plaintiffs lacked Article III standing where “[w]inning or losing [the] suit would not change the plaintiffs’ monthly pension benefits’
How later courts described this case
- plaintiffs lacked Article III standing where “[w]inning or losing [the] suit would not change the plaintiffs’ monthly pension benefits’
- “[F]or a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.”
- plaintiffs lacked standing for their ERISA claim where they “[could not] allege that they have been provided with less disability coverage than they contracted for’
- “In requesting direct relief for certain union members only and not “for the benefit of the labor organization,’ Phillips disqualified himself from proceeding under Section 501.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Case 2:21-cv-05215-CAS-JEM Document 38 Filed 01/24/22 Page 1 of 26 Page ID #:554
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL ‘O’
Case No. 2:21-cv-05215-CAS (JEMx) Date January 24, 2022
Title FRANCES FISHER V. SCREEN ACTORS GUILD AMERICAN
FEDERATION OF TELEVISION AND RADIO ARTISTS ET AL.
Present: The Honorable CHRISTINA A. SNYDER
Catherine Jeang Katie Thibodeaux N/A
Deputy Clerk Court Reporter / Recorder Tape No.
Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs: Attorneys Present for Defendants:
Daniel Lifschitz Julie Dickinson
Neville Johnson Lisa Demodovich
Robert Kriner, Jr. Dexter Rappleye
Steven Schwartz Corinne Johnson
Danielle Leonard
Jeffrey Demain
Proceedings: PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO FILE FIRST
AMENDED COMPLAINT ADDING CLAIM PURUSANT TO 29 U.S.C.
§ 501(A) (Dkt. 23, filed on August 4, 2021)
MOTION TO DISMISS FILED BY DEFENDANTS JOHN CARTER
BROWN, GABRIELLE CARTERIS, DUNCAN CRABTREE-IRELAND,
JOHN T. MCGUIRE, LINDA POWELL, RAY RODRIGUEZ, DAVID P.
WHITE (Dkt. 26, filed on October 6, 2021)
MOTION TO DISMISS FILED BY DEFENDANTS DAVID HARTLEY-
MARGOLIN, MICHAEL PNIEWSKI, SCREEN ACTORS GUILD
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TELEVISION AND RADIO ARTISTS
(Dkt. 28, filed on October 6, 2021)
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 25, 2021, plaintiff Francis Fisher filed a verified application, pursuant to
29 U.S.C. § 501(b), to file a proposed complaint against defendants Screen Actors Guild
– American Federation of Television and Radio Artists (“SAG-AFTRA”), Gabrielle
Carteris, David P. White, Duncan Crabtree-Ireland, Ray Rodriguez, Michael Pniewski,
David Hartley-Margolin, John T. McGuire, John Carter Brown, and Linda Powell. Dkt.
1. Plaintiff’s proposed complaint asserted two claims: (1) breach of the duty of fair
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
Case No. 2:21-cv-05215-CAS (JEMx) Date January 24, 2022
Title FRANCES FISHER V. SCREEN ACTORS GUILD AMERICAN
FEDERATION OF TELEVISION AND RADIO ARTISTS ET AL.
representation, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 159(a), against defendants White, Rodriguez,
McGuire, Hartley-Margolin, Pniewski, Brown, and Powell; and (2) breach of fiduciary
duty, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 501(a), against defendants Carteris, White, Rodriguez,
Crabtree-Ireland, McGuire, Brown, and Powell. Dkt. 1-1.
With respect to plaintiff's Section 501(a) claim, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 501(b), a
member of a labor organization may bring suit against “any officer, agent, shop steward,
or representative” of the labor organization for violation of Section 501(a), having first
made a pre-suit demand upon the labor organization or its governing board and “upon
leave of the court obtained upon verified application and for good cause shown, which
application may be made ex parte.” 29 U.S.C.A. § 501.
On July 28, 2021, the Court denied plaintiff's verified application to file the
proposed complaint, without prejudice to plaintiff filing a complaint setting forth her
Section 159(a) claim, alongside a verified application for leave to add a claim pursuant to
Section 501(a). Dkt. 18.
On August 3, 2021, plaintiff filed a complaint setting forth her Section 159(a)
claim. Dkt. 20 (“Compl.”). On August 24, 2021, plaintiff filed a verified application for
leave to add a claim pursuant to Section 501(a). Dkt. 23 (“App.”). With her application,
plaintiff filed her proposed first amended class action complaint. Dkt. 23-1 (“Prpsd.
FAC”).
On October 6, 2021, SAG-AFTRA, Pniewski, and Hartley-Margolin (collectively,
the “159 Defendants”) moved to dismiss plaintiff's Section 159(a) claim pursuant to Rule
12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. Dkt. 28 (“159 MTD”). On October 6, 2021,
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), White, Rodriguez, McGuire, Brown, Powell, Carteris, and
Crabtree-Ireland (collectively, the “Proposed 501 Defendants”) moved to dismiss
plaintiff's Section 501(a) claim, as well as her Section 159(a) claim. Dkt. 26-1 (“501
MTD”).
On November 22, 2021, plaintiff submitted her opposition to the 159 MTD (Dkt.
32 (“159 Opp.”)), and her opposition to the 501 MTD (Dkt. 31 (“501 Opp.”)). On
January 6, 2022, the 159 Defendants submitted their reply. Dkt. 34 (“159 Reply”). On
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
Case No. 2:21-cv-05215-CAS (JEMx) Date January 24, 2022
Title FRANCES FISHER V. SCREEN ACTORS GUILD AMERICAN
FEDERATION OF TELEVISION AND RADIO ARTISTS ET AL.
January 7, 2022, the Proposed 501 Defendants submitted their reply. Dkt. 35 (“S01
Reply”).
The Court held a hearing on January 24, 2022. Having carefully considered the
parties’ arguments and submissions, the Court finds and concludes as follows.
Il. BACKGROUND
The relevant allegations are drawn from the operative complaint and, with respect
to plaintiff's Section 501 claim, supplemented by additional allegations set forth in the
proposed first amended complaint.
A. The Parties
Plaintiff Fisher is a member of SAG-AFTRA. Compl. § 23. She has served as
First Vice President of the SAG-AFTRA Los Angeles Local and as a member of the
SAG-AFTRA National Board since August 29, 2019. Id. She was a member of both
SAG and AFTRA from 1976 until the 2012 Union Merger. Id.
SAG-AFTRA is a labor organization as defined under 29 U.S.C. § 402. Id. § 24.
SAG-AFTRA resulted from the 2012 merger of the respective SAG and AFTRA unions.
Id. 4 3. SAG-AFTRA (the “Union”) is governed by its Constitution. Id. 9] 39-45. The
Union’s objectives, as set forth in the Constitution, include protecting the rights of
entertainment and media artists in all other respects consistent with the overall objectives
of the Union and doing all other things necessary and proper to advance and promote
their welfare and interests. Id. 4 39.
At all times relevant to this dispute, Carteris served as President of SAG-AFTRA,
as a SAG-AFTRA National Board member, and as a SAG-AFTRA Executive Committee
member; White served as SAG-AFTRA’s National Executive Director and chief
negotiator and as a Union-appointed SAG-AFTRA Health Plan Trustee; Crabtree-Ireland
served as Chief Operating Officer and General Counsel of SAG-AFTRA; Rodriguez
served as SAG-AFTRA’s Chief Contracts Officer and Union-appointed SAG-AFTRA
Health Plan Trustee; McGuire served as SAG-AFTRA’s National Senior Advisor and a
Union-appointed SAG-AFTRA Health Plan Trustee; Hartley-Margolin served as a
Union-appointed SAG-AFTRA Health Plan Trustee; Pniewski served as a Union-
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
Case No. 2:21-cv-05215-CAS (JEMx) Date January 24, 2022
Title FRANCES FISHER V. SCREEN ACTORS GUILD AMERICAN
FEDERATION OF TELEVISION AND RADIO ARTISTS ET AL.
appointed SAG-AFTRA Health Plan Trustee; Powell served as a member of the SAG-
AFTRA National Board and as a Union-appointed SAG-AFTRA Health Plan Trustee:
and Brown served as a Union-appointed SAG-AFTRA Health Plan Trustee and as a
member of the SAG-AFTRA National Board. Id. 4 25-31; Prspd. FAC 4 26-34.
