State v. Thompson

[Cite as State v. Thompson, 2024-Ohio-2112.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

MADISON COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, :

Appellee, : CASE NO. CA2023-03-003

: OPINION

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:

CHRISTOPHER J. THOMPSON, :

Appellant. :

CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM MADISON COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

Case No. CRI20210212

Nicholas A. Adkins, Madison County Prosecuting Attorney, and Rachel M. Price,

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, and Michael S. Klamo, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney,

for appellee.

Christopher J. Thompson, pro se.

PIPER, J.

{¶1} Appellant, Christopher J. Thompson, appeals his convictions for

intimidation, OVI, and having weapons under disability after a jury trial in the Madison

County Court of Common Pleas. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm

Thompson’s convictions.

Madison CA2023-03-003

I. Factual and Procedural Background

{¶2} Beginning in 2020 and continuing through 2021, Thompson called the

Madison County Sheriff’s Office at least every other week, sometimes making ten or more

calls in a single day. Each time, Thompson would rant, insult sheriff’s office personnel,

and demand to speak to the sheriff. Thompson regularly told the dispatcher that he was

coming to the office and would “have [their] badges.” Thompson’s rants and threats would

later prove to be escalating in nature.

{¶3} On September 22, 2021, Thompson made an especially vicious series of

calls demanding to speak to the sheriff. The dispatcher informed Thompson that the

sheriff was not in the office, but he could leave a message. Thompson refused to accept

this and told the dispatcher “You need to hang up your badges and walk the fuck out of

your offices now,” and “you’re all complicit in crimes against humanity” that are

“punishable by death.” Thompson then demanded that the sheriff speak with him by six

o’clock, gave the ultimatum “If not, I’m coming,” and hung up. Later that afternoon,

Thompson called again, reiterated his demand to speak to the sheriff, and stated “I’ll take

it to the end and all the way until the last fucking shell is loaded in my gun.” Thompson

further threatened the dispatcher, stating “I’m taking the heads off of every fucking one of

you” and “I’m coming for your asses.” As a result, the sheriff’s office implemented

increased security measures and the dispatchers requested to be able to carry firearms.

{¶4} Later that day, several deputies were patrolling Ohio State University’s

Farm Science Review exhibition in London, Madison County, Ohio. As the exhibition

closed and attendees were exiting, deputies observed Thompson in the driver’s seat of a

white panel van, parked near one of the traffic gates. As Deputy Scott Henry approached,

he could see that Thompson appeared to be upset, confused, and yelling incoherently at

another deputy. Deputy Henry asked Thompson why he was there and so upset.

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Thompson appeared scattered and aggressively responded with profanities and slurred

speech, indicating that he was intoxicated. Thompson then abruptly drove off, narrowly

missing Deputy Henry. Deputy Henry immediately pursued the van in his cruiser,

activating his lights and siren, but Thompson ignored him. Thompson finally stopped his

van at the gate when an oncoming vehicle blocked his path.

{¶5} Around this time, Deputy Henry was advised by dispatch that Thompson

had been calling the office threatening to use a gun on law enforcement. Deputy Henry

again approached Thompson and asked for his license and registration, but Thompson

just responded with more screaming and profanity. Deputy Henry asked Thompson if he

had consumed alcohol, to which Thompson replied he was “allowed to drink alcohol and

smoke marijuana in this bitch.” As Deputy Henry came into close contact with Thompson

to detain him, he could smell a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage.

{¶6} Sergeant Jacob Gibson then arrived on the scene and observed that

Thompson’s eyes appeared glassy. Sergeant Gibson searched Thompson’s van and

found a loaded Colt 1911 handgun sitting on the center console. Deputy Kyle Kaufman

transported Thompson to jail and observed that Thompson was unsteady on his feet,

smelled of alcoholic beverage, had glassy and bloodshot eyes, and slurred his speech.

Deputy Kaufman asked Thompson to take a field sobriety test at the jail, but he refused.

{¶7} On October 20, 2022, Thompson was brought to trial on four counts:

intimidation, a felony of the third degree in violation of R.C. 2921.03(A); operating a motor

vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, a felony of the fourth degree in violation of

R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a), with a firearm specification; having weapons under disability, a

felony of the third degree in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2); and improperly handling

firearms in a motor vehicle, a felony of the fourth degree in violation of R.C. 2923.16(B).

