Opinion

Texas Department of Transportation v. Mark Self and Birgit Self

Court
Texas Supreme Court
Filed
May 17, 2024
Status
Published
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 16.1%

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Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Supreme Court of Texas

══════════

No. 22-0585

══════════

Texas Department of Transportation,

Petitioner,

v.

Mark Self and Birgit Self,

Respondents

═══════════════════════════════════════

On Petition for Review from the

Court of Appeals for the Second District of Texas

═══════════════════════════════════════

Argued November 30, 2023

JUSTICE BUSBY delivered the opinion of the Court.

Mark and Birgit Self sued the Texas Department of

Transportation (TxDOT), among other defendants, for negligence and

inverse condemnation after employees of a TxDOT subcontractor cut

down trees on the Selfs’ property outside the boundaries of the State’s

right-of-way easement. The court of appeals held that TxDOT’s

evidentiary plea to the jurisdiction failed on the negligence cause of

action but should have been granted on the cause of action for inverse

condemnation.

We disagree. As to negligence, the Selfs have not shown either

that the subcontractor’s employees were in TxDOT’s paid service or that

other TxDOT employees operated or used the motor-driven equipment

that cut down the trees, as required to waive immunity under the Tort

Claims Act. Regarding inverse condemnation, however, the Selfs have

alleged and offered evidence that TxDOT intentionally directed the

destruction of the trees as part of clearing the right-of-way for public

use. We therefore reverse the court of appeals’ judgment, render

judgment dismissing the negligence cause of action, and remand the

cause of action for inverse condemnation to the trial court for further

proceedings.

BACKGROUND

The Selfs own a tract of rural land that adjoins a portion of Farm-

to-Market Road 677 in Montague County and extends to the centerline

of that road. The State has a right-of-way easement that reaches fifty

feet from the centerline of the road in each direction and thus burdens

part of the Selfs’ property. The Selfs’ predecessors constructed a fence

along the edge of the easement, but the Selfs hired a contractor to

remove this decaying fence and construct a new fence. The Selfs offered

evidence that they instructed the fence contractor to “set the fence two

to three feet on [the Selfs’] side of the [right-of-way] easement” to

preserve large trees that had grown along the original fence and allow

“the trees and fence [to] be maintained.” As a result, a strip of the Selfs’

property two to three feet wide outside the new fence was not burdened

by the State’s right-of-way easement.

2

TxDOT started a highway maintenance project and, as part of

that project, contracted with T.F.R. Enterprises, Inc. (TFR) to remove

brush and trees from the right-of-way. Their contract provided that

“[t]rees to be removed shall be marked by the State,” either on the plans

or with an X painted on the trunk, “PRIOR TO WORK BEING

PERFORMED.” After TxDOT expressed concern about TFR’s ability to

complete the project on time, TFR notified TxDOT that it would increase

its production by “adding a separate tree removal crew.” TFR

subcontracted with Lyellco Inc. to remove the trees.

Following TxDOT’s revised instruction to TFR to “clear

everything between the fences,” Lyellco workers cut all trees up to the

Selfs’ fence line. After the Selfs complained, an email between TxDOT

employees acknowledged that a TxDOT inspector “did direct the

contractor to cut the trees down, but they were on the state highway side

of the fence.”

The Selfs sent a letter to TxDOT and attached a survey they had

obtained, which showed that twenty-eight oaks and elms with trunk

diameters ranging from eighteen to thirty-nine inches were removed

near their fence line—thirteen of which were wholly outside the State’s

right-of-way and seven of which were partly outside it. TxDOT indicated

in its interrogatory answers that it conducted “no surveys . . . in

association with this project” and “TxDOT is not aware of any

communications with [the Selfs] prior to clearing or maintaining of trees

or vegetation on this project.”

The Selfs obtained multiple estimates of the cost to replace the

twenty felled trees that had been located wholly or partly outside the

3

right-of-way with trees up to twenty inches in diameter (the largest

commercially available), and they sought $251,000 from TxDOT to

compensate them for this cost. TxDOT rejected their claim by letter,

explaining that the Attorney General’s Office investigated the matter

and concluded that TxDOT committed no act of negligence.

The Selfs sued TxDOT, contractor TFR, and subcontractor Lyellco

for removing trees from the Selfs’ land. They alleged two causes of

action against TxDOT: negligence and inverse condemnation.

TxDOT filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting immunity from

both causes of action. Regarding negligence, TxDOT argued that the

Selfs had not shown a TxDOT employee negligently damaged the trees

by operating or using motor-driven equipment. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. &

REM. CODE § 101.021(1). The Selfs responded that sovereign immunity

was waived because (1) the Lyellco employees who removed the trees

were TxDOT “employees” within the meaning of Section 101.001, and

(2) other TxDOT employees exercised such control over the motor-driven

equipment used to remove the trees that they “operated or used” that

equipment within the meaning of Section 101.021.

Turning to inverse condemnation, as relevant here, TxDOT

conceded that it directed TFR to remove the trees up to the fence line

but argued that the Selfs failed to offer evidence that TxDOT intended

to have trees removed from property outside its right-of-way. TxDOT

pointed to undisputed evidence that the trees were on the state highway

side of the fence and that the fence was not located at the edge of the

4

right-of-way. 1 The Selfs responded that TxDOT acted with sufficient

intent by countermanding the contract and ordering its contractor to

remove all trees up to the fence, and they pointed to the TxDOT

employee’s email acknowledging that a TxDOT inspector “did direct the

contractor to cut the trees down.”

The trial court denied TxDOT’s plea to the jurisdiction, and the

court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. As to the

negligence cause of action, the court of appeals ultimately concluded

there was a fact issue on whether the Texas Tort Claims Act waived

immunity, holding: (1) the trial court erred in identifying a factual

dispute regarding whether TxDOT operated or used motor-driven

equipment under Section 101.021; but (2) the trial court correctly

identified a fact issue about whether the Lyellco employees who did use

the equipment were TxDOT “employees” under Section 101.001 rather

than employees of an independent contractor. 683 S.W.3d 62, 73-88

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2022). Regarding the cause of action for inverse

condemnation, the court of appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment

and held there was no evidence that TxDOT intentionally destroyed the

Selfs’ property. See id. at 88-91. Both TxDOT and the Selfs filed

petitions for review, which we granted.

