observing that treatment corroborating allegations of severe and unremitting 14 || pain may include a strong Codeine or Morphine basic analgesic
How later courts described this case
- observing that treatment corroborating allegations of severe and unremitting 14 || pain may include a strong Codeine or Morphine basic analgesic
- in assessing claimant’s 10 || credibility, ALJ may properly rely on “unexplained or inadequately explained 11 || failure to seek treatment or to follow prescribed course of treatment’’
- in 15 || assessing the credibility of a claimant’s pain testimony, the Administration 16 || properly may consider the claimant’s failure to request treatment and failure to 17 || follow treatment advice
- describing five-step sequential evaluation process
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Case 5:21-cv-00564-JC Document 25 Filed 08/22/22 Page 1 of 13 Page ID #:2104
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 TERESA M. W.,1 Case No. 5:21-cv-00564-JC
12 Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
13 v. ORDER OF REMAND
14
KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting
15 Commissioner of Social Security,
16 Defendant.
17
18 I. SUMMARY
19 On March 31, 2021, plaintiff filed a Complaint seeking review of the
20 Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of plaintiff’s application for benefits.
21 The parties have consented to proceed before the undersigned United States
22 Magistrate Judge.
23 This matter is before the Court on the parties’ cross motions for summary
24 judgment, respectively (“Plaintiff’s Motion”) and (“Defendant’s Motion”)
25 (collectively “Motions”). The Court has taken the Motions under submission
26
27 1Plaintiff’s name is partially redacted to protect plaintiff’s privacy in compliance with
28 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2(c)(2)(B) and the recommendation of the Committee on
Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the United States.
1
Case 5:21-cv-00564-JC Document 25 Filed 08/22/22 Page 2 of 13 Page ID #:2105
1 without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L.R. 7-15; Case Management Order
2 filed on April 21, 2021, at ¶ 5.
3 Based on the record as a whole and the applicable law, the decision of the
4 Commissioner is REVERSED AND REMANDED for further proceedings
5 consistent with this Memorandum Opinion and Order of Remand. In this case, the
6 Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) materially erred by rejecting plaintiff’s
7 subjective symptom testimony without providing adequate reasons.
8 II. BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE
9 DECISION
10 Beginning on or about May 25, 2018, plaintiff filed applications for
11 Supplemental Security Income and Disability Insurance Benefits, alleging
12 disability since March 1, 2016, due to arthritis, acid reflux, high blood pressure,
13 and high cholesterol. (Administrative Record (“AR”) 199-208, 234-35). The ALJ
14 subsequently examined the medical record and heard testimony from plaintiff (who
15 was represented by counsel) and a vocational expert. (AR 32-62).
16 On September 2, 2020, the ALJ determined that plaintiff had not been
17 disabled through the date of the decision. (AR 15-26). Specifically, the ALJ
18 found: (1) plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments: degenerative
19 disc disease of the lumbar and cervical spine, status post left Achilles tendon repair
20 surgery, osteoporosis, bilateral SI joint osteoarthritis, bilateral carpal tunnel
21 syndrome, hypertension, and hyperparathyroidism (AR 17-18); (2) plaintiff’s
22 impairments, considered individually or in combination, did not meet or medically
23 equal a listed impairment (AR 18-19); (3) plaintiff retained the residual functional
24 capacity (RFC) to perform medium work (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(c), 416.967(c)),
25 with additional limitations (AR 19-25 (adopting RFC consistent with state agency
26 ///
27 ///
28 ///
2
Case 5:21-cv-00564-JC Document 25 Filed 08/22/22 Page 3 of 13 Page ID #:2106
1 physicians’ opinions at AR 73-75, 89-91, 106-08, 121-23));2 (4) plaintiff could
2 perform her past relevant work as a home attendant as generally performed and
3 therefore was not disabled (AR 25-26 (adopting vocational expert testimony at AR
4 58)); and (5) plaintiff’s statements regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting
5 effects of subjective symptoms were not entirely consistent with the medical
6 evidence and other evidence in the record (AR 19-20).
7 On January 29, 2021, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s application for
8 review. (AR 1-3).
