Steckman, W., III v. Scott, W.

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

WILLIAM GLENN STECKMAN III : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant :

:

v. :

:

WALLACE SHERWOOD SCOTT :

:

: No. 731 MDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered April 25, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County

Civil Division at No(s): 2019-SU-002139

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., KING, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED: MAY 29, 2024

Appellant, William Glenn Steckman III, appeals from the order entered

in the York County Court of Common Pleas, which granted summary judgment

in favor of Appellee, Wallace Sherwood Scott. We affirm.

The trial court opinion set forth the relevant facts and procedural history

of this appeal as follows:

The facts of this case revolve around a defamation claim

first filed July 18, 2019 by former Berks County employee

[Appellant] against [Appellee], former mayor of the City of

Reading…. In September of 2016, [Appellant], as the

Managing Director for the City of Reading, set up a

committee that oversaw the bidding processes for the

selection of a construction manager which would oversee

construction of two new fire stations in the City of Reading.

By September of 2018, after all bids were submitted, the

Committee ranked the bids based upon an established

criterion. [Appellant] argues he was terminated from his

position thereafter because, as he claims, [Appellee] was

upset that [he] had restarted the bidding process. This

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statement by [Appellant] stems from the allegation that

[Appellee], during the bidding process, wanted to bypass

the City’s established criteria and instead select the

Committee’s lowest ranked bidder based upon his personal

belief that the lowest ranked bidder was also the lowest

bidder for the job. [Appellee] denies this. After, and upon

review of the lowest bid, [Appellant] alleges he determined

its bid was open ended and thus noncompliant with the

City’s bidding requirements. [Appellee] was notified of

[Appellant’s] termination on or about September 18, 2018,

denying any personal vendetta1 towards him or his

termination.

1 Rather, [Appellee] states that, in his opinion, he had

a great working relationship with [Appellant]

throughout the course of his employment.

After his termination with the City of Reading, [Appellant]

sought and was eventually offered a position as Business

Administrator for the City of York, contingent—at least in

part—upon a background check. Thereafter, [Appellee]

claims he was contacted through his office by an

investigator from the City of York to conduct an interview as

part of that background check. [Appellee] eventually met

with an investigator in Reading who worked through the

York City Police Department, Investigator Michael Davis, to

do so. Importantly, Inspector Davis testified that he

considered the meeting with [Appellee] to be some sort of

official city business with the Mayor of Reading because

[Appellee] was the sitting acting mayor, during normal

business hours in his office, and would have direct

knowledge to answer … questions. Later, [Appellee]

engaged in a phone call with York City Council President,

Henry Nixon, shortly after [Appellant] was introduced to

York City Council but before he was considered for its

business administrator position.[1] There, [Appellee]

apparently indicated there was some history of personnel

issues with [Appellant].

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1 We will address the timing of Inspector Davis’s meeting with Appellee and

Appellee’s phone call with Mr. Nixon in our discussion of Appellant’s second

issue on appeal.

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[Appellant] claims that, as a result of that meeting and just

before he was going to be endorsed for the position with

York,2 [Appellee] intentionally, falsely and maliciously told

the York City Mayor, Michael Helfrich, and members of the

York City Council that [Appellant] had engaged in bid rigging

while employed by the City of Reading and that he was

under investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation

(FBI). [Appellant] further alleges those statements were

made by [Appellee] in hopes the City of York would cancel

its decision of employment with respect to his application.

Still, [Appellant] was only told that a highly placed source

from the City of Reading contacted the City of York.

Additionally, Mr. Nixon had allegedly only contacted

[Appellee] regarding [Appellant] based on a rumor he heard

about a possible FBI investigation. Still, [Appellant] does

recognize that [Appellee] did not directly acknowledge that

[Appellant] was being investigated by the FBI to Inspector

Davis.

2 [Appellant] alleges his employment was contingent

upon approval by the York City Council, with a vote

regarding his hiring scheduled to take place on

January 2, 2019. Further, he alleges [Appellee]

defamed him after becoming aware of [Appellant’s]

acceptance of the position and just before the York

City Council was scheduled to vote to endorse his

hiring. [Appellee] specifically denies such allegation

and alleges he was never made aware as to

[Appellant’s] acceptance of the position with the City

of York.

Ultimately, [Appellant] claims the City of York retracted its

job offer because he could not get enough votes from city

council to approve his job placement only after, and because

of, [Appellee’s] alleged informing to Mr. Nixon via phone

about an FBI investigation for bid rigging. [Appellant]

alleges this false information was then passed on to other

City Council members, hence the denial of his hiring.

