Ryan Morrison v. City of Los Angeles, California

Case 2:19-cv-01961-JGB-JPR Document 93 Filed 06/21/22 Page 1 of 8 Page ID #:2660

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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RYAN MORRISON, ) Case No. CV 19-1961-JGB (JPR)

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Plaintiff, ) ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS AND

12 ) RECOMMENDATIONS OF U.S.

v. ) MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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ALVARO RAMOS et al., )

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Defendants. )

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16 The Court has reviewed de novo the records on file and

17 Report and Recommendation of U.S. Magistrate Judge, which

18 recommends that Defendants’ summary-judgment motion be granted

19 except as to the state-law claims, which should be dismissed

20 without prejudice, and Plaintiff’s summary-judgment motion be

21 denied. See 28 U.S.C. § 636. On May 10, 2022, Plaintiff

22 objected to portions of the R. & R.; Defendants didn’t respond.

23 In 47 pages of objections, Plaintiff has included no record

24 citations other than when quoting (without quotation marks) the

25 R. & R., making it virtually impossible for the Court to assess

26 his arguments. See Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir.

27 1996) (noting that district court need not “scour the record in

28 search of a genuine issue of triable fact” (citation omitted));

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Case 2:19-cv-01961-JGB-JPR Document 93 Filed 06/21/22 Page 2 of 8 Page ID #:2661

1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3) (“[C]ourt need consider only the cited

2 materials[.]”). At any rate, he mostly reargues points made in

3 his summary-judgment motion, Opposition to Defendants’ motion,

4 and Reply, which the Magistrate Judge already considered and

5 appropriately rejected. Only a few warrant discussion.

6 Plaintiff doesn’t challenge the Magistrate Judge’s finding

7 that his malicious-prosecution claim fails or that his state-law

8 claims should be dismissed. Nor does he dispute that the

9 preliminary-hearing finding of probable cause precludes

10 relitigation of probable cause here. He instead insists that

11 probable cause is not a “total defense to false arrest and

12 imprisonment” claims. (Objs. at 14.) But as the Magistrate

13 Judge noted (see R. & R. at 12), the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly

14 held the opposite. See Yousefian v. City of Glendale, 779 F.3d

15 1010, 1014 (9th Cir. 2015) (“The absence of probable cause is a

16 necessary element of [a] § 1983 false arrest” claim); Hart v.

17 Parks, 450 F.3d 1059, 1069 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Because police had

18 probable cause to arrest him, [plaintiff’s] false arrest claim

19 necessarily fails.”); Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159

20 F.3d 374, 380 (9th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (“To prevail on his §

21 1983 claim for false arrest and imprisonment, [plaintiff] would

22 have to demonstrate that there was no probable cause to arrest

23 him.”).

24 Plaintiff claims, again, that Morrison “testified she never”

25 told arresting officers Mirzoyan and Ramos that Plaintiff

26 “contacted her in May 2016 and asked if he could move in with her

27 in [California] temporarily to attend school.” (Objs. at 3; see

28 also id. at 4-5, 7, 19, 21-23.) As the Magistrate Judge noted

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Case 2:19-cv-01961-JGB-JPR Document 93 Filed 06/21/22 Page 3 of 8 Page ID #:2662

1 (see R. & R. at 7 n.5, 25-26), however, that’s not true, and

2 Plaintiff points to nothing in the record to the contrary.

3 Indeed, at the preliminary hearing, Morrison testified that after

4 Plaintiff called and “said he was coming out to California,” she

5 “offered to let him stay with [her] for a couple of months.”

6 (Pl.’s Statement Genuine Disputes, Ex. 2 at 9.) At the time, she

7 was living alone. (See id.) When Plaintiff arrived in

8 California, they leased a different residence together. (See id.

9 at 10; id., Ex. 3 at 42, 48; id., Ex. 12 at 20-21.)

10 At Plaintiff’s criminal trial, Morrison was testifying about

11 that leased residence when she seemed to deny that he had told

12 her that he was moving in with her temporarily:

13 Q And you needed [Plaintiff] to cosign for the

14 apartment because he had good credit and you did

15 not.

16 A No. He –- he was moving in with me. We both had

17 to sign it.

18 Q Now, didn’t [Plaintiff] tell you that he was moving

19 in with you temporarily to help you get on your

20 feet but then he was going to move out on his own?

21 A No. It was –- we signed a year’s lease.

22 (Id., Ex. 3 at 47.) Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument (see Objs.