B. The SAG-AFTRA Merger and the Health Plans Merger
In January 2012, the governing boards of the Screen Actors Guild (“SAG”) and the
American Federation of Television and Radio Artists (“AFTRA”) agreed to merge to two
unions to become SAG-AFTRA. Compl. § 33. Prior to the merger, pension and health
benefits were provided to the respective members of SAG and AFTRA by separate
pension and welfare (health) plans, which were collectively bargained, joint-trusted
labor-management trusts subject to ERISA. Id.
In early June 2016, the respective trustees of the SAG and AFTRA health plans
agreed to merge the plans. Id. 34. The benefits provided under the merged plan
continued Senior Performer Coverage for SAG and AFTRA members who qualified.
Senior Performer Coverage provided the Union health benefit to all Union members (and
their qualified dependents and surviving spouses) who were receiving a pension from
either the SAG-Producers Pension Plan or the AFTRA Retirement Fund (if eligible for a
pension from both, members only needed a pension from SAG to qualify), and had a
certain number of Union “Retiree Health Credits” from years of qualifying for active
coverage under the health plans. Id. { 36. Senior Performer Coverage was secondary to
Medicare unless the member regained coverage through “Earned Active Eligibility,”
which could be achieved by meeting the “Covered Earnings” threshold based on the
member’s total compensation for work covered by the operative CBAs as long as the
member’s earnings included at least $1 in sessional earnings. This method of obtaining
“Earned Active Eligibility” considered both sessional and residual earnings! toward
1 Residual earnings are compensation paid to members performers for use of a theatrical
motion picture or television program beyond the use covered by initial compensation.
Compl. § 7 n. 2. While not defined in the complaint, the Court understands that sessional
earnings relate to earnings acquired through active work completed in a given time
period.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
Case No. 2:21-cv-05215-CAS (JEMx) Date January 24, 2022
Title FRANCES FISHER V. SCREEN ACTORS GUILD AMERICAN
FEDERATION OF TELEVISION AND RADIO ARTISTS ET AL.
qualifying for SAG-AFTRA Health Plan primary coverage, with Medicare as the
secondary coverage provider. Id.
At the time of the health plans merger, Carteris stated that the merger would
position the new health plan “to be financially sustainable for all members for years to
come.” Prpsd. FAC § 37. Ina letter to SAG-AFTRA members in the summer of 2016,
White stated that the Health Plans Merger “is tremendous news for our membership on
many fronts. Fully 65,000 souls who depend on these plans will become beneficiaries of
a single, financially strengthened plan that offers automatic family coverage for all
participants.” Id. § 38.
C. The Health Benefit Amendments
On August 12, 2020, the SAG-AFTRA Health Plan announced modifications (the
“Benefit Amendments’’) to its benefit structure. Compl. | 7. The Benefit Amendments
increased the SAG-AFTRA Health Plan’s eligibility requirements for many Union
members, disqualified residuals earnings toward earnings-based eligibility for Union
members age 65 and older taking a Union pension, eliminated Senior Performer
Coverage and Age and Service Eligibility (for members 40 and older with 10 years
vested and $13,000 in earnings), and negatively affected those members who previously
earned coverage under the lower Plan II $1,840 earnings threshold. Id. Additionally, the
Benefit Amendments modified the earnings period for all Union members age 65 and
older to run from October 1 to September 30, cutting short the time available to these
members to obtain the sessional earnings necessary to meet the increased eligibility
requirements and retroactively eliminating coverage for which some members had
already qualified. Id. { 8.
Plaintiff alleges that the Benefit Amendments effectively eliminated benefits under
the SAG-AFTRA Health Plan for thousands of Union members and their families who
are now unable to qualify based on earnings where residual earnings are no longer
credited toward SAG-AFTRA Health Plan eligibility, and many members face the
dramatically increased hurdles for eligibility under the Health Plan in the future. Id. { 9.
One week after the Benefit Cuts’ announcement, on August 19, 2020, SAG-
AFTRA Health Plan Trustee Richard Masur admitted that the Benefit Cuts had been in
the works for two years, and SAG-AFTRA Health Plan Trustee Barry Gordon
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL ‘oO’
Case No. 2:21-cv-05215-CAS (JEMx) Date January 24, 2022
Title FRANCES FISHER V. SCREEN ACTORS GUILD AMERICAN
FEDERATION OF TELEVISION AND RADIO ARTISTS ET AL.
highlighted that the Trustees had worked nearly every day for those two years to figure
out how they could preserve the SAG-AFTRA Health Plan’s benefits. Id. § 10.
D. Collective Bargaining Agreements
Funding to the SAG-AFTRA Health Plan is largely provided by employer
contributions set by the terms of the Union’s operative CBAs. Compl. § 10. In the two
years leading up to the Benefit Cuts, the 2019 Commercials, 2019 Netflix and 2020
TV/Theatrical CBAs that were operative on August 12, 2020 were negotiated and
approved by the Union. Id.
The Union, by law, is its members’ exclusive agent in collective bargaining and is
bound by the duty of fair representation under the NLRA. Id. § 46. The collective
bargaining agreements (“CBAs”) between the Union and the employers determine the
elements of compensation and value provided to Union members for their work as
performers, including the amount of new money, the amount of contributions by
employers to the benefit plans (including the SAG-AFTRA Health Plan) based on
members’ earnings, and potential diversions of wage increases to other funding such as
the SAG-AFTRA Health Plan. Id. ¥ 48.
With respect to the 2019 Commercials and the 2020 TV/Theatrical CBAs, the
Union National Board appointed a Wages and Working Conditions Committee for each
CBA in order to gather proposals from the national membership and formulate the
Union’s proposal package to exchange with the employers, including employer
contributions to the SAG-AFTRA Health Plan based on all earnings of all Union
members. Id. 12. Thereafter, the National Board appointed Negotiation Committees to
conduct the bargaining on behalf of the Union, and the bargained terms were submitted to
the National Board for approval. Id. The approved CBAs were then submitted to the
membership for ratification. Id.
The negotiation and approval process for the 2019 Netflix CBA was different,
however. Id. It was negotiated entirely by Union staff led by White and Rodriguez, and
was submitted to the TV/Theatrical Negotiating Committee as a take-it-or-leave-it matter.
Id. Moreover, it was approved by the National Board but was not submitted to the
membership for ratification. Id.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
Case No. 2:21-cv-05215-CAS (JEMx) Date January 24, 2022
Title FRANCES FISHER V. SCREEN ACTORS GUILD AMERICAN
FEDERATION OF TELEVISION AND RADIO ARTISTS ET AL.
The 2019 Commercials CBA was ratified by members on May 8, 2019. Id. 4 52.
The 2019 Netflix CBA was approved by the National Board on July 20, 2019, and went
into effect on August 1, 2019. Id. 953. Finally, the 2020 TV/Theatrical CBA was
ratified by members on July 22, 2020. Id. § 54.
White, Rodriguez, Pniewski, Hartley-Margolin, McGuire, Brown, and Powell are
and have been Union-appointed Trustees of the SAG-AFTRA Health Plan since the 2017
Health Plan Merger, and were involved in negotiating one or more of the 2019 Netflix
CBA, the 2019 Commercials CBA, and the 2020 TV/Theatrical CBA.” Id. §§ 4.11.
Plaintiff alleges that through their service as SAG-AFTRA Health Plan Trustees, these
defendants knew the urgent funding issues facing the SAG-AFTRA Health Plan, the level
of funding required to sustain its health benefit structure, that the Union proposals and
bargained terms were inadequate to sustain that health benefit structure, and that massive
cuts were coming to effectively eliminate the SAG-AFTRA Health Plan’s benefits for
thousands of Union members and their families under the terms of the Union proposal
packages and the terms of the negotiated CBAs. Id. § 13. Plaintiff further alleges that
White, Rodriguez, Pniewski, Hartley-Margolin, McGuire, Brown, and Powell bargained
for and approved terms that they knew were inadequate to sustain the SAG-AFTRA
Health Plan’s benefit structure for the Union and its members, and failed to disclose this
vital information to the other participants in the Union’s collective bargaining process.