Thompson’s attorney stipulated that Thompson had three prior OVI convictions and one

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prior violent felony conviction. At trial, the state presented testimony from Deputy Henry,

dispatcher Allison Haskins, Sergeant Gibson, dispatcher Mitchell Henson, and Deputy

Kyle Kauffman. Thompson testified on his own behalf and asserted that he is a “sovereign

citizen,” and that the authority of the sheriff’s department and judicial system is invalid.

{¶8} The jury found Thompson guilty on all four counts. The state stipulated that

Thompson’s convictions for improper handling and having weapons under disability

merged for purposes of sentencing and elected to proceed with sentencing for having

weapons under disability. Thompson was sentenced to 24 months in prison for

intimidation, 24 months in prison for OVI with an additional 12 months in prison for the

firearm specification, and 24 months in prison for having weapons under disability. Each

of these terms were ordered to be served consecutively for an aggregate sentence of

seven years.

{¶9} Thompson now appeals his convictions, raising six assignments of error for

our review.

II. Legal Analysis

{¶10} Assignment of Error No. 1:

TRIAL COURT FAILED TO PROVE THAT THE APPELLANT

HAD SOME SUBJECTIVE UNDERSTANDING OF THE

THREATENING NATURE OF HIS STATEMENTS TO THE

DISPATCHER OF MADISON COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPT.

[sic]1

{¶11} In his first assignment of error, Thompson argues that his conviction for

intimidation was not supported by sufficient evidence or by the manifest weight of the

evidence. Thompson asserts that the state failed to prove he subjectively understood his

statements to the dispatchers to be threatening. Thompson further argues that his words

1. Beyond the wording itself, we note that a trial court bears no burden of proof at a jury trial. Nevertheless,

we will attempt to address Thompson’s arguments.

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were misinterpreted and he “wasn’t trying to pester or make anyone upset.” We disagree

with Thompson’s suggestion of what the evidence demonstrates.

Standard of Review

{¶12} When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence underlying a criminal

conviction, an appellate court examines the evidence in order to determine whether such

evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt. State v. Intihar, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2015-05-046, 2015-Ohio-

5507, ¶ 9. The relevant inquiry is “whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d

259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. In other words, “the test for sufficiency

requires a determination as to whether the state has met its burden of production at trial.”

State v. Boles, 12th Dist. Brown No. CA2012-06-012, 2013-Ohio-5202, ¶ 34, citing State

v. Wilson, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2006-01-007, 2007-Ohio-2298, ¶ 33. When

evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, this court must “defer to the trier of fact on

questions of credibility and the weight assigned to the evidence.” State v. Kirkland, 140

Ohio St.3d 73, 2014-Ohio-1966, ¶ 132.

{¶13} On the other hand, a manifest weight of the evidence challenge examines

the “inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered at a trial, to support

one side of the issue rather than the other.” State v. Barnett, 12th Dist. Butler No.

CA2011-09-177, 2012-Ohio-2372, ¶ 14. To determine whether a conviction is against

the manifest weight of the evidence, the reviewing court must look at the entire record,

weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the

witnesses, and determine whether in resolving the conflicts in the evidence, the trier of

fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the

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conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. State v. Morgan, 12th Dist. Butler

Nos. CA2013-08-146 and CA2013-08-147, 2014-Ohio-2472, ¶ 34. An appellate court will

overturn a conviction due to the manifest weight of the evidence only in extraordinary

circumstances when the evidence presented at trial weighs heavily in favor of acquittal.

State v. Blair, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2014-01-023, 2015-Ohio- 818, ¶ 43.

{¶14} “The legal concepts of sufficiency of the evidence and weight of the

evidence are both quantitatively and qualitatively different.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio

St.3d 380, 386 (1997). Nevertheless, although the two concepts are different, a finding

that a conviction is supported by the manifest weight of the evidence is also dispositive

of the issue of sufficiency. State v. Jones, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2012-03-049, 2013-

Ohio-150, ¶ 19. Therefore, “[b]ecause sufficiency is required to take a case to the jury, a

finding that a conviction is supported by the weight of the evidence must necessarily

include a finding of sufficiency.” State v. Hart, 12th Dist. Brown No. CA2011-03-008,

2012-Ohio-1896, ¶ 43.