1 TxDOT also asserted that it thought the right-of-way ran to the fence

line, but the evidence it cited does not support that assertion. In any event,

our inverse condemnation analysis would be no different if TxDOT had

provided such evidence.

5

ANALYSIS

Sovereign immunity protects the State and its agencies and

subdivisions from suit and liability, PHI, Inc. v. Tex. Juv. Just. Dep’t,

593 S.W.3d 296, 301 (Tex. 2019), thereby depriving trial courts of

subject-matter jurisdiction over suits against them unless the State

consents. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217,

224 (Tex. 2004). Immunity is properly asserted in a plea to the

jurisdiction, id. at 225-26, which “may challenge the pleadings, the

existence of jurisdictional facts, or both.” Alamo Heights Indep. Sch.

Dist. v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755, 770 (Tex. 2018). We review the grant or

denial of a plea to the jurisdiction de novo, “determin[ing] whether the

plaintiff’s pleadings, construed in favor of the plaintiff, allege sufficient

facts affirmatively demonstrating the court’s jurisdiction to hear the

case.” Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. State, 381 S.W.3d 468, 476 (Tex.

2012). “If evidence central to the jurisdictional issue is submitted, it

should be considered in ruling on the plea to the jurisdiction” as

“[e]vidence submitted with the plea may rebut the pleadings and

undermine [the] waiver of immunity.” Id.

The parties’ petitions present the following issues for our decision.

In determining whether the Tort Claims Act waives TxDOT’s immunity

from the negligence cause of action, the first issue we must consider is

whether the Lyellco employees are TxDOT “employees” as defined by

Section 101.001 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. The second

issue is whether other TxDOT employees “operated” or “used” the motor-

driven equipment under Section 101.021 by exercising direct and

mandatory control over its use. Regarding the cause of action for inverse

6

condemnation, the issue before us is whether there is some evidence that

TxDOT acted with the required intent when it destroyed the Selfs’ trees.

We address each issue in turn.

I. The Tort Claims Act does not waive immunity from the

Selfs’ negligence claim.

As relevant here, the Tort Claims Act waives a governmental

unit’s immunity from suit and makes it liable for “property damage . . .

proximately caused by . . . the negligence of an employee acting within

his scope of employment” if the damage “arises from the operation or use

of . . . motor-driven equipment” and “the employee would be personally

liable to the claimant according to Texas law.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.

CODE § 101.021(1). The Selfs contend that their negligence claim falls

within this waiver for two reasons.

A. “Employee” under Section 101.001

First, the Selfs argue that the employees of subcontractor Lyellco

who cut down the trees are TxDOT “employees” as defined by Section

101.001, and thus their use of motor-driven equipment to destroy the

trees waives immunity under Section 101.021. Section 101.001(2) of the

Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides that

“Employee” [1] means a person, including an officer or

agent, who is in the paid service of a governmental unit by

competent authority, but [2] does not include an

independent contractor, an agent or employee of an

independent contractor, or a person who performs tasks

the details of which the governmental unit does not have

the legal right to control.

The court of appeals did not address the first part of the

definition: whether the Lyellco employees were “in the paid service of a

7

governmental unit by competent authority.” Rather, the court focused

on the exclusions listed in the second part of the definition and evaluated

whether the Lyellco employees fell into one of the excluded categories,

concluding they did not. 683 S.W.3d at 81-88. In so doing, the court

conducted the familiar employee-versus-independent-contractor

analysis that Texas courts have long used in this and other legal

contexts, 2 focusing on whether there was evidence that TxDOT

exercised sufficient control over Lyellco’s employees performing the tree

removal that they should be considered “employees” of TxDOT. See id.

In a footnote, the court observed that TxDOT had argued on rehearing

that Lyellco employees were paid by TFR and thus were not in the “paid

service of a governmental unit.” The court concluded that TxDOT

waived this argument by failing to raise it previously and thus declined

to “address TxDOT’s eleventh-hour issue.” Id. at 86 n.7.

This last conclusion was error for two reasons. First, TxDOT’s

“paid service” argument was not waived and should have been

considered. As subject-matter jurisdiction is never presumed and

cannot be waived, see Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852

S.W.2d 440, 443-44 (Tex. 1993), the issue can “‘be raised for the first

time on appeal by the parties or by the court,’ [and] a court is obliged to

ascertain that subject matter jurisdiction exists regardless of whether

2 See, e.g., JLB Builders, L.L.C. v. Hernandez, 622 S.W.3d 860, 865 (Tex.

2021); Limestone Prods. Distrib., Inc. v. McNamara, 71 S.W.3d 308, 312 (Tex.

2002); City of Houston v. Ranjel, 407 S.W.3d 880, 890-92 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.); Olivares v. Brown & Gay Eng’g, Inc., 401 S.W.3d

363, 377-78 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 461 S.W.3d 117 (Tex.

2015); EGBT Tex. Pipeline, L.P. v. Harris County Flood Control Dist., 176

S.W.3d 330, 336-38 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. dism’d).

8

the parties have questioned it.” Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. at Dallas v.

Loutzenhiser, 140 S.W.3d 351, 358-59 (Tex. 2004) (citations omitted).

Thus, an appellate court’s review of a plea to the jurisdiction is not

limited to the grounds set forth in the governmental unit’s plea in the

trial court. Dallas Metrocare Servs. v. Juarez, 420 S.W.3d 39, 41 (Tex.

2013) (“[A]n appellate court must consider all of a defendant’s immunity

arguments, whether the governmental entity raised other jurisdictional

arguments in the trial court or none at all.”); see also Rusk State Hosp.

v. Black, 392 S.W.3d 88, 95-96 (Tex. 2012).