Id.
E. —__Post-Benefit Amendments Activity
Following the Benefit Amendments, plaintiff and other Union Members formed
the “SOS Health Plan” team and launched SOSHealthPlan.com as a means of providing
clarity to Union members affected by the Benefit] Amendments. Compl. 63. They also
launched social media pages on Twitter, Instagram, and Facebook, made a social media
? White, Rodriguez and McGuire participated in the negotiations for all three CBAs, with
White and Rodriguez serving as lead negotiators. Compl. § 11. Hartley-Margolin
participated in the negotiations concerning the 2019 Commercials CBA. Id, Powell and
Pniewski participated in the negotiation of the 2019 Netflix and 2020 TV/Theatrical
CBAs. Id. Powell and Brown voted as Union National Board members to approve the
2019 Commercials, 2019 Netflix and 2020 TV/Theatrical CBAs. Id.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
Case No. 2:21-cv-05215-CAS (JEMx) Date January 24, 2022
Title FRANCES FISHER V. SCREEN ACTORS GUILD AMERICAN
FEDERATION OF TELEVISION AND RADIO ARTISTS ET AL.
video featuring over 20 high-profile rank-and-file Union members speaking out about the
draconian changes to the SAG-AFTRA Health Plan, and held two nationwide virtual
“town hall” meetings advertised via word-of-mouth that were open to all Union members
and the public. Id. 63, 64.
On December 1, 2020, in response to the Benefit Amendments Union members
filed an action under 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104 and 1105 (“ERISA”) in this Court on December
1, 2020, alleging breaches of fiduciary duty by the SAG-AFTRA Health Plan Trustees.
Id. § 15 (citing Asner et al v. The SAG-AFTRA Health Fund et al, Case No. 2:20-cv-
10914 (C_D. Cal.)).
Plaintiff alleges that the defendants in this case, most of whom face claims for
personal liability in the Asner action, used their fiduciary positions as Union officials and
Union assets to support and defend the Benefit Cuts and the SAG-AFTRA Health Plan
Trustees, and to protect themselves from personal liability. Compl. { 18. On December
4, 2020, three days after the filing of Asner, the Union disseminated an email to its
membership, in which it stated that the Union members were being “misled” by a
“deliberate public and social media campaign spreading misinformation and fear.” Id. 4
66. On December 14, 2020, at the direction of Defendants Carteris and White, a special
meeting of the National Board was called to pass a “RESOLUTION RE: ACCURACY
OF INFORMATION ABOUT HEALTH PLAN CHANGES.” Id. § 69. The resolution
“resolved” to “take all appropriate action to ensure members are not deceived by
misrepresentations” and “condemn|ed] those who seek to use the financial challenges of
the Health Plan and the related [benefit] changes to generate fear or anger in furtherance
of personal agendas.” Id. Additionally, defendants Carteris and White directed Union
staff to disseminate a press release concerning the resolution. Id. 70. The press release
quoted Carteris as stating that “|l|ike many scams that target the elderly, the
misinformation being spread is endangering our most vulnerable members.” Id. Finally,
also on December 14, 2020, the SAG-AFTRA Communications Department released a
video of SAG-AFTRA member Adam Arkin “discussing Five Facts about the Health
Plan change” with links to the December 4, 2020 Union message and the Union’s
December 14, 2020 press release. Id. 471.
On December 18, 2020, plaintiff demanded pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 501(b) that the
Union and National Board assert claims for breach of fiduciary duty under The Labor-
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
Case No. 2:21-cv-05215-CAS (JEMx) Date January 24, 2022
Title FRANCES FISHER V. SCREEN ACTORS GUILD AMERICAN
FEDERATION OF TELEVISION AND RADIO ARTISTS ET AL.
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 against the Union officials who
represented the Union and its members in connection with the Union’s CBA negotiations
and approvals, as well as those officials who used their Union positions and Union assets
to support and defend the Benefit Cuts and protect themselves from personal liability (the
“Demand”). Id. 4 19; see also Dkt. 23-2 (“Dmnd.”). The Demand requested “recovery of
losses to the union and members;” “recovery of any profits from the fiduciary
violations;” “full disclosure to the union and membership regarding their roles in the
contract negotiations and conception, design and approval of the benefit cuts;” and “such
other appropriate relief on behalf of the union and membership.” Dmund. at 4-5.
The Demand was on the agenda for the Union’s February 6, 2021, regularly
scheduled National Board meeting. Id. { 20. On February 5, 2021, Susan Davis of
Cohen, Weiss & Simon LLP (“CWS”), retained by the Union to address the Demand,
informed Plaintiff that, at the meeting, Plaintiff would be requested to present the
Demand and would then be directed to recuse herself during Davis’s presentation to the
National Board. Prpsd FAC § 77. Plaintiff is a member of the National Board. Id.
Plaintiff requested Davis provide the basis and authority supporting recusal, but Davis
did not respond. Id. CWS is representing the CB Defendants and others in the Asner
action, and is opposing claims made by Union members to the EEOC relating to the
Benefit Cuts. Id.
At the February 6, 2021, SAG-AFTRA National Board meeting, the National
Board voted to reject the Demand. Id. § 78. At the meeting, Plaintiff stated she believed
the Demand did not impair her capacity or duty impartially to evaluate and consider the
Demand and related information as a SAG-AFTRA National Board member and
therefore she would comply with the recusal directive but only on an involuntary basis.
Id. Neither the Demand, other materials relating to the Demand, nor CWS’s work related
to the Demand was provided to the National Board prior to or at the February 6 meeting.
Id.
Il. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Rule 12(b)(1)
A motion to dismiss an action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) raises the
objection that the federal court has no subject matter jurisdiction over the action. This
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL ‘oO’
Case No. 2:21-cv-05215-CAS (JEMx) Date January 24, 2022
Title FRANCES FISHER V. SCREEN ACTORS GUILD AMERICAN
FEDERATION OF TELEVISION AND RADIO ARTISTS ET AL.
defect may exist despite the formal sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint. T.B.
Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 226 F. Supp. 337, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir.
1964). When considering a Rule 12(b)(1) motion challenging the substance of
jurisdictional allegations, the Court is not restricted to the face of the pleadings, but may
review any evidence, such as declarations and testimony, to resolve any factual disputes
concerning the existence of jurisdiction. See McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558,
560 (9th Cir. 1988).
Once a Rule 12(b)(1) motion has been raised, the burden is on the party asserting
jurisdiction. Sopcak v. N. Mountain Helicopter Serv., 52 F.3d 817, 818 (9th Cir. 1995):
Ass’n of Am. Med. Coll. v. United States, 217 F.3d 770, 778-79 (9th Cir. 2000). If
jurisdiction is based on a federal question, the pleader must show that he has alleged a
claim under federal law and that the claim is not frivolous. See 5B Charles A. Wright &
Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1350, pp. 211, 231 (3d ed. 2004).
B. Rule 12(b)(6)
A motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal
sufficiency of the claims asserted in a complaint. Under 12(b)(6), a district court should
dismiss a claim if “there is a ‘lack of cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient
facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.”” Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d
1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699
(9th Cir. 1988)). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does
not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his
‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation
of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
US. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations omitted). “Factual allegations must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
In considering a 12(b)(6) motion, a court must accept as true all material allegations
in the complaint, and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them. Pareto v. FDIC,
139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). A court must read the complaint in the light most
favorable to the non-movant. Sprewell v. Golden State Warniors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th
Cir. 2001). However, “a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by
identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to
the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
Case No. 2:21-cv-05215-CAS (JEMx) Date January 24, 2022
Title FRANCES FISHER V. SCREEN ACTORS GUILD AMERICAN
FEDERATION OF TELEVISION AND RADIO ARTISTS ET AL.
complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
679 (2009); see Moss v. United States Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009)
(“[F]or a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory ‘factual content,’
and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim
entitling the plaintiff to relief.”). Ultimately, “[d]etermining whether a complaint states a
plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court
to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Unless a court converts a 12(b)(6) motion into a motion for summary judgment, the
court cannot consider material outside of the complaint, such as facts presented in briefs,
affidavits, or discovery materials. In re American Cont’] Corp./Lincoln Sav. & Loan Sec.
