United States v. Joaquin Rivero

USCA11 Case: 23-10646 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 05/14/2024 Page: 1 of 20

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-10646

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JOAQUIN RIVERO,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket Nos. 1:98-cr-00023-JAL-2,

1:00-cr-00220-JAL-1

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-10646

____________________

____________________

No. 23-10923

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JOAQUIN RIVERO,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket Nos. 1:00-cr-00220-JAL-1,

1:98-cr-00023-JAL-2

____________________

Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

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23-10646 Opinion of the Court 3

Defendant-Appellant Joaquin Rivero appeals his 168-month

sentence for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine,

contempt of court, and failure to appear. Rivero argues that the

government violated a term of his plea agreement. According to

Rivero, the district court also erred in applying a firearms enhance-

ment and denying safety-value relief, and his sentence is unreason-

able. After careful review, we affirm.

I.

In 1998, a federal grand jury charged Rivero with conspiracy

to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§§ 841(a)(1) and 846 (Count 1), and possession with intent to dis-

tribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C.

§ 2 (Count 2). After pleading not guilty, the court released Rivero

on bond.

Pursuant to a written plea agreement, Rivero agreed to

plead guilty to Count 1 with the understanding that the govern-

ment would seek dismissal of Count 2 at the time of sentencing. In

the agreement, he agreed to forfeit $37,700 found in his home be-

cause the money “constitute[d] or was derived from proceeds, ob-

tained directly or indirectly, as a result of a violation of 21 U.S.C.

§§ 846 and 841(a)(1), and/or was used or intended to be used to

commit or to facilitate the commission of the said violation.” The

plea agreement also included that the government would recom-

mend safety valve relief if Rivero was found to not “have possessed

a firearm or other dangerous weapon in connection with the of-

fense.” At the change-of-plea hearing, the district court placed

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4 Opinion of the Court 23-10646

Rivero under oath, and Rivero confirmed that (1) he understood

the charge against him, (2) the prosecutor’s facts of the case were

correct, and (3) he did not have any changes to the facts.

Relevant to this appeal, drug task force officers observed

drugs being moved from a Cadillac to another car in a parking lot.1

Officers then identified the address to which the Cadillac was reg-

istered, surveilled the address, and watched Rivero drive away

from the address in the Cadillac. The officers stopped Rivero, and

he consented to the search of his residence. During the search,

agents found additional kilograms of cocaine in a storage shed be-

hind Rivero’s residence. In the storage shed with the cocaine, the

agents found scales, drug packaging materials, drug mixing agents,

and other paraphernalia having to do with drug distribution. The

agents also found $37,700 in his house and four guns in a bedroom

drawer in his house.

Rivero was arrested. He subsequently told the agents that

he possessed the cocaine for about four to five days and that it had

been brought to his house by a person known to Rivero as “Ger-

man” with instructions for Rivero to hold the cocaine until con-

tacted. Rivero confirmed that he gave 14 kilograms of cocaine to

another person. He told the agents that the cocaine paraphernalia

and scales found in the shed on his property belonged to him and

that he had been involved with distributing cocaine for about 1 to

1 The officers continued surveilling the car until two people got into the car

and left. The officers pulled over the vehicle and those in the car consented to

a search of the car, which contained 14 kilograms of cocaine.

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1½ years. He also stated that he had been told he would be given

$300 per kilogram for holding the cocaine at his residence.

After discussing the forfeiture and possible safety-valve re-

lief, Rivero confirmed that: the plea agreement was read to him

before he signed it; he signed it; he fully discussed the agreement

with his attorneys before signing it; he understood all the terms of

the agreement before signing it; and the terms summarized by the

court were the terms of his plea agreement with the government

as he understood them. The government recommended that

Rivero remain on bond pending sentencing, which the court al-

lowed.

A presentence investigation report (1998 PSI) indicated the

application of a two-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G.

