Kuhn v. Owners Insurance Co.

2024 IL 129895

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

(Docket No. 129895)

MARK KUHN et al., Appellants, v. OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.

Opinion filed May 23, 2024.

JUSTICE ROCHFORD delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Chief Justice Theis and Justices Neville, Overstreet, Holder White,

Cunningham, and O’Brien concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 The question presented in this declaratory judgment action is whether the $1

million liability limits for each of seven covered vehicles in a single multivehicle

insurance policy may be aggregated or “stacked” for a total of $7 million of liability

coverage for one accident, despite an “antistacking” policy provision. The McLean

County circuit court answered this question in the affirmative, and the appellate

court reversed. Based on the specific insurance policy at issue, we affirm the

appellate court’s judgment.

¶2 I. BACKGROUND

¶3 Shortly before 9 p.m. on December 5, 2018, appellant Mark Kuhn was driving

a school bus carrying the Normal West High School junior varsity girls basketball

team, their coach Steven Price, and adult volunteer Charlie Crabtree. The bus was

traveling west on Interstate 74 in McLean County. Traveling in the opposite

direction, Ryan Hute was driving a 2010 Kenworth semitruck with an attached

trailer in the course of his employment with Farrell Trucking. The semitruck

crossed the center grass median of the highway, continued driving east in the

westbound lanes, and struck the school bus in a head-on collision. Hute and

Crabtree died as a result of the accident, and other occupants of the school bus were

injured.

¶4 Appellee Owners Insurance Company (Owners) insured the semitruck that

Hute was driving under a commercial vehicle insurance policy issued to Farrell

Trucking. 1 The policy also listed Hute as a covered driver. Farrell Trucking is

located in Iowa, but the parties have stipulated that the policy should be interpreted

under Illinois law.

¶5 Mark Kuhn and Karen Kuhn brought an action against Hute’s estate and entities

related to Farrell Trucking. 2 They then filed this suit seeking a declaration that the

$1 million liability limits in the insurance policy covering the semitruck and six

other vehicles (three semitrucks and four trailers in total) could be stacked, for a

combined $7 million in liability coverage. In their amended complaint, the Kuhns

added as defendants the other bus passengers who were potential claimants in the

underlying action (potential claimants), in order to bind them to the terms of the

judgment in this suit.

1

The trailer attached to the semitruck was not a listed vehicle in the policy.

2

The underlying complaint alleged that Hute was employed by Jason Farrell, Farrell Trucking,

and/or 3 Guys and a Bus, Inc. For purposes of this appeal, it is undisputed that the semitruck was

insured under Owners’ policy.

-2-

¶6 The Kuhns and Owners filed cross-motions for summary judgment. 3 The trial

court granted the Kuhns’ motion for summary judgment. In a 73-page order, it ruled

that the insurance policy was ambiguous and therefore should be construed against

Owners, such that stacking of the liability limits was appropriate. The appellate

court reversed the trial court’s decision. 2023 IL App (4th) 220827, ¶ 71. It held

that the policy’s antistacking clause was unambiguous on its face and, when read

together with the declarations and other policy provisions, that the antistacking

clause should be enforced as written. Id. ¶ 70.

¶7 This court allowed the petition for leave to appeal filed by the Kuhns and other

potential claimants. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. Oct. 1, 2021).

¶8 II. INSURANCE POLICY PROVISIONS

¶9 Section II(A) of the policy provides in relevant part: “We will pay all sums an

insured legally must pay as damages because of bodily injury or property damage

to which this insurance applies, caused by an accident and resulting from the

ownership, maintenance or use of a covered auto as an auto.”

¶ 10 Section II(C) of the policy states:

“C. LIMIT OF INSURANCE

We will pay damages for bodily injury, property damage and covered

pollution cost or expense up to the Limit of Insurance shown in the Declarations

for this coverage. Such damages shall be paid as follows:

1. When combined liability limits are shown in the Declarations, the

limit shown for each accident is the total amount of coverage and the most

we will pay for damages because of or arising out of bodily injury, property

damages and covered pollution cost or expense in any one accident.

2. When separate bodily injury and property damage limits are shown

in the Declarations:

3

Some potential claimants joined in the Kuhns’ motion for summary judgment.

