The opinion
04/25/2024
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
Assigned on Briefs April 5, 2024
SHELBY COUNTY, TENNESSEE v. DELINQUENT TAXPAYERS 2021
Appeal from the Chancery Court for Shelby County
No. TP-2023 Melanie Taylor Jefferson, Chancellor
___________________________________
No. W2024-00504-COA-T10B-CV
___________________________________
This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion for recusal of the
trial judge. After carefully reviewing the record provided by the appellant, we reverse the
decision of the trial court denying the motion for recusal and remand for reassignment.
Tenn. S. Ct. R. 10B Interlocutory Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery
Court Reversed and Remanded
CARMA DENNIS MCGEE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D. MICHAEL
SWINEY, C.J., and W. NEAL MCBRAYER, J., joined.
Gregory S. Gallagher and Kevin Eugene Childress, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant,
Shelby County, Tennessee.
OPINION
I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case began in May 2023 with the filing of a complaint by Shelby County,
Tennessee, for the collection of delinquent personal property taxes for tax year 2021. There
were approximately 3,816 defendants identified on exhibit A to the complaint who
allegedly owed delinquent taxes. In July 2023, Shelby County filed an “initial” motion for
default judgment, stating that it had mailed a summons and notice to each defendant and
was in the process of reviewing and compiling the returns in preparation for filing a
supplemental motion for default judgment within the next few weeks. Shelby County
asked the court to grant a default judgment as to all defendants who had not filed an answer
upon the filing of the supplemental motion. Shelby County also filed a motion for a
scheduling order.
On Friday, August 18, 2023, counsel for Shelby County, Gregory Gallagher,
appeared at a hearing before Chancellor Melanie Taylor Jefferson on the motion for a
scheduling order. According to Shelby County, Chancellor Jefferson was “extremely
upset” that the case had been assigned to Part I of chancery court, was “quite emphatic”
that she should have been included in the process and setting of any court dates, and
indicated that she felt “disrespected.” Chancellor Jefferson demanded that a meeting take
place expeditiously on Monday, August 21, with the other two Shelby County chancellors,
the court clerk and its tax sale staff, and the Shelby County Trustee. The record contains
the following email that was sent by Chancellor Jefferson to these individuals on Friday,
August 18:
First and foremost, I called this meeting when I discovered a personal
property lawsuit with over 5000 cases was filed and assigned to my court
room without one discussion with me or any of the other Chancellors. We,
not any of the other people listed on this email, dictate how or when this type
of undertaking should be implemented. This is a blatant disrespect of my title
and my authority.
With that being said, the issue is how you are going to fix the fact that
you have assigned these cases to my Court WITHOUT my consent. I set my
own calendar NOT any of you. September 29th and no other day is going to
be used for this endeavor until it is resolved. Further, there is the discussion
of assignments. There are three (3) parts to chancery and this massive
caseload should have been evenly and fairly distributed. The last
conversation I had was regarding the weighted case load and how tax matters
are assigned.
What happens when they start filing Motions to Stay when
garnishments for collection of these funds are issued? Call and come to court
unannounced with their questions.
These are the answers I am looking for on Monday.
According to Shelby County, the annual delinquent tax lawsuits have been assigned in the
same manner for at least twenty-five years, with the clerk rotating each year the part of the
chancery court to which the annual lawsuits are assigned. However, Chancellor Jefferson
had only recently assumed the bench, on or about September 1, 2022.
At the meeting on Monday, August 21, 2023, the court clerk explained that this case
could not be divided into three separate cases because it had already been filed as one.
According to Shelby County, Chancellor Jefferson again stated that she had been
disrespected and indicated that “it did not matter how many defendants were involved, she
was not going to do it.” She was reportedly “very emphatic” that “no one could make her”
handle the suit without assistance from other chancellors. The other two chancellors
-2-
ultimately agreed to each hear one-third of the motions, hearings, etc., on the pending
lawsuit by interchange. Mr. Gallagher was directed to draft a consent order to that effect
to be signed by all three chancellors. The “Tax Sale Coordinator” for chancery court
subsequently split the defendants in this lawsuit into three groups so that the three
chancellors could each hear an approximately equal number via interchange.