9 III. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS
10 A. Administrative Evaluation of Disability Claims
11 To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must show that she is unable “to
12 engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
13 physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which
14 has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
15 months.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting 42
16 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)) (internal quotation marks omitted), superseded by
17 regulation on other grounds as stated in Sisk v. Saul, 820 Fed. App’x 604, 606 (9th
18 Cir. 2020); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505(a), 416.905(a). To be considered disabled, a
19 claimant must have an impairment of such severity that she is incapable of
20 performing work the claimant previously performed (“past relevant work”) as well
21 as any other “work which exists in the national economy.” Tackett v. Apfel, 180
22 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)).
23 ///
24
25
2The ALJ determined that plaintiff would be limited to: (1) lifting and carrying 50
26 pounds occasionally and 25 pounds frequently; (2) standing and/or walking for six hours in an
eight-hour workday; (3) sitting for six hours in an eight-hour workday; (4) frequently climbing
27 ramps and stairs, balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling; (5) occasionally
28 climbing ladders, ropes, and scaffolds; and (6) frequently performing handling and fingering
with the upper extremities. (AR 19).
3
Case 5:21-cv-00564-JC Document 25 Filed 08/22/22 Page 4of13 Page ID #:2107
1 To assess whether a claimant is disabled, an ALJ is required to use the five-
2 || step sequential evaluation process set forth in Social Security regulations. See
3 || Stout v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration, 454 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th
4 || Cir. 2006) (describing five-step sequential evaluation process) (citing 20 C.F.R.
5 || §§ 404.1520, 416.920). The claimant has the burden of proof at steps one through
6 || four —i.e., determination of whether the claimant was engaging in substantial
7 || gainful activity (step 1), has a sufficiently severe impairment (step 2), has an
8 || impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of
9 || the conditions listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (“Listings’’)
10 || (step 3), and retains the residual functional capacity to perform past relevant work
11 || (step 4). Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
12 || The Commissioner has the burden of proof at step five — i.e., establishing that the
13 | claimant could perform other work in the national economy. Id.
14 B. Federal Court Review of Social Security Disability Decisions
15 A federal court may set aside a denial of benefits only when the
16 || Commissioner’s “final decision” was “based on legal error or not supported by
17 || substantial evidence in the record.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871
18 || F.3d 664, 674 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The standard
19 || of review in disability cases is “highly deferential.” Rounds v. Commissioner of
20 || Social Security Administration, 807 F.3d 996, 1002 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation and
21 || quotation marks omitted). Thus, an ALJ’s decision must be upheld if the evidence
22 || could reasonably support either affirming or reversing the decision. Trevizo, 871
23 || F.3d at 674-75 (citations omitted). Even when an ALJ’s decision contains error, it
24 || must be affirmed if the error was harmless. See Treichler v. Commissioner of
25 || Social Security Administration, 775 F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th Cir. 2014) (ALJ error
26 || harmless if (1) inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination; or
27 || (2) ALJ’s path may reasonably be discerned despite the error) (citation and
28 || quotation marks omitted).
Case 5:21-cv-00564-JC Document 25 Filed 08/22/22 Page5of13 Page ID#:2108
1 Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
2 || accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 674 (defining
3 || “substantial evidence” as “more than a mere scintilla, but less than a
4 || preponderance”) (citation and quotation marks omitted). When determining
5 || whether substantial evidence supports an ALJ’s finding, a court “must consider the
6 || entire record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence
7 || that detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion[.]|’? Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d
8 || 995, 1009 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
9 Federal courts review only the reasoning the ALJ provided, and may not
10 || affirm the ALJ’s decision “on a ground upon which [the ALJ] did not rely.”
11 || Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 675 (citations omitted). Hence, while an ALJ’s decision need
12 || not be drafted with “ideal clarity,” it must, at a minimum, set forth the ALJ’s
13 || reasoning “in a way that allows for meaningful review.” Brown-Hunter v. Colvin,
14 }|| 806 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1099).
