United States v. Shaun Allahyari

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 22-35422

Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 2:17-

cv-00668-TSZ

v.

SHAUN ALLAHYARI, OPINION

Defendant - Appellant,

and

KOMRON M. ALLAHYARI,

Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Thomas S. Zilly, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted September 12, 2023

Seattle, Washington

Filed April 17, 2024

Before: Michael D. Hawkins, Ryan D. Nelson, and Daniel

P. Collins, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Collins

2 USA V. ALLAHYARI

SUMMARY *

Tax

The panel dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction, in

an action by the government to reduce federal tax liens to

judgment and foreclose on real property, because there was

no final decision to appeal.

The order that taxpayer sought to appeal found that the

government was entitled to foreclose on the tax liens, and to

the sale of certain real property. However, the order was not

final because the district court did not have sufficient

information to enter an order for judicial sale. Instead, the

district court ordered the parties to submit a Joint Status

Report. Taxpayer filed his notice of appeal before the parties

submitted the Joint Status Report and stipulated to the value

of the property to be sold. The district court still has not

entered an order for judicial sale.

Taxpayer contended that the district court’s subsequent

entry of an order resolving the value of the property ripened

the premature notice of appeal into an effective appeal of

what he contended was the then-final judgment of

foreclosure. The panel first explained that, although a

premature notice of appeal “filed after the court announces a

decision or order—but before the entry of the judgment or

order—is treated as filed on the date of and after the entry,”

Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(2), this rule was inapplicable here. The

rule was intended to protect unskilled litigants from failing

to timely file a notice of appeal from what they reasonably

*

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

USA V. ALLAHYARI 3

believe to be a final judgment, such as where the only steps

that remain to produce a final decision are essentially

ministerial tasks. This rule could not be stretched to cover a

premature notice of appeal directed at an order that explicitly

deferred resolution of the quantification of a monetary award

and that called for briefing from the parties on that issue.

Taxpayer’s premature notice of appeal thus would not have

been effective to appeal any later final judgment if indeed

there were one here. But the panel further held that, in any

event, Taxpayer was wrong in contending that there was now

a final judgment. The panel clarified that, for a decree of sale

in a foreclosure suit to be considered a final decree for

purposes of an appeal, it must settle all of the rights of the

parties and leave nothing to be done but to make the sale and

pay out the proceeds. Because that standard was not met in

this case, there still was no final judgment. The panel

therefore dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

COUNSEL

Rachel I. Wollitzer (argued) and Jacob Christensen,

Attorneys; David A. Hubbert, Deputy Assistant Attorney

General; Nicholas W. Brown, United States Attorney;

United States Department of Justice, Tax Division,

Appellate Section, Washington, D.C.; Morgan B. Hlinka,

Trial Attorney; United States Department of Justice, Tax

Division, Washington, D.C.; for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Curtis Isacke (argued) and Avi J. Lipman, McNaul Ebel

Nawrot & Helgren PLLC, Seattle, Washington, for

Defendant-Appellant.

4 USA V. ALLAHYARI

OPINION

COLLINS, Circuit Judge:

Shaun Allahyari appeals the district court’s order

concluding that a deed of trust granted in Shaun’s favor by

his son Komron Allahyari was a fraudulent transfer that

lacks priority over the Government’s federal tax liens against

Komron. 1 We conclude that the challenged order is not a

final decision and that we therefore lack jurisdiction over

this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Accordingly, we

dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

I

In April 2005, Komron filed late tax returns for the years

1999–2002, and a tax return for 2004. Although these

returns showed that Komron owed various amounts to the

Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), he did not include any

payments with these returns. The IRS subsequently assessed

unpaid income taxes, interest, and penalties against Komron.

In April 2017, the Government filed this action in which,

inter alia, it sought to reduce the IRS’s assessments to a

judgment and to obtain foreclosure relief, in partial

satisfaction of these liabilities, with respect to a residence

owned by Komron in Mercer Island, Washington (the

“Mercer Island Property”). Shaun was named as an

additional Defendant with respect to the foreclosure-related

claims, because he was the beneficiary of two deeds of trust

that were recorded against the Mercer Island Property. In

June 2018, Komron and the Government stipulated to the

1

Because Shaun Allahyari and Komron Allahyari share the same last

name, we will generally refer to them only by their respective first

names.