Before the consent order was signed, however, Chancellor Jefferson entered a sua
sponte order of dismissal of the entire lawsuit on August 29. It simply states:
THIS MATTER is before the Court upon the Complaint for Collection of
Delinquent Taxes and Initial Motion for Default Judgment filed by the
plaintiff Shelby County, Tennessee (“Plaintiff”'), and the responses thereto
of the various defendants. Due to the immense volume of the defendants
potentially involved in this case, the Court, acting sua sponte, hereby finds
that this matter should be dismissed without prejudice to permit the Plaintiff
and the Clerk and Master additional time to ensure that hearings related to
this matter are properly apportioned across the three (3) Parts of Chancery
Court and to ensure the timely and efficient administration of justice in these
proceedings. Accordingly, this matter is hereby DISMISSED without
prejudice.
Shelby County timely filed a motion to alter or amend or set aside the order. In that motion,
Shelby County explained that its staff had expended an overwhelming amount of labor in
this case generating and processing the necessary taxpayer lists and required notices. It
explained that a summons and notice was sent to each of the three thousand defendants
with certified return receipt, and Shelby County had expended numerous hours reviewing
and processing the returns. It also pointed out that notices had already been provided to
defendants in connection with the pending motion for default judgment. Shelby County
claimed that it had spent over $41,000 in printing and mailing costs alone. It noted that
these costs and labor expenditures would have to be repeated if the lawsuit was dismissed
and refiled, and the County Trustee would have to request additional funds from the County
Commission to cover the costs because they were not presently in the County’s budget.
Additionally, Shelby County noted that any taxes not collected within a statutory collection
period become uncollectible, which could result in additional loss of revenue to the County.
Shelby County also explained, in its motion to alter or amend, that the average
number of municipal and county parcels involved in its mass real estate tax lawsuits is over
20,000. Still, Shelby County explained that each suit remains in a single court through the
confirmation of the tax sale, and the cases rotate between the three parts of chancery court.
Shelby County explained that its Trustee and delinquent tax attorneys chose not to combine
the personal property lawsuit with the real estate tax lawsuit but filed it separately to avoid
combining so many defendants. The County contended that it had proceeded in accordance
with all applicable laws and yet the chancellor had simply dismissed the case based on
-3-
concerns over docket management. Shelby County noted a local rule requiring refiled
cases to be assigned to the same part of chancery court where originally filed, so it
questioned what the order of dismissal sought to accomplish in the first place. In
conclusion, it asked the chancery court to set a hearing on the motion to alter or amend at
its earliest convenience, to grant the motion to alter or amend and reinstate the lawsuit, and
to sign the consent order as agreed during the August 21 meeting allowing the other
chancellors to hear the matters by interchange.
After the motion to alter or amend was filed, Shelby County’s delinquent tax
attorney, Mr. Gallagher, attended “a routine court tax docket” in Chancellor Jefferson’s
court and addressed the court in an effort to obtain a hearing for the Rule 59 motion.
According to Shelby County, Chancellor Jefferson “responded that she was not going to
set the Rule 59 motion for a hearing.” Mr. Gallagher then offered to file “a written motion
to request a hearing date” and schedule that motion for a hearing date “on the regular Friday
Motion docket.” Chancellor Jefferson “replied that if the motion was set in this manner,
she would strike it from the calendar.” Mr. Gallagher advised the court that he had a duty
to his client and to the taxpayers to take the steps necessary to have the motion set for a
hearing.
