SETH WATSON v. CAROL MICI & Others.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule

23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,

as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties

and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's

decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire

court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.

A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,

2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted

above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260

n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

23-P-321

SETH WATSON

vs.

CAROL MICI1 & others.2

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff, Seth Watson, filed a complaint in Superior

Court seeking a declaration that the North Central Correctional

Institution (NCCI) library services policy relating to the

photocopying of legal documents by inmates and part of the

corresponding Department of Correction (DOC) regulation are

unconstitutional and an injunction against enforcement of the

NCCI policy. See 103 Code Mass. Regs. § 478 (2017). Watson

also sought compensatory and punitive damages against the

defendants for alleged violations of his constitutional rights

1 Individually and as Commissioner of Correction.

2Department of Correction; Matthew Divris, individually and

in his capacity as superintendent of North Central Correctional

Institution, Gardner; and Carolyn Murray, individually and in

her capacity as librarian at North Central Correctional

Institution, Gardner.

under G. L. c. 12, §§ 11H and 11I. The court sua sponte

dismissed the complaint against DOC for failure to complete

service. See Superior Court Standing Order 1-88 (2020). A

judge of the Superior Court subsequently allowed the remaining

defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint and Watson appealed.

We affirm.

Background. We recite the pertinent facts alleged in

Watson's complaint. Watson is incarcerated at NCCI. He has a

disability that interferes with his daily functions and causes

him severe pain when he types or sits for long periods of time.

In 2021, Watson's two minor children stopped visiting him at

NCCI. In May 2021, in response to his request, the Probate and

Family Court sent Watson a form to petition for visitation.

Watson was instructed to send copies of the petition to his

children's mother and her attorney. Citing the applicable

regulations, NCCI librarian Carolyn Murray denied Watson's

request to make two photocopies of the petition. She told him

that, notwithstanding his disability, he could type copies using

a typewriter. Due to his limited access to the library during

the COVID-19 pandemic and the pain associated with his

disability, Watson spent about a month typing the two copies,

thus delaying his petition for visitation. When Watson later

requested to photocopy his response to the opposition to his

petition, Murray again denied his request for two photocopies.

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Four days later, Watson finished typing the copies and mailed

them.

Discussion. 1. Request for declaratory and injunctive

relief. "We review the denial of a motion to dismiss de novo."

Drake v. Leicester, 484 Mass. 198, 199 (2020). "[T]he

fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts

requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation

and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners

with adequate law libraries . . . ." Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S.

343, 346 (1996), quoting Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828

(1977). Because Watson alleged that the defendants interfered

with his constitutional right of access to the courts, he had a

private right of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Watson alleges that the defendants denied his access to the

courts by refusing to provide photocopies of his legal

documents. At the time, NCCI's procedure stated that

photocopying services were available to inmates "for the purpose

of reproducing original legal documents . . . in support of

[c]riminal litigation challenging the inmate's sentence . . . or

in support of civil litigation challenging the conditions of

[his] confinement." Cf. 103 Code Mass. Regs. § 478.05 (2017).

In July 2022, the photocopying procedure expanded to include

"[o]ther original legal documents upon showing of legal need."

Because Watson seeks declaratory and injunctive relief with

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respect to a policy that is no longer in effect, his request for

equitable relief is moot. See Lynn v. Murrell, 489 Mass. 579,

582 (2022) ("A party no longer has a personal stake in a case

where a court can order no further effective relief" [quotations

and citation omitted]). Watson also asserts that the issue is

ripe for review because, even though the revised policy broadens

the category of legal documents for which photocopying services

are available, the corresponding DOC regulation was not

similarly amended. However, Watson does not contend that he

will imminently suffer an injury under the revised policy, thus

his claim is not yet ripe for review. See Department of

Community Affairs v. Massachusetts State College Bldg. Auth.,

378 Mass. 418, 422 (1979) (power to render declaratory and other

relief limited to cases where actual controversy has arisen).

Even if we reached Watson's challenge to NCCI's prior

policy, his argument would fail for multiple reasons. In

particular, Watson ultimately was able to use NCCI library

services to file his legal documents, albeit after some delay.

Slower access to the courts is not the same as denial of access

to the courts and does not constitute a substantial injury. See

Casey, 518 U.S. at 351-352 (injury suffered by inmate must be

substantial, such as dismissal of action or inability to file

complaint). Watson's challenge to the DOC regulation fails for

the same reason.

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2. Request for damages. Watson also sought damages

against the defendants under G. L. c. 12, §§ 11H and 11I. The

defendants assert that they have qualified immunity. To

determine whether a defendant is entitled to a defense of

qualified immunity, we consider

"(1) whether the facts taken in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff demonstrate that there was a violation of the

plaintiff's Federal constitutional or statutory rights;

(2) if so, whether at the time of the violation those

rights were clearly established; and (3) whether a

reasonable person in the defendant's position would

understand that his conduct violated those clearly

established rights" (footnote omitted).

Cristo v. Evangelidis, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 585, 590 (2016). As

discussed above, the defendants did not violate Watson's

constitutional right to access the courts because he was able to

file his legal documents. Even if Watson had alleged facts

suggesting that the defendants' conduct infringed on his right

to access the courts, however, any right to photocopies of the

documents was not clearly established at the time the defendants

relied on existing policy and regulations. See Longval v.

Commissioner of Correction, 448 Mass. 412, 418-419 (2007)

(qualified immunity is so broad that "all but the plainly

incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law" are immune

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to civil suits [citation omitted]). Thus, Watson's claim for

damages was properly dismissed for that reason as well.3

3. Department of Correction's dismissal from the

complaint. The decision whether to allow a motion for

reconsideration rests within the sound discretion of the motion

judge. See Audubon Hill S. Condominium Ass'n v. Community Ass'n

Underwriters of Am., Inc., 82 Mass. App. Ct. 461, 470 (2012).

The movant "should specify (1) changed circumstances such as

(a) newly discovered evidence or information, or (b) a

development of relevant law; or (2) a particular and

demonstrable error in the original ruling or decision"

(quotation omitted). Id.

On February 11, 2022, Watson moved to extend the February

25 deadline to perfect service of process on DOC to April 15,

2022. On March 22, 2022, Watson mailed the complaint to DOC.

At that time, no action had been taken on his motion to extend

the deadline. On May 27, 2022, the judge dismissed DOC from the

complaint. On June 21, 2022, the judge allowed Watson's motion

to extend the deadline to April 15, 2022. On July 27, 2022, the

judge denied the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of the

3 Similarly, even if we reached Watson's claims under G. L.

c. 12, §§ 11H and 11I, his complaint alleged no facts plausibly

suggesting that the defendants engaged in "threats,

intimidation, or coercion" and thus would be dismissed on that

ground. See Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636

(2008).

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dismissal. To support his motion, Watson offered proof that he

served DOC on March 22, 2022, after the February 25 deadline but

before the April 15 deadline that he had requested. We discern

no error in the judge's denial of the motion for reconsideration

where the deadline for service had passed at the time the court

dismissed DOC from the complaint. Moreover, even if the

complaint against DOC had been reinstated, it would have been

properly dismissed for at least the same reasons that apply to

the claims against the other defendants.

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Green, C.J.,

Englander & Brennan, JJ.4),

Assistant Clerk

Entered: May 17, 2024.

4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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