Second, the first part of Section 101.001(2) defines “employee” as

a person in the “paid service of a governmental unit by competent

authority,” and the second part then narrows that category with various

exclusions. Under this definition, if the Lyellco employees were not in

TxDOT’s “paid service,” they cannot qualify as TxDOT employees even

if they do not fall within any of the exclusions. Accordingly, the court of

appeals should have addressed the parties’ dispute regarding “paid

service.” See Harris County v. Dillard, 883 S.W.2d 166, 167 (Tex. 1994)

(holding because there was “no dispute that Skeen was not in the paid

service of Harris County,” he was “therefore not an ‘employee’, within

the meaning of the Tort Claims Act,” and not reaching the exclusions);

Marino v. Lenoir, 526 S.W.3d 403, 406 (Tex. 2017) (concluding first that

Lenoir was “in the paid service” of a governmental unit and then

considering whether she was nonetheless excluded from the “employee”

definition by one of the statute’s exceptions). 3

3 See also Maldonado v. City of Pearsall, 977 F. Supp. 2d 646, 651-52

(W.D. Tex. 2013) (“[I]f a defendant fails to satisfy the ‘paid employment’ prong,

9

Turning to whether Lyellco’s employees were in TxDOT’s “paid

service,” TxDOT argues in its briefing for a strict “paycheck test”: a

requirement that the person receive payment directly from the

governmental unit. At oral argument, however, TxDOT conceded that

this test is too narrow. We agree and reject such a test.

One problem with a paycheck test is that the statute does not

include the phrase “paid by a governmental unit.” Instead, it uses the

broader phrase “in the paid service of a governmental unit by competent

authority.” That choice of words must be given meaning. Additionally,

the definition specifically excludes independent contractors, agents or

employees of independent contractors, and persons who perform tasks

the details of which the governmental unit does not have the legal right

to control. Many of these excluded persons and entities—for example,

employees of independent contractors—would not receive a paycheck

directly from the governmental unit. But excluding employees of

independent contractors in the second part of the definition indicates

that they could fall under the “paid service” umbrella of the first part.

Thus, a strict “paycheck test” would render this exclusion superfluous.

Relatedly, the phrase “by competent authority” indicates that some

person or entity other than the governmental unit itself can be made

competent—perhaps by law or contract—to place others in the unit’s

paid service. This phrase must likewise be given meaning.

A paycheck test would also be subject to easy manipulation in a

manner inconsistent with the concepts that the Legislature concluded

a court need not address whether the governmental unit had the right to

control the details of his assigned tasks.”).

10

should be the focus of whether immunity is waived, including control

and negligent operation of motor-driven equipment. See TEX. CIV. PRAC.

& REM. CODE §§ 101.001(2), 101.021(1). As long as a governmental unit

took steps to ensure its employees’ paychecks did not come directly from

the unit, its immunity would not be waived under a paycheck test

regardless of how much control it exerted over their negligent operation

of motor-driven equipment.

Moreover, the cases cited by TxDOT (1) stand for the limited

proposition that “paid service” excludes unpaid volunteers, which we do

not have in this case, and (2) themselves indicate that “paid service” has

a broader meaning than the paycheck test. For example, in Harris

County v. Dillard, we held that “a volunteer reserve deputy subject to

being called into service” but who had not been called into service “was

not in the paid service of Harris County at the time of the accident.” 883

S.W.2d at 167 (emphasis added). And in Murk v. Scheele, we similarly

held that a University of Texas medical student was not in the paid

service of the university because he received no monetary benefit other

than medical professional liability insurance coverage. 120 S.W.3d 865,

867 (Tex. 2003). Murk indicates that the question is instead whether

“part of” the person’s compensation “was ultimately paid by” the

governmental unit, id. (emphasis added), which suggests that direct

payment from the unit is not necessary to paid service.

As discussed below, the facts of this case do not require us to

define the precise contours of what constitutes “paid service.” But the

parties identify some cases from our courts of appeals that have

addressed whether particular people meet this statutory requirement

11

when they do not receive payment directly from a governmental unit, as

well as cases that have addressed similar issues in other legal contexts.

For example, two courts have held that workers are in the paid

service of a governmental unit when the unit pays them through a

staffing company based on timesheets they submit or when a contractor

bills the unit for reimbursement of the workers’ wages. 4 TxDOT also

cites a case addressing when an entity is an employer under the Labor

Code, arguing that this can be a helpful analogy in defining paid service

under the Tort Claims Act. See Risk Mgmt. Strategies, Inc. v. Tex.

Workforce Comm’n, 464 S.W.3d 864, 871-73 (Tex. App.—Austin 2015,

pet. dism’d) (holding trusts employed caregivers when management

company paid their wages and processed payroll but trusts reimbursed

company for their services). In City of Bellaire v. Johnson, for instance,

we concluded that a worker was “a person in the service of a political

subdivision who has been employed as provided by law” 5 for purposes of

workers’ compensation coverage because he “was paid by the City

through [a staffing company], and on the basis of the hours he reported

to the City.” 400 S.W.3d 922, 923 (Tex. 2013).

We do not endorse using any of these approaches to define “paid

service” in Section 101.001(2) today, as doing so is not necessary to

decide this case. Instead, we simply note that these authorities may

4 See Nickerson v. Pineda, No. 13-17-00346-CV, 2019 WL 2041774, at

*4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg May 9, 2019, pet. denied) (staffing

company); Miers v. Tex. A&M Univ. Sys. Health Sci. Ctr., 311 S.W.3d 577,

580-81 (Tex. App.—Waco 2009, no pet.) (reimbursement).

5 TEX. LAB. CODE § 504.001(2).

12

provide a useful starting point as courts and litigants attempt to develop

a more comprehensive test for “paid service” in future cases.

Here, the relationship between TxDOT and Lyellco’s employees is

far removed from the kinds of payment relationships that courts have

concluded amounts to paid service. TxDOT did not have any contractual

relationship with subcontractor Lyellco, which was retained by TxDOT’s

contractor TFR. And the TFR–Lyellco subcontract specifies that “the

payment provisions of the Contract between [TxDOT] and [TFR] are not

a part of this Subcontract and specifically are not incorporated by

reference.” Indeed, the record indicates that TxDOT paid TFR for tree

removal services on a per-tree basis, while TFR paid Lyellco on a per-

day basis. 6 There is no indication that these prices were substantially

similar. Nor is there any indication that TxDOT made payments that

“flowed through” TFR and Lyellco to Lyellco’s employees to compensate

them for their work, that TxDOT had any role in determining how much

Lyellco’s employees were paid, that any payment by TxDOT was a

prerequisite to TFR’s obligation to pay Lyellco or Lyellco’s obligation to

pay its employees, or that TxDOT had any reimbursement obligation

regarding subcontracted labor.