-3-

***

3. The Limit of Insurance applicable to a trailer, non-motorized farm

machinery or farm wagon which is connected to an auto covered by this

policy shall be the limit of insurance applicable to such auto. The auto and

connected trailer, non-motorized farm machinery or farm wagon are

considered one auto and do not increase the Limit of Insurance.

***

5. The Limit of Insurance for this coverage may not be added to the

limits for the same or similar coverage applying to other autos insured by

this policy to determine the amount of coverage available for any one

accident or covered pollution cost or expense, regardless of the number of:

a. Covered autos;

b. Insureds;

c. Premiums paid;

d. Claims made or suits brought;

e. Persons injured; or

f. Vehicles involved in the accident.”

¶ 11 The declarations pages contain an “ITEM ONE,” with the named insured’s

information. “ITEM TWO” begins on the same page and is titled “SCHEDULE OF

COVERED AUTOS AND COVERAGES.” It consists of a chart listing the

different types of coverages, “COVERED AUTOS SYMBOLS,” the “LIMIT OF

INSURANCE FOR ANY ONE ACCIDENT OR LOSS,” and the premium costs

for each type of coverage. The coverage for “Combined Liability” lists “$1 Million

each accident.” The page described appears as follows: 4

4

The numbers under “COVERED AUTOS SYMBOLS” refer to a separate table, in which

number “7” stands for “Scheduled Autos Only,” number “8” stands for “Hired Autos Only,” number

“9” stands for “Non-owned Autos Only,” and number “19” stands for “Mobile Equipment Subject

To Compulsory Or Financial Responsibility Or Other Motor Vehicle Insurance Law Only.”

-4-

Owners Page 1

Issued

58979 (10-16)

12-06-2018

INSURANCE COMPANY COMMERCIAL AUTO POLICY DECLARATIONS

6101 A NACAPRI BLVD.. LANSING. Ml 48917-3999 PREFERRED PROGRAM

•<<>c PRINS INSURANCE INC Endorsement Effective 11•27•2018

07-0677-00 MKT TERR 038 (712) 729-3252 POLICY NUMBER 51-829-065-00

ITEM ONE Company use 39-04-IA-1806

NAMEOINSIJAED JASON FARRELL

JASON FARRELL TRUCKING Company POLICY TERM

B111 12 01 a.m. 12:01 a.m .

At)0qf.SS 3717 210TH ST

06-22- 2018 to 06-22-2019

CLINTON IA 52732-8920

Entity: Individual

IN RETURN FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE PREMIUM. AND SUBJECT TO ALL THE TERMS OF THIS POLICY. WE AGREE WITH

YOU TO PROVIDE THE INSURANCE AS STATED IN THIS POLICY.

ITEM lWO • SCHEDULE OF COVERED AUTOS AND COVERAGES

This poHcy provides only those coverages where a charge is shown in the premium column bek>w. Each of these coverages wil apply

only to those autos shown as covered ilutos. Autos are shown as covered autos for a par1.io.Jlar coverage by 1he entry of one or more

of the symbols from the COVERED AUTOS section of the Commercial Auto Pol,cy next to lhe name of the coverage.

COVERAGES COVERED AUTOS LIMIT OF INSURANCE PREMIUM

SYMBOLS FOR ANY ONE ACCIDENT OR LOSS

Combined Liability 7.8. 9. 19 S1Million each accident S6.311.69

Uninsured Motorist •

7 S27.72

Uninsured/tJnclerinsured 5100,000 each person/ S100.000 each accident

Molorist Coverage

Underinsured Motorist •

7 $53.31

S100.000 each person/ s100.000 each accodenI

Medical Payments 7 SS,000 each person $39.27

.."' Comprehensive 7

S250 deductible applies for each covered auto unless a

deductible appears in IT EM T HREE.

52,120.34

0

i comsion 7

SS00 deductible applies for each covered auto unless a

deduclible appears in ITEM THREE.

S5.S79.75

e·;;; Road Trouble Service No Coverage

"'

.,:

0..

Additional Expense No Coverage

Premium for Endorsements and Terro rism Coverage 5201 .50

ESTIMATED TOTAL PREMIUM" $1 4,333.58

• Th.is poky may be subject to final audit.