15 A reviewing court may not conclude that an error was harmless based on
16 || independent findings gleaned from the administrative record. Brown-Hunter, 806
17 || F.3d at 492 (citations omitted). When a reviewing court cannot confidently
18 || conclude that an error was harmless, a remand for additional investigation or
19 || explanation is generally appropriate. See Marsh v. Colvin, 792 F.3d 1170, 1173
20 || (9th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted).
21)1V. DISCUSSION
22 Plaintiff contends, inter alia, that the ALJ erred by improperly rejecting her
23 || subjective symptom testimony. (Plaintiff's Motion at 11-12). For the reasons
24 || stated below, the Court agrees. Since the Court cannot find that the error was
25 || harmless, a remand is warranted.
26 A. Pertinent Law
27 When determining disability, an ALJ is required to consider a claimant’s
28 || impairment-related pain and other subjective symptoms at each step of the
Case 5:21-cv-00564-JC Document 25 Filed 08/22/22 Page 6 of 13 Page ID #:2109
1 sequential evaluation process. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(a), (d), 416.929(a), (d).
2 Accordingly, when a claimant presents “objective medical evidence of an
3 underlying impairment which might reasonably produce the pain or other
4 symptoms [the claimant] alleged,” the ALJ is required to determine the extent to
5 which the claimant’s statements regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting
6 effects of his or her subjective symptoms (“subjective statements” or “subjective
7 complaints”) are consistent with the record evidence as a whole and, consequently,
8 whether any of the individual’s symptom-related functional limitations and
9 restrictions are likely to reduce the claimant’s capacity to perform work-related
10 activities. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(a), (c)(4), 416.929(a), (c)(4); SSR 16-3p, 2017
11 WL 5180304, at *4-*10.3
12 When an individual’s subjective statements are inconsistent with other
13 evidence in the record, an ALJ may give less weight to such statements and, in
14 turn, find that the individual’s symptoms are less likely to reduce the claimant’s
15 capacity to perform work-related activities. See SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at
16 *8. In such cases, when there is no affirmative finding of malingering, an ALJ
17 may “reject” or give less weight to the individual’s subjective statements “only by
18 providing specific, clear, and convincing reasons for doing so.” Brown-Hunter,
19 806 F.3d at 488-89. This requirement is very difficult to satisfy. See Trevizo, 871
20 F.3d at 678 (“The clear and convincing standard is the most demanding required in
21 Social Security cases.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
22 An ALJ’s decision “must contain specific reasons” supported by substantial
23 evidence in the record for giving less weight to a claimant’s statements. SSR 16-
24 3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *10. An ALJ must clearly identify each subjective
25
26 3Social Security Ruling 16-3p superseded SSR 96-7p and, in part, eliminated use of the
term “credibility” from SSA “sub-regulatory policy[]” in order to “clarify that subjective
27 symptom evaluation is not an examination of an individual’s [overall character or truthfulness]
28 . . . [and] more closely follow [SSA] regulatory language regarding symptom evaluation.” See
SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *1-*2, *10-*11.
6
Case 5:21-cv-00564-JC Document 25 Filed 08/22/22 Page 7of13 Page ID#:2110
1 || statement being rejected and the particular evidence in the record which
2 || purportedly undermines the statement. Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1103 (citation
3 || omitted). “General findings are insufficient[.]” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715,
4 || 722 (9th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).
5 If an ALJ’s evaluation of a claimant’s statements is reasonable and is
6 || supported by substantial evidence, it is not the court’s role to second-guess it. See
7 || Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). When
8 || an ALJ fails properly to discuss a claimant’s subjective complaints, however, the
9 || error may not be considered harmless “unless [the Court] can confidently conclude
10 || that no reasonable ALJ, when fully crediting the testimony, could have reached a
11 || different disability determination.” Stout, 454 F.3d at 1056; see also Brown-
12 | Hunter, 806 F.3d at 492 (ALJ’s erroneous failure to specify reasons for rejecting
13 | claimant testimony “will usually not be harmless”).