§ 2D1.1(b)(1) based on the four firearms found in his house. The

1998 PSI also found Rivero ineligible for safety-valve relief under

U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2. Rivero objected to the two-level enhancement,

saying there was no connection to the offenses that he committed

because all the drugs and drug paraphernalia were found in a shed

in the back of his residence that was detached from his house and

that the weapons were found in his bedroom. He stated that, when

he entered into the plea agreement, both parties contemplated that

he would receive the benefits of the safety valve, as shown by the

language in the plea agreement. The government opposed.

At his sentencing hearing in June 1998, Rivero failed to ap-

pear, and a warrant was issued for his arrest. In March 2000, a fed-

eral grand jury charged Rivero in a new indictment with contempt

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of court, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 401(3), and failure to appear, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3146.

For over twenty years, Rivero lived in Costa Rica. But in

February 2020, Rivero was arrested while traveling through an air-

port in Panama City, Panama. He was returned to the Southern

District of Florida where he first pled not guilty to the 2000 indict-

ment. But without a plea agreement as to the 2020 charges, Rivero

later agreed to pled guilty to both counts, and the district court ac-

cepted his plea. The cases were consolidated for sentencing pur-

poses.

The new PSI (2020 PSI) described the conduct underlying

the 1998 conviction as detailed above but expanded on where the

money was found in Rivero’s house and clarified that the shed

where the cocaine was found had been unlocked. Additionally, the

2020 PSI said that officers found four handguns: a Smith & Wesson

semi-automatic firearm with a clip and 12 nine-millimeter bullets;

two .38 caliber Smith & Wesson firearms and two brown holsters;

and a .38 caliber long barrel Rossi firearm in a dresser in Rivero’s

master bedroom. The 2020 PSI also detailed Rivero’s fleeing from

Florida, his over twenty years in Costa Rica, and his arrest in the

Panama City airport.

Like the 1998 PSI, the 2020 PSI stated that Rivero was not

eligible for the safety-valve reduction because he was found in pos-

session of four firearms at his residence, which is also where drugs

and paraphernalia were stored. Based on a total offense level of 36

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and a criminal history category of I,2 Rivero’s guideline imprison-

ment range was 188 to 235 months. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2J1.6,

if sentencing for the 2000 indictment was imposed on the failure to

appear conviction, it must run consecutively to any other sentence

of imprisonment.

As he had done in 1998, Rivero again objected to the state-

ment that he was not eligible for safety-valve relief. He objected to

the two-level enhancement based on the four firearms. He re-

quested a downward variance and a 26-month term of imprison-

ment because he had a low criminal history score, was raised in an

orphanage in Cuba, was a father to four children, was low risk for

recidivism, was 86 years old, and suffered from multiple serious

health conditions.

The court held three separate sentencing hearings. At the

first one, Rivero sought to correct several alleged factual errors in

his 1998 PSI to which he had agreed in his plea agreement and dur-

ing his 1998 change‑of‑plea hearing. The government argued that

he was precluded from doing so.

At the second hearing, the district court found that prece-

dent precluded it from considering facts conflicting with state-

ments made during the 1998 Rule 11 guilty plea colloquy and con-

tained in the plea agreement. The court found that his objections

2 Starting with a base offense level of 32, the 2020 PSI added a two-level en-

hancement for possession of firearms and two levels for willfully obstructing

justice.

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to the facts previously admitted in the Rule 11 guilty plea colloquy

and contained in the plea agreement lacked merit. The govern-

ment did not need to present evidence because those facts were

admitted by Rivero—the $37,700 recovered in the house was drug

proceeds.

At the third hearing, the district court heard arguments on

Rivero’s objection to the firearms enhancement, again highlighting

the location of both the drugs (the shed) and guns (master bed-

room). The court found that the government met its initial burden

to show that Rivero possessed guns based on the factual proffer at

the 1998 Rule 11 hearing and the undisputed PSI findings that there

were four firearms present at the site of the charged conduct. After

considering Rivero’s arguments, the court found that Rivero did

not meet the burden required to demonstrate that a connection be-

tween the four firearms and the offense was clearly improbable.