¶ 12 Another portion of the declarations is titled “ITEM THREE—SCHEDULE OF

COVERED AUTOS, ADDITIONAL COVERAGES AND ENDORSEMENTS.”

Immediately above this title is the sentence: “This policy is amended in

consideration of the additional or return premium shown below. This Declarations

[sic] voids and replaces all previously issued Declarations bearing the same policy

number and premium term.” This section contains separate listings for each of the

seven vehicles, including the premium for each vehicle, and every listing states

“Combined Liability” under the heading “COVERAGES” and “$1 Million each

accident” under the heading “LIMITS.” The page of “ITEM THREE” containing

-5-

the semitruck involved in the accident appears as follows:

Page 6 58979 (10.16)

OWNERS INS. CO. issued 12-06-2018

A,>ENCY PRINS INSURANCE INC Company POLICY NUMBER 51-829-065-00

07-0677-00 MKT TERR 038 Bill Company Use 39-04-IA-1806

NAMEOINSUl<ED JASON FARRELL Term 06-22-2018 lo 06-22-2019

TERRITORY CLASS

5. 2010 KW T660 048

VIN: 1XKAD49X1AJ270127 Clinlon County, IA

COVERAGES LIMITS P REMIUM CHANGE

Combined Liability $1 Million each accident $2,265 28

Uninsured Motorist $ 100.000 each person/S 100.000 each accident 9 24

Underinsurcd Motorist $ 100.000 each person/S 100.000 each accident 17.77

Medical Payments $ 5.000 each person 13.09

Comprehensive ACV - 52.500 deductible 1.117.83

Collision ACV - $2.500 deductible 2.848.38

Terrorism Coverage 31.36

TOTAL 56.302.95

No Charge

Interested Panics:

Lienholdcr MAQUO<ETA STATE 81\NK. 203 N M/\IN ST. M/\QUOKETA. IA 52060-2204

Ad<l,tio°"I Endorsements ForThis Item: 58329 !10-16) 58330 no-16) 58402 105-16)

ITEM DETAILS. Extra hea..y 1ruck-traaor operated within a 300 m•c radius.

use CLASS (00753): Tn,d<crs - Miscclaneous.

Commercial Auto P~s Coverage Package apphcs.

Vchldc Count Faaor /\pplcs.

AS~ seat bett credit has been appffd 10 Bl and/or Med Pay premium.

Diminished Value Cova~ge applies.

160 0143665A 1184

6. 2000 NON OWNED TRAILER 048

VIN: NON OWNED Clinton County, IA

Secured Interested Part Chan ed

COVERAGES LIMITS PR EMIU M CHANGE

Combined Liabd1ty $1Million each acodent 578.66

Comprehensive ACV - $2,500 deductible 133.85

Collision ACV - 52.500 deductible 327.49

Terrorism Coverage 2.70

TOTAL $542.70

No Charge

Interested Parties:

Licnholdcr. XTRA LEASE LLC. 850 66TH AVE SW. CEDAR RAPIDS. IA 52404-4709

ITEM DETAILS: Uvcstoek trailer Operated w,lhln a 300 mt1e radius.

USE CLASS (00753): Trud<crs - fAiS<:elaneous.

Vehide Count Faaor App~es.

Diminished va~e Coverage appNes.

160 0080000 1184

¶ 13 III. ANALYSIS

¶ 14 When, as in this case, the parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, they

implicitly agree that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the dispute

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involves only questions of law, such that the court may decide the issues based on

the record. Acuity v. M/I Homes of Chicago, LLC, 2023 IL 129087, ¶ 20. We review

de novo the court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Id. Likewise, the

construction of an insurance policy is a question of law that we review de novo.

Hess v. Estate of Klamm, 2020 IL 124649, ¶ 14.

¶ 15 An insurance policy is a contract, so the rules governing contract interpretation

also govern the interpretation of an insurance policy. Galarza v. Direct Auto

Insurance Co., 2023 IL 129031, ¶ 38. Our primary objective is to ascertain and give

effect to the parties’ intent, as expressed in the policy language. Id. Clear and

unambiguous policy language will be enforced as written unless it conflicts with

public policy. Id.