23 at 3-4), this testimony wasn’t in the context of what she told

24 Defendants leading up to Plaintiff’s arrest; that came later (see

25 Pl.’s Statement Genuine Disputes, Ex. 3 at 65-68). She never

26 denied having told Defendants around the time of his arrest that

27 she had agreed to let Plaintiff move in with her temporarily (see

28 R. & R. at 7 n.5, 25-26); their evidence on that point therefore

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1 remains undisputed (see Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 8, Mirzoyan

2 Decl. ¶ 8; id., Ex. 2 at 2-3).1

3 Next, Plaintiff challenges the Magistrate Judge’s finding

4 that Ramos and Mirzoyan had to act fast because Morrison seemed

5 to be in harm’s way. (See Objs. at 6-7.) He claims Morrison

6 went to the police station “only to drop off paperwork,” not to

7 “report a crime or seek police action.” (Objs. at 7; see id. at

8 25.) Thus, he argues, she didn’t “fear[] for [her] safety.”

9 (Id. at 7; see id. at 25 (claiming that Morrison “was not in fear

10 for her safety” because “[s]he was not [at the police station] to

11 make a report or seek police action”).)

12 But the “paperwork” Morrison dropped off was a medical

13 report showing that she had suffered rib fractures the day she

14 called police and stating that she had “[ch]est pain after

15 assault.” (Pl.’s Statement Undisputed Facts, Ex. 5 at 3.)

16 What’s more, Mirzoyan declared that Morrison said she believed

17 Plaintiff’s threats were credible and that she “feared for her

18 safety.” (Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 8, Mirzoyan Decl. ¶ 11; see

19 also Pl.’s Statement Genuine Disputes, Ex. 10 at 37 (Ramos

20 testifying that Morrison “expressed being . . . afraid”).). And

21 she told them that Plaintiff had thrown items around the house,

22 including a 20-inch television, and struck her with a walker,

23 which was consistent with what responding officer Avila saw when

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25 1 Plaintiff likewise claims that Ramos and Mirzoyan knew he

“paid rent and was on [the] lease” (Objs. at 37; see also id. at 8-

26 9, 32) and that Morrison told them that he “paid money towards

[the] apartment” (id. at 45), but he cites no evidence supporting

27 those claims. (See R. & R. at 25.) In any event, all that matters

is what Ramos and Mirzoyan believed at the time of his arrest, not

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what they might have learned later.

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1 she first entered the apartment. (See R. & R. at 13, 15-16

2 (citing record evidence).)2 Indeed, Morrison later told Boylls

3 that she had “[f]ear[ed] that [Plaintiff] would be at her

4 residence” and therefore “responded to [the police station] and

5 spoke with” Ramos and Mirzoyan there. (Pl.’s Statement

6 Undisputed Facts, Ex. 25 at 2; see also R. & R. at 31.) She

7 reported that she “live[d] in constant fear” of Plaintiff (Pl.’s

8 Statement Undisputed Facts, Ex. 25 at 2) and requested a

9 restraining order (id., Ex. 2 at 89-90). Thus, Ramos and

10 Mirzoyan would have reasonably believed that Morrison was in

11 harm’s way and had to act quickly. (See R. & R. at 25.)

12 Plaintiff wrongly claims that “Avila testified nothing

13 stopped her from arresting Plaintiff,” and she could have

14 “fil[ed] an arrest report.” (Objs. at 21; see also id. at 24

15 (arguing that Avila had “opportunity” to arrest Plaintiff).) In

16 fact, Avila couldn’t arrest him because he was “already gone”

17 when she “took the investigative report.” (Pl.’s Statement

18 Genuine Disputes, Ex. 5 at 13; see Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 1 at

19 3-4 (investigative report noting that Avila and her partner

20 searched for but couldn’t find Plaintiff).)

21 Arguing that Mirzoyan and Ramos should have investigated

22 Morrison’s claims more before arresting him, Plaintiff for the

23 first time states that Morrison had falsely accused people

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2 In his Objections, Plaintiff for the first time “den[ies]”

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that Morrison “made these statements” to Mirzoyan and Ramos.

26 (Objs. at 20.) Never mind that he previously didn’t dispute those

facts (see Pl.’s Statement Genuine Disputes at 7-8 (noting that

27 they were “undisputed”)), he has pointed to no contradictory

evidence. (See Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 8, Mirzoyan Decl. ¶ 12

28 (Mirzoyan declaring what Morrison told them).)

