Opinion

Edward Simpkins v. Office of Personnel Management

Court: Merit Systems Protection Board
Filed: Apr 30, 2024
Status: Unpublished
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 15.9%

finding that the Government cannot be estopped from denying a benefit when Congress has not authorized expenditure for that benefit

How later courts described this case

finding that the Government cannot be estopped from denying a benefit when Congress has not authorized expenditure for that benefit

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

EDWARD J. SIMPKINS, DOCKET NUMBER

Appellant, DC-0842-20-0541-I-2

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL DATE: April 30, 2024

MANAGEMENT,

Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Edward J. Simpkins , Greenbelt, Maryland, pro se.

Carla Robinson , Washington, D.C., for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman

Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which

affirmed the reconsideration decision of the Office of Personnel Management

(OPM) finding that his refunded service is not creditable in his annuity

computation under the Federal Employees’ Retirement System (FERS).

Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following

A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).

circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact;

the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation

or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative

judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision

were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion,

and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material

evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due

diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of

Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully

considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not

established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.

Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision,

which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

BACKGROUND

The appellant filed a Board appeal of OPM’s reconsideration decision

affirming its initial decision calculating the appellant’s FERS retirement annuity.

Simpkins v. Office of Personnel Management, MSPB Docket No. DC-0842-20-

0541-I-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1. Specifically, OPM found that the

appellant’s service from September 26, 1987, through February 9, 1996, was not

creditable for retirement purposes because the appellant received a refund of his

retirement contributions for that period. IAF, Tab 10 at 6-9, 18-20. OPM further

found that, because the appellant was not covered under FERS on or after

October 28, 2009, he was not eligible to redeposit any refunded amounts. Id.

at 7-8, 18-19. OPM additionally did not include the appellant’s claimed service

with the D.C. Department of Parks and Recreation in 1979 and 1980 in its

retirement calculation because the appellant failed to submit information

verifying that service. Id. at 8.

In a prehearing conference, the parties agreed upon the following three

issues to be adjudicated: (1) whether OPM correctly determined that the

appellant’s service from 1987 to 1996 was not creditable due to his refund of

retirement contributions, and that he was not eligible to redeposit any refunded

amounts; (2) whether the appellant should be able to redeposit the refunded

amounts because he submitted the application for refund contributions under

duress; and (3) whether OPM correctly found that the appellant’s additional

service with the D.C. Department of Parks and Recreation in 1979 and 1980 was

properly not included in his annuity computation. Simpkins v. Office of Personnel

Management, MSPB Docket No. DC-0842-20-0541-I-2, Appeal File (I-2 AF),

Tab 1, Tab 8 at 2. The agency’s representative failed to appear for the scheduled

hearing and, after unsuccessful attempts to reach her, the administrative judge

held the telephonic hearing without her. I-2 AF, Tab 11, Initial Decision (ID)

at 2. Following the hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision

affirming OPM’s reconsideration decision. ID at 1-3.

The appellant has filed a petition for review, and the agency has responded.

Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1, 3. The appellant argues that he should

have been eligible to redeposit his refunded contributions. PFR File, Tab 1

at 1-5. He reiterates his duress argument, asserting that the administrative judge

failed to consider his financial duress and the influence of him taking pain

medication at the time of filing an application for a refund. Id. He further

alleges that his service with the D.C. Department of Parks and Recreation should

have been included in his annuity calculation, and asserts that he submitted

sufficient information supporting his service therewith. Id. He contends that the

administrative judge was biased against him, challenges various statements made

by the administrative judge, and argues that both his employing agency and OPM

breached the settlement agreement that led to his resignation in 2009. 2 Id.

After the close of the record on review, the appellant filed a motion for leave to

submit an additional pleading. PFR File, Tab 6. In this motion, the appellant asserts

that he recently received emails from his union representative that prove he is allowed

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW

An individual seeking retirement benefits bears the burden of proving

entitlement to those benefits by preponderant evidence. Resnick v. Office of

Personnel Management, 120 M.S.P.R. 356, ¶ 5 (2013); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)

(ii). A preponderance of the evidence is that degree of relevant evidence that a

reasonable person, considering the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient

to find that a contested fact is more likely to be true than untrue. 5 C.F.R.

§ 1201.4(q).

The administrative judge correctly found that the appellant’s refunded service

from 1987 to 1996 was not creditable towards his retirement annuity and that he

was not eligible to redeposit the refunded amounts.

The administrative judge found, and the parties do not dispute, that the

appellant took a refund for his service from September 26, 1987, to February 9,

1996. ID at 8. We decline to disturb this finding. The appellant argues,

however, that, based on his subsequent resignation date, he was eligible to

redeposit his refunded FERS deductions. PFR File, Tab 1 at 2. The

administrative judge found that he resigned before the relevant cutoff date and

therefore was not eligible to redeposit his refunded deductions. ID at 8-14. We

agree.