USA V. ALLAHYARI 5

entry of a partial judgment that fully resolved the IRS’s

claims for a monetary judgment concerning the amounts

assessed. 2 Under the terms of that partial judgment, a

monetary judgment was entered against Komron in the total

amount of $3,910,470.35, plus “interest and statutory

additions from June 14, 2018.”

With that partial judgment in place, three claims in the

Government’s operative amended complaint against

Komron and Shaun were left for resolution: (1) a request for

a declaration that any mortgage or deed of trust granted by

Komron in Shaun’s favor was invalid or unenforceable and

that Komron “owns the [Mercer Island] Property free and

clear of Defendant Shaun Allahyari’s purported interest”;

(2) a request for an order declaring that any such deeds of

trust were fraudulent transfers and setting them aside under

Washington law; and (3) for an order, under Internal

Revenue Code (“I.R.C.”) § 7403(c), that would (i) foreclose

on the various federal tax liens that had arisen from the IRS

assessments and that the IRS had recorded against the

Mercer Island Property beginning in 2005; and (ii) order the

sale of the property, with the proceeds “to be applied toward

satisfaction of the outstanding and unpaid tax assessments.” 3

2

Komron’s ex-wife, Leslie Cover, was originally named as a co-

defendant with respect to at least some of the amounts assessed, but in

April 2018, the Government stipulated to Cover’s dismissal from the

case, without prejudice.

3

The Government had also initially named King County as an additional

defendant because of the concern that it might assert an interest in the

Mercer Island Property. But in July 2017, the Government stipulated to

King County’s dismissal from the suit, without prejudice. The

stipulation between the Government and King County agreed that,

pursuant to I.R.C. § 6323(b)(6), the Government would “include in any

6 USA V. ALLAHYARI

These remaining claims challenged two distinct deeds of

trust that had been granted by Komron in favor of Shaun.

The first was a 2003 deed of trust on the Mercer Island

Property that had initially been granted by Komron to the

Boeing Employees’ Credit Union (“BECU”) as security for

a $400,000 loan. After Komron defaulted on that loan,

Shaun borrowed money in order to pay BECU the

outstanding balance of the loan, and Shaun took an

assignment of the BECU loan and the 2003 deed of trust.

BECU’s formal assignment of that deed of trust to Shaun

was recorded on September 8, 2010. On the parties’ cross-

motions for summary judgment, the district court held that,

as a matter of law, Shaun had “with respect to the amount he

paid to BECU in exchange for the assignment

($383,044.74), the same priority position that BECU had as

to its security interest in the real property at issue, which is

senior to the Government’s tax liens.” The court, however,

left for trial the question whether “any interest that has

accrued with respect to the amount defendant Shaun

Allahyari paid to BECU has priority over the Government’s

tax liens.” At that subsequent bench trial, the district court

ruled in Shaun’s favor on this issue, holding that “Shaun is

entitled to priority over the United States’ federal tax liens

with respect to interest that has accrued on the amount Shaun

paid to BECU.”

The second deed of trust that the Government challenged

had been granted by Komron to Shaun on July 25, 2005 and

formally recorded against the Mercer Island Property the

next day. At the bench trial, the district court ultimately

proposed order of sale a provision that any and all liens King County

may have on the [Mercer Island] Property for unpaid real property taxes

or special assessments at the time of sale be satisfied from the proceeds

of sale prior to any distribution on the federal tax liens.”

USA V. ALLAHYARI 7

ruled for the Government on this claim. The court

preliminarily agreed with Komron and Shaun that various

“transfers” made by Shaun to Komron “beginning in 1991

through 2005 were bona fide loans, not gifts.” Although the

2005 deed of trust was purportedly granted to secure

Komron’s performance with respect to such loans, the

district court nonetheless held that the 2005 deed of trust did

not take priority over the federal tax liens. The court relied

on two alternative grounds in reaching this conclusion. First,

the court held that the 2005 deed of trust did not meet the

requirements of federal and Washington law to qualify as a

“security interest” that would be entitled to priority over a

later-recorded tax lien under I.R.C. § 6323(a). See I.R.C.

