Chason, Kimbrel v. Clark

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D2023-1901

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GLEN KIMBREL, in his official

capacity as Sheriff of Calhoun

County, Florida, and HUNTER

CHASON, individually,

Appellants,

v.

CHRISTINA CLARK,

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Calhoun County.

Brandon J. Young, Judge.

May 22, 2024

OSTERHAUS, C.J.,

After being arrested by officers responding to a domestic

incident at her home, Christina Clark sued the Calhoun County

Sheriff and a deputy for false arrest and battery. The Sheriff’s

Office defendants moved for summary judgment on sovereign

immunity grounds. They argued that responding officers had

probable cause to arrest Appellee for committing domestic battery

and only used the force necessary to secure her lawful arrest. After

the trial court partly denied their motion, The Sheriff’s Office

defendants appealed. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

I.

The Calhoun County Sheriff’s Office responded to Appellee’s

home after her husband sought help following a domestic

altercation. Appellant Sheriff’s Deputy Hunter Chason responded

and determined with another officer that both Appellee and her

husband had committed domestic battery. Both were placed under

arrest.

What happened next is disputed by the parties. Appellant

Chason testified that after he placed Appellee into the patrol car,

she became aggressive hitting and kicking at the vehicle’s door and

window. When Chason opened the door, Appellee pushed her way

past him. Then, when he attempted to return Appellee to the

vehicle, “she continued to resist, kicking me multiple times in the

stomach and in the chest and throat area.” In response, Chason

deployed his taser, which facilitated Appellee’s return to the back

seat of the vehicle.

Appellee told a different story. Her deposition testimony

acknowledged being arrested and placed in the patrol car. She

described tapping on the door with her knees to ask a question.

But then, according to Appellee, “Deputy Chason opened the door

[and] tased me twice.” Appellee says she never left the vehicle.

After her arrest, Appellee filed a civil complaint for false

imprisonment and battery against the Sheriff and Deputy Chason.

The Sheriff’s Office defendants filed answers and moved for

summary judgment on sovereign immunity grounds. After a

hearing, the trial court entered a written order partly granting and

partly denying summary judgment. On the false arrest counts, the

court ruled that Deputy Chason had probable cause to arrest

Appellee for the domestic battery involving her husband. But the

court stopped short of completely granting summary judgment on

her false arrest claims in view of disputed facts surrounding how

Appellee was treated at her arrest. Additionally, the court ruled

that it couldn’t resolve on summary judgment Appellee’s officer-

battery claims or whether reasonable force had been used “because

there is conflicting evidence regarding what occurred after

[Deputy] Chason made the decision to arrest [Appellee] for

domestic battery.” The Sheriff’s Office Defendants then appealed.

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II.

Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fla. R. Civ. P.

1.510(a). We have jurisdiction insofar as Florida Rule of Appellate

Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(F)(iii) authorizes this Court to review a

nonfinal order that denies a motion asserting sovereign immunity.

See Pollock v. Fla. Dep’t of Highway Patrol, 882 So. 2d 928, 933

(Fla. 2004) (“[B]asic judgmental or discretionary governmental

functions are immune from legal action.”). This Court reviews an

order granting summary judgment de novo. See, e.g., Carter Dev.

of Mass., LLC v. Howard, 285 So. 3d 367, 370 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019).

A.

Appellants argue, first, that the trial court erred by partly

denying their summary judgment motion on the false

imprisonment counts. They argue that because the court found

probable cause to arrest Appellee for the domestic battery

involving her husband, no false imprisonment should have

survived irrespective of the merits of Appellee’s officer-battery

claim. We agree.

“The tort of ‘false imprisonment’ or ‘false arrest’ is the

unlawful restraint of a person against his or her will, and the gist

of the action is the unlawful detention of the person and the

deprivation of his or her liberty.” Spears v. Albertson’s Inc., 848 So.

2d 1176, 1178 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). Because a detention must be

unlawful to proceed on this claim, probable cause is a defense to

false imprisonment. See Fla. Game and Freshwater Fish Com’n v.