6 More specifically, TxDOT paid TFR for tree removal based on “unit

pricing”—that is, a per-tree price based on each tree’s diameter. The total

contract price was $335,907.50, subject to TxDOT-approved adjustments for

“additional trees to be removed (not on plans).” After TFR hired Lyellco to

conduct tree removal, Lyellco obtained payment by presenting TFR with “an

invoice every Monday for all Work performed and completed through the

previous week.” The record contains an invoice from Lyellco to TFR for “Tree

Removal” performed on July 20 through 24, with the amount due calculated by

multiplying a base rate of $1,500 per day by the number of work days.

13

For these reasons, we hold that Lyellco’s employees were not in

TxDOT’s paid service as required by Section 101.001(2), and therefore

they are not TxDOT employees whose operation or use of motor-driven

equipment could provide the basis for a waiver of immunity under

Section 101.021 of the Tort Claims Act. Because we hold that Lyellco’s

employees were not in TxDOT’s paid service, we do not address whether

those employees fall within one of Section 101.001(2)’s exclusions.

B. “Operation or use” under Section 101.021

The Selfs next argue that even if Lyellco’s employees who cut

down the Selfs’ trees do not qualify as employees in TxDOT’s paid

service, immunity is waived under Section 101.021 because other

TxDOT employees “operated” or “used” the motor-driven equipment that

cut down the trees by exercising direct and mandatory control over its

use. In reviewing this argument, we apply our conclusion in LeLeaux v.

Hamshire-Fannett Independent School District that a governmental

unit’s employee must negligently operate or use the motor-driven

equipment to satisfy this immunity waiver. 835 S.W.2d 49, 51 (Tex.

1992).

As noted above, Section 101.021(1) requires that the property

damage be caused by the employee’s negligence and that it arise from

the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle or piece of equipment. We

explained in LeLeaux that the statutory phrase

“arises from”, requires a nexus between the injury

negligently caused by a governmental employee and the

operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle or piece of

equipment. While the statute does not specify whose

operation or use is necessary—the employee’s, the person

who suffers injury, or some third party—we think the more

14

plausible reading is that the required operation or use is

that of the employee. This requirement is consistent with

the clear intent of the Act that the waiver of sovereign

immunity be limited.

Id.

But as the court of appeals explained in detail, there is a split in

authority on what it means for a government employee to “operat[e] or

use” a motor-driven vehicle or equipment as required by LeLeaux. Must

the employee be physically manning the controls of the vehicle or

equipment to “operate” or “use” it, or is it sufficient if the employee

exercises direct and mandatory control over the person at the controls?

The courts of appeals in County of Galveston v. Morgan, 882 S.W.2d 485

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied), and City of El

Campo v. Rubio, 980 S.W.2d 943 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg

1998, pet. dism’d w.o.j.), held that an employee of a governmental unit

can exercise such direct and mandatory control over motor-driven

vehicles or equipment that even though a private third party is

physically at the controls, the employee is operating or using the

equipment for purposes of Section 101.021.

Morgan involved a dump truck that contacted an electrical line.

The truck’s driver was an employee of a third-party contractor, but

county employees acted as spotters who told the driver when to move

forward and when to stop. Morgan reasoned:

There is no requirement [in Section 101.021] that the

vehicle in question be a county vehicle, only that a county

employee “used” or “operated” the vehicle. [LeLeaux, 835

S.W.2d at 51.] “Operation” refers to “a doing or performing

of a practical work,” and “use” means “to put or bring into

action or service; to employ for or apply to a given purpose.”

15

[Id.] The spotters in question were county employees.

They were a necessary part of the job. The spotters told

the truck driver when to move forward, how far to move,

when to raise his bed, how far to raise it, when to lower his

bed, and when to stop. The movement of the truck and the

laying of the gypsum was within the spotters’ sole

discretion. If a driver moved his truck contrary to the

spotters’ direction, he could be fired. Although the spotters

were not the drivers of the trucks, the spotters “used or

operated” the trucks by exercising complete control over

their “use or operation.”

882 S.W.2d at 490.

Rubio involved a police officer who arrested a driver for driving

with a suspended license. After arresting the driver, the officer ordered

the driver’s wife, who was not a licensed driver, to follow him in the

family’s vehicle to the police station and allegedly showed the wife how

to operate the vehicle by demonstrating the use of the gas and brake

pedals. When the officer pulled onto the highway, the wife followed him

as ordered and was struck by another car. Noting that LeLeaux defined

“use” broadly to include “bring into action” or “apply to a given purpose,”

980 S.W.2d at 946, the court concluded that the officer used the family’s

vehicle. Id. at 947.

Other courts of appeals have declined to follow Morgan and

Rubio, requiring instead that the government employee physically use

the motor-driven equipment to trigger Section 101.021’s waiver. See 683

S.W.3d at 75-80 (collecting cases). Because it is undisputed that

employees of Lyellco—not TxDOT—physically used the motor-driven

equipment to remove the trees, TxDOT would retain its immunity under

this line of cases.

16

This split may be a manifestation of the tension the Selfs identify

between LeLeaux’s reading of the statute and its plain text, which as

LeLeaux acknowledges does not expressly require the employee to use

or operate the motor-driven equipment. In PHI, Inc. v. Texas Juvenile

Justice Department, we recently explained that it was error for the court

of appeals to require that a government employee be actively operating

the vehicle at the time of the incident, as “no court has the authority,

under the guise of interpreting a statute, to engraft extra-statutory

requirements not found in a statute’s text.” 593 S.W.3d at 305.

As with the “paid service” issue, however, the facts of this case do

not require us to resolve the split. As the court of appeals observed, the

actions of TxDOT’s employees did not rise to the level of control that

cases like Morgan and Rubio determined was sufficient to create a fact

question on whether they were operating or using the equipment. See

683 S.W.3d at 80-81. The record indicates that TxDOT gave instructions

to TFR to clear trees beside the highway within certain parameters.

TFR then contracted with Lyellco to have Lyellco employees physically

remove the trees. These facts are not analogous to Morgan and Rubio,

which involved very precise direction by a government employee in close

physical proximity to the equipment being operated.

For these reasons, we hold that the Tort Claims Act does not

waive immunity for the Selfs’ negligence claim. Accordingly, the court

of appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s order denying TxDOT’s

plea to the jurisdiction regarding that cause of action, which must be

dismissed.