Litig., 102 F.3d 1524, 1537 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd on other grounds sub nom Lexecon, Inc.
v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998). However, a court may
consider exhibits submitted with or alleged in the complaint and matters that may be
judicially noticed pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201. In re Silicon Graphics Inc.
Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 986 (9th Cir. 1999): Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668,
689 (9th Cir. 2001).
As a general rule, leave to amend a complaint which has been dismissed should be
granted freely. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). However, the court may deny leave to amend when
it “determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading
could not possibly cure the deficiency.” Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture
Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986); see Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th
Cir. 2000).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff's Section 159(a) Claim
Plaintiff's complaint asserts a claim for breach of the duty of fair representation
(“DFR”), in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 159(a), against defendants SAG-AFTRA, White,
Rodriguez, McGuire, Hartley-Margolin, Pniewski, Brown, and Powell. Compl. {J 87-93.
The 159 Defendants and the Proposed 501 Defendants named in plaintiff's DFR claim
move to dismiss plaintiff's DFR claim. See 159 MTD; 501 MTD.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL ‘oO’
Case No. 2:21-cv-05215-CAS (JEMx) Date January 24, 2022
Title FRANCES FISHER V. SCREEN ACTORS GUILD AMERICAN
FEDERATION OF TELEVISION AND RADIO ARTISTS ET AL.
1. Statute of Limitations
The 159 Defendants and the Proposed 501 Defendants (collectively, “defendants”)
claim that plaintiff's DFR claim is time-barred based on the six-month statute of
limitations for asserting a DFR claim. 159 MTD at 14-16; 501 MTD at 16-18.
Defendants argue that whether plaintiff's DFR claim is based on the outcome of the three
CBAs or on defendants’ failure to disclose information about the SAG-AFTRA Health
Fund’s financial status, plaintiff's DFR claim is time barred given that the 2019
Commercials CBA was ratified on May 8, 2019, the 2019 Netflix CBA went into effect
August 1, 2019, the 2020 TV/Theatrical CBA was ratified on July 20, 2020, the Benefit
Amendments were publicly announced on August 12, 2020, and the fact that the Benefit
Amendments had been in the works for two years was announced on August 19, 2020.
Id. Plaintiff did not file her complaint until August 3, 2021. See Compl.
In opposition, plaintiff claims that the limitation period was tolled until February 5,
2021, “when she learned that any Demand though the Union and National Board was
futile.” 159 Opp. at 15-16; 509 Opp. at 26. Plaintiff points to Galindo v. Stoody Co..
where the Ninth Circuit stated that “[a]n employee should not be penalized for seeking to
resolve his dispute through the grievance process before filing a suit in federal court.”
793 F.2d 1502, 1510 (9th Cir. 1986). Plaintiff also cites Casumpang v. Hawaiian Com.
& Sugar Co., which found that an intra-union appeal of a union decision not to arbitrate a
claim tolled the limitation period. Civ. No. 12-00694 ACK, 2013 WL 6191087, at *10
(D. Haw. Nov. 25, 2013), aff'd, 712 F. App’x 709 (9th Cir. 2018). In sum, plaintiff
argues that “[t]he PAC’s allegations regarding Plaintiff's pursuit of intra-union remedies
are sufficient at the pleadings stage to support tolling under Galindo (which was decided
after trial) and Casumpang (decided on summary judgment).” 159 Opp. at 17; 509 Opp.
at 28.
In reply, defendants contend that plaintiffs effort to invoke equitable tolling based
on her Section 501 demand letter fails as a matter of law because “equitable tolling of
DFR claims applies only where a plaintiff pursues contractual remedies, whether under a
CBA or a union’s constitution or bylaws, that can provide the same relief sought in the
DFR claim.” 501 Reply at 11: see also 159 Reply at 10-11.
DFR claims are subject to a six-month statute of limitations. DelCostello v. Int’]
Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 172 (1983). The cause of action accrues “when the
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
Case No. 2:21-cv-05215-CAS (JEMx) Date January 24, 2022
Title FRANCES FISHER V. SCREEN ACTORS GUILD AMERICAN
FEDERATION OF TELEVISION AND RADIO ARTISTS ET AL.
plaintiff knew, or should have known, of the defendant’s wrongdoing and can
successfully maintain a suit in the district court.” Allen v. United Food & Commercial
Workers Int’] Union, 43 F.3d 424, 427 (9th Cir. 1994). At the latest, plaintiff's cause of
action accrued on August 19, 2020, when the Union “admitted that the Benefit Cuts had
been in the works for two years.”” Compl. § 10; Prspd. FAC § 10. Accordingly, the
statute of limitations on plaintiff's claim expired on February 19, 2021. Plaintiff did not
file her DFR claim until August 3, 2021.
In an effort to preserve her DFR claim, plaintiff argues that “the limitation period
was tolled while she pursued intra-union remedies in a good-faith effort to address the
misconduct and injury until February 5, 2021, when she learned that any Demand though
the Union and National Board was futile.” 159 Opp. at 15-16; 509 Opp. at 26. The Court
disagrees. The Demand was a statutory prerequisite to plaintiff's Section 501 claim, and
fails to toll the statute of limitations on her DFR claim. Plaintiffs Section 501 claim is
brought against individual Union officials, and seeks relief for harm to the Union.
Conversely, plaintiff's DFR claim is brought against the Union, for harm to the members
of the Union. Plaintiff's Demand cannot toll the statute of limitations on her DFR claim,
because the Demand “could not result in the relief that Plaintiff seeks” on her DFR claim.
Maurer v. Int’! Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Loc. 569, AFL-CIO, 200 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1061
(S.D. Cal. 2016). Moreover, equitable tolling of DFR claims is “‘most appropriate when
the plaintiff 1s required to avail himself of an alternate course of action as a precondition
to filing suit.”” Harris v. Alumax Mill Prod., Inc., 897 F.2d 400, 404 (9th Cir. 1990))
(italics in Harris) (quoting Conley v. Int’! Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Loc. 639, 810 F.2d 913,
915-16 (9th Cir. 1987)).
The primary authority that plaintiff relies upon in support of her argument that the
Demand tolls her DFR claim is Galindo, wherein the Ninth Circuit stated that “[a]n
employee should not be penalized for seeking to resolve his dispute through the
grievance process before filing a suit in federal court.” 793 F.2d at 1510. However, in
Galindo, the Ninth Circuit added that “resort to the grievance process should toll the
limitations period only if the grievance is related to the alleged breach of duty of fair
representation” and “could result in the relief sought be the employee. Id. at 1510 n. 5.
Plaintiff cites no authority that found that a Section 501 demand letter tolls a DFR claim.
Pursuant to the allegations set forth by plaintiff in her complaint and proposed first
amended complaint, plaintiff's DFR claim is time-barred.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
Case No. 2:21-cv-05215-CAS (JEMx) Date January 24, 2022
Title FRANCES FISHER V. SCREEN ACTORS GUILD AMERICAN
FEDERATION OF TELEVISION AND RADIO ARTISTS ET AL.
2. Individual Union Officials
Defendants also argue that, pursuant to Section §301(b) of the Labor Management
Relations Act, individual union officials are immune from lawsuits for breaches of the
DFR. 159 MTD at 17; 501 MTD at 18-19. Accordingly, they argue that plaintiff's DFR
claim against the individual defendants must be dismissed.