¶ 16 As a general rule, antistacking clauses in insurance policies do not violate public

policy. Hess, 2020 IL 124649, ¶ 16. A reviewing court will therefore give effect to

unambiguous antistacking clauses. Id. However, if insurance policy language is

ambiguous, the court will construe it liberally in favor of coverage and against the

insurer who drafted the policy. Id.; West American Insurance Co. v. Yorkville

National Bank, 238 Ill. 2d 177, 184-85 (2010). “Policy language is ambiguous if it

is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.” Hess, 2020 IL 124649,

¶ 16. “Reasonableness is the key” in determining whether a provision is subject to

more than one reasonable interpretation, as opposed to “whether creative

possibilities can be suggested.” Bruder v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 156 Ill.

2d 179, 193 (1993).

¶ 17 Appellants argue that, pursuant to Bruder and subsequent supreme court cases,

insurance policies are ambiguous where the declaration pages separately list

liability limits for each of the multiple vehicles insured, with the result that the

policy must be construed in favor of the insured and allow the stacking of coverage.

¶ 18 The pertinent part of Bruder examined whether the uninsured-motorist

coverage in a business auto policy should be stacked in return for separate

premiums for two pickup trucks. Id. at 189-90. The antistacking clause stated:

“ ‘The most we will pay for all damages resulting from bodily injury to any one

person caused by any one accident is the limit of Bodily Injury shown in the

declarations for “Each Person.” ’ ” Id. at 189. The provision applied “ ‘regardless

of the number of covered autos.’ ” Id. at 194. The declarations page had separate

-7-

entries for the premium paid for each pickup truck, but it listed the limit of liability

of $100,000 for bodily injury for “each person” just once on the page, separate from

the columns listing the vehicle information. Id. at 193. We stated:

“The only reasonable interpretation is that the policy provides only $100,000 of

liability for bodily injury occasioned to each person insured no matter how

many vehicles are listed in the column arrangement and no matter how many

premiums are paid. The representation of the limit of liability for bodily injury

for each person on the declarations page is consistent with the language of the

antistacking provision. It is also consistent with the language in the policy that

the antistacking provision would apply ‘regardless of the number of covered

autos.’ ” Id. at 193-94.

¶ 19 In discussing the arrangement of information on the declarations page, we also

stated:

“Understanding the arrangement of entries in the columns is important in

determining the effect of what is not there included. Specifically, the limits of

liability are not set out within the column arrangement in the same manner as

the page lists the premium amounts and totals. That is, there is no column for

which the limit of liability for bodily injury is to be listed like a premium

amount so that the $100,000 limit for each person would appear in both

sentence-like lines for the pickup trucks.

It would not be difficult to find an ambiguity created by such a listing of the

bodily injury liability limit for each person insured. It could easily be interpreted

that an insured should enjoy a total limit of $200,000 in coverage because a

figure of $100,000 would be shown for each pickup truck. There would be little

to suggest in such a listing that the parties intended that coverage was to be

limited to that provided for only one of the two pickup trucks. It would be more

reasonable to assume that the parties intended that, in return for the two

premiums, two $100,000 coverage amounts were afforded. See Squire, 69 Ill.

2d at 179-80 (holding that the existence of two declarations pages, both setting

$10,000 limits for liability for each person, created an ambiguity permitting the

aggregation of those coverage amounts).” Id. at 192.

-8-

The second paragraph of this quoted material, which appellants have labeled the

“Bruder dicta,” has been the subject of much debate in the appellate court.

¶ 20 This court revisited the subject of antistacking clauses in Hobbs v. Hartford

Insurance Co. of the Midwest, 214 Ill. 2d 11 (2005). Hobbs was a consolidated case

in which both underlying cases involved underinsured-motorist coverage for

multiple vehicles in a single policy. Id. at 14. We discuss only the first consolidated

case, which is germane here. The antistacking clause stated:

“ ‘LIMIT OF LIABILITY

The limit of liability shown in the Declarations for each person for

Underinsured Motorists Coverage is our maximum limit of liability for all

damages, including damages for care, loss of services or death, arising out of

bodily injury sustained by any one person in any one accident. *** This is the

most we will pay regardless of the number of:

1. Insureds;

2. Claims made;

3. Vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarations; or

4. Vehicles involved in the accident.’ ” Id. at 18.

¶ 21 We stated that the case was similar to Bruder in that the antistacking clause tied

the limit of liability to the limit shown on the declarations page, the declarations

page listed the premiums for the two vehicles separately, the declarations page

listed the relevant limit of liability only once, and the antistacking clause stated that

the provision applied regardless of the number of covered vehicles. Id. at 21. We

therefore held that the underinsured-motorist coverage in the policy could not be

stacked. Id.

