The opinion
2024 IL 128731
IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
(Docket No. 128731)
SHAWNEE COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 84 et al.,
v. ILLINOIS PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD et al., Appellees
(Shawnee Community Unit School District No. 84, Appellant).
Opinion filed May 23, 2024.
JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Chief Justice Theis and Justices Overstreet, Rochford, and O’Brien concurred
in the judgment and opinion.
Justice Neville dissented, with opinion, joined by Justice Holder White.
OPINION
¶1 The primary issue presented in this appeal is whether a taxpayer must pay
disputed property taxes as a condition precedent to pursuing an appeal before the
Property Tax Appeal Board (PTAB) under section 16-160 of the Property Tax Code
(Code) (35 ILCS 200/16-160 (West 2016)). The appellate court concluded that
payment of the disputed taxes was not required in order to pursue an appeal. 2022
IL App (5th) 190266. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the
appellate court.
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 Grand Tower Energy Center, LLC (Grand Tower), is the owner of a power plant
located along the Mississippi River in Jackson County, Illinois. For the 2014 tax
year, the Jackson County assessor imposed an assessed value of $33,445,837 on
Grand Tower’s property. Grand Tower appealed the assessment to the Jackson
County Board of Review, which reduced the assessed value of the property to
$31,538,245.
¶4 On May 28, 2015, Grand Tower timely filed an appeal to the PTAB under
section 16-160 of the Code (35 ILCS 200/16-160 (West 2014)), seeking a reduction
of the final assessment imposed by the board of review. Shawnee Community Unit
School District No. 84 (School District), which serves portions of Jackson County
and receives funding from property taxes generated in that county, was granted
leave to intervene in the appeal. 1
¶5 While its appeal was pending before the PTAB, Grand Tower’s 2014 property
taxes came due. Grand Tower did not pay the taxes. In December 2015, the Jackson
County collector prepared the annual list of properties with delinquent taxes. See
id. § 21-15. The list included Grand Tower’s property and showed that Grand
Tower owed $2,557,423.91 in unpaid taxes for 2014.
¶6 Thereafter, on January 14, 2016, the collector applied to the circuit court of
Jackson County for a judgment and order of sale for taxes on the 2014 delinquent
properties, including Grand Tower’s. See 35 ILCS 200/21-150 (West 2016). That
same day, the court entered a judgment and order of sale pursuant to section 21-
180 of the Code (id. § 21-180). The court’s order stated, in part:
1
The Jackson County Board of Review was a party in the PTAB proceedings and the appellate
court but is not participating in this appeal.
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“[W]hereas issue notice has been given of the intended application for
Judgment against said land and lots in said application described, and no
sufficient defense having been made or cause shown why Judgment should not
be entered against said lands and lots for taxes, *** Judgment *** is hereby
entered against the aforesaid tract o[r] tracts of lots or lands *** in favor of the
people of the State of Illinois for the sum annexed to each *** and it is Ordered
by the Court that the several tracts of lots or lands *** to be sold or forfeited as
the law directs.”
¶7 At a tax sale held on January 19, 2016, an unrelated third party purchased Grand
Tower’s 2014 taxes.
¶8 On August 17, 2016, the School District filed a motion before the PTAB
seeking dismissal of Grand Tower’s appeal. Citing section 23-5 of the Code (id.
§ 23-5), the School District maintained that Grand Tower was required to pay the
2014 property taxes under protest in order to pursue an appeal before the PTAB.
The School District asserted that Grand Tower “could have preserved its right to
appeal to the PTAB had it pursued its legal remedies and paid the real estate taxes
associated with the Grand Tower Station under protest” but it had not done so.
Thus, according to the School District, the appeal should be dismissed.
¶9 The School District also raised an additional argument in support of its motion
to dismiss. Citing Vulcan Materials Co. v. Bee Construction, 96 Ill. 2d 159 (1983),
the School District maintained that, once the Jackson County collector made the
application for judgment and order of sale, the circuit court acquired “jurisdiction
over the taxes and all supplemental matters,” including the determination of the
assessment. The School District argued, therefore, that the PTAB was divested of
jurisdiction to review the 2014 assessment and the appeal should be dismissed.
¶ 10 Finally, the School District maintained that the circuit court’s entry of the
judgment and order of sale stood as a conclusive determination not only of the fact
that the taxes were delinquent but also of the correctness of the assessment. The
School District argued that Grand Tower “could have presented its defenses or
made its objections” to the assessment before the circuit court but failed to do so.
As a consequence, according to the School District, Grand Tower “was collaterally
estopped from disputing the assessment,” and the appeal should be dismissed for
this reason as well.
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¶ 11 In a written order dated September 19, 2016, the PTAB denied the School
District’s motion to dismiss. A motion to reconsider was denied on November 4,
2016.
¶ 12 For the 2015 tax year, the Jackson County Board of Review again imposed a
final assessed valuation of $31,538,245 on Grand Tower’s property, and in
February 2016, Grand Tower again filed an appeal to the PTAB challenging the
assessment. The PTAB consolidated Grand Tower’s 2015 appeal with the 2014
appeal. Like the 2014 taxes, Grand Tower’s 2015 taxes also went unpaid and were
sold to the same party that had purchased the 2014 taxes.
¶ 13 In August 2017, Grand Tower redeemed the 2014 and 2015 taxes. Grand Tower
paid the full amount of the taxes due, plus penalties and interest, as required by
section 21-355 of the Code (35 ILCS 200/21-355 (West 2016)).
¶ 14 On June 18, 2019, following an evidentiary hearing, the PTAB issued a lengthy
written decision on Grand Tower’s consolidated appeals. In its decision, the PTAB
was highly critical of the methodology employed by the School District’s valuation
expert and found that Grand Tower had proved, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that its property had been overvalued for tax years 2014 and 2015. As a result of
the PTAB’s decision, the assessed value of Grand Tower’s property for each of the
2014 and 2015 tax years was reduced from $31,538,245 to $3,333,000. The School
District subsequently appealed the PTAB’s decision directly to the appellate court
pursuant to section 16-195 of the Code (id. § 16-195).
¶ 15 On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the PTAB. 2022 IL App
(5th) 190266. The appellate court rejected the School District’s contention that the
PTAB had erred in reducing the assessed valuation of Grand Tower’s property,
finding that the PTAB’s decision was not against the manifest weight of the
evidence. Id. ¶¶ 70-102. The court also rejected the School Board’s contention that
the PTAB had erred in denying its motion to dismiss. Id. ¶¶ 45-69. The appellate
court held that payment of the contested taxes was not a condition precedent to
pursuing an appeal before the PTAB and that the tax sale proceedings in the circuit
court did not divest the PTAB of jurisdiction to review the 2014 and 2015 property
assessments. Id. ¶ 69.
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¶ 16 We allowed the School District’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R.
315(a) (eff. Oct. 1, 2021). We also allowed the Illinois Association of School
Administrators and the Illinois Association of School Boards to file a brief amicus
curiae in support of the School District’s position and the Civic Federation to file
a brief amicus curiae in support of Grand Tower and the PTAB’s position. See Ill.
S. Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010).
¶ 17 ANALYSIS
¶ 18 In this court, the School District does not challenge the appellate court’s
judgment affirming the PTAB’s reduction of the assessments for the 2014 and 2015
tax years. Instead, the School District contends only that the appellate court erred
in affirming the PTAB’s denial of the School District’s motion to dismiss.
¶ 19 I. Timely Payment of Taxes Before Seeking PTAB Relief
¶ 20 The School District first argues that the PTAB should have granted the motion
to dismiss because Grand Tower did not timely pay its property taxes before
seeking assessment relief. According to the School District, timely payment of the
taxes is a condition precedent to pursuing an appeal before the PTAB. 2 We
disagree.