An employee separated for at least 31 consecutive days is entitled to be

paid a lump-sum credit of retirement deductions taken during the service period.

5 U.S.C. § 8424(a); Moore v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 109 M.S.P.R. 386,

¶ 9 (2008). Receipt of a lump-sum credit “voids all annuity rights . . . based on

“to repay” for some of his prior Federal service. Id. at 2. The appellant avers that he

was “not able to locate” these emails “until now.” Id. We find that the appellant’s

vague assertions do not provide a basis for accepting additional evidence into the

record; accordingly, we deny the appellant’s motion. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(k)

(stating that once the record on review closes, no additional evidence or argument will

be accepted unless it is new and material as defined in § 1201.115(d) and the party

submitting it shows that the evidence or argument was not readily available before the

record closed); see also 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(d) (explaining that, to constitute new

evidence, the information contained in the documents, not just the documents

themselves, must have been unavailable despite due diligence when the record closed).

the service on which the lump-sum credit is based . . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 8424(a).

Furthermore, the regulations provide that “[p]eriods of service for which

employee contributions have been refunded are not creditable service . . . .”

5 C.F.R. § 843.202(b). The appellant filed an application for a refund of

retirement deductions for, as relevant here, his service with the U.S. Postal

Service from 1987 to 1996. IAF, Tab 10 at 60. The application specifically

informed the appellant that “payment of a refund will result in permanent

forfeiture of any retirement rights that are based on the period(s) of [FERS]

service which the refund covers . . . .” Id.

On October 28, 2009, Congress passed the National Defense Authorization

Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (NDAA), which amended 5 U.S.C. § 8422(a) to provide

that employees who received a refund of retirement contributions under FERS

could redeposit those refunds and receive credit for the service covered by the

refund. Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1904, 123 Stat. 2190 (2009). Prior to this, only

individuals who received a refund of retirement contributions under the Civil

Service Retirement System (CSRS), rather than FERS, were eligible to deposit

the refunded amounts to receive credit for the refunded service. See Taylor v.

Office of Personnel Management, 230 F.3d 1383, *2 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Table)

(noting that only employees covered by CSRS, and not FERS, could redeposit

refunded amounts); 3 see also Moore, 109 M.S.P.R. 386, ¶ 9 (noting that, pursuant

to OPM guidance, “an employee cannot repay the money in the future to

reestablish credit for the refunded FERS service”) (emphasis in original).

The regulations covering refunded service under FERS specifically

separate an employee’s ability to deposit refunded amounts based on whether

their separation from service occurred before or after October 28, 2009, the date

the NDAA was enacted. 5 C.F.R. § 843.202(b). Indeed, the regulations state

that, “[f]or a retirement based on a separation before October 28, 2009, periods of

The Board may rely on unpublished Federal Circuit decisions when, as here, it finds

the court’s reasoning persuasive. Mauldin v. U.S. Postal Service, 115 M.S.P.R. 513,

¶ 12 (2011).

service for which employee contributions have been refunded are not creditable”

for any purpose. 5 C.F.R. § 843.202(b)(1). On the contrary, “[f]or a retirement

based on a separation on or after October 28, 2009, periods of service for which

employee contributions have been refunded” are not creditable for annuity

computation purposes unless those refunds have been redeposited. 5 C.F.R.

§ 843.202(b)(2)(ii). As such, the appellant’s eligibility to redeposit his refunded

amounts and thus receive credit for service covered by the refund turns on

whether his separation from the Federal service occurred before, or on or after,

October 28, 2009.

The administrative judge found that, regardless of the date of any

settlement agreement, the appellant resigned effective April 16, 2009. ID

at 11-13. On review, the appellant appears to assert that he was not separated

from the agency until on or after October 28, 2009, because the settlement

agreement reflecting his resignation was not fully executed until that date. PFR

File, Tab 1 at 2. We are unpersuaded.

The settlement agreement clearly denotes April 16, 2009 as the effective

date of the appellant’s resignation, and he has provided no support for the

proposition that the date the agreement was fully executed affects the

agreed-upon effective date. See McDavid v. Department of the Army,

58 M.S.P.R. 673, 677 (1993) (finding that the meaning of terms in a settlement

agreement is the meaning the parties intended to convey); see also Howarth v.

U.S. Postal Service, 77 M.S.P.R. 1, 3 n.1 (1997) (noting that the effective date of

a suspension was the stated retroactive date as set forth in the settlement

agreement and not the date the settlement agreement was actually signed).