§ 6323(h)(1) (defining “security interest” in part based on

incorporation of state law). Second, the court held that the

2005 deed of trust was “voidable under Washington’s

Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act because Komron intended

to ‘hinder, delay, or defraud’ the United States” in granting

the 2005 deed to Shaun. See REV. CODE WASH.

§ 19.40.041(1)(a).

On October 30, 2018, the district court entered a formal

judgment in accordance with these findings, and that

judgment specifically “foreclosed” the IRS’s tax liens and

ordered that the Mercer Island Property “shall be sold

pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7403 and 28 U.S.C. § 2001, with the

net proceeds to be disbursed as set forth” in a simultaneously

filed “Order of Foreclosure and Judicial Sale.” The latter

order contained detailed instructions concerning the “terms

and conditions of the sale,” which was to be conducted by

the U.S. Marshal or an IRS “Property Appraisal and

Liquidation Specialist,” and the order also contained detailed

instructions concerning the distribution of the proceeds.

8 USA V. ALLAHYARI

Both Shaun and the Government appealed, and we

reversed and remanded. United States v. Allahyari, 980 F.3d

684 (9th Cir. 2020). We concluded that the district court had

applied the wrong legal standards in both of its alternative

grounds for concluding that the 2005 deed of trust did not

have priority over the federal tax liens. Id. at 689–92. We

also held, in the Government’s cross-appeal, that the district

court failed to consider the effect of the Washington “statute

of limitations when calculating the value of Shaun’s senior

lien under the BECU Deed of Trust.” Id. at 694.

After receiving additional briefing on remand, the

district court on March 31, 2022 issued an order again

concluding that the 2005 deed of trust was a fraudulent

transfer and that a foreclosure order in the Government’s

favor was warranted.

The district court noted that the only error that this court

had identified with respect to the earlier fraudulent transfer

finding was that the district court had applied the

“preponderance of the evidence” standard rather than the

“clear-and-satisfactory-proof standard” that applied under

the relevant Washington law. Allahyari, 980 F.3d at 692.

Accordingly, the district court re-evaluated the relevant

factors under that standard and concluded that the

Government had “met its burden to demonstrate that the

2005 Deed of Trust was a fraudulent transfer by clear and

satisfactory proof.” Because the court found that the 2005

deed was voidable as a fraudulent transfer, it explicitly

declined to address, on remand, whether Shaun had

adequately established a “security interest” within the

meaning of I.R.C. § 6323.

As to the 2003 BECU deed of trust that had been

assigned to Shaun and that had priority over the

USA V. ALLAHYARI 9

Government’s liens, the district court on remand resolved

certain legal issues between the parties as to how the statute

of limitations applied. However, the court ultimately

concluded that it did not have sufficient information or

assistance from the parties to make what it believed to be the

necessary calculations to determine the amounts secured by

the BECU deed. Accordingly, the court ordered the parties

to “meet and confer” and to “submit a Joint Status Report”

setting forth their views as to five specified issues.

The district court further held that, although the court had

“limited discretion to not order a foreclosure sale,” Shaun

had failed to show that a favorable exercise of such

discretion was warranted here. Accordingly, the court

concluded that “[t]he United States has established it has

valid federal tax liens against the [Mercer Island] Property,

and therefore the United States is entitled to judgment and to

foreclose those liens, sell the [Mercer Island] Property, and

apply the proceeds toward its tax liens.”

The district court stated, however, that it would “delay

entering an order for judicial sale until after it ha[d] received

the requisite Joint Status Report from the parties and ha[d]

determined how to calculate the value of the BECU Deed of

Trust.” On May 23, 2022, the parties submitted a Joint

Status Report stating that they had “reached a tentative

agreement regarding the value of the BECU Deed of Trust”

and requesting additional time to “memorialize their

agreement via stipulation.”

On May 27, 2022, Shaun filed a notice of appeal from

the March 31, 2022 order.

On June 2, 2022, the parties filed their stipulation

regarding the value of the BECU Deed of Trust. The district

court entered an order approving the stipulation on June 29,

10 USA V. ALLAHYARI

2022. In the order, the court adopted the parties’ stipulation

that the “value of the BECU Deed of Trust as of May 1, 2022

is $620,000.” The order also set forth how interest would be

calculated on that sum. The final paragraph of the order

provides as follows: “The parties’ agreement does not impact

or waive the United States’ ability to seek a sale of the

[Mercer Island Property] . . . or Shaun Allahyari’s right to

oppose such a sale.” There are no further relevant

subsequent entries on the district court’s docket. In

particular, the district court has not entered on remand, as it

previously had in October 2018, an order for judicial sale.