Unlawful Threat of Harm

{¶15} R.C. 2921.03(A) provides, “No person, knowingly and by force, [or] by

unlawful threat of harm to any person or property * * * shall attempt to influence, intimidate,

or hinder a public servant * * * in the discharge of the person’s duty.” R.C. 2901.22(B)

instructs that “A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is aware

that the person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a

certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when the person is aware that

such circumstances probably exist.”

{¶16} Here, the recording of Thompson’s calls to the sheriff’s office, as well as the

testimony of dispatchers Haskins and Henson, established that Thompson attempted to

intimidate the dispatchers into abandoning their duties. Thompson told the dispatchers

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“You need to hang up your badges and walk the fuck out of your offices now,” and “you’re

all complicit in crimes against humanity” that are “punishable by death.” Thompson then

gave an ultimatum that the sheriff needed to speak with him by six o’clock, and threatened

“If not, I’m coming.” As the Supreme Court of Ohio has noted, “[t]he most intimidating

threat of all may be an indefinite one.” State v. Cress, 112 Ohio St.3d 72, 2006-Ohio-

6501, ¶ 37 (giving the example “You’ll be sorry” as an indefinite threat). However,

Thompson called the dispatcher again to provide greater detail to his threats, stating “I’ll

take it to the end and all the way until the last fucking shell is loaded in my gun,” as well

as “I’m taking the heads off of every fucking one of you,” and “I’m coming for your asses.”

Thompson’s multiple phone calls contained specific threats that were clearly intended to

intimidate the dispatchers into abandoning their duties. See State v. Eisele, 9th Dist.

Medina No. 13CA0044-M, 2014-Ohio-873, ¶ 21 (holding that defendant’s conviction for

intimidation was supported by the manifest weight of the evidence where defendant

placed multiple calls to police dispatchers containing specific threats of harm). The jury

did not clearly lose its way in weighing this evidence against Thompson’s testimony that

he “just wanted to talk to the sheriff.”

{¶17} Thompson’s first assignment of error is overruled.

{¶18} Assignment of Error No. 2:

TRIAL COURT FAILED TO PROVE THAT THE APPELLANT

WAS UNDER THE INFLUENCE/IMPAIRED. [sic]

{¶19} In his second assignment of error, Thompson argues that his OVI conviction

was against the manifest weight of the evidence because no field sobriety test was

administered.

{¶20} “R.C. 4511.19(A)(1), prohibits the operation of a motor vehicle if the person

is under the influence of alcohol or drugs of abuse. This subsection does not require the

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introduction of any results of chemical testing to meet the elements of the offense.” State

v. Egbert, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2004-12-304, 2006-Ohio-744, ¶ 18. For prosecutions

of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a), “the amount of alcohol found as a result of the chemical testing

of bodily substances is only of secondary interest. The defendant’s ability to perceive,

make judgments, coordinate movements, and safely operate a vehicle is at issue in the

prosecution of a defendant under such section.” (Citation omitted.) Newark v. Lucas, 40

Ohio St.3d 100, 104 (1988).

{¶21} Here, three deputies testified that Thompson smelled of an alcoholic

beverage, had slurred speech, and was belligerent, glassy eyed, and unsteady on his

feet. When Deputy Henry first attempted to speak with Thompson, he abruptly drove

away and nearly hit Deputy Henry. When Deputy Henry later caught up to Thompson’s

van and asked if he had been drinking, Thompson expressed a belief that he was “allowed

to drink alcohol and smoke marijuana in this bitch.” Thompson clearly displayed visible

signs of impairment. No field sobriety test was administered simply because Thompson

refused. However, there was overwhelming evidence demonstrating Thompson was

overly intoxicated and impaired when operating the van. The jury did not clearly lose its

way in finding Thompson operated his van under the influence of drugs or alcohol.

{¶22} Thompson’s second assignment of error is overruled.

{¶23} Assignment of Error No. 3:

TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION DURING

SENTENCING. [sic]

{¶24} In his third assignment of error, Thompson argues that the trial court abused

its discretion during sentencing. Thompson asserts that he did not waive the preparation

of a presentence-investigative report and the trial court improperly considered prior

offenses that he alleges were dismissed. However, in his brief, Thompson does not

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develop his argument as to which of his prior offenses were invalid.