The court next heard arguments on the safety-valve objec-

tion. Rivero again argued that his participation in the offense did

not involve guns and that there was no evidence in the record that

the guns were actually possessed in connection with the case or

used during the case. The government argued that it was still prob-

able that the guns were used in connection with the charged con-

duct for protection of the cash and the property generally where

the drugs were stored.

The court admitted that “it [was] a difficult question,” but

found it probable that the guns possessed by Rivero were possessed

in connection with the offense. The district court stated that “[t]he

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23-10646 Opinion of the Court 9

drugs were found on the property in the shed. This was his resi-

dence, the total property, and he has admitted that the cash was

from trafficking. I have no choice [but] to say that he does not

qualify for the safety valve.”

After confirming Rivero’s guideline range was 188 to 235

months, the court heard from Rivero where he allocuted and apol-

ogized for absconding. The government recommended a sentence

of 200 months’ imprisonment and emphasized that Rivero chose

to flee rather than accept responsibility for his actions in 1998.

The court sentenced Rivero to 168 months total imprison-

ment, 162 months attributed to the drug trafficking offense and 6

months each for the failure to appear and criminal contempt of

court offense, to run consecutively to the 1998 count and concur-

rently with each other. The court said that it considered the 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and the facts and circumstances of Rivero’s

case, as well as Rivero’s history and characteristics, the nature and

circumstances of Rivero’s offense. Rivero timely appealed.

II.

Rivero first argues that the government violated a term of

the plea agreement when it argued that he was not safety-valve el-

igible under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(2) and U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a)(2). Sec-

ond, he argues that the district court erred in determining that

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1)’s firearms enhancement applied to his drug

offense level. Third, he argues that the district court erred in deny-

ing safety‑valve relief pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(2) and

U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a)(2). Fourth, he argues that his 168-month total

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sentence is unreasonable. We will address each of his challenges in

turn.

A.

To begin, the government contends that Rivero’s argument

that the government breached the plea agreement is subject to

plain error review because he failed to object before the district

court. While we ordinarily review the alleged breach of a plea

agreement de novo, the government is correct in that we review

only for plain error if the issue was not raised below. United States

v. Malone, 51 F.4th 1311, 1318 (11th Cir. 2022).

Rivero asserts that he properly raised the objection, but a

review of the record belies that argument. Although Rivero argued

against the enhancement and in support of safety-valve relief, he

never argued to the district court that the government breached

the plea agreement or asked to hold the government to its promise.

See United States v. Massey, 443 F.3d 814, 819 (11th Cir. 2006) (ex-

plaining the defendant cannot preserve an argument by raising

facts underlying the argument if the facts were presented under a

different legal theory).

Thus, plain error applies and occurs where there is: “(1) an

error (2) that is plain and (3) that has affected the defendant’s sub-

stantial rights; and if the first three prongs are met, then a court

may exercise its discretion to correct the error if (4) the error seri-

ously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial

proceedings.” United States v. Madden, 733 F.3d 1314, 1320 (11th

Cir. 2013) (quotations omitted and alterations adopted). We have

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held that the government’s failure to abide by the plain text of a

plea agreement can satisfy the first two prongs of the plain error

test. See Malone, 51 F.4th at 1321.

Here, we find that no plain error occurred when the govern-

ment refused to recommend that Rivero receive safety-valve relief.

Rivero’s case is similar to our decision in United States v. Mahique.

150 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 1998). There, the government “agreed not

to oppose Mahique’s request to be sentenced under the safety-

valve provision ‘if he is eligible, and the Court makes appropriate

findings regarding the criteria.’” Id. at 1331. But at sentencing, the

government opposed the safety valve relief because Mahique fled

the jurisdiction and retracted several admissions he made during

his prior confession, and we found that “[t]he government did not

breach the plea agreement.” Id. at 1331–32. The government’s

promise in the plea agreement not to oppose Mahique’s request to

be sentenced under the safety-valve provision was conditioned on

him being eligible for the provision and the district court finding

that he met all criteria for application of the provision. Id. at 1332.