In opposition, plaintiff states that “[t]he DFR Claim does not seek recovery from
the Individual Defendants for the Union’s breach” and that “[t|he Individual Defendants
are named on the DFR count as the agents of the Union who controlled and caused the
Union actions in breach of the DFR.” 159 Opp. at 20; 509 Opp. at 30. In reply,
defendants reiterate that individual officers are immune from DFR claims, and note that
plaintiff failed to distinguish the controlling authority requiring dismissal of the
individual defendants. 159 Reply at 18; 509 Reply at 15-16.
“The language of section 301(b) and the Supreme Court’s decision in Atkinson []
provide a shield for individual union members in suits for breach of the duty of fair
representation.” Evangelista v. Inlandboatmen’s Union of Pac., 777 F.2d 1390, 1400 (9th
Cir. 1985); see also Carter v. Smith Food King, 765 F.2d 916, 920-21 (9th Cir. 1985) (“It
is well settled that section 301 provides the basis for an action for breach of the duty of
fair representation only against a union as an entity, and not against individuals who
happen to hold positions in that union.”’); 29 U.S.C. § 185 (“Any money judgment against
a labor organization in a district court of the United States shall be enforceable only
against the organization as an entity and against its assets, and shall not be enforceable
against any individual member or his assets.”). Accordingly, the only permissible named
defendant on plaintiff's DFR claim is SAG-AFTRA.
3. Whether Plaintiff's Allegations State a DFR Claim
Defendants argue that even if plaintiffs claims are not time barred and are
properly raised against the Union, courts take a “‘highly deferential’ approach” to
examining whether the Union has represented its members fairly, “‘recognizing the wide
latitude that [unions] need for the effective performance of their bargaining
responsibilities.” 501 MTD at 19 (quoting Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’] v. O’Neill, 499
U:S. 65, 78 (1991)): see also 159 MTD at 18-19. Accordingly, defendants argue that “a
union’s only obligation pursuant to its duty of fair representation 1s to refrain from
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL ‘oO’
Case No. 2:21-cv-05215-CAS (JEMx) Date January 24, 2022
Title FRANCES FISHER V. SCREEN ACTORS GUILD AMERICAN
FEDERATION OF TELEVISION AND RADIO ARTISTS ET AL.
conduct that rises to the level of being ‘arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.’” 159
MTD at 18 (quoting Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild, 525 U.S. 33, 44 (1998): see also
501 MTD at 20. Defendants add that plaintiff has not stated a claim based on arbitrary
conduct, discriminatory conduct, or conduct made in bad faith. 159 MTD at 19-23: 501
MTD at 20-23. Additionally, defendants argue that plaintiff's DFR claim should be
dismissed on the ground that plaintiff cannot establish causation, 1.e., that Union
members’ injury were caused by defendants’ alleged breach of the DFR. 159 MTD at
23-26; 501 MTD at 21-23.
In opposition, plaintiff contends that “[t]he PAC allegations state a plausible claim
[that] the actions of the Individual Defendants and thus the Union were arbitrary and in
bad faith.” 159 Opp. at 19; 509 Opp. at 29-30. This is because “the actions by
Defendants to accept and approve terms they knew were insufficient to sustain the benefit
structure were materially misleading” and “that none of the Defendants disclosed this
information to the other Union negotiators or National Board members or members
supports an inference of bad faith in a conspiracy of silence and acceptance.” 159 Opp.
at 20; 509 Opp. at 30. With respect to causation, plaintiff argues that “[i]t is reasonable
to infer, absent the alleged misconduct, the Union CBA processes would have proceeded
differently in evaluating and negotiating for members’ rights.” 159 Opp. at 22: 509 Opp.
at 31.
In reply, defendants reiterate that plaintiff must allege that the bargaining processes
would have had a different result if not for the nondisclosures, and that plaintiff failed to
do so. 509 Reply at 17-19; 159 Reply at 15-16. They add that plaintiff “has not alleged
facts to support a plausible inference that SAG-AFTRA’s conduct was arbitrary,
discriminatory, or in bad faith.” 159 Reply at 16-17; 509 Reply at 17.
A union’s duty of fair representation, which “applies to all union activity,
including contraction negotiation,” is breached where the union’s actions “are either
arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.” Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’] v. O’Neill, 499
US. 65, 67 (1991) (internal quotations omitted). “A union’s conduct can be classified as
arbitrary only when it is irrational, when it is without a rational basis or explanation.”
Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild, Inc., 525 U.S. 33, 46 (1998). “[A] union’s conduct
generally is not arbitrary when the union exercises its judgment. . . . If the challenged
conduct involves the union’s judgment, then the plaintiff] ] may prevail only if the union’s
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
Case No. 2:21-cv-05215-CAS (JEMx) Date January 24, 2022
Title FRANCES FISHER V. SCREEN ACTORS GUILD AMERICAN
FEDERATION OF TELEVISION AND RADIO ARTISTS ET AL.
conduct was discriminatory or in bad faith.” Demetris v. Transp. Workers Union of Am.,
AFL-CIO, 862 F.3d 799, 805 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted). To state a claim “that the union’s exercise of judgment was discriminatory,” a
plaintiff must allege “discrimination that is intentional, severe, and unrelated to legitimate
union objectives.” Beck v. United Food & Com. Workers Union, Loc. 99, 506 F.3d 874,
880 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Finally, to state a
claim that “the union’s exercise of judgment was in bad faith,” the plaintiff must allege
“fraud, deceitful action or dishonest conduct.” Id. (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted). “Unions owe their members ‘complete good faith and honesty.”” Demetris,
862 F.3d at 808 (quoting United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am. v. Metal Trades
Dep’t, AFL-CIO, 770 F.3d 846, 848 (9th Cir. 2014)). “Even so, mere negligence and
erroneous judgment calls cannot, by themselves, support an inference of bad faith.”
Demetris, 862 F.3d at 808.
To state a DFR claim “in a misrepresentation case—and thus in a nondisclosure
case—plaintiffs must demonstrate ‘a causal relationship between the alleged
misrepresentations and their injury.”” Ackley v. W. Conf. of Teamsters, 958 F.2d 1463,
1472 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Acri v. Int’] Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers,
781 F.2d 1393, 1397 (9th Cir. 1986). “They must show that (1) absent the
misrepresentations, the outcome of the ratification vote would have been different; and
that (2) had it been different, the company would have acceded to the union’s demands.”
Ackley, 958 F.2d at 1472. The Ninth Circuit has stated that “[t]he Acri test for causality,
and particularly the second prong, is difficult to satisfy, and rightly so. Generally, the
union’s internal election and rulemaking processes are the proper vehicle, at least
initially, for addressing members’ complaints regarding the adequacy of union
representation during the bargaining process.” Id. (citing Acri, 781 F.2d at 1399-1400
(Reinhardt, J., concurring)).
The Court finds that plaintiff's complaint fails to state a plausible DFR claim.
Plaintiff argues that the proposed first amended complaint contains allegations that
suggest that the actions of the Union were arbitrary and bad faith. 159 Opp. at 19; 509
Opp. at 29-30. However, “a union’s conduct generally is not arbitrary when the union
exercises its judgment.” Demetris, 862 F.3d at 805. While the Benefit Amendments, and
the outcome of the CBAs, may have benefited some at the expense of others, “a winners-
and-losers compromise does not mean that the union has violated its duty of fair
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
Case No. 2:21-cv-05215-CAS (JEMx) Date January 24, 2022
Title FRANCES FISHER V. SCREEN ACTORS GUILD AMERICAN
FEDERATION OF TELEVISION AND RADIO ARTISTS ET AL.
representation” (Addington v. US Airline Pilots Ass’n, 791 F.3d 967, 983 (9th Cir.
2015)), and the plaintiffs allegations fail to suggest that the Union’s actions were
“wholly irrational.” Demetris, 862 F.3d at 805.
With respect to bad faith, plaintiff argues “that none of the Defendants disclosed
this information to the other Union negotiators or National Board members or members
supports an inference of bad faith in a conspiracy of silence and acceptance.” 159 Opp.
at 20; 509 Opp. at 30. However, as noted above, with respect to DFR claims related to
misrepresentation and nondisclosure, plaintiff must allege that “(1) absent the
misrepresentations, the outcome of the ratification vote would have been different; and
that (2) had it been different, the company would have acceded to the union’s demands.”
