Opinion

Vernice James v. Social Security Administration

Court: Merit Systems Protection Board
Filed: May 6, 2024
Status: Unpublished
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 16.0%

finding that an appellant must receive explicit information on what is required to establish an appealable jurisdictional issue

How later courts described this case

finding that an appellant must receive explicit information on what is required to establish an appealable jurisdictional issue
explaining that collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, is appropriate when: (1) an issue is identical to that involved in the prior action, (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior action, (3

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

VERNICE LOCKHART JAMES, DOCKET NUMBERS

Appellant, AT-3443-17-0753-I-1

AT-3443-18-0058-I-1

SOCIAL SECURITY

ADMINISTRATION, DATE: May 6, 2024

Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Vernice Lockhart James , Columbia, South Carolina, pro se.

Avni D. Gandhi and Megan Cleary Deponte , Atlanta, Georgia,

for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman

Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed petitions for review of the initial decisions in these

appeals, which dismissed each appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Generally, we

grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial

decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based

A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).

on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application

of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either

the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required

procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the

outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available

that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record

closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R.

§ 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in these appeals, we JOIN them

for adjudication on review under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.36. 2 We conclude that the

petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the

petitions for review. Therefore, we DENY the petitions for review. Except as

expressly MODIFIED to VACATE the administrative judge’s finding in MSPB

Docket No. AT-3443-17-0753-I-1 that the appellant’s whistleblower claim is

barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel and to dismiss the appellant’s

whistleblowing claims as untimely filed, we AFFIRM the initial decisions.

BACKGROUND

On July 25, 2014, the appellant filed an individual right of action (IRA)

appeal contesting several matters, including nonselection for a position. James v.

Social Security Administration, MSPB Docket No. AT-3443-14-0870-I-1, Final

Order, ¶ 2 (Feb. 11, 2015). On February 11, 2015, the Board issued a final

decision dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Id., ¶ 1.

On July 1, 2015, the appellant filed a tort claim with the agency’s Office of

General Counsel and subsequently pursued that claim in U.S. district court under

the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). James v. Social Security Administration,

MSPB Docket No. AT-3443-17-0753-I-1, Initial Appeal File (0753 IAF), Tab 9

Joinder of two or more appeals filed by the same appellant is appropriate when doing

so would expedite processing of the cases and not adversely affect the interests of the

parties. Tarr v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 115 M.S.P.R. 216, ¶ 9 (2010); 5 C.F.R.

§ 1201.36(a)(2), (b). We find that these appeals meet the regulatory criteria, and

therefore, we join them. See Tarr, 115 M.S.P.R. 216, ¶ 9.

at 5, Tab 1 at 4. She asserted that the district court denied her claim, finding that,

because her tort claim arose from her Federal employment, she must seek redress

under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111.

0753 IAF, Tab 1 at 5-6. On August 29, 2017, she filed the first of the two

appeals joined herein. 0753 IAF, Tab 1.

In addition to raising her FTCA claim, the appellant challenged her

nonselection for a “lead” position in the agency’s Training Cadre Program, and

contended that the agency also denied her the opportunity to participate in its

equal employment opportunity (EEO) counselors’ program and its Growth and

Enrichment in the Atlanta Region (GEAR) 3 program. Id. at 4-5. As with her

FTCA claim, the appellant contended that the Chief Administrative Judge in her

office slandered and libeled her and she asserted that his actions resulted in her

not being selected for those programs. 0753 IAF, Tab 9 at 4. The appellant

indicated that she filed a complaint with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC)

concerning her allegations. Id.

The administrative judge dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

0753 IAF, Tab 15, Initial Decision (0753 ID). Because he found that the

appellant’s whistleblower claims were identical to the claims she previously

pursued in MSPB Docket No. AT-3443-14-0870-I-1, the administrative judge

found that she was collaterally estopped from establishing Board jurisdiction over

them. 0753 ID at 3-4. The administrative judge considered whether the agency

had taken a suitability action against the appellant, but found that neither the

agency nor OPM had done so. 0753 ID at 5. The administrative judge also found

Although the administrative judge in one of these appeals wrote in his initial decision

that the GEAR acronym represents Goals-Engagement-Accountability-Results, the

vacancy announcement for the program position instead indicates that the acronym

stands for Growth and Enrichment in the Atlanta Region. James v. Social Security

Administration, MSPB Docket No. AT-3443-18-0058-I-1, Tab 10, Initial Decision at 1,

Tab 9 at 2. We find that the administrative judge’s error harmless. See Panter v.