17

II. Evidence that TxDOT intentionally directed the trees’

destruction supports the Selfs’ claim for inverse

condemnation.

The Selfs also brought a cause of action against TxDOT seeking

compensation for inverse condemnation under Article I, Section 17 of

the Texas Constitution. The Selfs alleged that TxDOT and its agents

lacked “authority” or “consent” to enter the Selfs’ property outside the

right-of-way and that their acts in directing and implementing the

removal of trees outside the right-of-way were “physical” and

“intentional.” The Selfs also offered evidence that a TxDOT inspector

“did direct the contractor to cut the trees down.” But TxDOT responded,

and the court of appeals held, that the record “does not contain evidence

. . . that TxDOT acted with the requisite intent to support an inverse-

condemnation claim.” 683 S.W.3d at 88. To determine which position

is correct, we begin by examining the nature and requirements of a claim

for inverse condemnation.

“The protection of one’s right to own property is said to be one of

the most important purposes of government. That right has been

described as fundamental, natural, inherent, inalienable, not derived

from the legislature and as preexisting even constitutions.” Eggemeyer

v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex. 1977). The Texas Constitution

helps ensure that government fulfills this purpose by providing a robust

right to adequate compensation—and waiver of immunity—if a person’s

property is “taken, damaged, or destroyed for or applied to public use . . .

unless by the consent of such person.” TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17(a); see

Steele v. City of Houston, 603 S.W.2d 786, 791 (Tex. 1980). Our Takings

Clause protects against more types of government action than its federal

18

counterpart, 7 as it contains the additional verbs “damaged,” “destroyed,”

and “applied”—each of which creates a claim with its own distinct scope.

See City of Dallas v. Jennings, 142 S.W.3d 310, 313 n.2 (Tex. 2004);

Steele, 603 S.W.3d at 789-791. 8

“When the government takes private property without first

paying for it, the owner may recover damages for inverse

condemnation.” Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Gragg, 151 S.W.3d 546, 554

(Tex. 2004). 9 The elements of an inverse condemnation or “takings”

claim are that (1) an entity with eminent domain power intentionally

performed certain acts (2) that resulted in taking, damaging, or

destroying the property for, or applying it to, (3) public use. See, e.g.,

Sw. Bell Tel., L.P. v. Harris County Toll Rd. Auth., 282 S.W.3d 59, 62

(Tex. 2009); Gen. Servs. Comm’n v. Little–Tex Insulation Co., 39 S.W.3d

591, 598 (Tex. 2001). 10

7 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“nor shall private property be taken for public

use, without just compensation”).

8 See also City of Baytown v. Schrock, 645 S.W.3d 174, 182-84 (Tex.

2022) (Young, J., concurring); Jim Olive Photography v. Univ. of Houston Sys.,

624 S.W.3d 764, 780-82 (Tex. 2021) (Busby, J., concurring).

9 The action is “inverse” because an entity with the power of eminent

domain has not filed a statutory condemnation action to determine adequate

compensation before taking the property, so the owner initiates an action for

compensation under the Constitution. See City of Dallas v. Stewart, 361

S.W.3d 562, 567 (Tex. 2012).

10 Because takings that are threatened or completed for non-public

purposes are unlawful, property owners may obtain injunctive relief to prevent

or undo such takings. Jim Olive Photography, 624 S.W.3d at 781-82 (Busby,

J., concurring) (citing McCammon & Lang Lumber Co. v. Trinity & B.V. Ry.

Co., 133 S.W. 247, 248 (Tex. 1911)).

19

Although the Constitution does not expressly require an

intentional act, we have explained that such a requirement helps ensure

that the taking is for “public use.” See City of San Antonio v. Pollock,

284 S.W.3d 809, 820-21 (Tex. 2009). 11 An intentional act satisfying the

first element requires evidence that the entity either (a) “intended to

damage the property” or (b) “kn[ew] that [its conduct was] causing

identifiable harm” or that “specific property damage [was] substantially

certain to result from [the conduct].” Jennings, 142 S.W.3d at 313-14. 12

We explore these two Jennings standards for proving intent in more

detail below.

If a defendant files a plea to the jurisdiction showing that the

plaintiff has not alleged these elements and cannot amend its petition

to do so, or if the defendant negates an element in an evidentiary plea,

the takings claim must be dismissed. See City of Houston v. Carlson,

11 This requirement applies to both physical and regulatory takings.

For regulatory takings, the intentional acts are typically the passage of a law

or regulation or its actual or threatened application to the plaintiff’s property.

See Lowenberg v. City of Dallas, 168 S.W.3d 800, 802 (Tex. 2005); City of

Houston v. Maguire Oil Co., 342 S.W.3d 726, 742 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2011, pet. denied).

12 In Jennings, we rejected the government’s argument that it “must

necessarily intend to cause the damage,” recognizing that proof of knowledge

that the damage was “substantially certain to result” would also be sufficient.

142 S.W.3d at 314 (emphasis added). See also Schrock, 645 S.W.3d at 178 (“A

plaintiff must show that the government intended to or was substantially

certain that its actions would take or damage the property for public use.”);

Harris County Flood Control Dist. v. Kerr, 499 S.W.3d 793, 799 (Tex. 2016)

(“Generally, plaintiffs seeking recovery for a taking must prove the

government ‘intentionally took or damaged their property . . . or was

substantially certain that would be the result.” (quoting City of Keller v.

Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 808 (Tex. 2005))); Gragg, 151 S.W.3d at 555.

20

451 S.W.3d 828, 830 (Tex. 2014); Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226-28.

Although the fact-finder may need to “resolve disputed facts regarding

the extent of the governmental intrusion on the property, the ultimate

determination of whether the facts are sufficient to constitute a taking

is a question of law.” Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922,

933 (Tex. 1998).

Here, the Selfs alleged and the evidence shows that TxDOT

intended to damage the property: a TxDOT employee expressly directed

TxDOT’s agents to cut down the trees at issue, and it is undisputed at

this stage that doing so destroyed the Selfs’ personal property. The Selfs

owned the land on which the trees stood—and thus the trees

themselves—both within and outside TxDOT’s right-of-way easement.