14 B. Summary of Plaintiff's Testimony and Statements
15 Plaintiff testified that she stopped working after she injured her back at work
16 | in 2016. (AR 38). Plaintiff had foot and ankle problems and used crutches after an
17 || Achilles tendon surgery in 2017, but was not still using them. (AR 45-47).*
18 || Plaintiff said her legs swell, get numb, and have pain due to arthritis, she has daily
19 || pain in her neck, shoulders, back and feet, she is always in bed, and her hands
20 || cramp and get numb, but she could lift up to 40 pounds, and could stand or sit for
21 || about an hour at a time due to her pain limits. (AR 46, 53-56; see also AR 50-51
22 || (ALJ acknowledging during the hearing that plaintiff's pain was “well
23 || documented” in the record)). Plaintiff acknowledged that she could do housework
24 || at her own pace with rest. (AR 55).
25 } ///
26
27 “The ALJ noted that the consultative examiner had limited plaintiff to medium work with
28 standing and walking only two hours in an eight-hour day likely because of the repaired Achilles
tendon. (AR 47).
Case 5:21-cv-00564-JC Document 25 Filed 08/22/22 Page 8 of 13 Page ID #:2111
1 In an Exertion Questionnaire form, plaintiff similarly reported that she had
2 daily pain in her back, neck, legs, and shoulder, hand numbness and spasm,
3 shortness of breath, and foot swelling and pain. (AR 240-42). She admitted she
4 was able to clean and cook but indicated that she gets tired quickly and must rest.
5 (AR 240-42).
6 C. Analysis
7 The ALJ summarized plaintiff’s allegations and testimony and discussed in
8 some detail the medical record reflecting, inter alia, degenerative disc disease with
9 pain and treatments including pain management, physical therapy, chiropractic
10 treatment, and injection therapy. (AR 19-25). The ALJ determined that plaintiff’s
11 “medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the
12 alleged symptoms,” but plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence
13 and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical
14 evidence and other evidence in the record for the reasons explained in th[e]
15 decision.” (AR 20). However, the ALJ failed to provide specific, clear, and
16 convincing reasons to support this determination.
17 The ALJ reasoned:
18 [T]he persuasiveness of the claimant’s allegations regarding the
19 severity of her symptoms and limitations is diminished because those
20 allegations are greater than expected in light of the objective evidence
21 of record, discussed below. . . . The positive objective clinical and
22 diagnostic findings since the alleged onset date. . . do not support
23 more restrictive functional limitations than those assessed herein.
24 (AR 20; see AR 20-25 (detailing the objective medical evidence and generally
25 concluding throughout the discussion that the medical evidence was consistent
26 with or otherwise supported the ALJ’s RFC assessment)). The ALJ also reasoned
27 that the treatment for plaintiff’s degenerative disc disease “had generally been
28 conservative and routine with no recommended surgical intervention other than
8
Case 5:21-cv-00564-JC Document 25 Filed 08/22/22 Page9of13 Page ID#:2112
1 || injection therapy.” (AR 20 (citing AR 307-13, 318-55, 1786-1882)). The ALJ
2 || described plaintiff's pain as generally controlled with medication without
3 || specifying the medication. See AR 20 (citing AR 631-33, 636 (noting treatment
4 || with Norco, Gabapentin, and Lidoderm patches); AR 1552-1669 (also noting
5 || ongoing treatment with Norco, Gabapentin, and Lidoderm patches)).
6 Turning first to plaintiff's assertedly “conservative and routine” treatment to
7 || control plaintiffs pain, a limited course of treatment sometimes can justify the
8 || rejection of a claimant’s testimony, at least where the testimony concerns physical
9 || problems. See, e.g., Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d at 1112 (in assessing claimant’s
10 || credibility, ALJ may properly rely on “unexplained or inadequately explained
11 || failure to seek treatment or to follow prescribed course of treatment’’); Burch v.
12 || Barnhart, 400 F.3d at 681 (lack of consistent treatment such as where there was a
13 || three to four month gap in treatment properly considered in discrediting claimant’s
14 || back pain testimony); Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 1999) (in
15 || assessing the credibility of a claimant’s pain testimony, the Administration
16 || properly may consider the claimant’s failure to request treatment and failure to
17 || follow treatment advice) (citing Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 346 (9th Cir.