Here, the agreement said that the parties would jointly rec-

ommend safety-valve relief provided that Rivero was not found “to

have possessed a firearm or other dangerous weapon in connection

with the offense.” Although the language in this plea agreement

differs somewhat from the agreement in Mahique, the recommen-

dation of safety-valve relief was conditional on Rivero not having

been found to possess a firearm in connection with his offense.

And here, both probation via the 2020 PSI and the district court

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found Rivero possessed a firearm, so the government was not re-

quired to make the recommendation for safety-valve relief.

Thus, it was not plain error for the district court not to find

that the government breached the plea agreement by arguing

against safety-valve relief.

B.

“Whether a defendant possessed a firearm for purposes of

§ 2D1.1(b)(1) is a factual finding that we review under the clear-

error standard.” United States v. George, 872 F.3d 1197, 1204 (11th

Cir. 2017). For a finding to be clearly erroneous, we “must be left

with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been com-

mitted.” United States v. Rodriguez-Lopez, 363 F.3d 1134, 1137 (11th

Cir. 2004) (quotation marks omitted).

The Sentencing Guidelines provide for a two-level enhance-

ment in drug cases “[i]f a dangerous weapon . . . was possessed.”

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). The commentary for § 2D1.1(b)(1) pro-

vides 3 that “[t]he enhancement should be applied if the weapon

was present, unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was

3 We have held that a sentencing court may consider the Sentencing Commis-

sion’s interpretation of a Guideline as contained in the Commentary to the

extent that a Guideline is “genuinely ambiguous.” United States v. Dupree, 57

F.4th 1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 2023) (en banc). Neither Rivero nor the United

States makes any argument about whether the Guideline is ambiguous or

whether the district court properly relied on the commentary in applying this

enhancement. Thus, we leave whether U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) is ambiguous

for another day. See United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 873 (11th Cir. 2022)

(en banc).

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connected with the offense. For example, the enhancement would

not be applied if the defendant, arrested at the defendant’s resi-

dence, had an unloaded hunting rifle in the closet.” U.S.S.G.

§ 2D1.1, comment. (n.11(A)).

“To justify a firearms enhancement, the government must

either establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the firearm

was present at the site of the charged conduct or prove that the

defendant possessed a firearm during conduct associated with the

offense of conviction.” United States v. Stallings, 463 F.3d 1218, 1220

(11th Cir. 2006). We have recognized that close proximity between

weapons and drugs alone is sufficient for the government to meet

its initial burden under § 2D1.1(b)(1). United States v. Carillo-Ayala,

713 F.3d 82, 91–92 (11th Cir. 2013). The presence of the weapon

cannot be merely coincidental, and it must have some purpose or

effect to the offense. George, 872 F.3d at 1204. Evidence that a de-

fendant used or could have used a weapon to protect his criminal

activity is sufficient to show a connection between the weapon and

the offense and will thus satisfy the government’s burden under

§ 2D1.1(b)(1). See Carillo-Ayala, 713 F.3d at 92.

If the government meets its initial burden, the burden shifts

to the defendant, who has the opportunity to show that a connec-

tion between the weapon and the offense was “clearly improba-

ble.” Stallings, 463 F.3d at 1220. Failure to produce such evidence

permits a district court to apply the enhancement. United States v.

Hall, 46 F.3d 62, 63–64 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). The guidelines

impose a heavy burden to negate the connection and show that it

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14 Opinion of the Court 23-10646

is clearly improbable. Carillo-Ayala, 713 F.3d at 90; U.S.S.G.

§ 2D1.1, comment. (n.11(A)).

Here, the district court did not err in imposing a firearm en-

hancement under § 2D1.1(b)(1). First, Rivero kept guns at his

house, and he received and stored drugs on the property—in the

shed, based on the search of his property and his objections to the

PSI—on which the house was located. The guns were also found

near the money that Rivero admitted was drug proceeds. Rivero

also said that he received several kilograms of cocaine at his prop-

erty from German. Then on the day of his arrest, Rivero, at the

direction of German, removed 14 kilograms of cocaine from his

property and delivered it to German.