And their survey shows that at least twenty of the felled trees were

wholly or partially outside the easement, so TxDOT cannot rely on that

easement to show consent. In addition, the record contains ample

evidence—including TxDOT’s contract with TFR—that TxDOT directed

the trees’ destruction as part of exercising its authority to maintain the

highway right-of-way for public use. 13 That is all the plain text of Article

13 As to the first element, one court of appeals has suggested that the

intentional act itself must be a proper exercise of the government’s lawful

authority. City of Webster v. Hunnicutt, 650 S.W.3d 792, 798 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, pet. denied). But we have not so held. Rather, we

also consider the context in which the act occurred, examining whether it is

part of a project that the government has legal authority to undertake for

public use—the third element. See State v. Hale, 146 S.W.2d 731, 736 (Tex.

1941) (“The true test is, did the State intentionally perform certain acts in the

exercise of its lawful authority to construct such highway for public use which

resulted in the taking or damaging of plaintiffs’ property . . . .”); see also Steele,

603 S.W.2d at 791.

21

I, Section 17 and our precedents require to maintain a constitutional

claim of compensation for inverse condemnation.

We have recognized certain defenses to and exceptions from

liability for inverse condemnation, but none apply here. For example,

although we have “refus[ed] to differentiate between an exercise of

police power, which excused compensation, and eminent domain, which

required compensation,” 14 we have taken into account historical

limitations on private property rights, holding that the government may

prove as a defense to compensation that it was abating a condition found

by a court to be a public nuisance 15 or was acting upon “great public

necessity,” such as conflagration or war. 16 In addition, we have

explained that the government’s exercise of express constitutional

powers inconsistent with compensation—such as the power to tax—does

not constitute a taking, 17 and Article I, Section 17 itself recognizes the

owner’s “consent” as a defense. Similarly, no compensation is owed

14 Steele, 603 S.W.2d at 789 (observing that this “dichotomy . . . has not

proved helpful in determining when private citizens affected by governmental

actions must be compensated”); see also Travelers’ Ins. Co. v. Marshall, 76

S.W.2d 1007, 1009-1011 (Tex. 1934) (rejecting argument that government has

authority “under the police power” to act contrary to the “rights, guaranties,

privileges, and restraints” in the Bill of Rights, which are expressly “excepted

out of the general powers of government” by Article I, Section 29).

15 Stewart, 361 S.W.3d at 569; City of Texarkana v. Reagan, 247 S.W.

816, 817-18 (Tex. 1923).

16 Steele, 603 S.W.2d at 792; see also Baker v. City of McKinney, 84 F.4th

378, 385-88 (5th Cir. 2023) (examining historical basis for necessity defense).

17 See Norris v. City of Waco, 57 Tex. 635, 643 (1882).

22

when the government acts on its rights under a contract to which the

parties have consented because it is not exercising sovereign powers. 18

We have also held that “mere negligence which eventually

contributes to the destruction of property is not a taking”; it is a

negligence claim on which the government is immune from suit absent

a waiver. City of Tyler v. Likes, 962 S.W.2d 489, 504-05 (Tex. 1997). In

contrast, as explained above, the Selfs have alleged and offered evidence

here that TxDOT is liable for adequate compensation because it

“intentionally perform[ed] certain acts in the exercise of its lawful

authority to [maintain the] highway for public use which resulted in the

taking or damaging of [their] property.” State v. Hale, 146 S.W.2d 731,

736 (Tex. 1941). 19

The court of appeals and TxDOT make two points in opposition to

this conclusion. Neither withstands scrutiny.

First, the court of appeals concluded that TxDOT’s intent should

be assessed under the second standard we announced in Jennings. See

683 S.W.3d at 89-90 (citing Jennings, 142 S.W.3d at 314). We disagree.

Applying the second Jennings standard is unnecessary in cases where,

as here, the intentional conduct of government agents is itself a taking,

18Little–Tex Insulation Co., 39 S.W.3d at 598-99; City of Anson v.

Harper, 216 S.W.3d 384, 392 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2006, no pet.) (“[W]hen the

State acts as a party to a contract and exercises the same rights as would a

private party, it is not acting as a sovereign, and a takings claim does not lie.”);

but cf. Harrison v. City of Sulphur Springs, 67 S.W. 515, 516 (Tex. Civ. App.—

Dallas 1902, no writ) (rejecting city’s argument of contractual consent to

physical taking of drainage channel because contract was not with property’s

true owner).

19 See also Kerr, 499 S.W.3d at 800 n.17 (quoting Hale, 146 S.W.2d at

736).

23

damaging, destruction, or appropriation of property. Such conduct

satisfies the first Jennings standard: that the government “intend[ed] to

cause the damage.” 142 S.W.3d at 314.

“[W]e have sought objective indicia of intent in particular contexts

to determine whether property has been taken or damaged in

furtherance of the public interest.” Gragg, 151 S.W.3d at 555. This

Court identified such a context in Jennings: cases in which the

government’s intentional conduct is not itself a physical taking,

damaging, or destruction of property but the conduct initiates a chain of

events that “eventually contributes to” such harm. 142 S.W.3d at 313.20

In that context, the property owner must show that the government

(1) engaged in an affirmative act or course of conduct that resulted in

the physical taking, damaging, destruction, or application of property;

and (2) did so with the necessary intent under the second Jennings

standard—that is, with knowledge that either the conduct was causing

identifiable harm or specific property damage was substantially certain

to result. Id. at 314; see also Harris County Flood Control Dist. v. Kerr,

499 S.W.3d 793, 799-800 (Tex. 2016).

These requirements ensure that when there is a causal chain

linking the intentional government conduct to the eventual property

20 See Jennings, 142 S.W.3d at 314 (addressing cases in which the

government “did not particularly desire [or intend for] the property to be

damaged” but damage was “incident to” or “a consequential result of” the

government’s intentional act); Koch v. Tex. Gen. Land Off., 273 S.W.3d 451,

459 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. denied) (“[T]he cases in which the [second]

Jennings intent standard has been applied involve circumstances in which the

governmental entity’s intentional act is not the actual physical taking or

damaging of property, but rather the cause of a physical taking or damaging

of property.”).

24

damage, that damage occurred for “public use” because the government

was aware harm was substantially certain “and yet determine[d] that

the benefit to the public outweigh[ed]” it. Jennings, 142 S.W.3d at 314;

see also Kerr, 499 S.W.3d at 806-07. 21 The Jennings standards also help

to draw the line between takings claims and negligence claims against

the government—which, as discussed above, are generally barred by

immunity unless a waiver applies. See Gragg, 151 S.W.3d at 554.