II

At the threshold, the Government contends that we lack

jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because

the district court did not enter a final judgment and order of

sale. We agree.

Under § 1291, the courts of appeals are authorized to

hear “appeals from all final decisions of the district courts.”

28 U.S.C. § 1291. “A final decision ‘ends the litigation on

the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute

the judgment.’” Hall v. Hall, 584 U.S. 59, 64 (2018)

(quoting Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Central Pension Fund of

Operating Eng’rs & Participating Emps., 571 U.S. 177, 183

(2014)). Finality in this sense “is to be given a practical

rather than a technical construction,” Microsoft v. Baker, 582

U.S. 23, 37 (2017) (quoting Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,

417 U.S. 156, 171 (1974)), and a judgment will be deemed

final “if it fully adjudicates the issues and clearly evinces the

district court’s intention that it be that court’s final act in the

matter.” Long Beach Area Chamber of Com. v. City of Long

Beach, 603 F.3d 684, 690 (9th Cir. 2010); accord FirsTier

Mortg. Co. v. Investors Mort. Ins. Co., 498 U.S. 269, 273–

USA V. ALLAHYARI 11

74 (1991). We conclude that, under these standards, Shaun’s

appeal was not taken from a final decision.

As an initial matter, at the time that Shaun filed his notice

of appeal from the March 31, 2022 order, the district court

had not yet determined the “value of the BECU Deed of

Trust,” which the court had held was senior to the

Government’s tax liens here. For that reason alone, the order

appealed from was plainly not final at the time that this

appeal was taken. The Supreme Court has squarely held that

a foreclosure decree that referred to a special master the

determination of “the extent and amount of all liens prior to

said general mortgage upon the properties thereby covered”

was not a “final decree within the meaning of that term as

used in the statutes which provide for appeals to th[e]

[Supreme] [C]ourt from the final decrees of the Circuit

Courts in cases of equity jurisdiction.” Parsons v. Robinson,

122 U.S. 112, 114 (1887). The decree in Parsons left several

other substantive issues open as well, including key details

as to the manner in which the foreclosure sale was to be

conducted. Id. at 115. The Court held that, “[u]ntil the

particulars of the prior liens are ascertained,” and the

additional issues concerning the manner of the sale resolved,

“the rights of the parties will not have been sufficiently

settled” so as to allow an appeal to be taken. Id. So too here,

the March 31, 2022 order did not resolve the value of the

senior BECU deed of trust, but instead directed the parties to

provide their respective views concerning a variety of

substantive issues on that score. On its face, the order did

not “fully adjudicate[] the issues,” nor did it “clearly evince[]

the district court’s intention that it be that court’s final act in

the matter.” Long Beach Area Chamber of Com., 603 F.3d

at 690. The fact that, at the time the notice of appeal was

filed, the parties had jointly reported to the district court that

12 USA V. ALLAHYARI

they had reached a tentative agreement on the open issues

concerning the BECU deed of trust did not suffice to make

the March 31, 2022 order final. Notwithstanding that joint

report, the district court had neither been presented with, nor

had it yet adopted, any substantive resolution of those issues

at the time that Shaun filed his notice of appeal. In the

absence of such a ruling, the district court unquestionably

had not yet entered a final decision. At the time of its filing,

Shaun’s notice of appeal therefore was directed at a non-

final, non-appealable order.

Shaun does not contest this point, but he insists that, with

the district court’s subsequent entry of the June 29, 2022

order resolving the value of the BECU deed of trust, his

premature notice of appeal ripened into an effective appeal

of the then-final judgment of foreclosure. However, if

Shaun were correct that the June 29, 2022 order, without

more, sufficed to produce a final, appealable decision, the

result would be that Shaun would thereby now have lost his

appellate rights with respect to the March 31, 2022 and June

29, 2022 orders. That is because (1) Shaun did not file a new

notice of appeal within the 60-day statutory jurisdictional

time limit after the entry of the June 29, 2022 order, see 28

U.S.C. § 2107(b); and (2) under our settled caselaw, Shaun’s

May 27, 2022 premature notice of appeal cannot be applied

to what he posits is a June 29, 2022 final decision.