The record shows that Rivero kept both drugs and drug

money on the same premises as his guns. This evidence alone was

sufficient for the government to meet its burden under

§ 2D1.1(b)(1) by showing the guns were located at the site of the

offense conduct. Although Rivero argues that the house and the

shed are distinct locations, this argument is unavailing because he

could have used the firearms in his house to protect the drugs or

the drug money on his property, regardless of whether they were

located in the house. Carillo–Ayala, 713 F.3d at 94–95. We have

also rejected a similar argument and affirmed the same enhance-

ment (1) where a firearm found in the office area of a warehouse

was present at the site of the conduct, (2) when cocaine was found

“nearby in and around the warehouse” and (3) where drug

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transactions took place on warehouse premises. United States v.

Trujillo, 146 F.3d 838, 847 (11th Cir. 1998).

Next, the district court did not err in finding that Rivero

failed to show that a connection between the guns and the cocaine

was clearly improbable. Again, despite the drugs being kept in the

shed, Rivero admitted that the cash was drug proceeds which was

kept near the guns. So it is not clearly improbable that the guns

were kept to protect the drug proceeds. And although Rivero as-

serts that he possessed the guns before his involvement in drug traf-

ficking, he still failed to show why he would not also keep them to

protect the drugs or drug money on his property. 4 See id.

Thus, the district court did not err in applying the two-level

firearm enhancement.

C.

A district court’s factual findings and subsequent denial of

safety-valve relief are reviewed for clear error. United States v. Cruz,

106 F.3d 1553, 1557 (11th Cir. 1997).

For an offense violating 21 U.S.C. § 841, the safety-valve pro-

visions of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) and U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2 enable a district

court to disregard the statutory minimum sentence if five require-

ments are met. Relevant here, the second requirement for

4 Rivero also argues that the government’s return of the firearms to him shows

that it did not think the guns had a connection to Rivero’s drug trafficking.

But as the government notes, it was hard to verify the accuracy of this state-

ment twenty-five years later.

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16 Opinion of the Court 23-10646

safety-valve relief is that the defendant did not possess a gun “in

connection with the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(2); U.S.S.G.

§ 5C1.2(a)(2). Rivero has the burden of showing that he meets the

five factors for relief by a preponderance of the evidence, and that

it is more likely than not that he did not possess a firearm in con-

nection with the offense. See Carillo-Ayala, 713 F.3d at 90.

In considering the safety-valve, this court has held that “[a]

firearm found in close proximity to drugs or drug-related items

simply ‘has’—without any requirement for additional evidence—

the potential to facilitate the drug offense.” Id. at 92. “A defendant

seeking relief under the safety valve, despite his possession of a

weapon found in proximity to drug-related items, will have a diffi-

cult task in showing that, even so, there is no connection with the

drug offense so the safety valve applies.” Id. We also explained

that:

[w]hile other facts, such as whether the firearm is

loaded, or inside a locked container, might be relevant

to negate a connection, there is a strong presumption

that a defendant aware of the weapon’s presence will

think of using it if his illegal activities are threatened.

The firearm’s potential use is critical. The Sentencing

Commission gives special status to guns found in

proximity to drugs.

Id.

“[N]ot all defendants who receive the enhancement under

§ 2D1.1(b)(1) are precluded from” safety-valve relief. Id. at 91. If

the enhancement applies but the defendant also seeks safety-valve

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relief, “the district court must determine whether the facts of the

case show that a connection between the firearm and the offense,

though possible, is not probable.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

But “[t]he number of defendants who meet both guidelines will un-

doubtedly be rare.” Id.

Here, the district court correctly made individual findings

and addressed the different standards for the § 2D1.1(b)(1) en-

hancement and § 5C1.2(a)(2)’s safety-valve relief. The district

court also noted that the question of whether safety-valve relief ap-

plied was a difficult one.