Regarding the FBI investigation rumor, the FBI agent that

investigates public corruption could neither confirm nor

deny that there was a current FBI investigation into the City

of Reading or [Appellant].

As such, [Appellant] argues that as a direct result of

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[Appellee’s] alleged publication of false and defamatory

statements about him, York City Council delayed its vote to

approve his employment agreement and later decided

against hiring him in reliance on [Appellee’s] statements.

Consequently, [Appellant] asserts a claim of defamation

constituting defamation per se, believing [Appellee’s]

statements falsely implicated [Appellant] in criminal activity

and falsely implicated that he was the subject of a federal

criminal investigation. Importantly, [Appellant] believes

[Appellee’s] statements were both unsolicited by the City

of York and made outside the scope of his duties as Mayor

(as a private citizen).3 Further, [Appellant] asserts the

statements were made with the specific intent to

sabotage his employment opportunity and reputation,

without regard for the truth, and to cause financial

and economic harm to him.

3 [Appellant] asserts that the City of Reading

maintains a policy of providing only neutral

references for former employees and as such,

[Appellee] failed to abide by that practice.

[Appellant] filed his Complaint on July 18, 2019, and

[Appellee] filed Preliminary Objections on September 16. In

response, [Appellant] filed an Amended Complaint on

September 23, and [Appellee] answered on October 22,

2019. On December 6, 2021, [Appellee] moved for leave of

[c]ourt to file an Amended Answer with Counterclaim, which

the [c]ourt granted on December 2[2], 2021. [Appellee]

later filed an Amended Answer with Counterclaim on

January 12, 2022, and a final Case Management Order was

issued.[2] Discovery ended November 21, 2022, dispositive

motions were due by January 9, 2023, and [Appellee] filed

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2 In his counterclaim, Appellee argued that Appellant signed an “Authorization

for Release of Personal Information” for the City of York to perform the

background check in conjunction with Appellant’s job application.

(Counterclaim, filed 1/12/22, at ¶5). As part of the authorization, Appellant

agreed to “indemnify and hold harmless the person to whom this request is

presented … against all claims, damages, losses, and expenses….” (Id. at

¶6). Thus, Appellee insisted that the authorization was designed to protect

him from Appellant’s lawsuit, and Appellant “should be required to indemnify

[Appellee] pursuant to the Authorization.” (Id. at ¶10).

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his Motion for Summary Judgment the following day.

Subsequent briefing by the parties took place, and Oral

Argument requested in this matter was held on March 27,

2023.

(Order and Opinion Granting Appellee’s Summary Judgment Motion, filed

4/25/23, at 1-5) (record citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in

original).

By order and opinion entered April 25, 2023, the court granted summary

judgment in favor of Appellee. Significantly, the court found that Appellee

was a “‘high public official’ as acting mayor of the City of Reading when the

alleged defamatory statements were made,” and “absolute privilege does

apply to [Appellee’s] circumstances based on the specific facts of the case and

the evidence presented.” (Id. at 17). Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal

on May 16, 2023.3 On May 26, 2023, the court ordered Appellant to file a

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3 “Generally, this Court’s jurisdiction extends only to review of final orders. A

final order is defined as any order that: (1) disposes of all claims and of all

parties; (2) is explicitly defined as a final order by statute; or (3) is entered

as a final order pursuant to [Pa.R.A.P. 341(c)].” McGrogan v. First

Commonwealth Bank, 74 A.3d 1063, 1075 (Pa.Super. 2013) (internal

citations and quotation marks omitted). Here, the order granting summary

judgment did not expressly mention Appellee’s counterclaim. The court’s

opinion, however, specifically determined that the authorization for release of

personal information applied to Appellee’s comments about Appellant. (See

Order and Opinion Granting Appellee’s Summary Judgment Motion at 17-18).

Moreover, the order granting summary judgment had the practical effect of

rendering Appellee’s counterclaim moot. See Friia v. Friia, 780 A.2d 664,

667 (Pa.Super. 2001) (explaining that “we must consider whether the

practical ramification of the order will be to dispose of the case, making review

appropriate”); Cardinal Midstream II, LLC v. Energy Transfer LP, 295

A.3d 284, (Pa.Super. 2023) (reiterating that “[a]n issue before a court is moot

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal.

Following an extension, Appellant timely filed his Rule 1925(b) statement on

June 21, 2023.

Appellant now raises three issues for this Court’s review:

Whether the trial court committed reversable error in

granting [Appellee’s] motion for summary judgment on

Appellant’s defamation claim when [Appellee] published the

defamatory statements during an informal private

unscheduled phone call from a person whom [Appellee] did

not know and never met, and, pursuant to the Reading, PA

Ordinances, [Appellee] was not authorized to provide

information about employees?