Department of the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984) (finding that an adjudicatory

error that is not prejudicial to a party’s substantive rights provides no basis for reversal

of an initial decision).

that the appellant failed to raise an appealable employment practices claim

because she failed to identify any action by OPM that violated a basic

requirement set forth in 5 C.F.R. § 300.103 concerning any of the nonselections

she alleged. 0753 ID at 5. The administrative judge further found that the Board

lacks jurisdiction over the appellant’s FTCA claim. 0753 ID at 6.

While the 0753 appeal was still pending before the administrative judge,

the appellant filed the second appeal we have joined in this Final Order. James v.

Social Security Administration, MSPB Docket No. AT-3443-18-0058-I-1, Initial

Appeal File (0058 IAF), Tab 1. She argued therein that the score she received

during the selection process for the GEAR program violated 5 U.S.C.

§ 2302(b)(8). 0058 IAF, Tab 8 at 4. The administrative judge issued an initial

decision that dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the

appellant’s purported protected disclosure concerning the score she received, or

the agency’s implementation of the GEAR program, could not have been in

retaliation for her disclosure because she received her score before she made the

disclosure. 0058 IAF, Tab 10, Initial Decision (0058 ID) at 2.

The appellant has filed petitions for review in both appeals. James v.

Social Security Administration, MSPB Docket No. AT-3443-17-0753-I-1, Petition

for Review (0753 PFR) File, Tab 2; James v. Social Security Administration,

MSPB Docket No. AT-3443-18-0058-I-1, Petition for Review (0058 PFR) File,

Tab 1. Both petitions involve her application for GEAR and other developmental

programs and there is considerable overlap in the allegations therein. Concerning

the first of her petitions, the appellant asserted that she exhausted her

administrative remedies before OSC. 0753 PFR File, Tab 2 at 4. She reiterated

her employment practices claim, her argument that the agency took a suitability

action against her, and her FTCA claim. Id. at 4-8. She made a second filing in

which she included several documents in support of her petition for review,

including preliminary determination and close-out letters from OSC informing her

that she may have a right to seek corrective action from the Board. 0753 PFR

File, Tab 4 at 12-16. The appellant also includes documentation from December

2010, regarding her assertions of slander and libel and a December 18, 2015 letter

from the agency’s Office of General Law concerning her FTCA claim. Id.

at 17-19. In the petition for review that she filed in her second appeal, the

appellant contends that the Board has general jurisdiction over her appeal. 0058

PFR File, Tab 1. She reasserts her employment practices claim and challenges

the administrative judge’s finding that she received her score in the GEAR

program selection process before her purported protected disclosure. Id. at 5-6.

She argues that OPM never reported the scores, even though it previously had

done so, and yet claims that she had a perfect score but was not selected. Id. at 6.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW

The Board’s jurisdiction is limited to those matters over which it has been

given jurisdiction by law, rule, or regulation. Maddox v. Merit Systems

Protection Board, 759 F.2d 9, 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985). A nonselection for promotion

is not an independently appealable action. See 5 U.S.C. § 7512 (describing the

actions covered); Ellison v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 7 F.3d 1031, 1034

(Fed. Cir. 1993). Despite this general lack of Board jurisdiction, an appellant

may appeal a nonselection by other statutory means, such as pursuant to the

Veterans Employment Opportunities Act of 1998 (VEOA) or the Uniformed

Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (codified as

amended at 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4335) (USERRA), or through an IRA appeal.

E.g., Becker v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 107 M.S.P.R. 327, ¶ 5 (2007).

As discussed below, the record does not reflect that the agency took an

independently appealable action against the appellant in either of these appeals,

and there is nothing in the record to indicate that the appellant sought to pursue a

claim under VEOA or USERRA in either appeal. Concerning the appellant’s

employment practices claim, the Board has jurisdiction over an employment

practices appeal when two conditions are met: (1) the appeal must concern an

employment practice that OPM is involved in administering; and (2) the appellant

must make a nonfrivolous allegation that the employment practice violated one of

the “basic requirements” for employment practices set forth in 5 C.F.R.

§ 300.103. Meeker v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 319 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.

Cir. 2003); Sauser v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 113 M.S.P.R. 403, ¶ 6

(2010). Under 5 C.F.R. § 300.103, employment practices “shall be based on a job

analysis to identify: (1) The basic duties and responsibilities; (2) The

knowledges, skills, and abilities required to perform the duties and

responsibilities; and (3) The factors that are important in evaluating candidates.”

5 C.F.R. § 300.103(a). There also must be a “rational relationship between

performance in the position to be filled . . . and the employment practice used.”