On November 21, 2023, Shelby County filed a written “Motion for Hearing Date”
on its motion to alter or amend. Shelby County then filed a “Notice of Hearing Date for
Motion for Hearing Date,” scheduling the matter to be heard on December 8. On that date,
the trial court held a hearing on the motion for a hearing date and set the hearing on the
motion to alter or amend for March 14, 2024. During the December 8 hearing, an attorney
who appeared on behalf of a defendant indicated that he would speak to Mr. Gallagher in
the hallway about the history of the case and why it was dismissed sua sponte. Chancellor
Jefferson stated that if the attorney felt that Mr. Gallagher’s explanation was not complete,
then she “would be happy to make sure he was told the truth about the facts . . . because . .
. [Shelby County] and Mr. Gallagher had their story and she had hers.”
Around this time, Mr. Gallagher sought assistance from the Senior Criminal Court
Judge in Shelby County, Carolyn Wade Blackett, as to how he could amicably resolve the
issues with Chancellor Jefferson. Mr. Gallagher admittedly expressed concern about the
situation involving the sua sponte dismissal and the hearing dates. According to Shelby
County, Judge Blackett agreed to speak to Chancellor Jefferson to see if she could assist in
obtaining an amicable resolution.
Days later, on or about December 13, Chancellor Jefferson “approached” Mr.
Gallagher in the common area of the clerk’s office and was “extremely angry and upset.”
She began the conversation by stating that she “did not like being threatened” and then told
Mr. Gallagher to “Bring it.” He “attempted to calm the situation” and offered to discuss
the matter privately in chambers, but Chancellor Jefferson refused. She advised Mr.
Gallagher that the Shelby County Trustee, Regina Newman, only had three years left to
-4-
serve but that Chancellor Jefferson would be around for “a while.” She then told Mr.
Gallagher to tell Ms. Newman, his boss, to “Bring it.” According to Shelby County, it was
very apparent to everyone hearing the conversation that Chancellor Jefferson was
extremely angry with Ms. Newman. Chancellor Jefferson also accused Mr. Gallagher of
choosing to speak to Judge Blackett “because Judge Blackett is a black woman.” She also
accused Mr. Gallagher of threatening to file a complaint with the Court of the Judiciary but
said that if he did “it would not be the first” and that “she could handle it.” According to
Shelby County, this “confrontation” was humiliating and held within earshot of numerous
employees in the clerk’s office.
The very next day, Shelby County was before the chancery court in a real estate tax
sale case, and Chancellor Jefferson reversed a former ruling in favor of Shelby County in
what Shelby County describes as a clear violation of the applicable statute. According to
Shelby County, Chancellor Jefferson “seemed to almost dare the Shelby County
Delinquent Tax Attorney to argue against her ruling.”
On January 10, 2024, Shelby County filed a status report indicating that all the terms
of the proposed consent order had been met, with the parcels divided into groups, the other
chancellors committing to handle portions of the case by interchange, and the consent order
being drafted and ready for entry. However, no action was taken on the matter in the
following month.
On March 4, 2024, ten days before the scheduled hearing on the motion to alter or
amend, Shelby County filed a motion for recusal. It asked Chancellor Jefferson to recuse
herself from any further participation in this annual lawsuit and all court proceedings
generated from it. Shelby County asserted that it was clear that Chancellor Jefferson was
biased against Shelby County and its counsel and angry at them. Shelby County described
the course of events occurring in this lawsuit, including the first hearing at which
Chancellor Jefferson was “visibly upset” and said she felt disrespected; her email stating
that there had been a “blatant disrespect of my title and my authority” by assigning the case
to her court without her consent; the meeting in which she repeated her position that she
was “disrespected” and emphatically stated that she was not going to handle the suit
without assistance; the sua sponte order of dismissal despite the agreement among the
chancellors, resulting in significant losses by Shelby County; her refusal to set the motion
to alter or amend for a hearing; stating during open court that Shelby County had its story
and she had hers; confronting Mr. Gallagher in the clerk’s office and telling him and his
boss to “Bring it”; and changing her ruling in a separate case the following day. Shelby
County alleged that this course of action left “little doubt” that Chancellor Jefferson was
hostile toward and prejudiced against it and its attorneys. At the very least, Shelby County
asserted that these actions gave an appearance of bias. Shelby County noted Tennessee
Code Annotated section 67-5-2405(c), which states, “Suits for the collection of delinquent
taxes are to be prosecuted to a conclusion as soon as practicable, and for this purpose
proceedings in respect thereto are to be accorded priority by the court.” Shelby County
-5-
supported its motion with an affidavit of Shelby County Trustee Regina Newman, who
stated that the chancellor’s actions had delayed the collection of taxes and created
additional unanticipated costs for the County. She believed that Shelby County could not
obtain a fair hearing in this case.
