing religious belief, as opposed to

protecting health and safety. Id. Defendants contend that, on the contrary, the policy

explicitly permits employees who object to the vaccine on religious grounds to request

exemptions. Id. at 4-5. Thus, defendants argue, plaintiffs have not, and cannot, allege

facts showing that the policy is facially unconstitutional. Id.

Next, defendants argue that plaintiffs have failed to allege that employees who

requested exemptions for religious reasons were treated differently from similarly

situated employees. Id. at 5. Defendants contend that the relevant comparator group for

the equal protection analysis is employees who requested exemptions for medical (1.e.,

non-religious) reasons. Id. According to defendants, employees who requested

exemptions for religious reasons and employees who requested exemptions for medical

reasons were offered the same accommodations. Id. Thus, plaintiffs have not, and

cannot, allege facts demonstrating that religious employees were treated differently

because of their religion. Id.

In their opposition, plaintiffs argue that they have factually alleged that the vaccine

policy is discriminatory on its face and as applied. Dkt. 37 at 5. Plaintiffs state that they

do not need to allege that defendants’ application of the policy intentionally has a

disparate impact. Id. at 6. Rather, plaintiffs contend, they can allege an Equal Protection

Clause violation by alleging that the “vaccine policy, “on its face and as applied, is an

CV-90 (10/18) CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Page 4 of 8

Case 2:22-cv-03723-CAS-MRW Document 41 Filed 10/03/22 Page5of8 Page ID #:153

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’

Case No. 2:22-CV-03723-CAS (MRWx) Date October 3, 2022

Title SHAWN DOLLAR, ET AL. V. GOLETA WATER DISTRICT, ET AL.

unconstitutional abridgment of |p |laintiffs’ right to equal protection.’” Id. (quoting

Compl. { 65). Plaintiffs argue that they have alleged facts demonstrating that the policy

is unconstitutional on its face because the Complaint states that defendants require

plaintiffs to wear N95 masks and take bi-weekly tests and prohibit them from entering

certain buildings “because they have a religious exemption.” Id. (quoting Compl. 4 66)

(emphasis in original). Plaintiffs state that the policy does not impose the same

requirements on similarly situated vaccinated employees “even though they pose a

similar risk of infection and transmission of COVID-19.” Id. With respect to their as-

applied challenge, plaintiffs argue that they have alleged that the policy treats contractors

more favorably than plaintiffs. Id.

Additionally, plaintiffs argue that they have adequately pled that the policy does

not survive strict scrutiny. Id. at 7. Plaintiffs contend that vaccinated employees and

plaintiffs pose a similar risk of infection and transmission of COVID-19 and that

defendants failed to engage in less restrictive means of promoting their purported health

and safety goal, such as negotiating with plaintiffs to determine whether less restrictive

protocols were appropriate. Id. Thus, plaintiffs argue the “Complaint adequately alleges

that [d]efendants have no rational, much less compelling, justification for their vaccine

policy.” Id.

Plaintiffs request that, in the event the Court determines the Complaint is deficient,

they be granted leave to amend pursuant to Rule 15(a). Id. at 8. Plaintiffs argue that

granting leave to amend would “serve justice and promote judicial efficiency” and would

not prejudice defendants because this case is still in its early phases. Id.

Defendants’ reply reiterates their argument that plaintiffs have failed to allege a

facial violation given that the policy accommodates religious employees by exempting

them from the vaccine requirement based on their religious beliefs. Dkt. 38 at 3.

Defendants argue that plaintiffs have failed to allege an as-applied violation because

plaintiffs have not alleged disparate treatment among employees who were exempted

from the vaccine requirement. Id. Defendants further contend that vaccinated employees

and independent contractors are not similarly situated to plaintiffs. Id. at 3-4. Vaccinated

employees are treated differently from non-vaccinated employees because the policy, by

definition, requires all employees to be vaccinated, unless they request an exemption. Id.

at 3. And independent contractors are treated differently from plaintiffs because GWD

lacks authority to control and direct independent contractors. Id. at 4. Thus, defendants

CV-90 (10/18) CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Page 5 of 8

Case 2:22-cv-03723-CAS-MRW Document 41 Filed 10/03/22 PageGof8 Page #:154

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL ‘O’

Case No. 2:22-CV-03723-CAS (MRWx) Date October 3, 2022

Title SHAWN DOLLAR, ET AL. V. GOLETA WATER DISTRICT, ET AL.

argue, plaintiffs cannot maintain an equal protection claim by comparing themselves to

vaccinated employees or independent contractors. Id. at 3-4.

The Court concludes that the Complaint fails to adequately allege that the vaccine

policy discriminates against plaintiffs on the basis of religion in violation of the Equal

Protection Clause. The Equal Protection Clause provides that: “No State shall ... deny to

any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend.

XIV, § 1. The Equal Protection Clause “is essentially a direction that all persons

similarly situated should be treated alike.” Green v. City of Tucson, 340 F.3d 891, 896

(9th Cir. 2003) (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439

(1985)). “A denial of equal protection entails, at a minimum, a classification that treats

individuals unequally.” Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 707 (9th

Cir.1997) (citing Adarand Constructors. Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 223-25 (1995)).