Unlike the facts at issue in Jennings, this case does not present a

context in which the government’s intentional conduct initiated a chain

of events that ultimately resulted in a taking of private property. Here,

TxDOT employees intended to physically destroy the trees for a public

use and directly ordered TxDOT’s agents to cut them down, which they

did. This intentional government conduct was not the cause of an

eventual taking—it was the taking. The second Jennings intent

standard serves no purpose in such cases. 22 By applying that standard

21 Several of our cases provide additional examples of causal-chain

scenarios in which the second Jennings standard is used to determine intent.

See, e.g., Kerr, 499 S.W.3d at 796-97 (applying standard when county’s

approval of “‘unmitigated’ upstream development, combined with a failure to

fully implement [a previously approved flood-control plan],” ultimately caused

flooding of plaintiffs’ homes); Gragg, 151 S.W.3d at 549 (applying standard

when construction and operation of water reservoir caused significant change

in flooding characteristics resulting in damage to plaintiff’s ranch); Jennings,

142 S.W.3d at 313 (applying standard when city’s unclogging of public sewer

led to sewage flooding plaintiffs’ home).

22 Koch, 273 S.W.3d at 459 (holding second Jennings standard

inapplicable when “the intentional act alleged is the physical taking and

dominion over the property at issue”); City of Anson, 216 S.W.3d at 393

(“[U]nlike Jennings, this is not an attenuated claim based upon unhappy

circumstance. Plaintiffs’ claim [for physical damage to their mineral estate] is

the direct result of the City’s dirt work.”); see also Maguire Oil Co., 342 S.W.3d

25

here, the court of appeals chose the wrong focus for its analysis of intent,

which contributed to another error that we discuss next.

Second, the court of appeals held the Selfs were required to prove

“that TxDOT intended to cut down those of the Selfs’ trees beyond the

right-of-way” and they failed to do so, as TxDOT simply “assumed trees

on the road side of the fence were in the right-of-way.” 683 S.W.3d at

90. Focusing on what it called the “impetus of” TxDOT’s intentional act,

the court saw “no evidence that TxDOT had any inkling that it was

damaging the Selfs’ trees when the area up to their fence was cleared.”

Id. at 91. TxDOT doubles down on this position in our Court, arguing

that it believed its instruction to clear trees between the fences would

ensure those trees were within its right-of-way easement. In TxDOT’s

view, no compensation is owed because the Selfs cannot show it “knew

that the trees at issue were . . . [not] in the right of way.”

Many Texas and federal courts have rejected such arguments, 23

and we join them in holding that the Constitution means what it says:

the government must pay compensation when it intentionally takes

private property for public use—even if the government mistakenly

believes that it has a legal right to do so apart from its power of eminent

domain. Of course, a takings claim will fail if the government’s belief

turns out to be correct. But the court of appeals’ approach would allow

the government to escape liability for inverse condemnation merely by

at 741-43 (holding second Jennings standard inapplicable to regulatory taking

given evidence of city’s intentional enforcement of ordinance); City of San

Antonio v. El Dorado Amusement Co., 195 S.W.3d 238, 245 (Tex. App.—San

Antonio 2006, pet. denied) (same given intentional approval of rezoning).

23 See, e.g., infra notes 25-27.

26

asserting that it owns or has rights to—or thought at the time of the

taking that it owned or had rights to—property it intentionally took,

damaged, destroyed, or appropriated for public use. That position finds

no support in the text of Article I, Section 17, is contrary to precedent,

and would “permit government to escape its constitutional duty to

compensate its citizens for destruction of their property.” Hansen v.

United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 76, 81 (2005).

The words of our Takings Clause do not remotely suggest that a

property owner must prove the government had a particular “impetus”

or mindset regarding whether its intentional taking of property for

public use was permissible. When the government wishes to take

property in which it has no rights, it need only exercise its power of

eminent domain by initiating a condemnation action and paying

compensation. The point of a constitutional action for inverse

condemnation is to allow private property owners to obtain

compensation for other intentional government conduct that takes,

damages, destroys, or appropriates their property for public use without

any valid legal basis other than eminent domain. See Labruzzo v.

United States, 144 Fed. Cl. 456, 473 (2019).

Nor do the “public use” element or the need to distinguish

between negligence and takings claims impel us to demand proof that

TxDOT acted in bad faith—that is, with subjective awareness that it

had no legal right to cut down the Selfs’ trees. As discussed above, these

considerations are already served by Jennings’ requirement that the

property owner prove intentional government conduct that either is a

taking itself or that the government knows is substantially certain to

27

result in a taking. And here, the Selfs have alleged and offered evidence

that TxDOT’s intentional conduct was itself a taking: it expressly

directed the trees’ destruction as part of clearing the right-of-way for

public use. Nothing more is necessary.

For these reasons, “[w]e are not persuaded that the State’s

subjective belief regarding its title to [or rights in] property, by itself,

changes or dictates the capacity in which the State acts. . . . [A]bsent

. . . a determination” that “the State is, in fact, the property owner” or

has other rights in the property, “the State’s intentional act of taking

property for public use is an exercise of its eminent domain powers” that

requires compensation. Koch v. Tex. Gen. Land Off., 273 S.W.3d 451,

458 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. denied). As we explained in City of

Dallas v. Stewart, although a government entity “commits no taking

when it abates what is, in fact, a public nuisance” as determined by a

court, the government cannot avoid paying compensation based simply

on its own declaration that the property is a nuisance. 361 S.W.3d 562,

569-570 (Tex. 2012). Thus, “[w]hether the [government] acted in good

faith in physically [taking] the [property,] or believed that [doing so] was

not a ‘taking’ of property as a constitutional matter, has no impact on

whether [its] act in taking the [property] was intentional.” Koch, 273

S.W.3d at 460. 24

This view—that the government must pay compensation when it

intentionally destroys private property for public use with the mistaken

24 In other words, “[w]hat matters is not whether the [government]

intended to violate a private property right. Rather, the requisite intent is

whether the [government] intended its physical [taking].” Labruzzo, 144 Fed.

Cl. at 474.