{¶25} App.R. 16(A)(7) requires an appellate brief to include reasons in support of

an assignment of error with citations to authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied

upon. If a party fails to identify the error in the record upon which the assignment is based

or argue an assignment as required by App.R. 16(A), an appellate court may disregard

the assignment of error. App.R. 12(A)(2). An appellant bears the burden of affirmatively

demonstrating error on appeal and substantiating his or her arguments in support thereof.

Ostigny v. Brubaker, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2023-03-026, 2024-Ohio-384, ¶ 38. It is

not an appellate court’s duty to “root out” or develop an argument that can support an

assigned error, even if one exists. Lebanon v. Ballinger, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2014-

08-107, 2015-Ohio-3522, ¶ 27. Nor is it the duty of an appellate court to search the record

for evidence to support an appellant’s argument as to alleged error. Hellmuth v.

Stephens, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2022-04-034, 2023-Ohio-4592, ¶ 23.

{¶26} Regardless, there is no indication that Thompson’s prior criminal history

was inaccurate, and we disagree with Thompson’s assertions.

Lack of Necessity for PSI Report

{¶27} “The decision to order a presentence investigation generally lies within the

sound discretion of the trial court if the court contemplates a prison term and not

community control in sentencing upon a criminal offense.” State v. McCauley, 5th Dist.

Licking No. 19-CA-84, 2020-Ohio-2813, ¶ 43. Here, the trial court determined that the

firearms specification dictated mandatory prison time, therefore community control

sanctions were unavailable and a PSI report was not necessary. See R.C. 2951.03(A)(1).

After making this determination, the trial court asked Thompson’s attorney if there was

any reason not to proceed to sentencing and he raised no objections. The trial court did

not err by not ordering a PSI report prior to sentencing.

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Consecutive Sentencing

{¶28} A consecutive sentence is contrary to law where the trial court fails to make

the consecutive sentencing findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). State v. Jones, 12th

Dist. Butler No. CA2019-05-087, 2020-Ohio-149, ¶ 10-14. Pursuant to R.C.

2929.14(C)(4), a trial court must engage in a three-step analysis and make certain

findings before imposing consecutive sentences. State v. Smith, 12th Dist. Clermont No.

CA2014-07-054, 2015-Ohio-1093, ¶ 7. Specifically, the trial court must find that (1)

consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish

the offender, (2) consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the

offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public, and (3) one of the

following applies:

(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple

offenses while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing,

was under a sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16,

2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under post-

release control for a prior offense.

(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as

part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused

by two or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so

great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the

offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct

adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct.

(c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates

that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the

public from future crime by the offender.

R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).

{¶29} At sentencing, the trial court specifically found that consecutive sentences

were necessary to protect the public and punish Thompson. Additionally, the trial court

found that consecutive sentences were not disproportionate to the seriousness of

Thompson’s conduct, especially where Thompson had instilled fear and caused

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psychological harm to the dispatchers. Finally, the trial court recognized that Thompson

had five prior OVIs, a pending felony OVI, and at least four prior other felonies. The trial

court found that Thompson had not responded favorably to previous sanctions and his

prior criminal history indicated a high risk of recidivism, therefore consecutive sentences

were necessary to protect the public from future crime. The trial court’s findings satisfied

the requirements of R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) and it did not abuse its discretion in imposing

consecutive sentences.

{¶30} Thompson’s third assignment of error is overruled.

{¶31} Assignment of Error No. 4:

TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING APPELLANT

CONSECUTIVELY IN ALL 4 CHARGES, 3 OF WHICH,

CONTAINING FIREARM SPECIFICATIONS “ALLIED

OFFENSES.” [sic]

{¶32} In his fourth assignment of error, Thompson argues that each of his four

offenses were allied offenses, and the trial court could not impose consecutive prison

terms. We disagree.

{¶33} R.C. 2941.25 prohibits the imposition of multiple punishments for the same

criminal conduct, and provides that:

(A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed

to constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the

indictment or information may contain counts for all such

offenses, but the defendant may be convicted of only one.

(B) Where the defendant’s conduct constitutes two or more

offenses of dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in

two or more offenses of the same or similar kind committed

separately or with a separate animus as to each, the

indictment or information may contain counts for all such

offenses, and the defendant may be convicted of all of them.