2 The dissent repeatedly asserts that we have “misstate[d] the central issue in this case” and that
“[t]he School District does not argue that payment of property taxes constitutes a condition
precedent to filing an appeal with the [PTAB].” Infra ¶ 74. This is incorrect. As in the trial court
and the appellate court (see 2022 IL App (5th) 190266, ¶¶ 45-58), the School District first argues in
this court that the PTAB erred in denying its motion to dismiss because Illinois taxpayers are
required “to make timely payments before seeking assessment relief” and, specifically, that the
payment under protest requirement of section 23-5 of the Code (35 ILCS 200/23-5 (West 2016))
“set[s] forth a condition precedent for objecting to property taxes generally before any forum.” This
argument has been the School District’s primary contention throughout this litigation. Indeed, fully
two-thirds of the analysis portion of the School District’s opening brief in this court is devoted to
this issue. Grand Tower recognizes this point, stating that the first issue in this appeal is whether
“the Property Tax Appeal Board err[ed] when it concluded that the Property Tax Code does not
require a taxpayer to pay the disputed property tax, under protest or otherwise, as a condition of
maintaining an appeal to PTAB under Section 16-160 of the Code.” The dissent’s repeated
assertions that we have “misstated” the School District’s arguments are inaccurate and unwarranted.
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¶ 21 The PTAB is a state agency created in 1967 to review taxpayer challenges to
property tax assessments imposed by local boards of review. Cook County Board
of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 339 Ill. App. 3d 529, 535 (2002). The
statutory provisions governing the administration of the PTAB are set forth in
article 16 of the Code (35 ILCS 200/16-160 to 16-195 (West 2016)).
¶ 22 Section 16-160 of the Code (id. § 16-160), defines the procedure taxpayers must
follow to appeal property tax assessments to the PTAB. Section 16-160 provides,
in relevant part:
“any taxpayer dissatisfied with the decision of a board of review or board of
appeals as such decision pertains to the assessment of his or her property for
taxation purposes, or any taxing body that has an interest in the decision of the
board of review or board of appeals on an assessment made by any local
assessment officer, may, (i) in counties with less than 3,000,000 inhabitants
within 30 days after the date of written notice of the decision of the board of
review *** appeal the decision to the Property Tax Appeal Board for review.
*** Such taxpayer or taxing body, hereinafter called the appellant, shall file a
petition with the clerk of the Property Tax Appeal Board, setting forth the facts
upon which he or she bases the objection, together with a statement of the
contentions of law which he or she desires to raise, and the relief requested.”
Id.
¶ 23 Nothing in section 16-160 states that a taxpayer is required to pay the disputed
property taxes in order to pursue an appeal of an assessment before the PTAB.
Rather, section 16-160 requires only that the taxpayer file a petition with the clerk
of the PTAB within 30 days of the local review board’s decision on an assessment,
regardless of whether any property tax payment is due.
¶ 24 The 30-day deadline for filing the petition is significant. Because the property
tax imposed on a taxpayer is determined by multiplying the assessed value of the
property by the tax rate (id. § 18-45), the assessment decision is made well in
advance of the extension of the tax. The 30-day deadline therefore means that, in
almost every instance, the taxpayer must initiate an appeal with the PTAB before
the actual tax payments are due for the tax year in question. Cf. Millennium Park
Joint Venture, LLC v. Houlihan, 241 Ill. 2d 281, 308 (2010) (noting that a taxpayer
can immediately challenge an assessment before a local board of review “before
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any taxes are due and payable”). It would be unreasonable to conclude that the
legislature made paying disputed property taxes a condition precedent to pursuing
an appeal of an assessment before the PTAB when, at the time of initiating the
appeal, the taxpayer has not yet even received a property tax bill.
¶ 25 Further support for the conclusion that payment of the disputed taxes is not a
condition precedent to pursuing an appeal before the PTAB can be found in section
16-185 of the Code (35 ILCS 200/16-185 (West 2016)). That provision states, in
part:
“The extension of taxes on any assessment so appealed shall not be delayed by
any proceeding before the [PTAB], and, in case the assessment is altered by the
[PTAB], any taxes extended upon the unauthorized assessment or part thereof
shall be abated, or, if already paid, shall be refunded with interest as provided
in Section 23-20.” (Emphasis added.) Id.
¶ 26 The inclusion of the phrase “if already paid” in section 16-160 shows
conclusively that payment of the disputed property taxes is not required to pursue
an appeal before the PTAB. If payment were required, there would be no need to
include that language. Accordingly, by their plain terms, sections 16-160 and 16-
185 do not require payment of the disputed property taxes as a condition precedent
to pursuing an appeal before the PTAB.
¶ 27 Despite the foregoing, the School District nevertheless maintains that payment
of the disputed property taxes is required to pursue an appeal. In support, the School
District points to section 23-5 of the Code (id. § 23-5), a provision that governs the
filing of tax objection complaints in the circuit court.
¶ 28 A tax objection complaint (see id. § 23-10) provides an alternative means of
challenging a property tax assessment imposed by a local board of review. Madison
Two Associates v. Pappas, 227 Ill. 2d 474, 477-78 (2008). The two options for
challenging an assessment—an appeal to the PTAB and the filing of a tax objection
complaint—are mutually exclusive. Id. at 477. A taxpayer seeking review of an
assessment before the PTAB may not file a tax objection complaint challenging the
assessment in circuit court, and a taxpayer who files a tax objection complaint
challenging as assessment in circuit court may not file an appeal before the PTAB.
Id. at 477-78.
-7-
¶ 29 Section 23-5 requires that a taxpayer who files a tax objection complaint pay
the disputed taxes “under protest” as a condition precedent to filing the complaint.
Section 23-5 states:
“Payment under protest. *** [I]f any person desires to object to all or any part
of a property tax for any year, for any reason other than that the property is
exempt from taxation, he or she shall pay all of the tax due within 60 days from
the first penalty date of the final installment of taxes for that year. Whenever
taxes are paid in compliance with this Section and a tax objection complaint is
filed in compliance with Section 23-10, 100% of the taxes shall be deemed paid
under protest without the filing of a separate letter of protest with the county
collector.” 35 ILCS 200/23-5 (West 2016).
¶ 30 Stressing that section 23-5 states that the “payment under protest” requirement
applies to “any person” objecting to “any part” of a property tax for “any reason,”
the School District argues that the requirement applies to taxpayers who bring
appeals before the PTAB. We reject this contention.
¶ 31 Section 23-5 appears in article 23 of the Code, which is titled “Procedures and
Adjudication for Tax Objections.” Id. art. 23. Section 16-160, the provision setting
forth the procedure for initiating an appeal before the PTAB, appears in an entirely
different part of the Code, article 16 (id. art. 16), titled “Review of Assessment
Decisions.” The two means of challenging an assessment, the tax objection
complaint and the appeal to the PTAB, are different procedures. In the absence of
language indicating otherwise, there is no reason to presume the legislature
intended that a statutory provision governing one should also apply to the other.
¶ 32 Further, the second sentence of section 23-5 expressly references section 23-10
of the Code (the provision that authorizes the filing of tax objection complaints),
indicating that the payment of taxes in accordance with section 23-5 satisfies the
“payment under protest” requirement for filing the complaint. However, section 23-
5 contains no reference to section 16-160 or, indeed, to any statutory provision
related to proceedings before the PTAB. Requiring a taxpayer to pay disputed taxes
as a condition precedent to pursuing an appeal is a significant matter. Had the
legislature intended the “payment under protest” requirement of section 23-5 to
apply to PTAB appeals, there would be some reference to section 16-160 in that
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provision. There is none. By its express terms, section 23-5 applies to tax objection
complaints, not appeals filed in the PTAB.