28

belief that it has a legal right to do so—is widely shared among Texas

and federal courts. Whether the claim is for a physical taking 25 or a

regulatory taking, 26 and whether the owner alleges that the

25 See, e.g., Glade v. Dietert, 295 S.W.2d 642, 643, 646-47 (Tex. 1956)

(concluding owner could obtain compensation for trees removed from property,

either by separate action or in subsequent condemnation proceeding, where

city “by inadvertence had failed to acquire the necessary additional . . . right of

way”); State v. BP Am. Prod. Co., 290 S.W.3d 345, 364-66 (Tex. App.—Austin

2009, pet. denied) (concluding owner alleged takings claim based on State’s

intentional leasing of minerals to third party notwithstanding State’s assertion

of ownership); City of Dallas v. VSC, LLC, 242 S.W.3d 584, 593 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2008) (“The City misreads Little–Tex Insulation Co. as requiring, for a

takings claim, that the government intend to act under its eminent domain

power.”), rev’d on other grounds, 347 S.W.3d 231 (Tex. 2011); Koch, 273 S.W.3d

at 458 (rejecting argument that government mineral owner’s claim of title to

disputed materials it removed from property of plaintiff surface owner

established lack of intent for takings claim); Porretto v. Patterson, 251 S.W.3d

701, 708 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.] (denying plea to

jurisdiction on physical takings claim where government asserted ownership

of private land and leased it to third party but later abandoned its assertion

and explaining that government cannot “claim immunity for a taking by simply

asserting title”); City of Anson, 216 S.W.3d at 391 (holding mineral owner’s

allegations and evidence established potential claim for damage caused by

city’s surface work despite city’s contention it was acting under its surface

ownership rights); Kenedy Mem’l Found. v. Mauro, 921 S.W.2d 278, 281-82

(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1995, writ denied) (holding inverse

condemnation claim survived jurisdictional plea despite State’s assertion of

title where foundation alleged that state mineral leases encroached on

foundation’s property); Harrison, 67 S.W. at 516 (concluding city took private

property by digging drainage channel where person from whom city obtained

consent proved not to be owner).

26 See, e.g., Maguire Oil Co., 342 S.W.3d at 743 (“[A] viable [regulatory]

inverse condemnation claim can be predicated on the City’s intentional but

erroneous enforcement of an ordinance that interferes with permissible

activity by the targeted entity.”); Barto Watson, Inc. v. City of Houston, 998

S.W.2d 637, 641-42 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. denied)

(allowing regulatory takings claim where city inspector improperly enforced

permit requirement to shut down sand pit that city later allowed to reopen).

29

government’s intentional conduct was itself the taking or that the

government knew its conduct was substantially certain to result in a

taking, 27 it is no answer for the government to argue “that the [property

owner’s] takings claim must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because

[it] had no intent to take the [owner’s property], but rather only to assert

the government’s ‘rights.’” Porretto v. Patterson, 251 S.W.3d 701, 709

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.).

Finally, requiring property owners to show that the government

subjectively believed it had no right to take their property would

eviscerate our constitutional bulwark against uncompensated takings.

When a plaintiff alleges a state taking of property and title

to that property is in dispute, the State cannot evade its

constitutional obligations merely by asserting that it

“believes” it is acting as landowner [or exercising other

legal rights] rather than [exercising eminent-domain

power] as sovereign regardless of whether that belief is, in

fact, accurate. Otherwise, the State would be in the

position of unilaterally determining the outcome of takings

disputes simply by declaring a subjective belief—whether

right or wrong—that it thought it owned [or had rights

regarding] the property. Takings jurisprudence does not

work this way.

Koch, 273 S.W.3d at 459.

Indeed, “if the government could claim immunity for a taking by

simply asserting title [or other rights], then it need never legally

condemn land—it ‘could simply appropriate it, and the landowner would

27 See Labruzzo, 144 Fed. Cl. at 474 n.13 (“Under either” an intentional

taking or intentional conduct substantially certain to result in a taking, “the

focus is on the nature of the government’s [invasion], not the government’s

mindset about the permissibility of its [invasion].”).

30

be entitled to no compensation unless the Legislature granted him

permission to sue.’” Porretto, 251 S.W.3d at 708 (quoting Griffin v.

Hawn, 341 S.W.2d 151, 153 (Tex. 1960)). And the government could

bulldoze anyone’s house without compensation simply by asserting a

belief—even a wholly unsupported one—that it had the legal right to do

so, regardless of whether that assertion was later withdrawn or

disproved. These are the very depredations that Article I, Section 17

was adopted to guard the people of Texas against.

We conclude that the government may not avoid paying

compensation for intentionally taking, damaging, destroying, or

appropriating private property for public use by showing that it acted

under the incorrect impression that it had a legal right to do so. 28

Because the Selfs have alleged and offered evidence of each required

element of their claim for inverse condemnation, the court of appeals

erred in dismissing that claim.

28 We note that when TxDOT directed the destruction of the Selfs’ trees,

it had access to all the information it needed to determine that its easement

rights did not extend to all those trees. An owner of property rights is

presumed to know the boundaries of its property. Garcia v. Palacios, 667

S.W.2d 225, 231 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Allen v.

Robbins, 347 S.W.2d 362, 366 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1961, no writ); see also

City of Anson, 216 S.W.3d at 393 (“The City’s chain of title establishes that it

was on actual notice of plaintiffs’ ownership interest.”). And the record shows

TxDOT had a map at its local office showing the width of its right-of-way

easement, which in any event was publicly recorded. In addition, TxDOT

identifies no authority—and we have found none—suggesting that an

easement holder is entitled to presume that a fence is located on the boundary

line of its easement.

31

CONCLUSION

The Selfs’ negligence cause of action against TxDOT is barred by

sovereign immunity because neither of the two theories offered by the

Selfs satisfies the waiver requirements of the Tort Claims Act. The Selfs

have a viable cause of action for inverse condemnation, however, as they

have raised a fact issue regarding whether TxDOT intentionally

destroyed the trees on their property for public use. We therefore

reverse the court of appeals’ judgment, render judgment dismissing the

Selfs’ cause of action for negligence, and remand their cause of action for

inverse condemnation to the trial court for further proceedings. See TEX.

R. APP. P. 60.2(c), (d).

J. Brett Busby

Justice

OPINION DELIVERED: May 17, 2024

32

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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