18 || 1991) (en banc)); Matthews v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 679-80 (9th Cir. 1993)
19 || (permissible credibility factors in assessing pain testimony include limited
20 || treatment and minimal use of medications); see also Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d
21 || 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995) (absence of treatment for back pain during half of the
22 || alleged disability period, and evidence of only “conservative treatment” when the
23 || claimant finally sought treatment, sufficient to discount claimant’s testimony).
24 Here, it is doubtful that plaintiff's consistent treatment with narcotic pain
25 || medications may properly be characterized as “conservative” within the meaning
26 || of Ninth Circuit jurisprudence. See, e.g., Shepard v. Colvin, 2015 WL 9490094, at
27 || *7 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 30, 2015) (“[p]rior cases in the Ninth Circuit have found that
28 || treatment was conservative when the claimant’s pain was adequately treated with
Case 5:21-cv-00564-JC Document 25 Filed 08/22/22 Page 10o0f13 Page ID #:2113
1 || over-the-counter medication and other minimal treatment,” however where record
2 || reflected heavy reliance on Tramadol and Oxycodone and other prescriptions for
3 || pain, record did not support finding that treatment was “‘conservative’’) (internal
4 || citations omitted; citing for comparison Lapeirre-Gutt v. Astrue, 382 Fed. App’x
5 || 662, 664 (9th Cir. 2010) (doubting whether “copious amounts of narcotic pain
6 || medication” as well as nerve blocks and trigger point injections was “conservative”
7 || treatment)); Childress v. Colvin, 2014 WL 4629593, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16,
8 || 2014) (“[i]t is not obvious whether the consistent use of [Norco] (for several years)
9 || is ‘conservative’ or in conflict with Plaintiff’s pain testimony”); Aguilar v. Colvin,
10 | 2014 WL 3557308, at *8 (C.D. Cal. July 18, 2014) (“It would be difficult to fault
11 || Plaintiff for overly conservative treatment when he has been prescribed strong
12 || narcotic pain medications”); cf. Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1166 (9th Cir.
13 | 2001) (observing that treatment corroborating allegations of severe and unremitting
14 || pain may include a strong Codeine or Morphine basic analgesic).
15 The medical record shows that plaintiff regularly sought treatment for pain
16 || with her providers throughout the alleged disability period, and she consistently
17 || was prescribed narcotic pain medication (Norco) and had some epidural steroid
18 || injections which provided some relief. See, e.g., AR 319-55 (pain management
19 | records from April of 2016 through June of 2017); AR 520-24, 536-39, 551-63,
20 || 631-35, 647-48, 659-64, 1558-88, 1593-98, 1647-52 (primary doctor treatment
21 || records for osteoarthritic pain and neuropathy from December 2015, February,
22 || March, September, and December 2016, July 2017, October and December 2018,
23 || January, April, August, and November 2019, and January, March, and May 2020);
24 || AR 710, 712-15 (podiatrist’s treatment with steroid injections for neuropathy in
25 || July of 2016, April 2017, and December 2019); AR 1957-92 (pain management
26 || records from March 2019 through June 2020). Accordingly, it appears that
27 || plaintiffs treatment has not been “conservative” within the meaning of Ninth
28 || Circuit jurisprudence. Compare Hazelton v. Saul, 812 Fed. App’x 453, 454 (9th
10
Case 5:21-cv-00564-JC Document 25 Filed 08/22/22 Page 11 of 13 Page ID #:2114
1 Cir. 2020) (finding the record supported the ALJ’s “reasonable” interpretation of
2 treatments as “conservative” where doctor’s own treatment notes indicated
3 claimant had “attempted multiple conservative therapies” such as steroid
4 injections, nerve blocks, nerve ablation, and narcotic pain medications) (emphasis
5 added). Whereas, in this case, for example, plaintiff’s new pain management
6 doctor stated in March 2019 the intention not to prescribe Norco long term; the
7 doctor wanted to try other conservative therapies to treat plaintiff’s pain. (AR
8 1959). However, that doctor was still prescribing Norco in June 2020 – the last
9 available record – and in fact increased plaintiff’s Norco dose at that visit. (AR
10 1964-66).