On March 14, 2024, Chancellor Jefferson entered an order denying the motion for
recusal. At the outset, she explained that the clerk’s office assigned this matter “in its
entirety” to Part I of chancery court, which she had presided over since September 1, 2022.
Chancellor Jefferson explained that she had “made it well known that she alone controls
the Court’s calendar” and that any litigants must obtain hearing dates directly from her.
She stated that during the August 18 hearing on the motion for a scheduling order, she “first
comprehended the tremendous burden this lawsuit would potentially impose upon the
functionality of the Court and its administration of its other pending matters.” She
acknowledged requesting a meeting about the situation and emailing the interested parties
with her concerns. She also conceded that during the meeting “it was agreed” that the
matter would be equally split between the three parts of chancery court with two-thirds of
the matter being heard by the other chancellors by interchange and a consent order being
drafted to that effect.
“However,” she explained that shortly after the August 21 meeting, she learned that
Shelby County had already “unilaterally and improperly” set its motion for default
judgment for hearing on September 29. Chancellor Jefferson stated that she had not been
approached about setting the motion for a hearing, despite her longstanding policy, so she
was “astonished to learn that thousands of Defendants had received these Notices
commanding them to appear before Part I for hearing.” She stated that she was “disturbed
by the fact that [Shelby County]’s counsel had completely neglected to bring this fact to
the Court’s attention during the August 21, 2023 meeting.” As a result, she decided that
she “could not simply rely upon the candor of [Shelby County]’s counsel to ensure this
matter proceeded in the manner discussed during the August 21, 2023 meeting.”
According to Chancellor Jefferson, Mr. Gallagher “came into the August 21, 2023 meeting
with unclean hands” because he had already sent out thousands of notices of the hearing.
Chancellor Jefferson said it “appeared” to her that Shelby County “intended to go forward
with this lawsuit regardless of the outcome of the August 21, 2023 meeting or the prompt
execution of the Consent Order agreed to by all the parties present.” For that reason, she
had entered the sua sponte order of dismissal on August 29.
Chancellor Jefferson noted that the “primary basis” for Shelby County’s recusal
motion appeared to be the conversation that allegedly occurred regarding Mr. Gallagher’s
consultation with Judge Blackett. Chancellor Jefferson said she had been advised that Mr.
Gallagher “did, in fact, threaten to file a complaint against Chancellor Jefferson with the
Board of Judicial Conduct if she did not yield to [Shelby County]’s efforts to forcefully
strongarm this lawsuit to a hasty resolution.” Thus, Chancellor Jefferson claimed that any
“reference” she made to that situation was simply “to confirm to [Shelby County]’s counsel
-6-
that the Court would steadfastly uphold its obligation to adjudicate matters before it fairly,
justly and impartially[.]” She added, “[Shelby County]’s attempt to characterize these
comments as forming the basis for recusal only further demonstrates the pattern of
overreaching throughout the course of this lawsuit, to which this Court will not yield.”
Chancellor Jefferson acknowledged that prior to this case, she had been largely
adhering to the procedures followed by the other two parts of chancery court for real
property tax sales. She said she was “amenable to following the historical practices”
established in chancery court prior to her election “to some extent.” However, she said it
was her understanding that a personal property tax suit had not been filed for approximately
ten years, so the procedure for tax sales of this type would be less familiar to all three
chancellors and the court clerk, “all of whom were likely not in their respective positions”
at the time of the last sale. Thus, she said that she had exercised her discretion in requesting
an amendment to the procedure for assignment where necessary, as demonstrated by the
agreement at the August 21 meeting, “to prevent a tremendous burden on one Part, that
potentially harbors the Court’s ability to effectively manage its caseload.”