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1 before: she “has a long history of accusing people,” “[m]ade many

2 false police reports,” and “filed complaints against many other

3 people including judges, lawyers, medical doctors, psychologists,

4 school teachers and principles [sic] and family members and

5 more.” (Objs. at 25-26.) Even if that’s true, however, nothing

6 suggests that Defendants had reason to so suspect, and because of

7 Morrison’s apparent injuries at Plaintiff’s hands, they had to

8 act quickly. They had no immediate basis to doubt Morrison’s

9 veracity, as the Magistrate Judge found. (See R. & R. at 16-17)

10 Plaintiff’s next argument fares even worse: because Mirzoyan

11 allegedly testified that he entered the residence only to

12 investigate, he must have lied in his declaration about Morrison

13 giving him consent to enter to arrest Plaintiff. (See Objs. at

14 9.) As the Magistrate Judge noted (see R. & R. at 26 n.18),

15 Mirzoyan never testified that he entered the residence only to

16 investigate. But even if he did, that wouldn’t mean that

17 Morrison didn’t consent to their entry to arrest Plaintiff.

18 Indeed, she affirmatively told police that she wanted Plaintiff

19 arrested (see Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 8, Mirzoyan Decl. ¶ 13;

20 see also id., Ex. 1 (investigative report noting that Morrison

21 told Avila that she “want[ed]” Plaintiff “prosecuted for th[e]

22 crime”)), so when she brought them to the apartment and used her

23 key to open the door and let them in, the officers would have

24 reasonably inferred that she did so so that they could arrest

25 Plaintiff.

26 Ramos testified, Plaintiff asserts, “that there were no

27 facts known to hi[m] that suggested . . . Morrison had any

28 access, mutual use or control over the bedroom with Plaintiff.”

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Case 2:19-cv-01961-JGB-JPR Document 93 Filed 06/21/22 Page 7 of 8 Page ID #:2666

1 (Objs. at 38.) But as with all his objections, he doesn’t supply

2 supporting record citations, and the Court has found no such

3 testimony. Indeed, Morrison repeatedly referred to the apartment

4 as hers and told the officers that Plaintiff was supposed to stay

5 with her for a short time. (See Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 8,

6 Mirzoyan Decl. ¶¶ 8, 11, 13; id., Ex. 2 at 2-3.) As the

7 Magistrate Judge correctly noted, no facts known to Ramos and

8 Mirzoyan suggested that Plaintiff had “exclusive control” over

9 the room. (See R. & R. at 29; see also id. at 24-25.)

10 Finally, as to qualified immunity, Plaintiff again discusses

11 United States v. Whitfield, 939 F.2d 1071, 1073, 1075 (D.C. Cir.

12 1991), stating that it’s “nearly identical” to his case. (Objs.

13 at 43.) But as the Magistrate Judge found, no Supreme Court or

14 Ninth Circuit case as of November 2016 held that a parent’s

15 consent “prevails (or doesn’t prevail) over a present and

16 objecting adult child.” (R. & R. at 28.) And even if Whitfield

17 is “nearly identical” (Objs. at 43), it certainly doesn’t reflect

18 a “robust consensus” of persuasive authority, Dist. of Columbia

19 v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589-90 (2018) (“clearly established”

20 means “dictated by ‘controlling authority’” or supported by

21 “robust consensus” of “persuasive authority” (citation omitted)).

22 (See R. & R. at 28-29 (summarizing cases disagreeing with

23 Whitfield)); see also In re D.C., 188 Cal. App. 4th 978, 987

24 (2010) (observing that Whitfield “does not reflect a clear

25 federal consensus”). Thus, the Magistrate Judge correctly found

26 that Mirzoyan and Ramos were entitled to qualified immunity on

27 Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim: they had no “fair and clear

28 warning of what the Constitution requires.” City & Cnty. of S.F.

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ase 2:19-cv-01961-JGB-JPR Document 93 Filed 06/21/22 Page 8of8 Page ID #:266

Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 617 (2015) (citation omitted).

2 The Court accepts the findings and recommendations of the

3 ||Magistrate Judge. It therefore is ORDERED that Defendants’

4 || motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in part and Plaintiff’s

5 | summary-judgment motion is DENIED. Judgment is to be entered in

6 || Defendants’ favor, dismissing this action with prejudice as to

7 | Plaintiff’s federal claims and without prejudice as to his state-

8 || law claims.

10 || DATED: June 21, 2022 oe

JESUS fG] BERNAL

11 U.S. STRICT JUDGE

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