Ackley, 958 F.2d at 1472. Plaintiff's complaint fails to plead allegations that meet this
causation standard. Accordingly, plaintiff's complaint and proposed first amended
complaint fail to state a DFR claim.
4. Standing
Under Article III of the Constitution, the Court's jurisdiction over the case
“depends on the existence of a “case or controversy.’” GTE Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 39 F.3d
940, 945 (9th Cir. 1994). A “case or controversy” exists only if a plaintiff has standing to
bring the claim. Nelson v. NASA, 530 F.3d 865, 873 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d on other
grounds, 131 S. Ct. 746 (2011). To establish standing, “a plaintiff must show (1) it has
suffered an ‘injury in fact’ that 1s (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative,
that their injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs.. Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000); see also Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
The 159 Defendants argue that plaintiff has failed to allege that she suffered a
cognizable injury because the complaint contains no allegations that plaintiff was a
member of the SAG-AFTRA Health Plan or that plaintiff was a one of the “group of
members whose benefits were reduced, eliminated, or otherwise affected by the
eligibility changes at the heart of Plaintiff's clam.” 159 MTD at 28 (citing Compl. § 23).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
Case No. 2:21-cv-05215-CAS (JEMx) Date January 24, 2022
Title FRANCES FISHER V. SCREEN ACTORS GUILD AMERICAN
FEDERATION OF TELEVISION AND RADIO ARTISTS ET AL.
In opposition, plaintiff argues that “[t|]he PAC alleges the subversion and material
impairment of the Union CBA processes injured the rights of the members to leverage
collective action to maximize their compensation, and vote to ratify the terms.” 159 Opp.
at 23. Moreover, in an effort to establish injury-in-fact, plaintiff offers the Declaration of
plaintiff Frances Fisher. See Dkt. 33 (“Fisher Decl.”). Therein, Fisher states that “I am a
participant in the SAG-AFTRA Health Plan,” and that “[u|nder the health plan benefit
structure changes announced in August 2020, my residuals earnings no longer credit
toward my Union health benefit eligibility.” Id. Fisher adds that “[e]mployer
contributions to the health plan negotiate|ted] and approved under the Commercials,
Netflix and TV/Theatrical CBAs are made on my behalf based on all earnings, including
residuals earnings.” Id.
In reply, the 159 Defendants argue that “the subversion and material impairment of
the Union CBA processes” is not a concrete and particularized injury, and therefore
cannot support standing. 159 Reply at 12. The 159 Defendants note that plaintiff's
opposition fails to assert that plaintiff lost coverage due the Benefit Amendments, and
contend that “Plaintiff's argument that she suffered a redressable injury based on a
change in the apportionment of employer contributions to the Health Plan lacks merit.”
Id. at 13-14.
The Court finds that plaintiff has not adequately alleged a “concrete and
particularized” injury. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. While plaintiffs declaration states that,
as aresult of the Benefit Amendments, “[her] residuals earnings no longer credit toward
[her] Union health benefit eligibility,” plaintiff fails to allege that the Benefit
Amendments eliminated, or reduced, her benefits, or that any such reduction or
elimination is imminent. Fisher Decl. | 3. Thus, she fails to allege that the outcomes of
the relevant CBAs, the Benefit Amendments, or the nondisclosure of the fact the Benefit
Amendments were in the works for two years, caused her a concrete and particularized
injury. Even though “[a]t the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury
resulting from the defendant’s conduct may suffice,” the Court finds that plaintiff's
allegations fail to meet this threshold. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561; see also Spokeo. Inc. v.
Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 341 (2016) (“Article III standing requires a concrete injury even
in the context of a statutory violation.”’); Keener v. Nat’] Nurses Org. Comm., 615 F.
App’x 246, 250 (6th Cir. 2015) (plaintiffs lacking standing for a duty of fair
representation claim where they alleged that “a pre-negotiated agreement . . . will
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
Case No. 2:21-cv-05215-CAS (JEMx) Date January 24, 2022
Title FRANCES FISHER V. SCREEN ACTORS GUILD AMERICAN
FEDERATION OF TELEVISION AND RADIO ARTISTS ET AL.
adversely affect their benefits at some point’): Impress Comme’ns v. Unumprovident
Corp., 335 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1059 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (plaintiffs lacked standing for their
ERISA claim where they “[could not] allege that they have been provided with less
disability coverage than they contracted for’); Thole v. U. S. Bank N.A, 140 S. Ct. 1615,
1622 (2020) (plaintiffs lacked Article III standing where “[w]inning or losing [the] suit
would not change the plaintiffs’ monthly pension benefits’).
Plaintiff also argues that “|t|he PAC alleges the subversion and material
impairment of the Union CBA processes injured the rights of the members to leverage
collective action to maximize their compensation, and vote to ratify the terms.” 159 Opp.
at 23. However, “deprivation of a procedural right without some concrete interest that 1s
affected by the deprivation . . . is insufficient to create Article III standing.” Summers v.
Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 496 (2009). Accordingly, the court finds that plaintiff
has failed to plead “an ‘injury in fact’ that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual
or imminent” sufficient to support Article III standing. Friends of the Earth, Inc., 528
US. at 180-81.
B. Plaintiff's Application for Leave to Add Section 501(a) Claim; 501
Defendants Motion to Dismiss Section 501(a) Claim
In her verified application for leave to add a claim pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 501(a)
(the “Verified Application”), plaintiff contends that she has fulfilled all pre-suit
requirements to assert her Section 501 claim on behalf of SAG-AFTRA. App. §§ 30-33.
Plaintiff adds that good cause for her Section 501 claim exists because the 501
Defendants “disloyally misused their fiduciary positions and the assets and machinery of
SAG-AFTRA to defend the Benefit Cuts and themselves, adversely to the interests and
claims of the Union and its membership arising from the breaches of fiduciary duty and
breach of the Union’s [DFR] relating to the Union’s 2019 Commercials, 2019 Netflix,
and 2020 TV/Theatricals collective bargaining process|es| and approvals under the Union
Constitution.” App. {J 30-33, 37.
The Proposed 501 Defendants argue that the Court should deny leave to file the
Section 501 claim or, in the alternative, dismiss the Section 501 Claim. 501 MTD at 23-
24.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL ‘oO’
Case No. 2:21-cv-05215-CAS (JEMx) Date January 24, 2022
Title FRANCES FISHER V. SCREEN ACTORS GUILD AMERICAN
FEDERATION OF TELEVISION AND RADIO ARTISTS ET AL.
“Section 501 sets out the fiduciary responsibilities of labor organization officers
and provides a cause of action against officers who breach these obligations.” Cowger v.
Rohrbach, 868 F.2d 1064, 1065-66 (9th Cir. 1989). “Under section 501(a), officers of a
labor organization occupy positions of trust in relation to the organization and its
members, and have a duty to hold its money and property solely for the benefit of the
organization.” Id. at 1066. In turn, “Section 501(b) gives individual members of a labor
organization the right to sue any officer who violates these fiduciary duties.” Id.
However, the right to sue only arises after (1) “the labor organization or its
governing board [refuses or fails] ‘to sue or recover damages or secure an accounting or
other appropriate relief within a reasonable time after being requested to do so’ by a
member,” and (2) the plaintiff obtains leave of the Court following a verified application
for leave and a showing of “good cause” for filing the complaint. Cowger, 868 F.2d at
1066 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 501(b)). This unique “good cause” provision “is designed to
safeguard union officials from “harassing and vexatious litigation brought without merit
or good faith.’” Filippini v. Austin, 106 F.R.D. 425, 429 (C_D. Cal. 1985) (quoting
Horner v. Ferron, 362 F.2d 224, 228 (9th Cir. 1966)).
“Section 501(b) makes it clear that relief granted under Section 501 is for the
benefit of the real party in interest, the union whose officers are charged with
dereliction.” O’Hara v. Teamsters Union Loc. No. 856, 151 F.3d 1152, 1161 (9th Cir.