Dockery, 676 So. 2d 471, 474 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (“To succeed in

their claim that they were entitled to the affirmative defense of

probable cause to the claim of false arrest, the defendants were

required to show that the facts and circumstances known to the

arresting officers were sufficient to cause a reasonably cautious

person to believe that the suspect was guilty of committing the

crime.”). When analyzing a probable cause defense, “[t]he validity

of an arrest does not turn on the offense announced by the officer

at the time; if there is a valid charge for which a person could have

been arrested, probable cause exists.” Daniel v. Village of Royal

Palm Beach, 889 So. 2d 988, 991 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (citing et al

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Jernigan v. State, 566 So.2d 39, 40 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)); see also

Garcia v. Casey, 75 F.4th 1176, 1187 (11th Cir. 2023) (“Under the

‘any-crime rule’ an officer is ‘insulate[d] from false-arrest claims so

long as probable cause existed to arrest the suspect for some crime,

even if it was not the crime the officer thought or said had

occurred.’”).

Here, the trial court found that law enforcement officers had

probable cause to arrest Appellee for the battery involving her

husband. That determination isn’t challenged on appeal. The other

disputed charge (battery on the officer) caused Appellee no

additional detention. Because probable cause existed to arrest

Appellee for domestic battery, Appellee’s detention was lawful. It

was error for the trial court to stop short of fully granting

Appellants’ motions for summary judgment as to both false

imprisonment claims. See Fla. Game and Freshwater Fish Com’n,

676 So. 2d at 474.

B.

Appellants’ second argument is that the trial court erred by

denying summary judgment on Appellee’s officer-battery

allegation. In reviewing the trial court’s order, we consider the

record evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant,

drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the conclusion that

Appellee has raised a jury issue on her battery claims. See Blue v.

Weinert, 284 So. 3d 1176, 1177 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (quoting Moore

v. Morris, 475 So. 2d 666, 668 (Fla. 1985) (“[A] party moving for

summary judgment must show conclusively the absence of any

genuine issue of material fact and the court must draw every

possible inference in favor of the party against whom a summary

judgment is sought.”).

A police officer may be liable for the use of excessive force (i.e.,

battery) while effectuating a lawful arrest. See, e.g., City of Miami

v. Sanders, 672 So. 2d 46, 47 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). Police officers

receive a presumption of good faith, however, as to the use of force

applied during a lawful arrest. City of Miami, 672 So. 2d at 47.

Officers are only liable for damage where the force used is “clearly

excessive.” Id. “[O]rdinary incidents of [an] arrest . . . do not give

rise to an independent tort.” Lester v. City of Tavares, 603 So. 2d

18, 19–20 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). § 776.05, Fla. Stat. (establishing

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that “[a] law enforcement officer . . . need not retreat or desist from

efforts to make a lawful arrest because of resistance or threatened

resistance to the arrest. The officer is justified in the use of any

force . . . [w]hich he or she reasonably believes to be necessary to

defend himself or herself or another from bodily harm when

making the arrest.”). Thus, battery claims for excessive force are

“analyzed by focusing upon whether the amount of force used was

reasonable under the circumstances.” City of Miami, 672 So. 2d at

47. If an officer uses excessive force, the “ordinarily protected use

of force . . . is transformed into a battery.” Id.

Appellants point to evidence showing that they used

reasonable force in arresting Appellee. But the trial court found

“conflicting evidence regarding what occurred” after the decision

was made to arrest Appellee for domestic battery. Appellant

Chason and Appellee gave materially conflicting accounts of the

arrest. Appellant Chason testified that Appellee pushed past him

and out of the patrol car and repeatedly kicked him before he

deployed his taser. While Appellee says that she never left the

vehicle and that Appellant Chason needlessly tased her twice

while she sat in the back seat.

On this record, we find no error in the trial court’s finding of

disputed material facts. A rational jury could seemingly side with

either parties’ version of events incident to Appellee’s arrest. And,

depending on these findings of fact, either Appellant might

possibly be liable. See, e.g., City of Boynton Beach v. Weiss, 120 So.

3d 606, 611 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (describing personal liability for

acts done in “bad faith or with malicious purpose or . . . disregard

of human rights, safety, or property”); (explaining how a

government employer could be “held liable for an employee’s

intentional act(s) as long as the employee is acting within the

course and scope of his employment and the act or omission is not

committed in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or in a manner

exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of the plaintiff's rights”).

We, therefore, AFFIRM in part and REVERSE in part and

remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

ROBERTS and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., concur.

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_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or

9.331.

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Alyssa M. Yarbrough and Timothy M. Warner, of Warner Law

Firm, P.A., Panama City, for Appellants.

Ashley N. Richardson and Marie A. Mattox, of Marie A. Mattox,

P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellee.

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