Moreover, as stated by the administrative judge, the letter of resignation, the

settlement agreement, and the appellant’s Standard Form (SF) 50 associated with

his resignation all list April 16, 2009 as the date of the appellant’s resignation.

ID at 12-13; IAF, Tab 10 at 67; I-2 AF, Tab 7 at 12-16. Accordingly, we agree

with the administrative judge and OPM that the appellant separated from service

prior to October 28, 2009, and, thus, he was not eligible to redeposit any refunded

retirement contribution amounts.

The appellant additionally alleges that both his employing agency and OPM

materially breached the settlement agreement by referencing his separation from

the employing agency as a removal instead of a resignation. PFR File, Tab 1

at 3-4. Thus, he argues, because the settlement agreement was breached, the

terms no longer apply and he was still employed beyond the October 28, 2009

cutoff date, rendering him eligible to redeposit the refunded contributions. Id.

The administrative judge considered this argument but found it unavailing. ID

at 13. We agree.

Specifically, the administrative judge found that she did not have the

authority to consider whether the settlement agreement was breached in the

instant appeal of OPM’s reconsideration decision regarding the appellant’s

retirement annuity calculation. Id. Rather, she found that the appellant would

need a ruling finding that the settlement was breached, that the breach somehow

officially changed his resignation date to a date on or after October 28, 2009, and

that he then would have to request OPM to allow him to make a redeposit of his

refunded retirement contributions. Id. The appellant on review merely points to

more evidence purportedly showing that a breach occurred but does not explain

how the administrative judge erred in finding that the breach issue was not

properly before the Board in the instant appeal. The appellant’s arguments

constitute mere disagreement with the administrative judge’s findings, and we

discern no reason to disturb them. See Crosby v. U.S. Postal Service,

74 M.S.P.R. 98, 105-06 (1997) (finding no reason to disturb the administrative

judge’s findings when she considered the evidence as a whole, drew appropriate

inferences, and made reasoned conclusions); Broughton v. Department of Health

& Human Services, 33 M.S.P.R. 357, 359 (1987) (same).

The administrative judge correctly rejected the appellant’s argument that he is

eligible to redeposit the refund of his retirement contributions because he signed

the refund application under duress.

The appellant argues that the administrative judge failed to give proper

weight to his statements that he requested a refund of retirement contributions

because of “financial duress” and being under the influence of pain medication.

PFR File, Tab 1 at 2. He further challenges the applicability of the administrative

judge’s cited case law and asserts that this was not a matter of equitable relief.

Id. at 3. The administrative judge considered his duress arguments but found

them unpersuasive. ID at 14-15. We agree.

To the extent the appellant is arguing that he should be allowed to redeposit

the refunded amount or that the amount should be waived based on his alleged

duress, we find that no statutory or regulatory provision allows for a waiver or

redeposit under such circumstances. See e.g., Harper v. Office of Personnel

Management, 116 M.S.P.R. 309, ¶ 7 (2011). Indeed, as noted by the

administrative judge, such a resolution is not permitted under the law. ID at 15.

Thus, even if the appellant sufficiently proved that he filed the application for a

refund of contributions under duress, OPM cannot be forced to grant him service

credit for the period of time covered by the refund or allow a redeposit of the

refund not otherwise permitted by law. See Office of Personnel Management v.

Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 434 (1990) (finding that the Government cannot be

estopped from denying a benefit when Congress has not authorized expenditure

for that benefit); Conway v. Office of Personnel Management, 59 M.S.P.R. 405,

410-12 (1993) (finding that, even if the appellant succeeded in demonstrating that

he filed an application for a refund of his retirement contributions under improper

circumstances, OPM nevertheless was not estopped from denying him service

credit for the period of time covered by his refund). Thus, the appellant’s

challenge to the administrative judge’s reliance on Richmond is unpersuasive.

The administrative judge correctly found that the appellant failed to meet his

burden of proving that his claimed service with the D.C. Department of Parks and

Recreation is creditable towards his annuity computation.

The appellant argues that the administrative judge erred in finding that he

failed to demonstrate that his claimed service with the D.C. Department of Parks

and Recreation was creditable towards his retirement annuity. PFR File, Tab 1

at 2, 5. The administrative judge found that OPM properly relied on the SF-2806,

“Certified Summary of Federal Service,” in determining that the appellant failed

to demonstrate that the alleged service was creditable towards his retirement

annuity. ID at 15-17. We agree.