¶ 33 In addition, a fundamental contradiction arises when attempting to apply
section 23-5 to PTAB appeals. If the “payment under protest” requirement of
section 23-5 were also a condition precedent to pursuing an appeal before the
PTAB, the taxpayer appealing to the PTAB would have to file a tax objection
complaint, since it is this complaint, and only this complaint, that constitutes the
statutorily required “protest.” However, section 16-160 expressly prohibits a
taxpayer who appeals to the PTAB from filing a tax objection complaint. That
section states: “If a petition is filed by a taxpayer, the taxpayer is precluded from
filing objections based upon valuation, as may otherwise be permitted by Sections
21-175 and 23-5.” Id. § 16-160. Such an internally contradictory approach is
unworkable and could not have been intended by the legislature. See, e.g., Dynak
v. Board of Education of Wood Dale School District 7, 2020 IL 125062, ¶ 16 (we
presume the legislature does not intend absurd results).
¶ 34 Citing Clarendon Associates v. Korzen, 56 Ill. 2d 101, 106 (1973), Central
Illinois Public Service Co. v. Thompson, 1 Ill. 2d 468, 471 (1953), and other cases,
the School District also argues that the “payment under protest” requirement of
section 23-5 must apply to taxpayers pursuing an appeal before the PTAB because,
otherwise, a “loophole” would be created that “resurrect[s] an antiquated process
that allows taxpayers to ‘harass’ units of local government by refusing to pay their
taxes while awaiting relief from the assessments or as a means to negotiate a more
favorable property tax settlement.” This argument is unpersuasive.
¶ 35 As this court has explained, prior to 1933, there was no statutory mechanism in
place that allowed taxpayers to pay taxes under protest and, at the same time, file
an objection to a property assessment. Clarendon, 56 Ill. 2d at 106. Instead, a
taxpayer wishing to challenge an assessment would withhold paying the property
taxes, and then, once the county collector made the annual application for judgment
and order of sale, the taxpayer would submit the objection to the assessment in that
proceeding. Id. When a large number of taxpayers followed this procedure (as
happened during the Great Depression), adjudication of the objections was often
delayed. Id. This, in turn, led to a delay in determining the final amount of taxes
due, the entry of any findings of delinquency, and the ordering of judicial tax sales,
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all of which “severely impaired the collection of taxes and thus the functions of
governmental units.” Id.
¶ 36 The concerns regarding delays described in cases such as Clarendon are not
present with appeals before the PTAB. Section 16-185 of the Code expressly states
that “[t]he extension of taxes on any assessment so appealed [to the PTAB] shall
not be delayed by any proceeding before the Board.” 35 ILCS 200/16-185 (West
2016). This means that the existence of an appeal before the PTAB does not prevent
or delay the county clerk from sending the taxpayer a property tax bill, which the
taxpayer is required to pay. And, unlike the situation in cases such as Clarendon, if
the taxes go unpaid, the existence of a PTAB appeal does not prevent or delay a
county collector’s application for judgment and order of sale, a finding of
delinquency, or the subsequent judicial sale of the taxes. The type of delay and
“harassment” described in cases like Clarendon simply is not present, even if the
“payment under protest” requirement of section 23-5 is not applied to the PTAB
appeal.
¶ 37 Finally, the School District cites a footnote from this court’s decision in
Madison Two Associates, 227 Ill. 2d at 477 n.2 (citing 35 ILCS 200/16-185 (West
2002)), which states:
“Unlike the tax objection alternative, paying the property tax is not a
prerequisite for seeking relief from the [PTAB]. Pursuing the appeal through
the [PTAB] does not, however, stay the obligation to pay the contested tax. If
the tax falls due before the [PTAB] issues its decision, the tax must still be paid.
If the [PTAB] subsequently lowers the assessment, any taxes paid on the portion
of the assessment determined to have been unauthorized must be refunded with
interest.”
¶ 38 According to the School District, this court’s statement that “paying the
property tax is not a prerequisite for seeking relief from the [PTAB]” means only
that the taxpayer need not pay the property taxes to initiate an appeal. The
subsequent statement that, “[i]f the tax falls due before the [PTAB] issues its
decision, the tax must still be paid” means that the “payment under protest”
requirement is a condition of maintaining the appeal. Because that did not happen
here, the School District contends the 2014 and 2015 appeals should have been
dismissed. Again, we disagree.
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¶ 39 The statement that, “[i]f the tax falls due before the [PTAB] issues its decision,
the tax must still be paid,” means only that the pendency of a PTAB appeal does
not stay enforcement of the Code’s provisions regarding tax collection and
enforcement. See 35 ILCS 200/16-185 (West 2016). The statement does not mean
that payment of the tax is a condition precedent to maintaining an appeal before the
PTAB. “[T]his court has long held that ‘[t]axing statutes are to be strictly construed.
Their language is not to be extended or enlarged by implication, beyond its clear
import. In cases of doubt they are construed most strongly against the government
and in favor of the taxpayer.’ ” Van’s Material Co. v. Department of Revenue, 131
Ill. 2d 196, 202 (1989) (quoting Mahon v. Nudelman, 377 Ill. 331, 335 (1941)).
¶ 40 Here, the “clear import” of section 23-5 is that the “payment under protest”
requirement applies only to tax objection complaints filed in the circuit court.
Accordingly, we hold that the payment of disputed property taxes is not a condition
precedent to pursuing an appeal before the PTAB under section 16-160 of the Code.
¶ 41 II. Jurisdiction Over Grand Tower’s Tax Liability
¶ 42 The School District also contends, however, that the PTAB erred in denying its
motion to dismiss for an additional reason. The School District notes that, in Vulcan
Materials, this court stated that “a tax-sale proceeding is in rem and the court
acquires jurisdiction over the land when the county collector makes his application
for judgment and order for sale.” Vulcan Materials, 96 Ill. 2d at 165. Relying on
this statement, the School District maintains that the circuit court acquired
jurisdiction to determine Grand Tower’s property tax assessment when the Jackson
County collector made the applications for judgment and order of sales regarding
the 2014 and 2015 taxes. At that time, according to the School District, the PTAB
was divested of its jurisdiction to review the correctness of the assessments, and the
motion to dismiss should therefore have been granted. We disagree.
¶ 43 The PTAB acquired jurisdiction to review Grand Tower’s property tax
assessments when Grand Tower timely filed its petitions pursuant to section 16-
160 of the Code (35 ILCS 200/16-160 (West 2016)). No other jurisdictional step
was required. While the appeals were pending, the property taxes went unpaid, and
the Jackson County collector applied for judgments and orders of sale pursuant to
procedures set forth in article 21 of the Code. See, e.g., id. § 21-110 (requiring the
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collector to publish a list of the delinquent properties, giving notice of the intent to
seek a judgment and order of sale); id. §§ 21-150, 21-160 (setting out the
procedures for the collector to follow in applying for a judgment and order of sale);
id. § 21-180 (establishing the form for a judgment and order of sale).
¶ 44 Importantly, however, none of the statutory provisions in article 21 state that
the PTAB is divested of its jurisdiction to consider a properly filed, pending appeal
once the county collector files a subsequent application for judgment and order of
sale. The statutes are entirely silent on this point. And Vulcan Materials is not to
the contrary. That decision does not concern or discuss the effect a collector’s
application for judgment and order of sale has on a pending PTAB appeal, and it
does not hold that the application for judgment and order of sale divests the PTAB
of its jurisdiction.
¶ 45 The legislature knows how to divest the PTAB of jurisdiction. Section 16-160
states, for example, that if an appeal before a local board of review is dismissed
because the taxpayer failed to appear, the PTAB “shall have no jurisdiction to hear
any subsequent appeal on that taxpayer’s complaint.” Id. § 16-160. If the legislature
had intended to divest the PTAB of its jurisdiction when a county collector makes
an application for judgment and order of sale, there would be a provision in the
Code stating so. Yet there is no such provision. The School District is asking this
court to read language into the Code that is not there. This, of course, we may not
do. See, e.g., Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entertainment Corp., 2019 IL 123186, ¶ 24.
¶ 46 Further, the School District’s contention that the PTAB loses jurisdiction of an
appeal once a county collector makes an application for judgment and order of sale
leads to questionable results. Appeals before the PTAB are not limited to taxpayers.