As the Supreme Court of Ohio explained, “If any of the following is true, the offenses

cannot merge and the defendant may be convicted and sentenced for multiple offenses:

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(1) the offenses are dissimilar in import or significance—in other words, each offense

caused separate, identifiable harm, (2) the offenses were committed separately, or (3)

the offenses were committed with separate animus or motivation.” State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio

St.3d 114, 2015-Ohio-995, ¶ 25.

{¶34} Here, Thompson’s intimidation offense occurred separately from his other

offenses, with the separate harm of threatening the dispatchers in the sheriff’s office, and

therefore does not merge. Thompson’s improper handling and weapons under disability

offenses merged, and the State elected to sentence Thompson for weapons under

disability only. Thompson’s OVI offense had the separate harm of Thompson operating

a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Although Thompson had a weapon

specification attached to his OVI offense, it does not transform the OVI offense into an

allied offense with his improper handling and weapons under disability offenses. Further,

it is well established that firearm specifications are penalty enhancements, not offenses,

therefore firearms specifications are not subject to merger with other offenses merely

because they each involve the use of the same firearm. State v. Ford, 128 Ohio St.3d

398, 2011-Ohio-765, ¶ 19. Therefore, neither the OVI offense nor its attached firearm

specification merge with the weapons under disability offense.

{¶35} Thompson’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.

{¶36} Assignment of Error No. 5:

TRIAL COURT FAILED IN PROVING THAT APPELLANT

WAS/IS A MENTAL DEFECTIVE AS JUDGE COSTELLO

ENTERED A PLEA OF NOT GUILTY BY REASON

INSANITY, BY ATTORNEY S. FOX ON 2/7/2022. [sic]

{¶37} In his fifth assignment of error, Thompson argues that he was improperly

found competent to stand trial. We disagree.

{¶38} Due process and fundamental fairness demand that a criminal defendant

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who is not competent to stand trial not be tried and convicted of an offense. State v.

Murphy, 173 Ohio App.3d 221, 227, 2007-Ohio-4535, ¶ 28 (12th Dist.), citing State v.

Braden, 98 Ohio St.3d 354, 2003-Ohio-1325, ¶114. However, a criminal defendant is

presumed to be competent to stand trial, R.C. 2945.37(G), and therefore a defendant who

claims he is not competent has the burden of proving that fact by a preponderance of the

evidence. State v. Stanley, 121 Ohio App.3d 673, 685 (1st Dist. 1997), citing State v.

Williams, 23 Ohio St.3d 16, 19 (1986); see also, Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (1992)

(a state does not violate due process by presuming a defendant is competent to stand

trial and placing the burden on him to prove his incompetence by a preponderance of

evidence). If, after holding a competency hearing, the trial court finds by a preponderance

of the evidence that, because of the defendant’s present mental condition, he is incapable

of understanding the nature and objective of the proceedings against him or of assisting

in his own defense, the court must find the defendant incompetent to stand trial. R.C.

2945.37(G).

{¶39} An appellate court will not disturb a competency determination if there was

some reliable, credible evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion that the defendant

understood the nature and objective of the proceedings against him. State v. Bullocks,

12th Dist. Warren No. CA2010-01-008, 2010-Ohio-2705, ¶ 7, citing Williams at 19. The

adequacy of the data relied upon by the expert who examined the defendant is a question

for the trier of fact. Bullocks at ¶ 7, citing State v. Neely, 12th Dist. Madison No. CA2002-

02-002, 2002-Ohio-7146, ¶ 10. “A defendant’s failure to cooperate with [a psychological

examination] does not constitute sufficient indicia of incompetence to raise doubt about a

defendant’s competence to stand trial.” State v. Neyland, 139 Ohio St.3d 353, 2014-

Ohio-1914, ¶ 46.