11 Turning to the ALJ’s remaining reason for discounting plaintiff’s subjective
12 statements and testimony (i.e., the objective medical evidence), a purported lack of
13 supporting objective medical evidence is not – in and of itself – a sufficient basis to
14 discount a claimant’s testimony, but may be a relevant factor. See, e.g., Burch, 400
15 F.3d at 681 (“Although lack of medical evidence cannot form the sole basis for
16 discounting pain testimony, it is a factor that the ALJ can consider in his credibility
17 analysis.”). Because the ALJ’s only other reason for discounting plaintiff’s
18 subjective complaints (i.e., plaintiff’s assertedly conservative treatment) does not
19 withstand scrutiny on the current record, the ALJ’s reliance on the available
20 medical evidence in this case cannot stand.
21 Even if the ALJ’s evaluation of the available medical evidence could support
22 the ALJ’s determination, the ALJ did not explain adequately how the medical
23 evidence undermined or contradicted plaintiff’s specific statements. The ALJ’s
24 references to plaintiff’s examination findings and general conclusions that the
25 residual functional capacity assessment reasonably accounted for plaintiff’s
26 impairments fail to demonstrate how these findings support the rejection of
27 plaintiff’s statements. See Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d 1266, 1278 (9th Cir. 2020)
28 (“Although the ALJ did provide a relatively detailed overview of [plaintiff’s]
11
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1 || medical history, ‘providing a summary of medical evidence . . . is not the same as
2 || providing clear and convincing reasons for finding the claimant’s symptom
3 || testimony not credible.”) (quoting Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 494); see also id. at
4 | 1268 (“‘[T]he ALJ must identify the specific testimony that he discredited and
5 || explain the evidence undermining it.”).
6 Defendant suggests that the ALJ adequately addressed plaintiff's testimony
7 || and statements by also citing to the state agency medical opinions finding no
8 || greater limitations than the ALJ found to exist. See Defendant’s Motion at 24.
9 || The contrary medical opinion evidence is not an independent reason the ALJ gave
10 || for discrediting plaintiffs testimony and statements. The Court is constrained to
11 || consider those reasons the ALJ provided. Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 675. In any event,
12 || the ALJ’s reliance on medical opinion evidence to determine plaintiff's residual
13 || functional capacity is nothing more than an additional citation to the objective
14 | medical evidence which, as the Court has stated, cannot stand alone as a reason to
15 | discount plaintiffs statements and testimony.
16 Because the ALJ failed to provide specific, clear, and convincing reasons to
17 || discount plaintiff’s subjective statements, remand is warranted for reconsideration
18 || of these statements. See Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1103 (“Because ‘the agency’s path’
19 || cannot ‘reasonably be discerned,’ we must reverse the district court’s decision to
20 || the extent it affirmed the ALJ’s credibility determination.) (quoting Alaska Dep’t
21 || of Env’t Conserv. v. E.P.A., 540 U.S. 461, 497 (2004)).
22 | ///
23} ///
24 | ///
25 } ///
26 | ///
27 | ///
28 ///
12
Case 5:21-cv-00564-JC Document 25 Filed 08/22/22 Page 13 of 13 Page ID #:2116
1 V. CONCLUSION
2 For the foregoing reasons,5 the decision of the Commissioner of Social
3 Security is REVERSED in part, and this matter is REMANDED for further
4 administrative action consistent with this Opinion.
5 LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
6 DATED: August 22, 2022
7
8 ______________/s/___________________
Honorable Jacqueline Chooljian
9
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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5The Court need not, and has not adjudicated plaintiff’s other challenges to the ALJ’s
25
decision, except insofar as to determine that a reversal and remand for immediate payment of
26 benefits would not be appropriate. When a court reverses an administrative determination, “the
proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional
27 investigation or explanation.” Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16
28 (2002) (citations and quotations omitted); Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1099 (noting such “ordinary
remand rule” applies in Social Security cases) (citations omitted).
13