A taxing body, such as a county, may appeal a property tax assessment to the PTAB
if it believes the assessment is too low. See 35 ILCS 200/16-160 (West 2016).
Accepting the School District’s argument would mean that, when a county files an
appeal with the PTAB, a taxpayer could simply withhold payment of the property
taxes and wait until the county collector applies for the annual judgment and order
of sale, thereby divesting the PTAB of its jurisdiction to hear the county’s appeal.
The taxpayer could then pay the taxes before a judicial sale (see id. § 21-165) and,
in so doing, retain the property with no risk of an increase in the assessment. No
matter how incorrect the assessment might be, the county would no longer have
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any appeal before the PTAB, and any potential increase in property tax revenue
would be lost. We do not think the legislature intended this result.
¶ 47 The governing rule is well settled. “The obligation of citizens to pay taxes is
purely a statutory creation, and taxes can be levied, assessed and collected only in
the manner expressly spelled out by statute.” (Emphasis added.) Millennium Park
Joint Venture, 241 Ill. 2d at 295. Nothing in the Code expressly states that the
PTAB is divested of jurisdiction when a county collector makes an application for
judgment and order of sale, and such a provision cannot be read into the Code by
this court. This is particularly true given that the School District is asking this court
to deny a taxpayer its right to an appeal—one expressly provided for by the
legislature—and negate the proceedings before the PTAB in their entirety. This is
not a step this court may take. Accordingly, we conclude that the county collector’s
application for judgment and order of sale did not divest the PTAB of its
jurisdiction to review Grand Tower’s properly filed appeals.
¶ 48 III. Review of the Assessments
¶ 49 In addition to arguing that the PTAB was divested of jurisdiction when the
application for judgment and order of sale was filed, the School District also argues
that the circuit court’s entry of the judgment order itself “precluded further relief
from the PTAB.” The School District notes that the amount of property taxes a
taxpayer must pay is determined by multiplying the assessed value of the property
times the tax rate. The School District further notes that, when a circuit court enters
a judgment and order of sale, as it did in this case, it must state the amount of the
property taxes to be sold. See 35 ILCS 200/21-180 (West 2016) (setting out the
requirements for the order). That number, according to the School District, must
necessarily include a determination of the assessment, since “a property tax
assessment has only one function – to determine the amount that goes into the tax
bill.” The School District argues that the assessment and the taxes are “inextricably
intertwined” and that the circuit court’s judgment and order of sale stands as a
conclusive determination of the assessment. Thus, the School District maintains
that, once the circuit court entered the judgment and order of sale, Grand Tower
was precluded or estopped from seeking any further review of the assessments. We
disagree.
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¶ 50 Prior to 1995, a tax objection brought in the circuit court to challenge an
assessment was not filed as a separate complaint but, instead, was filed as a
response or defense “within the annual county collector’s application for judgment
and order of sale of delinquent properties.” Report of the Civic Federation Task
Force on Reform of the Cook County Property Tax Appeals Process at 7 (Mar. 2,
1995), https://www.civicfed.org/sites/default/files/report_of_the_task_force_on_
reform_of_cook_county_property_tax_appeals_process_march_1995.pdf [https://
perma.cc/XZ3D-J6LN]. 3 The governing statutes at that time reflected this reality
and expressly authorized the circuit court to determine the correct amount of the
taxes due within the application for judgment and order sale proceedings. Section
21-150, for example, stated:
“Time of applying for judgment. Except as otherwise provided in this Section
or by ordinance or resolution enacted under subsection (c) of Section 21-40, all
applications for judgment and order of sale for taxes and special assessments
on delinquent properties and for judgment fixing the correct amount of any tax
paid under protest shall be made during the month of October. In those counties
which have adopted an ordinance under Section 21-40, the application for
judgment and order of sale for delinquent taxes or for judgment fixing the
correct amount of any tax paid under protest shall be made in December. In the
10 years next following the completion of a general reassessment of property
in any county with 3,000,000 or more inhabitants, made under an order of the
Department, applications for judgment and order of sale and for judgment fixing
the correct amount of any tax paid under protest shall be made as soon as may
be and on the day specified in the advertisement required by Section 21-110
and 21-115. If for any cause the court is not held on the day specified, the cause
shall stand continued, and it shall be unnecessary to re-advertise the list or
notice.” (Emphases added.) 35 ILCS 21-150 (West 1994).
Cases decided prior to 1995 would thus speak of the circuit court having
“jurisdiction to determine the validity of the assessment” in the application for
judgment and order of sale proceedings (First Lien Co. v. Markle, 31 Ill. 2d 431,
3
The Civic Federation is “ ‘an independent, non-partisan taxpayer watchdog and government
research organization.’ ” People ex rel. Devine v. Murphy, 181 Ill. 2d 522, 534 n.1 (1998). Its report
was incorporated as part of the legislative history of the 1995 amendments to the Code enacted by
Public Act 89-126 (eff. July 11, 1995). Devine, 181 Ill. 2d at 534 n.1.
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436 (1964)), because that is where the correctness of a contested assessment was
determined.
¶ 51 However, this is no longer the case. Amendments to the Code adopted by the
legislature in 1995 expressly removed the language (italicized in the statutory quote
above) that authorized the circuit court to determine the correctness of the tax when
a county collector makes an application for judgment and order of sale. See Pub.
Act 89-126 (eff. July 11, 1995) (amending 35 ILCS 200/21-110, 21-115, 21-150,
21-160, 21-170). Thus, under current law, a circuit court does not have the authority
to review the correctness of a contested assessment when a collector makes an
application for judgment and order of sale. That occurs in an entirely separate
proceeding, either in a tax objection complaint or in an appeal before the PTAB.
¶ 52 Section 22-75(b) of the Code states:
“Any order for the sale of property for delinquent taxes, except as otherwise
provided in this Section, shall estop all parties from raising any objections to
the order ***, which existed at or before the rendition of the order, and which
could have been presented as a defense to the application for the order. The
order itself is conclusive evidence of its regularity and validity in all collateral
proceedings ***. 35 ILCS 200/22-75(b) (West 2014).
The circuit court’s judgment and order of sale in this case could not preclude or
estop Grand Tower from seeking review of its 2014 and 2015 assessments before
the PTAB because Grand Tower was prohibited, as a matter of law, from
challenging those assessments in the circuit court proceeding. Simply put, Grand
Tower’s challenges to its assessments were not “objections *** which existed at or
before the rendition of the order, and which could have been presented as a defense
to the application for the order.” Id.
¶ 53 This court has long applied this understanding of estoppel within the context of
tax judgment proceedings and section 22-75(b). In Markle for example, this court
held that a taxpayer was estopped from challenging an assessment after the
judgment and order of sale had been entered because the objections to the
assessment “clearly existed prior to the rendition of the judgment and could have
been presented to the court as a defense to the collector’s application for judgment.”
Markle, 31 Ill. 2d at 437; see, e.g., United Legal Foundation v. Department of
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Revenue, 272 Ill. App. 3d 666 (1995) (a taxpayer was foreclosed from challenging
a tax judgment and order of sale where it had a statutory defense to the county
collector’s application that could have been raised in the circuit court). That is not
the case here. 4
¶ 54 A judgment and order of sale conclusively establishes that the property taxes
are delinquent and are to be sold at a tax sale. However, the entry of that judgment
does not estop a taxpayer under section 22-75(b) from pursuing a properly filed
appeal challenging an assessment before the PTAB. Accordingly, the appellate
court correctly affirmed the PTAB’s denial of the School District’s motion to
dismiss.
¶ 55 CONCLUSION
¶ 56 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court, which affirmed
the decision of the PTAB, is affirmed.
¶ 57 Appellate court judgment affirmed.
¶ 58 Board decision affirmed.