¶ 22 The appellate court in Hobbs had relied on two other appellate court cases,

Yates v. Farmers Automobile Insurance Ass’n, 311 Ill. App. 3d 797 (2000), and

Hall v. General Casualty Co. of Illinois, 328 Ill. App. 3d 655 (2002), in determining

that ambiguity resulted from the policy statement “ ‘COVERAGE IS PROVIDED

ONLY WHERE A PREMIUM IS SHOWN FOR THE AUTO AND

COVERAGE.’ ” Hobbs, 214 Ill. 2d at 24. We disagreed with the appellate court’s

-9-

assessment. We stated that, although Yates had similar disputed language, the

policy was already ambiguous because the declarations page listed the

underinsured-motorist limits once for each covered vehicle. Id. at 25. We reiterated

our remark in Bruder that it would not be difficult to find an ambiguity where the

antistacking clause limits liability to the limit shown on the declarations page and

the declarations page lists the limit of liability twice. Id. at 26. We circumscribed

our statement by adding that, “[i]n the absence of other qualifying language in the

antistacking clause, ‘[t]here would be little to suggest in such a listing that the

parties intended that coverage was to be limited to that provided for only one of the

two [vehicles].’ ” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 25 (quoting Bruder, 156 Ill. 2d at 192).

We further cautioned that our discussion “should not be construed as establishing

a per se rule that an insurance policy will be deemed ambiguous as to the limits of

liability anytime the limits are noted more than once on the declarations. Variances

in policy language and, in particular, antistacking clauses, frequently require case-

by-case review.” Id. at 26 n.1.

¶ 23 In Hall, the other case that the appellate court in Hobbs cited, the policy

contained an antistacking clause that the plaintiff conceded was unambiguous. Id.

at 26 (citing Hall, 328 Ill. App. 3d 655). The declarations page listed separate bodily

injury premiums for the two covered vehicles but listed the limit of liability only

once. Id. The Hall court reasoned that the statement “ ‘insurance is provided where

a premium is shown’ ” (id. (quoting Hall, 328 Ill. App. 3d at 657)) was directly

contradictory to the antistacking clause, thus creating an ambiguity that permitted

stacking (id. (citing Hall, 328 Ill. App. 3d at 660)). We overruled Hall as being

wrongly decided because the disputed clause did not address the subject of stacking

and could not reasonably be read to conflict with the antistacking clause. Id. at 27.

¶ 24 The subject of antistacking clauses arose again in this court in Hess, 2020 IL

124649, this time in the context of bodily injury liability limits instead of uninsured-

or underinsured-motorist coverage. The clause in Hess provided:

“ ‘LIMIT OF LIABILITY

A. The limit of liability shown in the Declarations for each person for

Bodily Injury Liability is our maximum limit of liability for all damages,

including damages for care, loss of services or death, arising out of “bodily

injury” sustained by any one person in any one auto accident. Subject to this

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limit for each person, the limit of liability shown in the Declarations for each

accident for Bodily Injury Liability is our maximum limit of liability for all

damages for “bodily injury” resulting from any one auto accident.

***

This is the most we will pay regardless of the number of:

1. “Insureds”;

2. Claims made;

3. Vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarations; or

4. Vehicles involved in the auto accident.’ ” Id. ¶ 23.

¶ 25 The first page of the declarations listed three covered autos and listed the bodily

injury limit only once. Id. ¶ 6. The second declarations page listed a fourth covered

vehicle and again listed the limits for bodily injury coverage. Id. ¶ 7. The circuit

court ruled that the liability limits could be stacked four times, once for each

vehicle, and the appellate court held that it could be stacked twice, based on the

liability limits being listed two times. Id. ¶ 25. We stated that the only reasonable

explanation for the liability limits appearing for a second time on the second

declarations page was that the information for all four covered vehicles could not

fit on one physical page. Id. We held that, “[w]hen read together with the

declarations, *** the antistacking clause unambiguously prohibits stacking of

bodily injury liability coverage.” Id.