Thus, the district court did not clearly err in finding that

Rivero failed to meet this burden. In attempting to establish that

he did not possess a firearm “in connection with” the charged drug

offenses, Rivero largely repeats the arguments used in opposition

to the firearm enhancement. Rivero points to the guns being inside

his bedroom away from where the drugs were found (in the shed)

and that he had possessed the firearms for years before he began

his drug activities. Although the burden is lower, these arguments

still fall short for reasons explained above. Even though Rivero has

pointed to some evidence that might call into question the presence

or purpose of his firearm, he has not shown that it is “more likely

than not” that firearms found in his bedroom near the money from

his drug proceeds was not possessed “in connection with” his drug

sales.

The district court reiterated Rivero’s admission that the

money found in his bedroom was the proceeds of drug trafficking.

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18 Opinion of the Court 23-10646

It is a permissible view of the evidence that Rivero possessed the

gun in part to protect himself and his drug proceeds and that the

gun was thus possessed in connection with the offense. See United

States v. Smith, 821 F.3d 1293, 1302 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Where there

are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact-finder’s choice

between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” (quotation marks and

alteration omitted)).

Because the guns were found in a house where drugs and

money were also found on the property, the record does not leave

us with “a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been

committed” by the district court in denying Rivero safety-valve re-

lief. See Rodriguez-Lopez, 363 F.3d at 1137.

D.

When reviewing the procedural and substantive reasonable-

ness of a sentence, we apply a deferential abuse-of-discretion stand-

ard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).

To determine whether a sentence is procedurally reasona-

ble, we ask whether “the district court: (1) properly calculated the

Guidelines range; (2) treated the Guidelines as advisory; (3) consid-

ered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors; (4) did not select a sentence

based on clearly erroneous facts; and (5) adequately explained the

chosen sentence.” United States v. Wayerski, 624 F.3d 1342, 1353

(11th Cir. 2010).

We will consider a sentence substantively unreasonable

only if “we are left with a definite and firm conviction that the dis-

trict court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the

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§ 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range

of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” United

States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quota-

tion marks omitted). A district court abuses its discretion when it

“(1) fails to afford consideration to relevant factors that were due

significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper or

irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in con-

sidering the proper factors.” Id. at 1189 (quotation marks omitted).

“A sentence imposed well below the statutory maximum penalty

is an indicator of a reasonable sentence.” United States v. Dougherty,

754 F.3d 1353, 1362 (11th Cir. 2014).

As discussed above, the district court did not err in calculat-

ing Rivero’s sentence. The court also treated the guidelines as ad-

visory, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, did not select a

sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, and adequately ex-

plained the chosen sentence. Therefore, Rivero’s sentence is not

procedurally unreasonable.

Rivero fails to meet his burden to show that his 168-month

total sentence is substantively unreasonable as the district court did

not abuse its discretion in weighing the § 3553(a) factors, including

the relevant offense conduct and conduct surrounding his obstruc-

tion of justice enhancement. Further, Rivero’s sentence was below

the Guidelines range and the statutory maximum penalty.

III.

As a result, the government did not breach Rivero’s plea

agreement. Under the plain error standard, Rivero cannot show

USCA11 Case: 23-10646 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 05/14/2024 Page: 20 of 20

20 Opinion of the Court 23-10646

that the government failed to abide by the plain text of the agree-

ment regarding the safety-valve recommendation. Next, the dis-

trict court did not clearly err in applying the two-level firearm en-

hancement because the guns were found in the house with the

money that Rivero admitted constituted drug proceeds and illegal

drugs were found on the same property. Additionally, the court

did not clearly err in finding that Rivero did not qualify for safety-

valve relief because it was probable that Rivero possessed guns in

connection with his offense conduct. Lastly, Rivero’s total sen-

tence is neither procedurally nor substantively unreasonable.

Thus, we affirm Rivero’s convictions and sentences.

AFFIRMED.