The latter point follows from our decision in Kennedy v.

Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477 (9th Cir. 1996). There, the

plaintiff filed a notice of appeal from a post-judgment order

awarding attorney’s fees, but that order explicitly left the

amount to be awarded “undetermined,” and the district court

“requested further submissions from both parties in order to

assist it in this determination.” Id. at 1482–83. We held that

the notice of appeal was “premature” and that it was not

USA V. ALLAHYARI 13

effective to place before this court the subsequent final order

fixing the amount of attorney’s fees. Id. In reaching this

conclusion, we noted that, under Federal Rule of Appellate

Procedure 4(a)(2), a premature notice of appeal “filed after

the court announces a decision or order but before the entry

of the judgment or order is treated as filed on the date of and

after the entry.” FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(2) (1995) (quoted in

Kennedy, 90 F.3d at 1482). 4 We observed that this rule “was

intended to protect the unskilled litigant who files a notice of

appeal from a decision that he reasonably but mistakenly

believes to be a final judgment, while failing to file a notice

of appeal from the actual final judgment.” Kennedy, 90 F.3d

at 1483 (quoting FirsTier Mortg., 498 U.S. at 276). As we

explained, this rule protects those who file a premature

notice of appeal, when the only steps that remain to produce

a final decision are essentially “ministerial task[s].” Id.

(citation omitted); see also Weston Family P’ship LLLP v.

Twitter, Inc., 29 F.4th 611, 618 (9th Cir. 2022) (holding that,

under Rule 4(a)(2), a subsequent district court order formally

dismissing the case after the plaintiff declined to amend the

complaint “cured the premature notice of appeal” directed to

the prior order dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint with

leave to amend).

But we concluded in Kennedy that Rule 4(a)(2) could not

be stretched to cover a premature notice of appeal directed

at an order that explicitly deferred resolution of the

quantification of a monetary award and that called for

briefing from the parties on that issue. Kennedy, 90 F.3d at

1483. A litigant could not “reasonably” believe such an

order to be final, and the tasks left to be completed by such

an order were far from ministerial. Id. Because Shaun’s

4

The current version of Rule 4(a)(2) is identical, except that the phrase

“but before the entry of the judgment or order” is now set off by dashes.

14 USA V. ALLAHYARI

premature notice of appeal was directed at a March 31, 2022

order that explicitly left the amounts to be awarded from the

foreclosure sale unsettled and that asked for submissions

from the parties on that issue, that notice of appeal was

defective under Kennedy and cannot be applied to the

subsequent order that provided the court’s substantive

resolution of the merits of that open issue.

Fortunately for Shaun, however, he is wrong in

contending that the June 29, 2022 order, without more, was

sufficient to produce a final judgment in this case. As our

prior discussion indicates, the Supreme Court in Parsons

further held that, in order for a foreclosure order to be

considered final and appealable, that order must determine,

not only the amount of any superior liens, but also “what the

order of sale of said mortgage properties shall contain” so

that the court’s “ministerial officers can proceed to carry the

decree into execution.” Parsons, 122 U.S. at 115 (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, in order for a

“decree of sale in a foreclosure suit” to qualify as “a final

decree for the purposes of an appeal,” the court’s order must

“settle[] all the rights of the parties and leave[] nothing to be

done but to make the sale and pay out the proceeds.” Grant

v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 106 U.S. 429, 431 (1882).

Here, several aspects of the record make clear that, under

these standards, the district court has not yet issued a

sufficiently final order of sale that settles all of the rights of

the parties and that can be ministerially executed without

further substantive input from the court.