¶ 26 We further stated that the appellate court had improperly compared the case to

Cherry v. Elephant Insurance Co., 2018 IL App (5th) 170072, and Johnson v.

Davis, 377 Ill. App. 3d 602 (2007), both of which allowed the stacking of

underinsured-motorist coverage in multivehicle policies. Hess, 2020 IL 124649,

¶ 26. We pointed out that those policies listed the liability limits separately for each

covered vehicle, unlike the policy before us. Id. 5

5

Appellants argue that we distinguished Cherry and Johnson solely on the basis of the

declarations pages, thus determining that the antistacking clauses in those cases were not sufficient

to overcome the ambiguity created by declarations pages that listed the limits of liability separately

for each of multiple autos insured. To be clear, we distinguished Cherry’s and Johnson’s

- 11 -

¶ 27 Addressing our prior discussion in Bruder and Hobbs of ambiguity arising from

multiple liability limits, we stated that we were referring to liability limits that were

listed separately for each of the covered vehicles. Id. ¶ 27. We repeated our

statement in Hobbs that there was no per se rule that an insurance policy will be

construed as being ambiguous regarding the limits of liability any time that the

limits are listed more than once in the declarations. Id. ¶ 22. We stated that, instead,

the issue must be determined on a case-by-case basis and that the declarations page

must be construed together with other policy provisions rather than being read in

isolation. Id. Based on our resolution of the case, we did not address the defendant’s

alternative argument that automobile liability coverage, as distinguished from

uninsured- and underinsured-motorist coverage, should never be stacked as a

matter of law. Id. ¶¶ 17, 30.

¶ 28 Returning to the instant case, we begin by examining section II. Section II(A)

provides general language that Owners “will pay all sums an insured legally must

pay as damages” caused by an accident involving a covered auto. Section II(C),

titled “LIMIT OF INSURANCE,” contains the antistacking language. Like the

insurance policies discussed in other cases, it references the declarations pages,

stating that Owners “will pay damages for bodily injury *** up to the Limit of

Insurance shown in the Declarations for this coverage.” Further:

“When combined liability limits are shown in the Declarations, the limit

shown for each accident is the total amount of coverage and the most we will

pay for damages because of or arising out of bodily injury, property damages

and covered pollution cost or expense in any one accident.”

¶ 29 The section later continues:

“5. The Limit of Insurance for this coverage may not be added to the limits

for the same or similar coverage applying to other autos insured by this policy

to determine the amount of coverage available for any one accident or covered

pollution cost or expense, regardless of the number of:

declarations pages simply to explain why the appellate court erred in relying on them to stack the

insurance coverage. We did not discuss or even mention the antistacking clauses in those cases,

much less pass judgment on the ultimate outcomes reached.

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a. Covered autos;

b. Insureds;

c. Premiums paid;

d. Claims made or suits brought;

e. Persons injured; or

f. Vehicles involved in the accident.”

¶ 30 Section II(C)(5) is somewhat similar to the antistacking clauses in Hobbs and

Hess, but it more directly prohibits stacking by stating that the “Limit of Insurance

for this coverage may not be added to the limits for the same or similar coverage

applying to other autos insured by this policy to determine the amount of coverage

available for any one accident.” That is, section II(C) states that the “Limit of

Insurance shown in the Declarations for this coverage” may not be added to the

limits of coverage that apply to other autos that the policy insures to determine the

amount of coverage in a single accident, regardless of factors such as the number

of covered autos and premiums paid. This prohibition against stacking is

underscored by section II(C)(3), which provides that, in the particular scenario that

a trailer insured by the policy is connected to an auto insured by the policy, the auto

and the trailer “are considered one auto and do not increase the Limit of Insurance.”