Whether the trial court’s major mistake of fact concerning

the original forum in which the defamatory statements were

first published by [Appellee] (i.e., the trial court concluded

that an in-person meeting which took place on December

31, 2018, preceded a phone conversation between Henry

Nixon and [Appellee] which, based on sworn testimony,

occurred prior to or on December 28, 2018, and which is

when the defamatory statements concerning a possible FBI

investigation of Appellant were first published) should

necessitate a remand of this matter back to the trial court

for reconsideration of its decision to grant summary

judgment.

Whether the trial court committed reversible error or abused

its discretion in determining that Appellant waived [his]

claim of verbal defamation by signing an authorization for

the City of York to obtain documents in furtherance of its

background check, by failing to consider: (1) that City of

York had superior bargaining power as his prospective

employer; (2) that the sole drafting party of the

authorization was the City of York; (3) that the authorization

was ambiguous as to whether or not it authorized anything

____________________________________________

when a determination is sought on a matter which, when rendered, cannot

have any practical effect on the existing controversy). Under these

circumstances, we deem the instant appeal to be proper.

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other than records and attorney recollections; and (4) that

the authorization never specifically authorized the receipt of

any verbal information?

(Appellant’s Brief at 2-3).4

Our role in cases involving a grant of summary judgment is as follows:

On appellate review, an appellate court may reverse a grant

of summary judgment if there has been an error of law or

an abuse of discretion. But the issue as to whether there

are no genuine issues as to any material fact presents a

question of law, and therefore, on that question our

standard of review is de novo. This means we need not

defer to the determinations made by the lower tribunals. To

the extent that this Court must resolve a question of law,

we shall review the grant of summary judgment in the

context of the entire record.

Valley National Bank v. Marchiano, 221 A.3d 1220, 1222 (Pa.Super. 2019)

(quoting Summers v. Certainteed Corp., 606 Pa. 294, 307, 997 A.2d 1152,

1159 (2010)). Our scope of review is plenary. Pappas v. Asbel, 564 Pa.

407, 418, 768 A.2d 1089, 1095 (2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 938, 122 S.Ct.

2618, 153 L.Ed.2d 802 (2002).

In reviewing a trial court’s grant of summary judgment,

[w]e apply the same standard as the trial court, reviewing

all the evidence of record to determine whether there exists

a genuine issue of material fact. We view the record in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts

as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must

be resolved against the moving party. Only where there is

no genuine issue as to any material fact and it is clear that

the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of

law will summary judgment be entered. All doubts as to the

existence of a genuine issue of a material fact must be

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4 We have reordered Appellant’s issues for ease of disposition.

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resolved against the moving party.

Motions for summary judgment necessarily and directly

implicate the plaintiff’s proof of the elements of [a] cause of

action. Summary judgment is proper if, after the

completion of discovery relevant to the motion, including

the production of expert reports, an adverse party who will

bear the burden of proof at trial has failed to produce

evidence of facts essential to the cause of action or defense

which in a jury trial would require the issues to be submitted

to a jury. In other words, whenever there is no genuine

issue of any material fact as to a necessary element of the

cause of action or defense, which could be established by

additional discovery or expert report and the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary

judgment is appropriate. Thus, a record that supports

summary judgment either (1) shows the material facts are

undisputed or (2) contains insufficient evidence of facts to

make out a prima facie cause of action or defense.

Upon appellate review, we are not bound by the trial court’s

conclusions of law, but may reach our own conclusions.

Chenot v. A.P. Green Services, Inc., 895 A.2d 55, 61 (Pa.Super. 2006)

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

In his first issue, Appellant acknowledges that Appellee was the mayor

of Reading at the time of the alleged defamatory statements, and Appellee

qualified as a high public official for purposes of analyzing the doctrine of

absolute privilege. Nevertheless, Appellant contends that a high public official

is not protected by absolute privilege if his remarks were: “(1) not made

within the course of the high public official’s official duties; and (2) not made

within the scope of the high public official’s authority.” (Appellant’s Brief at

15) (emphasis in original). Under this standard, Appellant asserts that

Appellee was not protected by absolute privilege “when he falsely implicated

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[Appellant] in an FBI investigation for bid rigging during his phone

conversation with Nixon.” (Id.)