The chancellor also noted Shelby County’s reference to a hearing on December 14,
2023, the day after her interaction with Mr. Gallagher, in which she had “diverged from
the historical practice of Chancery Court” on a matter. She acknowledged that chancery
courts had historically awarded taxes for the full year to Shelby County out of the excess
proceeds due to the former owner at the time of the tax sale. However, she claimed that
she “chose to exercise [her] judicial discretion” to make a different award in that case based
on the fact that the former owner had not owned the property for the entire year and should
not be penalized with tax obligations for the time period when it was not the owner. Thus,
although she admittedly chose to “diverge from precedent,” she claimed this was an act of
an “impartial tribunal” based on the facts and the law and what the court determined to be
the most ethical decision.
In summary, Chancellor Jefferson characterized the “crux of the dispute” in this
case as being due to “[Shelby County]’s failure to consult the Court before setting matters
for hearing in Part I.” She claimed that each reference Shelby County made to a basis for
recusal “has involved this Court’s refusal to relent to [Shelby County]’s attempts to
disregard the processes and procedures this Court has implemented for ALL litigants to
adhere to in seeking relief.” She added, “[Shelby County] must follow the Court’s
preferences for obtaining dates just like every other litigant and cannot unilaterally bend
the rules in its favor in an effort to expedite its recovery of tax funds.” She then suggested
that Shelby County was simply “anxious to get this suit resolved because of its mishandling
of the most recent real property tax sale, which stands to cost taxpayers over . . .
($1,200,000), but this Court will not be railroaded by [Shelby County] into rushing through
the proper handling of this lawsuit.” She said that Shelby County “cannot and will not
usurp this Court’s authority to circumvent the practices all litigants must follow in an effort
to quickly recoup funds lost in other tax sales.” The chancellor denied the motion for
-7-
recusal, finding that Shelby County “failed to demonstrate any bias whatsoever by this
Court which might be perceived to be so pervasive as to deny it a fair trial.”
Shelby County timely filed a petition for an accelerated interlocutory appeal before
this Court pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. This Court entered a stay of
all proceedings in the trial court pending further order of this Court. Based on our review,
we have determined that neither an answer, additional briefing, nor oral argument is
necessary, and we elect to act summarily on the appeal in accordance with Rule 10B, §§
2.05 and 2.06.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews a trial court’s decision on a motion for recusal under a de novo
standard of review. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B § 2.01. The only issue we may consider in a
Rule 10B appeal is whether the trial judge should have granted the motion for recusal.
Elseroad v. Cook, 553 S.W.3d 460, 462 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018); Boren v. Hill Boren, PC,
557 S.W.3d 542, 546 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017). We do not review the merits or correctness
of the trial court’s other rulings. Duke v. Duke, 398 S.W.3d 665, 668 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2012).
III. DISCUSSION
The Tennessee Supreme Court recently summarized the standards that guide courts
in a recusal case:
“Tennessee litigants are entitled to have cases resolved by fair and
impartial judges.” Cook v. State, 606 S.W.3d 247, 253 (Tenn. 2020) (citing
Davis [v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 38 S.W.3d 560, 564 (Tenn. 2001)]; see also
State v. Griffin, 610 S.W.3d 752, 757-58 (Tenn. 2020). To preserve public
confidence in judicial neutrality, judges must be fair and impartial, both in
fact and in perception. Cook, 606 S.W.3d at 253; Kinard v. Kinard, 986
S.W.2d 220, 228 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). To these ends, the Tennessee Rules
of Judicial Conduct (“RJC”) declare that judges must “act at all times in a
manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and
impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance
of impropriety.” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10, RJC 1.2. Another provision declares
that judges “shall uphold and apply the law, and shall perform all duties of
judicial office fairly and impartially.” Id., RJC 2.2.