¶ 31 Appellants argue that, pursuant to the Bruder dicta, “the multiple listing of

liability limits for each vehicle insured renders the otherwise clear anti-stacking

clause in Owner’s policy ambiguous.” Appellants seem to take the position that,

regardless of the specific antistacking language used in an insurance policy, the

declarations pages alone will render the policy ambiguous if the limits of liability

are listed in conjunction with each insured vehicle. However, we have repeatedly

emphasized there is no “per se rule that an insurance policy will be deemed

ambiguous as to the limits of liability anytime the limits are noted more than once

on the declarations.” Hobbs, 214 Ill. 2d at 26 n.1. We further stated in Hobbs that

“[v]ariances in policy language and, in particular, antistacking clauses, frequently

require case-by-case review.” (Emphasis added.) Id. Like any contract, we construe

an insurance policy in its entirety and give effect to each provision where possible.

Sanders v. Illinois Union Insurance Co., 2019 IL 124565, ¶ 23. Therefore, an

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“antistacking clause must be read in conjunction with the policy as a whole.” Hess,

2020 IL 124649, ¶ 24; see Hobbs, 214 Ill. 2d at 23 (uncertainty can arise if a

declarations page is read in isolation, so we must examine the complete document

in interpreting an insurance policy).

¶ 32 Thus, we keep the provisions of the antistacking clause in mind as we turn to

the declarations pages. “ITEM TWO” lists a “Combined Liability” of “$1 Million

each accident” as the “LIMIT OF INSURANCE FOR ANY ONE ACCIDENT OR

LOSS,” in exchange for a premium of $6311.69. The policy does not define

“Combined Liability,” but its meaning can be determined by referring to sections

II(C)(1) and II(C)(2). Section II(C)(1) begins with the situation of when “combined

liability limits are shown in the Declarations,” whereas section II(C)(2) contrasts

this with when “separate bodily injury and property damage limits are shown in the

Declarations.” Therefore, a plain reading of the policy shows that “Combined

Liability” means combined bodily injury and property damage limits. The

“Combined Liability” lists a single limit of “$1 Million each accident” and a

premium of $6311.69. As such, “ITEM TWO” lists the relevant liability limit of $1

million just once, which under Bruder and Hobbs would mean that the coverages

could not be stacked.

¶ 33 However, “ITEM THREE” contains separate listings for each of the seven

covered vehicles. The listings delineate the type of coverage, the limits of insurance

for each type of coverage, and the premium charged for the coverage. The types of

coverage differ among the vehicles. For example, the trailers do not have

uninsured- or underinsured-motorist coverage, or “Medical Payments,” and one

vehicle does not have comprehensive or collision coverage. Each vehicle has a

listing of “Combined Liability” coverage of “$1 Million each accident,” with a

corresponding premium on the same line.

¶ 34 Appellants again point to the Bruder dicta in arguing that declarations pages

that list limits of liability separately for each of multiple insured vehicles give rise

to the reasonable interpretation that the policy provides separate limits for each

vehicle. However, unlike the scenario described in the Bruder dicta, we must

consider both sections (“ITEM TWO” and “ITEM THREE”) of the declarations

pages. Further, as discussed, there is no bright-line rule that an insurance policy is

ambiguous as to the limits of liability any time the limits are listed more than once

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on the declarations. Instead we must consider each case individually, construing the

applicable policy as a whole.

¶ 35 Appellants additionally argue that “ITEM THREE” is the only section that we

should consider in the declarations because it is an “amended” declarations sheet,

in that “ITEM THREE” states: “This policy is amended in consideration of the

additional or return premium shown below. This Declarations [sic] voids and

replaces all previously issued Declarations bearing the same policy number and

premium term.” Appellants maintain that “ITEM THREE” amends the policy’s

declarations section by indicating that the insured had purchased separate $1

million combined liability limits on each of the seven vehicles listed. Appellants

argue that the coverages have changed from those listed in “ITEM TWO,” in that

some but not all of the vehicles listed have $100,000 per person/$100,000 per

accident in uninsured/underinsured-motorist coverage and $5000 per person in

medical payments coverage, which is a change from “ITEM TWO,” where all

“Scheduled Autos” (symbol “7”) are listed as having uninsured/underinsured-

motorist coverage and medical payments coverage. Appellants contend that it is

reasonable to interpret “ITEM THREE” as not subject to any terms in “ITEM

TWO” and view it as the policy’s controlling declarations.