Regarding Appellee’s official duties, Appellant posits that the

“impromptu” phone call between Appellee and Mr. Nixon “was about as

informal as could be.” (Id. at 16). Appellant emphasizes that the “call was a

private closed conversation between the two men and was not disclosed to or

made accessible to the public or other governmental officials of the City of

Reading.” (Id.) During the phone call, Appellant maintains that Appellee

“was only responding to an unexpected inquiry from a stranger seeking

information on a job candidate in another city—a matter that was not of public

concern to the people of the City of Reading, whom [Appellee] served.” (Id.

at 18). Moreover, “[t]he conduct of [Appellee] was also not ‘closely related’

to the performance of his official duties because [Appellee] interfered with the

pending contractual relations between [Appellant] and the City of York.” (Id.

at 22).

Regarding the scope of Appellee’s authority, Appellant cites Reading’s

Code of Ordinances, which provides the mayor with express powers and

duties. Relying on the ordinances, Appellant avers that Appellee was not

authorized to provide information regarding former employees upon request.

Rather, “requests for information with respect to an employee shall be made

to the Managing Director for review with the City Solicitor to determine if

response is appropriate.” (Id. at 20). Appellant argues that there was no

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evidence that Appellee consulted with the city’s managing director prior to

speaking with Mr. Nixon; therefore, Appellee acted outside the scope of his

authority in speaking with Mr. Nixon about Appellant. Based upon the

foregoing, Appellant concludes that this Court must reverse the order granting

summary judgment in favor of Appellee and remand the matter for trial. We

disagree.

Our Supreme Court has explained the doctrine of absolute privilege for

high public officials as follows:

[A]s its name implies, [the doctrine] is unlimited and

exempts a high public official from all civil suits for

damages arising out of false defamatory statements

and even from statements or actions motivated by

malice, provided the statements are made or the

actions are taken in the course of the official’s

duties or powers and within the scope of his

authority, or as it is sometimes expressed,

within his jurisdiction.

The doctrine of absolute privilege rests upon the … idea that

conduct which otherwise would be actionable is to escape

liability because the defendant is acting in furtherance of

some interest of social importance, which is entitled to

protection even at the expense of uncompensated harm to

the plaintiff’s reputation. This sweeping immunity is not for

the benefit of high public officials, but for the benefit of the

public. Absolute privilege is

designed to protect the official from the suit itself,

from the expense, publicity, and danger of defending

the good faith of his public actions before the jury.

And yet, beyond this lies a deeper purpose, the

protection of society’s interest in the unfettered

discussion of public business and in full public

knowledge of the facts and conduct of such business.

As such, absolute immunity for high public officials from civil

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liability is the only legitimate means of removing any

inhibition which might deprive the public of the best service

of its officers and agencies. Even though the innocent may

sometimes suffer irreparable harm,

it has been found to be in the public interest and

therefore sounder and wiser public policy to immunize

public officials, for to permit slander, or libel … suits

where the official’s charges turn out to be false, would

be to deter all but the most courageous or the most

judgment-proof public officials from performing their

official duties.

Lindner v. Mollan, 544 Pa. 487, 490-91, 677 A.2d 1194, 1195-96 (1996)

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).

“We have previously noted that our Supreme Court has never

articulated a standard for determining when a high public official’s acts or

statements are within the scope of his official duties.” Azar v. Ferrari, 898

A.2d 55, 60 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2006).5 “Nevertheless, we have identified two

factors that are relevant in reaching such a determination, including (1) the

formality of the forum in which the alleged defamatory words were spoken

and (2) the relationship of the legitimate subject of governmental concern to

the person seeking damages for the defamatory utterance.” Id. (citing Appel

v. Township of Warwick, 828 A.2d 469 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2003), appeal denied,

576 Pa. 725, 841 A.2d 532; Hall v. Kiger, 795 A.2d 497 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2002),

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5 See also Petow v. Warehime, 996 A.2d 1083, 1089 n.1 (Pa.Super. 2010),

appeal denied, 608 Pa. 648, 12 A.3d 371 (2010) (stating: “This Court is not

bound by decisions of the Commonwealth Court. However, such decisions

provide persuasive authority, and we may turn to our colleagues on the

Commonwealth Court for guidance when appropriate”).

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appeal denied, 572 Pa. 713, 813 A.2d 846 (2002)).

Instantly, the trial court determined that Appellee’s statements fell

within the scope of his official duties:

[W]hile we do not believe [Appellee’s] comments about

[Appellant] were at all excessive, even if they were deemed

to be so, [Appellee’s] belief in an on-going investigation by

the FBI about [Appellant] would render that belief closely

related to a matter pending within a mayor’s office.

Irrespective of whether there actually was an on-going

investigation at the time the City of York investigator

contacted the mayor, [Appellee] was offering comments

about a former employee from the information he had (i.e.,

as mayor, he believed that the FBI had come and removed

documents the day after [Appellant] left, etc.).