4 The School District does not contend that the common-law doctrine of res judicata precluded
Grand Tower from proceeding with its appeal before the PTAB. Nevertheless, the dissent discusses
this principle extensively in its analysis. That analysis is clearly misplaced in the context of this
case. The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court
of competent jurisdiction bars any subsequent actions between the same parties or their privies on
the same cause of action. Blumenthal v. Brewer, 2016 IL 118781, ¶ 42. Although the circuit court
rendered a final judgment in the application for judgment and order of sale proceeding, the School
District was not a party in that proceeding. Further, the circuit court proceeding and the
administrative proceeding did not concern the same cause of action: the former was an in rem action
brought by the Jackson County collector to establish whether Grand Tower’s taxes were delinquent
and should be sold at a tax sale, while the latter was a review of assessment complaints brought by
Grand Tower and was limited solely to determining the correctness of those assessments. See, e.g.,
Wand v. Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board, 2023 IL App (2d) 210150-U (noting that the PTAB’s
jurisdiction is limited to determining the correctness of a contested assessment).
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¶ 59 JUSTICE NEVILLE, dissenting:
¶ 60 This case turns on a simple and previously unquestioned principle: when a
defendant, served with process, fails to file a response to a complaint, the court has
authority to enter a default judgment finally determining the rights of the parties
concerning the matters raised in the complaint. See Saichek v. Lupa, 204 Ill. 2d 127
(2003). The Jackson County circuit court’s final default judgment of January 14,
2016, entered after Grand Tower failed to respond to the Jackson County collector’s
complaint, adopted the Jackson County board of review’s finding that Grand Tower
owed $2,557,423.91 in property taxes for 2014. The default judgment became
res judicata—a matter decided—after 30 days and barred a second assessment of
the 2014 taxes by the Property Tax Appeal Board (PTAB). According to section
22-75(b) of the Property Tax Code (Code) (35 ILCS 200/22-75(b) (West 2014)),
the Jackson County circuit court’s final default delinquency judgment also estopped
Grand Tower from challenging the amount of the assessment. By misconstruing the
res judicata effect of the Jackson County circuit court’s default judgment, entered
on January 14, 2016, and by ignoring section 22-75(b)’s estoppel of Grand Tower’s
appeal to PTAB, the majority’s decision permits an administrative agency to
contradict the circuit court’s order on the amount of Grand Tower’s liability for its
2014 property taxes. Accordingly, because the majority (1) disregards the
res judicata effect of the Jackson County circuit court’s January 14, 2016, judgment
as a bar to a second proceeding by PTAB to determine Grand Tower’s tax liability
for 2014; (2) misinterprets section 22-75(b) of the Code which, upon the entry of
the Jackson County circuit court’s January 14, 2016, default judgment, explicitly
estops Grand Tower from challenging the finding that it owed $2,557,423.91 in
unpaid taxes for 2014; and (3) ignores or misinterprets consistent well-reasoned
precedent construing the Code, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 61 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 62 A. The Board of Review’s Assessment
¶ 63 Grand Tower owns a large tract of land and a power generation facility in
Jackson County. The county assessor assessed the property for 2014 taxes, and
Grand Tower asked the board of review to reduce the assessment. On May 7, 2015,
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the board of review notified Grand Tower that it reduced the assessment of the
property to $31,538,245 for 2014.
¶ 64 On May 28, 2015, Grand Tower filed an appeal with PTAB, challenging the
2014 assessment. PTAB permitted Shawnee Community Unit School District No.
84 (School District) to intervene in the appeal.
¶ 65 While the appeal remained pending before PTAB, the county collector sent
Grand Tower a tax bill for 2014, with payment due in November 2015. Grand
Tower did not pay the taxes. Jackson County’s collector included Grand Tower’s
property on the delinquency list it prepared in December 2015. The list specified
the amount of unpaid taxes assessed against each property on the list. According to
the delinquency list, based on the board of review’s assessment, Grand Tower owed
$2,557,423.91 in unpaid taxes for 2014. The county collector applied to the Jackson
County circuit court for an order for sale of all the delinquent properties for the
unpaid taxes. Grand Tower filed no defense to the application for an order for sale.
¶ 66 The Jackson County circuit court, in accord with section 21-180 of the Code
(id. § 21-180), entered a judgment against Grand Tower’s property finding Grand
Tower liable for 2014 taxes in the amount of $2,557,423.91 and ordering the sale
of the property for the unpaid taxes. Grand Tower filed no appeal from the
delinquency judgment and the order for sale.
¶ 67 On January 19, 2016, a bidder at the tax sale purchased Grand Tower’s property
and paid the taxes of $2,557,423.91, as assessed by the board of review, in accord
with the delinquency judgment.
¶ 68 The taxes for 2015 followed a similar course: Grand Tower refused to pay the
taxes, the collector applied for a delinquency judgment, Grand Tower filed no
defense, the circuit court entered a default delinquency judgment against Grand
Tower’s property for the amount assessed by the board of review, and the bidder at
the sale for 2014 taxes also paid the 2015 taxes.
¶ 69 B. PTAB and the Appellate Court
¶ 70 In August 2016, the School District filed with PTAB a motion to dismiss Grand
Tower’s appeal because of Grand Tower’s failure to pay the 2014 taxes and the
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circuit court’s entry of a default judgment and an order for sale. PTAB denied the
motion.
¶ 71 Grand Tower redeemed the property in August 2017, 19 months after the
Jackson County circuit court entered its January 14, 2016, default delinquency
judgment and order for sale.
¶ 72 PTAB held a hearing and concluded that the property had a value of about one-
tenth of the value assessed by the board of review. PTAB’s order concluded with
only one form of relief: interested parties could apply to Jackson County’s treasurer
for a refund of taxes paid in excess of the amount due under PTAB’s assessment of
the property. The appellate court affirmed PTAB’s order. 2022 IL App (5th)
190266.
¶ 73 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 74 The majority misstates the central issue in this case. The School District does
not argue that payment of property taxes constitutes a condition precedent to filing
an appeal with PTAB. Supra ¶¶ 1, 20. The School District states at the outset of its
argument:
“With respect to PTAB appeals, the 30-day deadline in almost every
conceivable instance necessitates that taxpayers file PTAB appeals before their
tax bills are even calculated for the tax year in question. *** Therefore, in most
instances PTAB appeals must be filed months before taxpayers pay their taxes.”
The School District does not contend that property owners who choose to file
appeals with PTAB must pay the taxes before they come due.
¶ 75 Instead, the School District argues that Grand Tower could not continue its
appeal because the Jackson County circuit court’s default judgment of January 14,
2016, deprived PTAB of jurisdiction over Grand Tower’s appeal.
¶ 76 To address the issues argued by the School District, I will rely on cases
concerning the res judicata and estoppel effects of default judgments under the
Property Tax Code. Next, I will use the Code to analyze the School District’s
argument that Grand Tower’s refusal to pay taxes estops Grand Tower from
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challenging the judgment and seeking a second assessment with an appeal to PTAB.
Finally, I will conclude my analysis by questioning some of the assertions the
majority makes in support of its holding.
¶ 77 A. The Property Tax Code
¶ 78 The legislature set out the basic procedures for tax assessment in articles 9, 12,
and 18 of the Code. First, the county assessor determines the fair cash value for
each property. 35 ILCS 200/9-155 (West 2014). The county clerk later determines
the tax rate applicable to all properties’ assessed valuations. Id. § 18-45. The
assessed value times the tax rate equals the amount of property taxes the owner
must pay. Id. The county collector sends tax bills to all property owners in the
county and keeps a record of all payments. Id. §§ 20-5, 20-40.
¶ 79 Article 21 concerns collection when the owner has not timely paid the assessed
tax. See id. art. 21. After the due date for the payment of taxes, the collector must
publish a list of the delinquent properties, giving notice of the collector’s intent to
apply for a judgment of delinquency and an order for sale of the properties. Id. § 21-
110. The collector then applies to the circuit court for a delinquency judgment and
an order for tax sales of all properties remaining on the delinquency list. Id. §§ 21-
150, 21-160. The possible particular grounds for objecting to an application for
judgment and order for sale include the defense that “the tax or special assessments
were paid prior to the sale.” Id. § 22-75(b).