To act “impartially” is to act in “absence of bias or prejudice in favor
of, or against, particular parties or classes of parties, as well as maintenance
of an open mind in considering issues that may come before a judge.” Id.,
Terminology. “A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding
in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Id., RJC
-8-
2.11(A).
Rule of Judicial Conduct 2.11 “incorporates the objective standard
Tennessee judges have long used to evaluate recusal motions.” Cook, 606
S.W.3d at 255. “Under this objective test, recusal is required if ‘a person of
ordinary prudence in the judge’s position, knowing all of the facts known to
the judge, would find a reasonable basis for questioning the judge’s
impartiality.’” Id. (quoting Davis, 38 S.W.3d at 564-65).
The intermediate appellate courts have explained that the proponent
of a recusal motion bears the burden of establishing that recusal is
appropriate and that any alleged acts of bias or prejudice arise from
extrajudicial sources rather than from events or observations during the
litigation of the case. Tarver v. Tarver, No. W2022-00343-COA-T10B-CV,
2022 WL 1115016, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2022). A trial judge has
a duty to serve unless the proponent establishes a factual basis warranting
recusal. Raccoon Mtn. Caverns and Campground, LLC v. Nelson, No.
E2022-00989-COA-T10B-CV, 2022 WL 3100606, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Aug. 4, 2022) (quoting Rose v. Cookeville Reg’l Med. Ctr., No. M2007-
02368-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 2078056, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 14,
2008)).
Furthermore, rulings adverse to the proponent of a recusal motion are
not, standing alone, grounds for recusal. [State v. Cannon, 254 S.W.3d 287,
308 (Tenn. 2008)]; Davis, 38 S.W.3d at 564; Duke v. Duke, 398 S.W.3d 665,
671 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012). “Rulings of a trial judge, even if erroneous,
numerous and continuous, do not, without more, justify disqualification.”
Alley v. State, 882 S.W.2d 810, 821 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). “[T]he mere
fact that a judge has ruled adversely to a party or witness in a prior judicial
proceeding is not grounds for recusal.” Davis, 38 S.W.3d at 565 (citing State
v. Hines, 919 S.W.2d 573, 578 (Tenn. 1995)). The “adversarial nature of
litigation” makes it necessary for trial judges to “assess the credibility of
those who testify before them, whether in person or by some other means,”
and “the mere fact that a witness takes offense at the court’s assessment of
the witness cannot serve as a valid basis for a motion to recuse.” Id. “If the
rule were otherwise, recusal would be required as a matter of course since
trial courts necessarily rule against parties and witnesses in every case, and
litigants could manipulate the impartial[it]y issue for strategic advantage,
which the courts frown upon.” Id.
Adams v. Dunavant, 674 S.W.3d 871, 878-79 (Tenn. 2023).
Here, Shelby County alleges bias. “Bias is often divided into two types, each of
which implicates a different standard for determining whether recusal is warranted.”