Furthermore, even if [Appellee’s] comments to the City of

York may have resulted from a failure to exercise reasonable

care and diligence, that fact is immaterial to the invocation

of an immunity that is intended to encompass even

maliciously motivated comments. Indeed, even taking

[Appellant’s] averments as true—that [Appellee’s]

comments were only that he heard or understood that there

was a possible investigation by the FBI for bid rigging

against [Appellant]—such statements still fall under the

immunity.

* * *

This matter involving [Appellant] was government business.

[Appellee’s] comments to the City of York investigator

during normal business hours, in the mayor’s office, and to

the York city council president on the phone, were closely

related to that government business and to what had taken

place during [Appellant’s] time as a former employee for the

City of Reading. If allegations of bid rigging occurred, and

the City of Reading terminated its employment with

[Appellant], such information is of public concern as it

corresponds to the suitability of a former employee for a

public position in the City of York Administration. Indeed,

absolute immunity is a means of removing any inhibition

which might deprive the public of the best service of its

officers and agencies. The doctrine of this privilege given to

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public officials then, is to be used as a shield, not as a

sword. In the current action, it is appropriately utilized as

a shield by [Appellee].

(Order and Opinion Granting Appellee’s Summary Judgment Motion at 14-16)

(internal footnotes and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original).

Here, the court correctly observed that Appellee’s phone call with Mr.

Nixon related to governmental business. We agree that the possibility of an

investigation into bid rigging would impact Appellant’s suitability for another

public position, and Appellee’s comments on the topic amounted to actions in

furtherance of an interest of social importance. See Lindner, supra. To the

extent Appellant cites Reading’s Code of Ordinances for the proposition that

Appellee’s comments did not occur within the scope of his official duties, we

also agree with the court’s determination that this conclusion “would be

drawing the line of such immunity too narrowly.” (Order and Opinion Granting

Appellee’s Summary Judgment Motion at 15). On this record, the court did

not err in applying the doctrine of absolute privilege for high public officials.

See Lindner, supra. See also Azar, supra (holding alleged defamatory

statements made by intermediate school unit executive director and assistant

director regarding former employee’s work and health problems were made

within scope of their duties and authority; former employee had solicited

school districts to provide management information systems services;

statements were made to school districts that were members of intermediate

unit, and defendants’ duties included coordination of programs offered by

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intermediate unit). Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to relief on his first

claim.

In his second issue, Appellant contends that the trial court resolved “a

major issue of fact against [Appellant] despite the fact that there was evidence

to the contrary.” (Appellant’s Brief at 11). Specifically, Appellant claims that

Inspector Davis “testified at his deposition that he decided to meet with

[Appellee] in Reading only after hearing about the infamous call between

[York City Council President Henry] Nixon and [Appellee] on December 28,

2018.” (Id.) (emphasis in original). Appellant complains, however, that the

court incorrectly determined that the inspector’s meeting with Appellee

occurred before Appellee’s phone call with Mr. Nixon. Appellant maintains

“that the defamation arose solely from the phone conversation in which

[Appellee] engaged in with Nixon,” and “[t]he forum in which [Appellee’s]

slanderous phone call with Nixon took place was very different from the forum

for the follow-up investigation.” (Id. at 14). Appellant concludes that the

court erroneously granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee where its

reasoning was “wrongly focused on the meeting with [Inspector] Davis and

[Appellee] at City Hall.” (Id. at 13). We disagree.

Considering our resolution of Appellant’s first issue, we need not tarry

long with Appellant’s allegation that the court confused this sequence of

events. Regardless of whether the meeting with Inspector Davis occurred

after Appellee’s phone call with Mr. Nixon, it does not alter our conclusion that

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the court correctly applied the doctrine of absolute privilege for high public

officials to Appellee’s statements. We do not accept Appellant’s assertion that

the trial court committed an error of law by failing to interpret the facts in a

light most favorable to Appellant as the non-moving party, and we conclude

that Appellant is not entitled to relief on his second issue. See Chenot,

supra.

In his third issue, Appellant asserts that trial court erroneously

concluded that Appellant waived his claims against Appellee by signing the

authorization for the release of personal information. Because we have

already determined that the trial court did not err in granting summary

judgment in favor of Appellee, we need not address Appellant’s argument

regarding the court’s waiver analysis. (See also Trial Court Opinion, filed

7/19/23, at 2) (unnumbered) (recognizing that court’s determination of

validity of authorization for release of personal information was secondary to

initial determination of immunity). Therefore, we conclude that the court

properly granted Appellee’s motion for summary judgment. See Valley

National Bank, supra; Chenot, supra. Accordingly, we affirm.

Order affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 05/29/2024

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