{¶40} Here, Thompson’s attorney filed a motion to have Thompson evaluated for

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competency and the trial court granted the motion. However, Thompson refused to

cooperate in the evaluation, and the resulting report was of limited value. On July 15,

2022, the trial court held a competency hearing and heard additional arguments from the

parties. The report was stipulated into evidence. At the close of the evidentiary hearing,

the trial court found that although Thompson subscribed to the highly unorthodox and

illogical “sovereign citizen” legal theory, he was lucid and understood the issues being

raised by the court, even if he had no faith in the validity of the proceedings. As the trial

court recognized, and as the psychological examiner pointed out, Thompson is not alone

in his “sovereign citizen” beliefs, and his conduct in the legal proceedings has been driven

by ideology rather than mental defect. The trial court determined Thompson was capable

of understanding the nature and objective of the proceedings against him and assisting

in his own defense. Therefore, the trial court properly found that Thompson was

competent to stand trial.

{¶41} Thompson’s fifth assignment of error is overruled.

{¶42} Assignment of Error No. 6:

TRIAL COURT FAILED TO PROVE THAT APPELLANT

KNEW HE POSSESSED A FIREARM AND THAT

APPELLANT KNEW, HE BELONGED TO THE RELEVANT

CATEGORY OF ‘PERSON’ BARRED FROM POSSESSING

A FIREARM. [sic]

{¶43} In his sixth assignment of error, Thompson argues that the state failed to

prove he possessed a firearm for purposes of his weapons under disability conviction.

Thompson also argues that he is not a “person” subject to the statute. We disagree.

Possession of the Firearm

{¶44} To “have” a firearm within the meaning of R.C. 2923.13(A), “a person must

have actual or constructive possession of the firearm.” State v. Brown, 12th Dist. Butler

No. CA2013-03-043, 2014-Ohio-1317, ¶ 16, citing State v. Leide, 12th Dist. Butler No.

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CA2005-08-363, 2006-Ohio-2716, ¶ 29. Ownership of the weapon, however, “need not

be proven to establish constructive possession.” State v. Brooks, 9th Dist. Summit No.

23236, 2007-Ohio-506, ¶ 23. Rather, “[a]n accused has ‘constructive possession’ of an

item when the accused is conscious of the item’s presence and is able to exercise

dominion and control over it, even if the item is not within the accused’s immediate

physical possession.” State v. Jester, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2010-10-264, 2012-Ohio-

544, ¶ 25. “Dominion and control can be proven by circumstantial evidence alone.” State

v. Brown, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2006-10-247, 2007-Ohio-7070, ¶ 43.

{¶45} Here, immediately after Thompson was apprehended from his van,

Sergeant Gibson found a loaded Colt 1911 handgun sitting in the open on the center

console. When Thompson was driving his van, he had dominion and control of the

handgun. Although it was not necessary for the state to prove actual ownership, during

the pendency of the case Thompson personally filed a letter with the court (which was

read into the record at trial) requesting the return of his property that was seized from the

van. In the letter, Thompson specifically requested that his “Colt Mark IV Government

Model 1911 automatic pistol” be returned—the exact model that was seized. The

evidence clearly demonstrated that Thompson had possession of the firearm.

Sovereign Citizen Arguments

{¶46} In his brief, Thompson goes on to argue that he is “an American State

National, an alien, nonresident of D.C.” and not a “person” and therefore is not subject to

the laws or courts of Ohio. These “sovereign citizen” legal theories have no basis in law

and such arguments have been “soundly rejected by every court that has been given the

opportunity to do so.” See, e.g., State v. Miller, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2018-04-019,

2018-Ohio-4258, ¶ 28. “Our whole system of law is predicated on the general,

fundamental principle of equality of application of the law. ‘All men are equal before the

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law,’ ‘This is a government of laws and not of men,’ ‘No man is above the law,’ are all

maxims showing the spirit in which legislatures, executives and courts are expected to

make, execute and apply laws.” Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 332 (1921). We take

this present opportunity to reject Thompson’s “sovereign citizen” arguments as meritless.

{¶47} Thompson’s sixth assignment of error is overruled.

III. Conclusion

{¶48} In light of the foregoing, we conclude that each of Thompson’s convictions

were supported by sufficient evidence and by the manifest weight of the evidence, the

trial court did not err in imposing consecutive sentences, and the trial court did not err in

finding Thompson competent to stand trial. Additionally, we reject Thompson’s

“sovereign citizen” arguments that he is not subject to the laws of Ohio and that these

laws cannot be administered by Ohio’s judiciary. Each of Thompson’s six assignments

of error are overruled.

{¶49} Judgment affirmed.

S. POWELL, P.J., and BYRNE, J., concur.

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