C.D.B. v. A.B., No. M2018-00532-COA-T10B-CV, 2018 WL 1976119, at *6 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Apr. 26, 2018). Specifically, “[t]he source of the alleged bias alters the burden that
-9-
the party seeking recusal must bear.” Schmeeckle v. Hamilton Cnty., No. E2023-01533-
COA-T10B-CV, 2023 WL 8093111, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2023). “Where a bias
stems from an extrajudicial source, rather than from events or observations during litigation
of a case, it may be sufficient to justify recusal if the judge’s behavior raises ‘reasonable
questions about the judge’s impartiality.” C.D.B., 2018 WL 1976119, at *6 (quoting
Groves v. Ernst-W. Corp., No. M2016-01529-COA-T10B-CV, 2016 WL 5181687, at *5
(Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2016)). On the other hand, “‘[i]f the bias is alleged to stem from
events occur[r]ing in the course of the litigation of the case, the party seeking recusal has
a greater burden to show bias that would require recusal, i.e., that the bias is so pervasive
that it is sufficient to deny the litigant a fair trial.’” Boren, 557 S.W.3d at 552 (quoting
Runyon v. Runyon, No. W2013-02651-COA-T10B-CV, 2014 WL 1285729, at *6 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2014)). A “pervasive bias” is one that “reflect[s] an utter incapacity to
be fair.” Schmeeckle, 2023 WL 8093111, at *5 (quoting Groves, 2016 WL 5181687, at
*5). However, “[j]udicial expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even
anger towards counsel, the parties, or the case, will not ordinarily support a finding of bias
or prejudice unless they indicate partiality on the merits of the case.” Id. (quoting Groves,
2016 WL 5181687, at *5). The term “extrajudicial” is defined as “‘[o]utside court’ or ‘out-
of-court.’” C.D.B., 2018 WL 1976119, at *6 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 665 (9th
ed. 2009)).
Applying these standards de novo to the facts of this case, we readily conclude that
Shelby County has demonstrated pervasive bias to warrant recusal. We acknowledge that
some of the statements made by Chancellor Jefferson throughout this litigation could be
characterized as mere dissatisfaction, annoyance, or anger toward counsel, the parties, and
this case. However, the fact remains that she approached Mr. Gallagher in the common
area of the clerk’s office, within earshot of numerous employees, in an “extremely angry
and upset” manner, stating that she “did not like being threatened” and that he and his boss
could both “Bring it.” She also accused Mr. Gallagher of choosing to speak to Judge
Blackett because Judge Blackett is a black woman. Notably, in denying the motion for
recusal, Chancellor Jefferson did not deny that she made these statements in the course of
their conversation. She simply stated that she referenced the situation “to confirm to
[Shelby County]’s counsel that the Court would steadfastly uphold its obligation to
adjudicate matters before it fairly, justly and impartially.”
During this same timeframe, however, Mr. Gallagher appeared at a routine court tax
docket and addressed the court to obtain a hearing on the Rule 59 motion, but Chancellor
Jefferson “responded that she was not going to set the Rule 59 motion for a hearing.” Mr.
Gallagher offered to file a written motion to request a hearing date, but she said “she would
strike it from the calendar.” It was only after Shelby County filed a written motion for a
hearing date, and appeared for a hearing on it, that the motion to alter or amend, filed in
September, was finally set for a hearing date in March. These inexplicable actions “reflect
an utter incapacity to be fair.” Schmeeckle, 2023 WL 8093111, at *5 (quoting Groves,
- 10 -
2016 WL 5181687, at *5).1
IV. CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, we reverse the denial of the motion for recusal.
This case is remanded for reassignment and such further proceedings as may be necessary.
Costs of this appeal are taxed to the appellant, Shelby County, Tennessee, for which
execution may issue if necessary.
_________________________________
CARMA DENNIS MCGEE, JUDGE
1
This Court has recognized that
[A] danger of manipulation in order to require a change of judge exists where the basis for
recusal is criticism or irritation directed at an attorney. A rule that allowed an attorney to
have his case transferred to another judge by quarreling with the court is not in the interest
of justice. If every time a judge criticized the conduct of an attorney in the trial of a case,
no matter how much it was warranted, a ground for recusal might exist, it would allow for
the kind of forum shopping and cause for delay that is disfavored.
Denney ex rel. Doghouse Computers, Inc. v. Rather, No. M2022-01743-COA-T10B-CV, 2023 WL 316012,
at *5 n.5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2023) (quoting McKenzie v. McKenzie, No. M2014-00010-COA-T10B-
CV, 2014 WL 575908, at *4-5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2014)). Here, however, there is no suggestion of
forum shopping or manipulation by Shelby County. Since the case was filed, Shelby County has attempted
to have this case remain in Part I of chancery court, despite steadfast opposition from the chancellor.
- 11 -