1998) (anternal citations and quotation marks omitted). “[S]tatutes extending federal
jurisdiction, such as Section 501(b), are narrowly construed so as not to reach beyond the
limits intended by Congress.” Phillips v. Osborne, 403 F.2d 826, 828 (9th Cir. 1968).
1. Good Cause
The Proposed 501 Defendants argue that the Court should deny leave to file the
Section 501 claim because plaintiff failed to comply with the statutory notice and demand
requirement in that the Demand “did not identify the Union officials that she has now
named in her 501 Application and Proposed FAC.” 501 MTD at 25. They also argue
that “[b]ecause the Plaintiff's Section 501 Application rests on allegations that on their
face have no merit whatsoever under Section 501, leave to file the claim should not be
granted.” Id. at 26.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
Case No. 2:21-cv-05215-CAS (JEMx) Date January 24, 2022
Title FRANCES FISHER V. SCREEN ACTORS GUILD AMERICAN
FEDERATION OF TELEVISION AND RADIO ARTISTS ET AL.
In opposition, plaintiff argues that the Demand “unquestionably provided sufficient
information for CWS to identify the targeted officials” because it “specifically defined
three groups of individuals in Union leaders, and attached the Asner Complaint, which
specifically alleges Defendants White, Rodriguez, Pniewski, Hartley-Margolin, McGuire,
Brown and Powell were Health Plan trustees who represented the Union and membership
in the Union’s CBA processes without disclosing material funding information.” 501
Opp. at 16.
In reply, the Proposed 501 Defendants argue that leave to file plaintiff's Section
501 claim should be denied because plaintiff's Section 501 application “rests on
allegations that are facially meritless.” 501 Reply at 30. Moreover, they reiterate that
attaching a 60-page complaint to a demand letter is not sufficient notice, especially where
“Plaintiff seeks to bring Section 501 claims against three Union officials (out of the
dozens of Union officials encompassed by the broad categories listed in her demand
letter) who are not even named as defendants in the Asner complaint.” Id. at 31.
Notice to the Union is a “condition precedent” to filing suit on a Section 501 claim.
Phillips, 403 F.2d at 828. The Court finds that plaintiff satisfied this condition precent
through the Demand, which specified identified the groups of individuals against which
she demanded SAG-AFTRA and the National Board commence litigation:
“{PJursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 501(b), this letter constitutes a formal and immediate
demand on SAG-AFTRA and the National Board to commence litigation to assert
claims for breach of fiduciary duty under the LMRDA against: (1) the members of
union leadership who are health plan trustees; (2) the members of union leadership
who participated in the contract negotiations and approvals with knowledge of the
ongoing activity by the health plan trustees to change the benefit structure; and (3)
the members of union leadership who approved the health benefit changes or who
have used their union positions and the union to support the benefit changes and
oppose the claims by union members challenging the health benefit changes.”
Dmnd. at 4. While the Demand did not identify the specific Union individuals
against whom plaintiff's proposed Section 501 claim would eventually be brought against
seventh months later, the Proposed 501 Defendants offer no Ninth Circuit authority
suggesting that identification of specific future defendants is required. The lack of such
authority is not surprising: the Demand requested “full disclosure to the union and
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Case 2:21-cv-05215-CAS-JEM Document 38 Filed 01/24/22 Page 22 0f 26 Page ID #:575
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
Case No. 2:21-cv-05215-CAS (JEMx) Date January 24, 2022
Title FRANCES FISHER V. SCREEN ACTORS GUILD AMERICAN
FEDERATION OF TELEVISION AND RADIO ARTISTS ET AL.
membership regarding their roles in the contract negotiations and conception, design and
approval of the benefit cuts” (Dmnd. at 5), which suggests that, at the time of the
Demand, plaintiff may not have known against who she would eventually bring suit.
The Court declines to find that plaintiff failed to meet the good cause standard in the
absence of any Ninth Circuit authority suggesting that the identification of specific
officials Union is mandatory.
Otherwise, defendants argue that leave to file plaintiff's Section 501 claim should
not be granted because the claim is meritless. 501 MTD at 25. However, with respect to
the good cause standard, “[u]|nder the current Ninth Circuit approach, review 1s limited
and designed simply to ensure that a suit is not frivolous or undertaken for the purpose of
harassment.” Pimentel v. Aloise, No. 18-CV-00411-EMC, 2018 WL 6025613, at *15
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2018): see also Cowger, 868 F.2d at 1068 (9th Cir. 1989) (The good
cause requirement “protects union officials from harassing and vexatious litigation which
has no merit.”). Here, plaintiff's first amended complaint is not patently frivolous or
undertaken for the purpose of harassment. Rather, it legitimately attempts to put in
question whether the Proposed 501 defendants violated their Section 501 fiduciary duties.
The Court GRANTS plaintiff leave to file her proposed first amended complaint, and
proceeds to analyze plaintiff's Section 501 claim pursuant to the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss standard.
2. Whether Plaintiff's Allegations State a Section 501 Claim
A Section 501 breach of fiduciary duty claim may be brought “to recover . . . relief
for the benefit of the labor organization.” 29 U.S.C. § 501(b). “The real beneficiaries of
a successful section 501 action are the union and its entire membership.” Kerr v. Shanks,
466 F.2d 1271, 1277 (9th Cir. 1972). “Often, if a union official’s act has been authorized
by constitution, bylaw, resolution, or by a vote of the membership, liability under § 501
attaches only if: (1) the officer benefitted personally from the act; or (2) the act is patently
unreasonable or taken in bad faith.” Servs. Emps. Int’] Union v. Nat’! Union of
Healthcare Workers, 718 F.3d 1036, 1049 (9th Cir. 2013).
Plaintiff's Section 501 claim appears to be premised upon the Proposed 501
Defendants failure to disclose the SAG-AFTRA Health Funds’ financial status during the
negotiation and ratification of the relevant CBAs, and their failure to negotiate CBAs that
would have provided sufficient funding to the Health Fund to avoid the Benefit
CV-349 (01/18) CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Page 22 of 26
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL ‘oO’
Case No. 2:21-cv-05215-CAS (JEMx) Date January 24, 2022
Title FRANCES FISHER V. SCREEN ACTORS GUILD AMERICAN
FEDERATION OF TELEVISION AND RADIO ARTISTS ET AL.
Amendments. Prpsd. FAC § 121. Additionally, plaintiff's Section 501 claim challenges
the Proposed 501 Defendants’ use of their positions to support and defendant the Benefit
Amendments. Id. § 18.
With respect to the failure to disclose the SAG-AFTRA Health Funds’ financial
status or the failure to negotiate CBAs that would have provided additional funding to the
Health Fund, the Proposed 501 Defendants argue that “injury to a subset of members,
especially one that comprises only 20% of the membership, does not constitute injury to
the union as an organization, and it cannot form the basis for a Section 501 claim.” 501
MTD at 28. They also argue that a Section 501 claim does not apply to harm to a
benefits fund, such as the one at issue here, that is legally separate from a union. Id. In
sum, the Proposed 501 Defendants argue that “[b]ecause Plaintiff's 501 Application and
Proposed FAC necessarily rest entirely on a theory of harm to a mere subset of individual
Union members rather than harm to the union, leave to file that claim should be denied
(or the claim should be dismissed without leave to amend).” Id, at 30. With respect to
the Union’s communications in support of the Benefit Changes, the Proposed 501
Defendants argue that those communications do not constitute a breach of Section 501
because “an official breaches his or her fiduciary duty to the union only if the official (1)
violates the union constitution, (2) expends union funds for his or her direct personal
benefit, or (3) otherwise acts in bad faith.” 501 MTD at 31 (citing Servs. Emps. Int’]
Union, 718 F.3d at 1049).