¶ 36 Appellant’s argument that “ITEM THREE” was intended to take the place of

“ITEM TWO” is contradicted by the policy documents. The policy has a page that

states “DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES EFFECTIVE 11-27-2018” and states that

a lienholder was added for one of the trailers. “ITEM TWO” and “ITEM THREE”

both list a policy term of June 22, 2018, to June 22, 2019, and an endorsement

effective date of “11-27-2018.” Accordingly, both “ITEM TWO” and “ITEM

THREE” were active portions of the policy.

¶ 37 Appellants additionally argue that “ITEM THREE” lists “Combined Liability”

in the singular, whereas the antistacking provision refers to “combined liability

limits” (emphasis added) in the plural, such that the individual liability amounts can

be “combined” or stacked to constitute “combined liability limits.” The trial court

engaged in a similar analysis. We note that “ITEM THREE” lists “Combined

Liability” under the heading “COVERAGES” and “$1 Million each accident”

under the heading “LIMITS,” such that “ITEM THREE” also references

“Combined Liability” limits. More importantly, as discussed, a plain reading of the

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policy illustrates that “Combined Liability” means combined bodily injury and

property damage limits. See also Hess, 2020 IL 124649, ¶ 16 (we “will not strain

to find ambiguity in an insurance policy where none exists” (internal quotation

marks omitted)); Hobbs, 214 Ill. 2d at 31 (“We will not *** ‘torture ordinary words

until they confess to ambiguity.’ ” (quoting Western States Insurance Co. v.

Wisconsin Wholesale Tire, Inc., 184 F.3d 699, 702 (7th Cir. 1999))).

¶ 38 Taking a wide-angled view of the declarations pages, the only logical and

reasonable interpretation is that “ITEM THREE” provides a more specific

breakdown of the information summarized in a chart in “ITEM TWO,” including

the differing coverages applicable to each vehicle and the corresponding premium

for each vehicle. As the coverages varied greatly, it was necessary for Owners to

provide the information over multiple pages. Significantly, the distinct premium

amounts listed individually in “ITEM THREE” for “Combined Liability” add up to

the same $6311.69 total for “Combined Liability” in “ITEM TWO,” which clearly

states a $1 million per accident maximum just once. The fact that the total premium

amounts are identical indicates that both sections are intended to provide the same

coverage.

¶ 39 It is true that “ITEM THREE” lists a combined liability limit of “$1 Million

each accident” for each vehicle, but this may be viewed as consistent with the

“ITEM TWO” combined liability limit of “$1 Million each accident.” The

antistacking clause likewise ties the maximum liability to “the limit shown for each

accident.” Moreover, when the declarations pages are considered in light of the

antistacking provision, including the language that the “Limit of Insurance for this

coverage may not be added to the limits for the same or similar coverage applying

to other autos insured by this policy to determine the amount of coverage available

for any one accident” regardless of the number of covered autos, it is clear that the

limits may not be aggregated. In other words, the insurance policy as a whole is

subject to only one reasonable interpretation, which unambiguously provides a $1

million per accident liability limit and prohibits stacking the liability limits of each

insured vehicle.

¶ 40 Owners additionally argues that, unlike uninsured- and underinsured-motorist

coverage, liability insurance by its nature cannot be stacked. Owners did not raise

this issue in the trial court, and as appellants highlight, in the appellate court Owners

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stated in its reply brief that, “[u]nlike the insurer in Hess, Owners does not ask this

Court to adopt a per se rule that primary liability limits can never be stacked.”

Regardless of whether Owners waived the argument, we do not consider whether

the per se rule is warranted because, as in Hess, 2020 IL 124649, ¶ 30, we have

determined that the policy as a whole clearly shows that the parties’ intent was not

to allow aggregation of the limits of liability coverage for the individual vehicles

insured.

¶ 41 IV. CONCLUSION

¶ 42 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court, which

reversed the judgment of the circuit court and remanded with directions to enter

summary judgment for Owners.

¶ 43 Appellate court judgment affirmed.

¶ 44 Circuit court judgment reversed.

¶ 45 Cause remanded with directions.

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