The Board has the authority to review the accuracy and completeness of an

Individual Retirement Record (IRR) in the context of appeals from OPM final

decisions that rely on them. Conner v. Office of Personnel Management,

120 M.S.P.R. 670, ¶ 6 (2014), aff’d, 620 F. App’x 892 (Fed. Cir. 2015).

Nonetheless, the appellant bears the burden of proving entitlement to those

benefits by preponderant evidence. Resnick, 120 M.S.P.R. 356, ¶ 5. Although

the appellant listed his service with the D.C. Department of Parks and Recreation

in the summers of 1979 and 1980 on his application for deferred retirement, his

IRR does not confirm any such service. IAF, Tab 10 at 33, 39-40. Moreover,

despite the appellant raising the issue with OPM, it informed him that this service

was not verified by his IRR and instructed him that he could submit additional

information to verify the service. Id. at 8, 15. As the administrative judge found,

the appellant’s Social Security earnings record purportedly submitted in support

of the service does not specifically verify any service with the D.C. Department

of Parks and Recreation. ID at 17. Although the earnings record shows that he

worked and was taxed in 1979 and 1980, the record does not identify with whom

the appellant was employed, whether it was creditable for CSRS annuity benefits,

or whether any retirement contributions were deducted from the appellant’s pay

for that service. I-2 AF, Tab 7 at 22-23. Accordingly, the administrative judge

correctly held that the appellant failed to meet his burden of proving that this

service was creditable for retirement purposes or that OPM erred in excluding it

from his annuity computation. The appellant questions why OPM did not contact

the Social Security Administration to determine whether this work was creditable

under CSRS and asserts that it is not his job to recertify his SF-2806 to include

the service in question. PFR File, Tab 1 at 2. However, he has not identified any

active duty on the part of OPM to seek additional information beyond his IRR.

The appellant has provided no further evidence that his service with the D.C.

Department of Parks and Recreation was creditable towards his retirement

annuity, and we therefore see no reason to disturb the administrative judge’s

findings.

The appellant’s remaining arguments on review are unpersuasive.

The appellant challenges the administrative judge’s statement that, because

the appellant did not request a hearing, the decision was made on the written

record. PFR File, Tab 1 at 3. The appellant correctly points out that, in

contradiction to the administrative judge’s prior statement discussing the hearing

in this appeal, she stated that no hearing was requested and that the initial

decision was based on the written record. ID at 3. While the administrative

judge erred in stating that no hearing was requested and that the decision was

based on the written record, this statement appears to have been mistakenly

added. The appellant requested and and participated in a hearing, and the

administrative judge repeatedly referenced and considered the appellant’s

testimony in reaching her determinations in the initial decision. ID at 11, 14 -15,

18. As such, the administrative judge’s error in this regard was harmless. See

Panter v. Department of the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984) (finding that

an adjudicatory error that is not prejudicial to a party’s substantive rights

provides no basis for reversal of an initial decision).

The appellant additionally alleges that the administrative judge showed bias

in favor of the agency. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4. Seemingly in support of this

assertion, the appellant questions the administrative judge’s conduct in attempting

to contact the agency’s representative when she failed to appear for the telephonic

hearing. Id. In making a claim of bias or prejudice against an administrative

judge, a party must overcome the presumption of honesty and integrity that

accompanies administrative adjudicators. Oliver v. Department of

Transportation, 1 M.S.P.R. 382, 386 (1980). We find nothing inappropriate with

the administrative judge’s efforts to contact the agency’s representative when the

representative failed to appear for the hearing. Moreover, when these efforts

were unsuccessful, the administrative judge nonetheless held the hearing without

the agency’s representative, affording the appellant the opportunity to present his

case without the agency’s rebuttal. ID at 3. The appellant has not explained how

the administrative judge’s actions favored the agency in this appeal.

Accordingly, we find that the appellant has failed to overcome the presumption of

honesty and integrity accompanying the administrative judge.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 4

You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By

statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such

review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).

Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit

Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most

appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a

statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their

jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should

immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all

filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time

limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.

Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated

the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the

Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.

Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review

below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions

about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you

should contact that forum for more information.

(1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking

judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court

within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.

§ 7703(b)(1)(A).

If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the

following address:

U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20439

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that

any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of

discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you

were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action

was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain

judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination

claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you

receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems

Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file

with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative

receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on

race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be

entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any

requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.

Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective

websites, which can be accessed through the link below:

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .

Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding

all other issues . 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the

EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive

this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file

with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives

this decision.

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the

address of the EEOC is:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, D.C. 20013

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or

by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

131 M Street, N.E.

Suite 5SW12G

Washington, D.C. 20507

(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection

Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised

claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).

If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section

2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),

(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of

competent jurisdiction. 5 The court of appeals must receive your petition for

review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.

§ 7703(b)(1)(B).

The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain

whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on

December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on

July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of

MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.

The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,

132 Stat. 1510.

If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for

the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the