In opposition, plaintiff argues that her allegations that “the Individual Defendants
breached their duty of trust to the Union and its members by subverting and materially
impairing the Union CBA processes, and by disloyally misusing their fiduciary positions
and Union resources to protect their personal interests adverse to the Union and
membership . . . support a plausible claim against the 501 Defendants for breaches of
their fiduciary [duty] under Section 501.” 501 Opp. at 19. Plaintiff points to the CBA,
which states that the objectives of the Union include “[i|ncreasing the power and leverage
of our members in their bargaining relationships with the employers in our industry,” and
“lo|rganizing workers in the entertainment and media industries in order to maximize our
bargaining strength,” and notes that the fidelity of the CBA ratification votes
“fundamentally and obviously depends on fully informed voters.” Id. at 19-20. Plaintiff
adds that “causing the Union to engage CWS to address Plaintiff's Demand knowing
CWS’ inherent conflicts, was incompatible with their fiduciary duties.” Id. at 24-25.
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Case 2:21-cv-05215-CAS-JEM Document 38 Filed 01/24/22 Page 24o0f26 Page ID #:577
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
Case No. 2:21-cv-05215-CAS (JEMx) Date January 24, 2022
Title FRANCES FISHER V. SCREEN ACTORS GUILD AMERICAN
FEDERATION OF TELEVISION AND RADIO ARTISTS ET AL.
Finally, plaintiff argues that in subverting the CBA processes under the Union
Constitution, the Proposed 501 Defendants “expose[d] the Union to liability on a DFR
claim.” Id. at 22.
In reply, the Proposed 501 Defendants reiterate that “Plaintiff's Section 501 claim
based on alleged failures by union officials to disclose information regarding the Health
Fund’s financial status during collective bargaining necessarily fails because it does
not—and cannot—allege any harm to the Union itself from those nondisclosures.” 501
Reply at 20. With respect to plaintiff's argument that the Proposed 501 Defendants
subverted and impaired the Union CBA collective bargaining processes, the Proposed
501 Defendants argue that ““it is the breach of the union’s internal rules that must serve
as the basis for any complaint that insufficient information was provided to the
membership prior to or at the time of ratification of a contract.’” Id. at 22 n. 13 (quoting
Ackley, 958 F.2d at 1476). With respect to plaintiff's argument that the Proposed 501
Defendants have exposed the union to liability on the DFR claim, the Proposed 501
Defendants argue that “Plaintiff cannot bootstrap herself into a Section 501 claim simply
by simultaneously alleging a DFR claim. . . . No case has ever allowed this.” 501 Reply
at 25. Finally, the Proposed 501 Defendants reiterate that the challenged Union
communications fall outside of Section 501. Id. at 27-30.
The Court finds that plaintiff first amended complaint fails to state a Section 501
claim in that it seeks to recover for harm to a subset of Union members, rather than for
any harm to the Union. See Phillips, 403 F.2d at 832 (“In requesting direct relief for
certain union members only and not “for the benefit of the labor organization,’ Phillips
disqualified himself from proceeding under Section 501.”). Importantly, plaintiff's first
amended complaint does not allege that the outcomes of the CBAs, or the nondisclosures
related to the Health Plan, harmed the Union. See Nellis v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, 815
F.Supp.1522, 1542 (E.D. Va. 1993) (“[S]ection 501 requires a showing that the union
itself suffered harm. As long as a union leadership remains in compliance with the
union’s internal policies, then the union itself suffers no harm, even if subgroups within
the union are disadvantaged.”).
While plaintiff argues that “the PAC [] states a plausible claim the 501 Defendants
harmed the Union and all of its members by subverting and materially impairing the
Union’s CBA processes under the Constitution,” plaintiff's proposed first amended
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
Case No. 2:21-cv-05215-CAS (JEMx) Date January 24, 2022
Title FRANCES FISHER V. SCREEN ACTORS GUILD AMERICAN
FEDERATION OF TELEVISION AND RADIO ARTISTS ET AL.
complaint fails to allege that any provisions of the Union constitution were violated by
the CBA negotiation processes, by the outcome of the CBAs, or by the failure to disclose
the coming Benefit Amendments. This failure makes her primary authorities, Sheen v.
Screen Actors Guild No. CV 12-01468 SJO AJWX, 2012 WL 2360923, at *7 (C.D. Cal.
Mar. 28, 2012), and Stelling v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Loc.
Union No. 1547, 587 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1978), distinguishable. In both Sheen and
Stelling, the plaintiff alleged the violation of a right that was expressly guaranteed by the
Union constitution at issue. Sheen, 2012 WL 2360923, at *7 (Plaintiffs alleged that
defendants breached their Section 501 fiduciary duty by “refusing to conduct an actuarial
study prior to the merger vote, as required by SAG’s governing documents,” which
“denied the membership its right to a meaningful vote.”); Stelling, 587 F.2d at 1387
(“The allegation that appellees have denied the membership of the union the
constitutionally guaranteed right to vote is a sufficient assertion of a breach of trust on the
part of the appellees to invoke the jurisdiction of [Section] 501.”). While plaintiff points
to certain CBA “objectives,” and the “subversion and material impairment” of the
Union’s CBA processes, she does not allege that any rights provided under the Union
constitution were violated. This counsels in favor of dismissal.
Plaintiff also argues that “|t|he PAC also states a plausible claim that the 501
Defendants breached their fiduciary duty under Section 501 by disloyally misusing their
fiduciary positions and Union resources to protect their personal interests adverse to the
Union and membership.” 501 Opp. at 23. This argument appears to focus on the
communications made in support of the Benefit Amendments, after they were enacted.
Prpsd. FAC §] 69-80. These communications consist of an email to members sent by the
Union, a resolution of the SAG-AFTRA National Board, a press release sent in
conjunction with the resolution of the SAG-AFTRA National Board, and a video released
by the SAG-AFTRA communications department. Id. 69-74. Although plaintiff
argues that “it is reasonable to infer Defendants Carteris, White and Crabtree-Ireland
controlled and directed this conduct,” plaintiff's proposed first amended complaint fails
to identify how Carteris, White and Crabtree-Ireland personally benefitted from those
communications? or allege that the expenditures associated with those communications
> For example, the proposed first amended complaint vaguely alleges that defendants
“disloyally abused their fiduciary positions and the assets and machinery of the Union to
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
Case No. 2:21-cv-05215-CAS (JEMx) Date January 24, 2022
Title FRANCES FISHER V. SCREEN ACTORS GUILD AMERICAN
FEDERATION OF TELEVISION AND RADIO ARTISTS ET AL.
were “manifestly unreasonable.” Carpenters Loc. Union 721 v. Limon, No. CV18-8470
DSF (MRWx), 2020 WL 3124222, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2020). While plaintiff relies
on Servs. Emps. Int’] Union v. Nat’] Union of Healthcare Workers, 718 F.3d 1036 (9th
Cir. 2013), in that case, “|t]he defendants used union resources to undermine and weaken
their own union and promote a rival union.” Id. at 1049. The factual allegations here,
premised on communications sent through Union channels and relating to the Benefit
Amendments, do not rise to the same level.
Finally, to the extent plaintiffs personal benefit argument is premised on the
Proposed 501 Defendants “causing the Union to engage CWS to address Plaintiff's
Demand,” which plaintiff contends “was incompatible with their fiduciary duties” (501
Opp. at 24), “dual representation of the union and union officials [is] permissible at the
early stages of [] litigation.” Doe #] v. Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., No. CV 20-1558
(JDB), 2021 WL 3550996, at *4 (D.D.C. Aug. 11, 2021) (stating that “the Court is not
aware of |] any case involving breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims where dual representation
of a union and the union’s officials was prohibited before or at the motion-to-dismiss
stage’).
V. CONCLUSION
In accordance with the foregoing, the Court GRANTS plaintiff leave to file her
Section 501 claim, and DISMISSES plaintiffs first amended complaint. Plaintiff must
submit a second amended complaint on or before February 23,2022.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
00 33
Initials of Preparer CMS
protect themselves and obstruct challenges to their conduct” and “disloyally misused
their fiduciary positions and the assets and machinery of SAG-AFTRA to defend the
Benefit Cuts and themselves.” Prpsd. FAC § 76, 80.
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