To allege an equal protection violation, a plaintiff may allege that “defendants

acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon

membership in a protected class.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th

Cir. 2001). Such actions are subjected to “strict scrutiny” and “will only be sustained if

they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” City of Cleburne, 473 U.S.

at 439. Similar oversight is applied where state action “impinges on personal rights,”

otherwise framed as “fundamental rights,” protected by the Constitution.” Id. “Where

the challenged governmental policy is ‘facially neutral,’ proof of its disproportionate

impact on an identifiable group can satisfy the intent requirement only if it tends to show

that some invidious or discriminatory purpose underlies the policy.” Lee, 250 F.3d at

686 (citing Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264—

66 (1977)).

Plaintiffs have not alleged facts showing that the policy discriminates against them

because of their religion. The policy’s vaccine mandate explicitly permits GWD

employees to obtain exemptions on religious grounds, and plaintiff employees have all

sought and been granted such exemptions. With respect to the accommodations, the

restrictions plaintiffs identify (taking biweekly tests, wearing N95 masks, and refraining

from entering certain buildings without authorization) are restrictions imposed on

employees who are unvaccinated as opposed to employees who are vaccinated. Thus,

plaintiffs have simply identified ways in which the policy distinguishes between

employees based on their vaccination status. Similarly, in alleging that independent

contractors are not subject to the same requirements under the policy, plaintiffs have not

CV-90 (10/18) CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Page 6 of 8

Case 2:22-cv-03723-CAS-MRW Document 41 Filed 10/03/22 Page 7of8 Page #:155

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL ‘O’

Case No. 2:22-CV-03723-CAS (MRWx) Date October 3, 2022

Title SHAWN DOLLAR, ET AL. V. GOLETA WATER DISTRICT, ET AL.

identified any facts showing that they are treated differently on the basis of their

religion.’

When comparing similarly situated groups for the purposes of equal protection

analysis, “[t]he groups need not be similar in all respects, but they must be similar in

those respects relevant to the [d|efendants’ policy.” Ariz. Dream Act Coalition v.

Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 1064 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Here, vaccinated employees and independent contractors are not similar to plaintiffs “in

those respects relevant to the [vaccine] policy,” id., because, unlike plaintiffs (and

employees granted non-religious exemptions), they either are vaccinated, and thus do not

require the same public health cautions, or are not subject to the same vaccine policy

requirements on account of their not being GWD employees. Accordingly, plaintiffs

have not alleged how the policy denies them equal protection on the basis of their

religion by pointing to ways in which vaccinated employees and independent

contractors—who are not similarly situated to plaintiffs—are treated differently.”

' At oral argument, counsel for plaintiffs argued that the policy, by its express terms,

applies to independent contractors. Counsel for plaintiffs further stated that the fact that

the policy’s requirements are enforced as to plaintiffs but not as to independent

contractors gives rise to an as-applied equal protection violation. Counsel for defendants

argued that, while the policy may state that it applies to independent contractors, GWD

lacks authority to enforce the policy as to independent contractors. The Court finds that,

regardless of whether the policy applies to independent contractors, plaintiffs have not

alleged facts showing that the policy treats plaintiffs differently from independent

contractors because of plaintiffs’ religion. Instead, plaintiffs have simply alleged facts

showing that independent contractors are treated differently from employees generally

and that unvaccinated independent contractors are treated differently from unvaccinated

employees.

? At oral argument, counsel for plaintiffs argued that they do allege that vaccinated

employees are similarly situated to plaintiffs because the Complaint states that vaccinated

and unvaccinated persons have similar rates of COVID-19 contraction and transmission.

These allegations, however, support the contention that vaccinated and unvaccinated

people are similarly situated. They do not demonstrate how the policy singles out

plaintiffs on the basis of their religion.

CV-90 (10/18) CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Page 7 of 8

Case 2:22-cv-03723-CAS-MRW Document 41 Filed 10/03/22 Page 8of8 Page ID #:156

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’

Case No. 2:22-CV-03723-CAS (MRWx) Date October 3, 2022

Title SHAWN DOLLAR, ET AL. V. GOLETA WATER DISTRICT, ET AL.

Importantly, plaintiffs have not alleged that employees who receive exemptions on

religious grounds are treated any differently from employees who receive exemptions on

non-religious grounds. Instead, plaintiffs have only alleged that the policy treats them

differently from other employees because of their vaccination status, not because of their

religion. C.f, UnifySCC v. Cody, No. 22-cv-01019-BLF, 2022 WL 2357068, at *10

(June 30, 2022, N.D. Cal.) (finding that the accommodations framework of a Santa Clara

County COVID-19 vaccine policy “target[ed] religious practices” because it “plac|ed]

those with religious exemptions at a disadvantage behind those with secular exemptions”

in the hiring of exempted employees for alternative work positions). Because plaintiffs

have not alleged that the policy, on its face or as applied, treats them differently from

employees exempted on non-religious grounds, that is, employees who are similarly

situated to plaintiffs “in those respects relevant to the . . . policy,” Anz. Dream Act

Coalition, 757 F.3d at 1064, the allegations in the Complaint fail “to raise a right to relief

above the speculative level,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ fourth

claim for relief for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted with leave to

amend.

V. CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motion to

dismiss with leave to amend.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

00 14

Initials of Preparer ELUM

CV-90 (10/18) CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Page § of 8