5 C.F.R. § 300.103(b)(1).

The appellant contended in her 0058 appeal that the GEAR program was

announced through OPM, but that she did not receive a score from OPM,

asserting instead that an agency team completed their own assessments to

determine the selections. 0058 IAF, Tab 8 at 4. 4 On review, the appellant states

that, for 2 years “we received a score from OPM first” before the agency panel

determined the selections. 0058 PFR File, Tab 1 at 6. She alleges that she should

have been selected for the position based on her score. Id. Although our

reviewing court in Meeker found that a scoring formula constituted an

“employment practice,” 319 F.3d at 1373, the appellant has failed to make a

nonfrivolous allegation that the scoring formula violated a basic requirement set

forth in 5 C.F.R. § 300.103. Thus, we agree with the administrative judge’s

finding that the appellant failed to establish jurisdiction over her employment

practices claim. See Banks v. Department of Agriculture, 59 M.S.P.R. 157, 160

(1993) (finding that the appellant failed to establish that the agency subjected him

to an appealable employment practice when he merely challenged his

The appellant also cited the Board’s employment practices jurisdiction in her 0753

appeal. 0753 IAF, Tab 14 at 4; 0753 PFR File, Tab 2 at 4.

nonselection for the position and the agency’s alleged irregularities in the

selection process), aff’d per curiam, 26 F.3d 140 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Table).

We also agree with the administrative judge that the agency did not take a

suitability action against the appellant. 0753 ID at 5; see 5 C.F.R. § 731.203(a)

(defining a “suitability action” as a cancellation of eligibility, a removal, a

cancellation of reinstatement eligibility, and a debarment). Under 5 C.F.R.

§ 731.203(b), a nonselection for a specific position is not a suitability action,

even if it is based on the criteria for making such a determination. Similarly, the

appellant fails to identify any basis for her contentions that the FTCA, the Fair

Labor Standards Act, or the Board’s general jurisdiction over employment matters

that are unfair, 0058 PFR File at 6-8, provide a basis for Board jurisdiction over

her appeals. Additionally, to the extent that the appellant is alleging

discrimination, such prohibited personnel practices under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b) are

not an independent source of Board jurisdiction. Wren v. Department of the

Army, 2 M.S.P.R. 1, 2 (1980), aff’d, 681 F.2d 867, 871-73 (D.C. Cir. 1982).

The appellant’s allegations of whistleblower retaliation are untimely.

Under the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 (WPEA), 5

the Board has jurisdiction over an IRA appeal if the appellant has exhausted her

administrative remedies before OSC and makes nonfrivolous allegations that:

(1) she made a protected disclosure described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or

engaged in protected activity described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B),

(C), or (D), and (2) the disclosure or protected activity was a contributing factor

in the agency’s decision to take or fail to take a personnel action as defined by

The incidents at issue in this appeal occurred after the December 27, 2012 effective

date of the WPEA. Pub. L. No. 112-199, § 202, 126 Stat. 1465, 1476.

5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A). 6 Salerno v. Department of the Interior, 123 M.S.P.R.

230, ¶ 5 (2016).

In the first of these appeals, the administrative judge found that the

appellant’s whistleblower claims were the same ones she had made in an earlier

appeal, MSPB Docket No. AT-3443-14-0870-I-1. 0753 ID at 4. Finding all the

elements of collateral estoppel present, he determined that the appellant’s

whistleblower claims were precluded by the Board’s final decision in her prior

appeal. Id.; see Kroeger v. U.S. Postal Service, 865 F.2d 235, 239 (Fed. Cir.

1988) (explaining that collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, is appropriate

when: (1) an issue is identical to that involved in the prior action, (2) the issue

was actually litigated in the prior action, (3) the determination on the issue in the

prior action was necessary to the resulting judgment, and (4) the party precluded

was fully represented in the prior action). Id. However, because a jurisdictional

dismissal of an appellant’s prior whistleblower claims for failure to exhaust their

administrative remedies before OSC does not bar a second IRA appeal of the

same claims, we find that the administrative judge improperly applied the

doctrine of collateral estoppel. Bump v. Department of the Interior, 64 M.S.P.R.

326, 330-33 (1994). We therefore vacate the portion of the 0753 ID finding the

appeal barred by collateral estoppel. 0753 ID at 4.

Although the administrative judge found that the appellant’s purported

protected disclosure in the second of the appeals before us here occurred after she

received her score for the GEAR program, 0058 ID at 2-3, our review of the

Although the record shows that the administrative judge in the 0058 appeal failed to

give the appellant notice of all of the elements she must meet to establish jurisdiction

over an IRA appeal, 0058 IAF, Tab 2 at 2, the agency did so in its motion to dismiss the

appeal for lack of jurisdiction, 0058 IAF, Tab 7 at 6-7; see Burgess v. Merit Systems

Protection Board, 758 F.2d 641, 643-44 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (finding that an appellant must

receive explicit information on what is required to establish an appealable jurisdictional

issue). Nevertheless, because the agency’s motion to dismiss provided the required

notice, the administrative judge’s Burgess error was harmless. See Harris v. U.S.