¶ 80 For all properties on the delinquency list for which the owner offers no defense
to the application for a judgment and an order for sale, the circuit court enters a
judgment “in favor of the People of the State of Illinois, for the amount of taxes
*** due thereon.” Id. § 21-180. The form of the court’s default delinquency order
has remained largely unchanged for more than 60 years. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1957,
ch. 120, ¶ 716. The judgment establishes “the amount of taxes *** due” for each
property for which the owner, like Grand Tower, presented no defense to the
application for a judgment and an order for sale. See 35 ILCS 200/21-180 (West
2014).
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¶ 81 B. The Res Judicata Effect of the Default Judgment
Entered Against Grand Tower’s Property
¶ 82 In accord with sections 21-150 and 21-160 (id. §§ 21-150, 21-160), in
December 2015, the collector for Jackson County applied to the court for an order
for sale of all delinquent properties, including Grand Tower’s property because
Grand Tower refused to pay the taxes due for 2014. Grand Tower did not assert any
defense to the application. Accordingly, on January 14, 2016, without any
objection, the circuit court entered a default judgment against Grand Tower’s
property in accord with section 21-180 (id. § 21-180). Based on the board of
review’s finding that the property had an assessed value of $31,538,245, the circuit
court ordered a sale of the property for unpaid taxes in the amount of $2,557,423.91,
as set out on the delinquency list. See id.; see McChesney v. People ex rel.
Kochersperger, 178 Ill. 542, 548 (1899) (court may enter default judgment against
delinquent lands for unpaid property taxes where owner asserts no defense).
¶ 83 Illinois courts have repeatedly held that a default judgment entered when a
property owner files no defense to an application for a delinquency judgment for
unpaid taxes conclusively determines the amount of the property owner’s tax
liability. Judgments by default have “the same preclusive effect under the doctrine
of res judicata as any other judgment.” Housing Authority for La Salle County v.
Young Men’s Christian Ass’n of Ottawa, 101 Ill. 2d 246, 251 (1984).
¶ 84 In People v. Hagerty, 104 Ill. App. 3d 240, 242 (1982), Hagerty failed to pay
the taxes due on her property, and the court, on the collector’s application, entered
an order for sale of the property. No bidder offered to pay the delinquent taxes, so
the State took ownership of the forfeited property. The State then sued Hagerty to
recover the unpaid taxes. Id. Hagerty argued that the county had imposed an
excessive assessed valuation on her property, leading to an overstatement of her tax
liability. Id. at 244. The Hagerty court held that the default judgment the court
entered because Hagerty filed no defense to the application for a delinquency
judgment conclusively determined the assessed value of the property and the
amount of Hagerty’s tax liability. Id. at 245.
¶ 85 In People v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 50 Ill. App. 3d 387, 389 (1977), the
court similarly held, “After judgment for taxes is entered against realty, the
judgment is conclusive evidence of the regularity and validity of the judgment
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unless the property is exempt from general taxes or where the tax is paid.” Again,
“the judgment entered on the collector’s application therefore must be deemed to
act as a bar to further litigation.” Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Tully, 76 Ill. App. 3d
336, 341 (1979); see also Vulcan Materials Co. v. Bee Construction, 96 Ill. 2d 159,
165 (1983).
¶ 86 The majority holds that the Jackson County circuit court’s judgment does not
conclusively establish the amount of taxes due, as it only “conclusively establishes
that the property taxes are delinquent and are to be sold at a tax sale.” Supra ¶ 54.
¶ 87 The collector alleged in its application that Grand Tower owed $2,557,423.91
in unpaid property taxes for 2014. “[D]efault judgments are always res judicata on
the ultimate claim or demand presented in the complaint.” Young Men’s Christian
Ass’n, 101 Ill. 2d at 251. Thus, the Jackson County circuit court’s default judgment
stands as res judicata on the collector’s ultimate claim that Grand Tower owed
$2,557,423.91 in unpaid property taxes for 2014.
¶ 88 The default judgment “constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action
involving the same claim, demand or cause of action.” People v. Kidd, 398 Ill. 405,
408 (1947). The proceeding on the collector’s application and the proceeding
before PTAB both addressed the collector’s ultimate claim that Grand Tower owed
$2,557,423.91 in unpaid property taxes for 2014. The only relief PTAB purported
to grant was a reduction of liability for property taxes, thereby clarifying that it
addressed the same claim or demand (that Grand Tower owed $2,557,423.91 in
unpaid property taxes owed for 2014) determined by the Jackson County circuit
court’s January 14, 2016, default judgment and order for sale. The circuit court’s
default judgment against Grand Tower “is conclusive not only as to every matter
which was offered to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other
matter which might have been offered for that purpose.” Barry v. Commonwealth
Edison Co., 374 Ill. 473, 478 (1940).
¶ 89 The proceedings before PTAB make this case very similar to First Lien Co. v.
Markle, 31 Ill. 2d 431 (1964), and United Legal Foundation v. Department of
Revenue, 272 Ill. App. 3d 666 (1995). In Markle, Markle objected to an error in the
assessor’s records that led to an overstatement of property taxes for 1956 and 1957.
Markle, 31 Ill. 2d at 433-44. The assessor acknowledged the error and reduced the
amount owed for 1956 and 1957. Id. at 434. The Cook County treasurer filed an
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application for a judgment and order of sale for the 1958 taxes on Markle’s
property. Id. at 432-33. Markle, relying on the objections he presented to the
assessor, filed no response to the application. Id. at 436. The circuit court entered
an unopposed judgment and order for sale of Markle’s property for the unpaid taxes
as alleged in the treasurer’s application. Id.
¶ 90 On appeal, this court noted that Markle had good cause for objecting to the tax
assessment, but the court held that the default delinquency judgment, entered
because Markle filed no response to the application, conclusively established the
amount of Markle’s liability for 1958 taxes. Id. at 437. The circuit court that entered
the default judgment had passed no judgment on the validity of Markle’s objections,
as Markle had not presented any defense to the application for judgment and order
for sale.
¶ 91 In United Legal Foundation, the United Legal Foundation and the Elijah
Muhammad Foundation (collectively, the Foundations) filed an application for an
exemption from property taxes for 1990. United Legal Foundation, 272 Ill. App.
3d at 668. When the Department of Revenue (Department) denied the application,
the Foundations filed a complaint for administrative review of the Department’s
decision. Id. In 1992, while the complaint for administrative review remained
pending, the Cook County treasurer filed an application for a judgment and order
for sale of the property for 1990 taxes. Id. at 673. The Foundations, relying on the
administrative review proceedings, filed no response to the application. Id. at 673-
74. The circuit court entered the unopposed judgment and order for sale in January
1993. Id. at 673 n.4. The United Legal Foundation court said, “If a taxpayer fails
to object to the [collector’s] application, the judgment and order of sale acts as a
default judgment against the property for the year in question.” Id. at 674. The
United Legal Foundation court held that the default judgment entered on the
treasurer’s application conclusively established the amount of the Foundations’
liability for 1990 taxes. Id. at 675-76. The circuit court had not passed judgment on
the Foundations’ claim for an exemption, as the Foundations had not presented any
defense to the application for judgment and order for sale.
¶ 92 Here, similarly, Grand Tower initiated proceedings to contest property taxes for
2014 before the taxes came due. Like Markle and the Foundations, Grand Tower
relied on the separate proceedings on its objections and filed no response to the
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application for judgment and order for sale. Like the circuit courts in Markle and
United Legal Foundation, the Jackson County circuit court here did not consider
any of the arguments raised in the separate proceedings on objections to the taxes,
as the parties did not present the arguments to the court. In all three cases, the
property owner’s failure to respond to the application led to the entry of a judgment
and order for sale for the amount of unpaid taxes. The results in Markle and United
Legal Foundation should control the result here: the default judgment entered when
Grand Tower failed to respond to the application for judgment established
conclusively the amount of Grand Tower’s liability for 2014 property taxes.
¶ 93 C. The Code Estops Grand Tower From
Contesting Its Property Taxes
¶ 94 Section 22-75 additionally clarifies the consequences of a default delinquency
judgment and an order for sale. In Markle, the court explained the circuit court’s
jurisdiction in a tax proceeding and the effect of the circuit court’s ruling in
delinquency proceedings:
“The trial court acquired in rem jurisdiction of the property and of the
subject matter upon the collector’s application for judgment and order of sale,
and therefore had the power to enter the judgment order against defendants’
lands. [Citations.] Whether the assessment was erroneous or illegal, the trial
court had the jurisdiction to determine the validity of the assessment, and that
determination, no matter how erroneous, is conclusive upon the parties after 30
days ***.
***
The finality of the tax judgment and order of sale was clearly established by
the legislature in section 270 of the Revenue Act when it provided as follows:
‘And any judgment for the sale of real estate for delinquent taxes, except as
otherwise provided in this section, shall estop all parties from raising any
objections thereto, or to a tax title based thereon, which existed at or before the
rendition of such judgment or decree, and could have been presented as a
defense to the application for such judgment in the court wherein the same was
rendered, and as to all such questions, the judgment itself shall be conclusive
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evidence of its regularity and validity in all collateral proceedings, except in
cases where the tax or special assessments have been paid or the real estate was
exempt from general taxes under this Act or was not subject to special
assessment.’ Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, chap. 120, par. 751 [(now codified at 35 ILCS
200/22-75)].
***
*** [T]he judgment and order of sale was conclusive as to defendants’
objections to the assessment which clearly existed prior to the rendition of the
judgment and could have been presented to the court as a defense to the
collector’s application for judgment.” Markle, 31 Ill. 2d at 436-37.
See Hagerty, 104 Ill. App. 3d at 245 (predecessor of section 22-75(b) estopped
Hagerty from contesting taxes established conclusively by the default delinquency
judgment).
¶ 95 Thus, under section 22-75, the Jackson County circuit court’s January 14, 2016,
default judgment and order for sale estops Grand Tower from objecting to the
assessment made part of the judgment for sale. See 35 ILCS 200/22-75(b) (West
2014).
¶ 96 D. The Majority’s Arguments
¶ 97 1. The Majority Misstates the Res Judicata Effect
of the Default Delinquency Judgment
¶ 98 The majority admits that article 22 of the Code (id. art. 22) applies to Grand
Tower’s property and permits enforcement of the default delinquency judgment
(supra ¶¶ 52, 54, but the majority holds that the judgment does not establish the
amount of taxes owed. Prior to today’s decision, Illinois courts consistently held
that default delinquency judgments stood as res judicata conclusively determining
the amount of taxes the property owner owed. See Markle, 31 Ill. 2d at 436-37;
Vulcan Materials, 96 Ill. 2d 159; United Legal Foundation, 272 Ill. App. 3d 666;
Hagerty, 104 Ill. App. 3d at 245; Tully, 76 Ill. App. 3d 336; Chicago Title & Trust,
50 Ill. App. 3d 387. The majority does not explain what constitutes a final judgment
establishing the amount of taxes owed for the properties on the delinquency list if
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the delinquency judgment, entered in accord with section 21-180, does not finally
determine the amount of taxes owed. See 35 ILCS 200/21-180 (West 2014).
¶ 99 The majority contends my analysis of res judicata is “misplaced.” Supra ¶ 53
n.4. “[A] reviewing court has a duty to consider its jurisdiction and to dismiss the
appeal if it determines that jurisdiction is wanting.” Archer Daniels Midland Co. v.
Barth, 103 Ill. 2d 536, 539 (1984). An adjudicative body has jurisdiction when it
has “the power to decide the matter involved.” Herb v. Pitcairn, 392 Ill. 151, 152
(1945).
¶ 100 Here, the judgment of the circuit court, finally establishing the amount of Grand
Tower’s property tax liability for 2014, left PTAB with nothing to decide.
Therefore, PTAB lacked jurisdiction over Grand Tower’s appeal, and the appellate
court had a duty to vacate PTAB’s order and dismiss the appeal.
“We have power to review judgments of the Appellate Court when they are
properly before us, but we cannot review a judgment which the Appellate Court
had no jurisdiction to render. *** [Where PTAB and the Appellate Court lack
jurisdiction], this court cannot entertain an appeal from that court for the
purpose of passing upon the merits of the case, but for the purpose, only, of
vacating or reversing the judgment of the Appellate Court, with directions to
dismiss the appeal.” Kowalczyk v. Swift & Co., 317 Ill. 312, 324 (1925).
¶ 101 The majority also suggests that res judicata does not apply because the School
District intervened only in the PTAB appeal and not also in the proceedings on the
delinquency petition. Supra ¶ 53 n.4. For res judicata to apply, the court must find
“an identity of parties or their privies.” People ex rel. Burris v. Progressive Land
Developers, Inc., 151 Ill. 2d 285, 294 (1992). “Privity is said to exist between
parties who adequately represent the same legal interests. [Citation.] It is the
identity of interest that controls in determining privity, not the nominal identity of
the parties [citation].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 296.
¶ 102 Jackson County collects tax revenues and distributes those revenues to fund
services throughout the county, including the services provided by the School
District. Thus, Jackson County and the School District, as cobeneficiaries of the
$2,557,423.91 collected from the purchaser in the tax sale of Grand Tower’s
property, share the same legal interest in the determination of Grand Tower’s tax
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liability in this case. Res judicata applies to the Jackson County circuit court’s final
determination of Grand Tower’s tax liability for 2014 property taxes and bars
PTAB from redetermining Grand Tower’s tax liability.
¶ 103 2. The Majority Misconstrues Section 16-185
¶ 104 According to the majority, the legislature in a single sentence both requires
payment of taxes when due and then establishes that the property owner has no
obligation to pay the taxes when due. Supra ¶ 26.
¶ 105 Section 16-185 provides,
“The extension of taxes on any assessment so appealed shall not be delayed by
any proceeding before the Board, and, in case the assessment is altered by the
Board, any taxes extended upon the unauthorized assessment or part thereof
shall be abated, or, if already paid, shall be refunded with interest as provided
in Section 23-20.” 35 ILCS 200/16-185 (West 2014).
In this context, the sentence means that, if PTAB completes its review before the
tax falls due, the property owner needs to pay only the tax found due by PTAB—
the decision “abate[s]” the tax. But, as in this case, if PTAB does not complete its
review before the tax comes due, the statute provides that “[t]he extension of taxes
on any assessment so appealed shall not be delayed by any proceeding before the
Board” and, therefore, the owner must pay the tax and PTAB may order a refund
of any overpayment.
¶ 106 3. The Majority Misconstrues Section 22-75
¶ 107 The majority asserts,
“The circuit court’s judgment and order of sale in this case could not preclude
or estop Grand Tower from seeking review of its 2014 and 2015 assessments
before the PTAB because Grand Tower was prohibited, as a matter of law, from
challenging those assessments in the circuit court proceeding. Simply put,
Grand Tower’s challenges to its assessments were not ‘objections *** which
existed at or before the rendition of the order, and which could have been
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presented as a defense to the application for the order.’ ” Supra ¶ 52 (quoting
35 ILCS 200/22-75(b) (West 2014)).
¶ 108 Grand Tower had the option of raising all its objections in court, rather than
filing an appeal to PTAB. See 35 ILCS 200/23-10 (West 2014). Even after it filed
the initial appeal to PTAB, it had the option of withdrawing the appeal to pursue
instead the court proceeding. And Grand Tower always had the option of keeping
its property off the delinquency list in the first place, and pursuing the appeal to
PTAB, by paying the taxes when due. See id. § 16-185. Because the facts that form
the basis for Grand Tower’s objection to the tax assessment were already available
to Grand Tower before entry of the default delinquency judgment, the objections
existed at or before the rendition of the order, and section 22-75(b) estops Grand
Tower from arguing against the amount of taxes found owing in the default
delinquency judgment. See Markle, 31 Ill. 2d at 436-37; 35 ILCS 200/22-75(b)
(West 2014).
¶ 109 4. The Majority Incorrectly Holds the
Legislature Relies on Tax Sales as
Complete Protection for the Collection of Taxes
¶ 110 The majority relies on the tax sale as adequate protection for the collection of
taxes. Supra ¶ 36. Illinois courts have observed that tax sales do not always meet
the county’s tax collection needs, as no law requires anyone to bid at the tax sale
and some properties go unsold. Hagerty, 104 Ill. App. 3d at 243; Tully, 76 Ill. App.
3d at 341; see 35 ILCS 200/21-260 (West 2014) (concerning sales when no bidder
offers to pay the full amount of the unpaid taxes).
¶ 111 5. The Majority Misconstrues the 1994
and 1995 Amendments to the Code
¶ 112 The majority relies on amendments to section 21 regarding the change in
procedures when the property owner pays the taxes under protest and files an
objection in circuit court challenging the tax. Supra ¶¶ 51-52. The 1994
amendments to the Code separated proceedings on tax objections in the circuit court
from proceedings on the collector’s application for default judgments by taking the
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properties for which the owner filed an objection under section 23-10 off the
delinquency list. Compare 35 ILCS 200/21-150 (West 1996) (“all applications for
judgment and order of sale for taxes and special assessments on delinquent
properties shall be made during the month of October”), with Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989,
ch. 120, ¶ 710 (“all applications for judgment and order of sale for taxes and special
assessments on delinquent lands and lots and for judgment fixing the correct
amount of any tax paid under protest shall be made during the month of October”).
The 1994 amendments to the Code did not alter the finality or effect of default
judgment in proceedings on the collector’s application for judgment and order for
sale of properties that remained on the delinquency list.
¶ 113 The majority asserts, “a circuit court does not have the authority to review the
correctness of a contested assessment when a collector makes an application for
judgment and order of sale. That occurs in an entirely separate proceeding, either
in a tax objection complaint or in an appeal before the PTAB.” Supra ¶ 51.
¶ 114 The court that addresses the application for judgment and orders for sale does
not pass judgment concerning objections filed under section 23-10 because
properties for which the owners paid the taxes under protest do not appear on the
delinquency list and therefore they do not appear on the application for judgment
and orders for sale. See 35 ILCS 200/21-150, 23-10 (West 2014). The court only
passes judgment on properties, like Grand Tower’s, on the delinquency list. The
Jackson County circuit court’s judgment and order for sale, according to section
21-180, establishes “the amount of taxes *** due” for each property on the
delinquency list. Id. § 21-180. The amendment to section 21-150 has no effect on
owners whose properties, like Grand Tower’s, appear on the delinquency list and
who fail to file a defense to the collector’s application for a judgment and an order
for sale.
¶ 115 6. The Legislature Did Not Include a Provision
for PTAB to Retain Jurisdiction Over Properties That
Appear on the Delinquency List
¶ 116 The majority asserts, “The legislature knows how to divest the PTAB of
jurisdiction.” Supra ¶ 45. The majority stresses that the Code does not explicitly
state that PTAB loses jurisdiction. See supra ¶¶ 44-45.
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¶ 117 Code provisions also show the legislature knew how to provide for continuing
jurisdiction of administrative agencies over properties that appear on the
delinquency list.
¶ 118 Section 21-175 of the Code provides that “if a defense is made that the property
*** is exempt from taxation and *** a proceeding to determine the exempt status
*** is pending ***, the court shall not enter a judgment relating to that property
until the proceedings *** have terminated.” 35 ILCS 200/21-175 (West 2014).
¶ 119 The Code includes no similar provision for continuing PTAB’s jurisdiction over
a pending claim that the board of review imposed an excessive tax. The absence of
a similar provision for cases in which an owner filed an appeal with PTAB shows
that the legislature intended the proceedings on the collector’s application to finally
determine the amount of the property owner’s tax liability, despite a pending appeal
before PTAB, if the property appeared on the delinquency list.
¶ 120 The Code did not need an explicit provision providing that PTAB loses
jurisdiction when the circuit court enters a default judgment because the
res judicata effect of the default judgment, entered because the property owner
failed to answer the application, established the amount of property taxes owed.
The Jackson County circuit court’s January 14, 2016, default judgment for
$2,557,423.91 in unpaid 2014 property taxes, after 30 days, became res judicata—
a matter decided—and left PTAB with nothing to decide, regardless of whether a
statute specifically states it loses jurisdiction.
¶ 121 7. The Majority’s Other Arguments Do
Not Support the Majority’s Decision
¶ 122 Next, the majority acknowledges the Civic Federation’s 1995 report as part of
the Code’s legislative history. Supra ¶ 50 n.3. The Civic Federation’s report did not
suggest any change to section 22-75(b) or to the res judicata effect of default
delinquency judgments.
¶ 123 Finally, the majority claims that a finding that a default delinquency judgment
finally determines a property owner’s tax liability would lead to the unfair result
that an owner could nullify a taxing body’s appeal to PTAB for an increase in the
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tax on the owner’s property. Supra ¶ 46. The majority says, “when a county files
an appeal with PTAB, a taxpayer could simply withhold payment of the property
taxes and wait until the county collector applies for the annual judgment and order
of sale, thereby divesting the PTAB of its jurisdiction to hear the county’s appeal.”
Supra ¶ 46. No provision of the Code prevents the county or another interested
taxing body from objecting to the entry of a default delinquency judgment on
grounds that the collector has not required a sufficient amount for the property tax
payment. The taxing body’s objection, like a timely defense from a property owner,
removes the property from the list of properties subject to the default delinquency
judgment, allowing PTAB to complete its review of the board of review’s
assessment of the property.
¶ 124 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 125 In 2016, the Jackson County circuit court, ruling on an application for a
judgment of tax liability and an order for sale, entered a final judgment holding that
Grand Tower owed $2,557,423.91 in unpaid taxes for 2014, based on the board of
review’s finding that the property had an assessed value of $31,538,245. No party
appealed from the Jackson County circuit court’s judgment. More than three years
later, PTAB entered an order with a conflicting finding that Grand Tower’s property
had a market value for 2014 that would support an assessed value of $3,333,000.
¶ 126 The majority’s decision affirming PTAB’s order leaves standing two
incompatible judgments for Grand Tower’s liability for 2014 property taxes and
ignores the res judicata effect of the Jackson County circuit court’s default
delinquency judgment. Prior to today’s decision, Illinois courts have consistently
held that a circuit court’s default judgment entered on an application for judgment
and order for sale for unpaid property taxes conclusively determines the amount of
taxes the property owner owes. Markle, 31 Ill. 2d at 436-37; United Legal
Foundation, 272 Ill. App. 3d 666; Hagerty, 104 Ill. App. 3d at 243; Vulcan
Materials, 96 Ill. 2d at 165; Tully, 76 Ill. App. 3d at 341; Chicago Title & Trust, 50
Ill. App. 3d at 389. Therefore, because the majority (1) ignores the res judicata
effect of the Jackson County circuit court’s judgment as a bar to a second
proceeding by PTAB to determine Grand Tower’s tax liability for 2014,
(2) misconstrues section 22-75(b) of the Code, which explicitly estops Grand
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Tower from challenging the finding that it owed $2,557,423.91 in unpaid taxes for
2014, (3) ignores or misinterprets consistent well-reasoned precedent, and
(4) destabilizes funding for Illinois counties by misconstruing the Code (35 ILCS
200/1-1 et seq. (West 2014)), I respectfully dissent.
¶ 127 JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE joins in this dissent.
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