First, the district court expressly stated in its March 31,

2022 order that it intended to issue a separate and further

“order for judicial sale,” but that it would “delay entering”

that order “until after it has received the requisite Joint Status

Report from the parties and has determined how to calculate

USA V. ALLAHYARI 15

the value of the BECU Deed of Trust.” The subsequent June

29, 2022 order does not constitute that separate “order for

judicial sale,” nor does it in any way indicate that the district

court had changed its mind about issuing such a separate

order. On the contrary, the June 29, 2022 order delimits

Shaun’s agreed-upon right to recover “sums under the

BECU Deed of Trust” “in connection with a sale of the

property, if ordered,” and it further preserves “the United

States’ ability to seek a sale of the subject property” and

“Shaun Allahyari’s right to oppose such a sale” (emphasis

added). On their face, the district court’s orders do not

“clearly evince[] the district court’s intention that [they] be

that court’s final act in the matter.” Long Beach Area

Chamber of Com., 603 F.3d at 690. By confirming that a

sale would be the subject of a further order, they instead

confirm the exact opposite.

Second, as in Parsons, the lack of a final decision is

confirmed by the absence of any order specifying the

necessary substantive requirements governing how the sale

should be conducted and the proceeds distributed. This is

not a minor matter. Among other things, nothing in the

March 31, 2022 or June 29, 2022 orders contains the sort of

needful details that were supplied in the district court’s

previous formal order of sale that was reversed by our

opinion in the prior appeal. In particular, the prior order of

sale clearly specified the sequence in which the funds

obtained from a sale should be paid out: first to the IRS, but

only “for allowed costs and expenses of sale”; second, to

King County “for unpaid real property taxes or special

assessments”; third, to Shaun for the amounts due in

connection with the BECU deed of trust; and fourth to the

IRS for the tax liens. Nothing in the March 31, 2022 or June

29, 2022 orders explicitly addresses this crucial subject.

16 USA V. ALLAHYARI

Although it might be reasonable to assume that the court

would probably follow the same ruling it had previously

made on that score, the fact remains that, after the case was

remanded for new proceedings concerning the merits, the

district court never did issue such an order. Moreover, in

contrast to the prior formal order of sale, there is nothing in

either of the 2022 orders that sets forth any details about how

the sale is to be conducted. Again, it is perhaps reasonable

to think that the district court would impose the same

conditions that it did before the prior appeal, but it has not

yet taken any action that can be said, even by implication, to

have done so. With this many loose ends, the district court

has neither “fully adjudicate[d] the issues,” nor has it

“clearly evince[d] [its] intention” that its two post-remand

orders are “that court’s final act in the matter.” Long Beach

Area Chamber of Com., 603 F.3d at 690.

In arguing for a contrary conclusion, Shaun points to our

decision in Citicorp Real Estate, Inc. v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1097

(9th Cir. 1998), but that case instead confirms the

correctness of our holding. In Citicorp Real Estate, the

district court did “order[] the property securing the loans to

be sold at a judicial foreclosure sale,” and no party

contended that any further order of the district court was

necessary to accomplish that sale. Id. at 1100. Instead,

Citicorp argued that there was nonetheless no final,

appealable decision under § 1291 because the district court

had also entered deficiency judgments against the borrowers,

with the precise amount of those judgments to be fixed after

it was known exactly how much was left over from the

proceeds of the sale. Id. at 1101. We held that this

ministerial post-sale calculation did not detract from the fact

that the district court’s orders had “conclusively

determine[d] the rights of the parties to the litigation.” Id.

USA V. ALLAHYARI 17

In contrast to Citicorp Real Estate, the issue here is not a

ministerial question about the post-sale application of funds

in accordance with the court’s pre-sale instructions. Rather,

the problem here is that the district court has not issued the

necessary pre-sale instructions in the first place.

In all events, we now clarify that, in accordance with

more than 100 years of Supreme Court precedent, for “a

decree of sale in a foreclosure suit” to be considered “a final

decree for the purposes of an appeal” under § 1291, it must

“settle[] all the rights of the parties and leave[] nothing to be

done but to make the sale and pay out the proceeds” in

accordance with the decree’s terms. Grant, 106 U.S. at 431.

For the reasons we have explained, that standard is not met

in this case.

Shaun complains that adherence to such a rule is

“inefficient” in this case, because it requires him to return to

the district court and obtain a final decision and then “to

pursue a new appeal.” That may be so, but clear

jurisdictional rules also have the countervailing benefit of

avoiding traps for the unwary. Indeed, if we did not apply

such a bright-line rule here, the supposedly efficient result

would be that, as we have explained, Shaun would have no

appeal at all.

III

For the foregoing reasons, this appeal is dismissed for

lack of jurisdiction.

DISMISSED.