Postal Service, 112 M.S.P.R. 186, ¶ 9 (2009) (finding that the necessary jurisdictional

notice may be provided by the agency pleadings or the initial decision).

record reveals that the appellant did not identify when she made her purported

disclosure. Accordingly, the record does not support the administrative judge’s

finding that the appellant’s disclosure happened after the purported nonselection.

0058 ID at 2-3.

Nevertheless, the 2014 documentation from OSC that the appellant filed in

support of the 0753 petition for review indicates that it involves the appellant’s

whistleblowing claims in both of these appeals, i.e., the agency’s selection

process for GEAR. 0753 PFR File, Tab 4 at 12-16; 0753 IAF, Tab 12 at 4;

0058 IAF, Tab 8 at 4. An appellant must file an IRA appeal with the Board no

later than 65 days after the date of issuance of OSC’s written notification that it

was terminating its investigation of her allegations or, if she shows that OSC’s

notification was received more than 5 days after the date of issuance, within

60 days after the date of receipt. 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3)(A); Kalus v. Department

of Homeland Security, 123 M.S.P.R. 226, ¶ 7 (2016); 5 C.F.R. § 1209.5(a)(1). As

discussed below, because OSC’s letter was dated September 30, 2014, and she

filed the first of these appeals on August 29, 2017, the appellant’s whistleblower

reprisal claims were untimely filed by nearly 3 years. 0753 PFR File, Tab 4

at 12-16; 0753 IAF, Tab 1.

The Office of the Clerk of the Board issued a detailed order advising the

appellant of the law applicable to the timeliness of an IRA appeal, including the

circumstances under which the Board will employ equitable tolling to extend the

filing deadline. 0753 PFR File, Tab 6. The Clerk’s Office directed the appellant

to file evidence and argument showing that she filed her appeal on time or that

the delay was caused by circumstances that meet the test for equitable tolling. Id.

The Board’s regulations provide that the 65-day deadline for filing an IRA appeal

is subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling, which permits the Board to extend

the deadline when the appellant, despite having diligently pursued her rights, was

unable to make a timely filing. 5 C.F.R. § 1209.5(b).

The appellant filed a response and an amended response, neither of which

addressed the timeliness of her whistleblower reprisal claims. 0753 PFR File,

Tabs 7-8. As noted above, OSC’s close-out letter is dated September 30, 2014,

and it advised the appellant of her appeal rights. 0753 PFR File, Tab 4 at 11.

Specifically, OSC’s letter advised the appellant of her right to file an IRA appeal

within 65 days after the date of the letter. Id. Sixty-five days from

September 30, 2014, was December 4, 2014. The appellant filed the first of these

appeals on August 29, 2017, and the second on October 22, 2017, well more than

65 days following OSC’s September 30, 2014 close out letter. 0753 PFR File,

Tab 4 at 12-13; 0753 IAF, Tab 1; 0058 IAF, Tab 1. She identified no basis under

which the Board may apply the doctrine of equitable tolling to her whistleblower

reprisal claims. 5 C.F.R. § 1209.5(b). Thus, based on the current record, we

modify the initial decision to find that the appellant’s whistleblower reprisal

claims in both appeals were untimely filed.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 7

The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the

Board’s final decision in this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You may obtain

review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of

your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate

forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following

summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not

provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and

the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule

regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of

this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your

claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file

Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated

the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the

Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.

within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your

chosen forum.

Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review

below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions

about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you

should contact that forum for more information.

(1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking

judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court

within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.

§ 7703(b)(1)(A).

If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the following

address:

U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20439

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that

any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of

discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you

were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action

was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain

judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination

claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you

receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems

Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file

with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative

receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on

race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be

entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any

requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.

Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective

websites, which can be accessed through the link below:

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .

Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding

all other issues . 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the

EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive

this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file

with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives

this decision.

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the

address of the EEOC is:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, D.C. 20013

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or

by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

131 M Street, N.E.

Suite 5SW12G

Washington, D.C. 20507

(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection

Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised

claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).

If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in

section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or

2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial

review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court

of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 8 The court of appeals must receive your

petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.

5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).

The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain

whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on

December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on

July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of

MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.

The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,

132 Stat. 1510.

If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for

the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the

following address: