The opinion
TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
State of California
ROB BONTA
Attorney General
_______________
:
OPINION :
: No. 21-1001
of :
: March 20, 2024
ROB BONTA :
Attorney General :
:
SUSAN DUNCAN LEE :
Deputy Attorney General :
The HONORABLE ROBERT H. PITTMAN, SONOMA COUNTY COUNSEL,
has requested an opinion on questions relating to regulation of pesticides in California’s
“coastal zone.”
QUESTIONS PRESENTED AND CONCLUSIONS
1. May a county adopt ordinances to regulate the use of pesticides in the coastal
zone to implement Local Coastal Program requirements?
No. Food and Agricultural Code section 11501.1 expressly preempts local
ordinances regulating “the registration, sale, transportation, or use of pesticides.”
Ordinances violating this restriction are “void and of no force or effect.” Given this
broad preemption, a county may not adopt ordinances or other laws of general application
to regulate the use of pesticides, even to implement Local Coastal Program requirements,
unless it obtains approval from the Department of Pesticide Regulation under
Agricultural Code section 11503.
2. May a county take other actions—legislative, regulatory or otherwise—to
address the environmental impacts of pesticide use in a Local Coastal Program without
violating Food and Agricultural Code section 11501.1?
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Yes. Although a county may not adopt ordinances or other laws of general
application that purport to regulate the use of pesticides in the coastal zone absent
approval from the Department of Pesticide Regulation, it may take certain other
actions—legislative, regulatory or otherwise—to address the environmental impacts of
pesticide use in the coastal zone without violating section 11501.1. For example:
• In deciding whether to grant an individual land-use development permit for a
particular site, a county may condition the permit on site-specific restrictions
on pesticide use.
• A county may adopt policies or regulations aimed at reducing the need for
pesticide use in the first instance, such as sanitary rules for the reduction of
rodents and other pests.
• A county may adopt policies or regulations that mitigate the local post-use
effects of pesticides, such as by requiring training and certification in methods
of cleaning that minimize the leaching of pesticides after they have been used.
• Similarly, a county may publish recommendations or advisory policies
encouraging best practices regarding pesticide use or alternatives to pesticide
use.
• And a county may restrict the use of pesticides by its own employees in the
course of their work, or on property owned by the county, so long as those
restrictions apply only to county operations and do not purport to impose
generally applicable restrictions throughout the county.
BACKGROUND
In this opinion, we consider whether a county may adopt ordinances to regulate
the use of pesticides, or otherwise adopt policies to address the environmental impacts of
pesticides, in the coastal zone to implement a Local Coastal Program under the California
Coastal Act. We begin by reviewing the applicable legal principles.
State law preempts local government attempts to prohibit or regulate the
registration, sale, transportation, or use of pesticides without the approval of the
Department of Pesticide Regulation. California’s Food and Agricultural Code establishes
a statutory scheme governing the use of pesticides. 1 Its purposes include protecting
public health, worker safety, and the environment; authorizing the issuance of permits for
1
Food & Agr. Code, §§ 11401-14103.
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controlled pesticide use; ensuring proper labeling of pesticides; and encouraging the
development of less harmful pest control methods. 2
To further these purposes, the Legislature has established the Department of
Pesticide Regulation within the California Environmental Protection Agency. 3 The
Department’s mission is to protect the environment and human health by regulating
pesticides and by supporting integrated pest management. 4
Food and Agricultural Code section 11501.1 places statewide responsibility for
pesticide regulation in the hands of the Department. Subdivision (a) preempts any local
ordinance or regulation that prohibits or attempts to regulate the “registration, sale,
transportation, or use” of pesticides:
(a) This division and Division 7 (commencing with Section 12501) are of
statewide concern and occupy the whole field of regulation regarding
the registration, sale, transportation, or use of pesticides to the
exclusion of all local regulation. Except as otherwise specifically
provided in this code, no ordinance or regulation of local government,
including, but not limited to, an action by a local governmental agency
or department, a county board of supervisors or a city council, or a
local regulation adopted by the use of an initiative measure, may
prohibit or in any way attempt to regulate any matter relating to the
registration, sale, transportation, or use of pesticides, and any of these
ordinances, laws, or regulations are void and of no force or effect. 5
Subdivision (b) provides that, if the Department’s Director “determines that an
ordinance or regulation, on its face or in its application, is preempted by subdivision (a),
the director shall notify the promulgating entity that it is preempted by state law.” 6 If the
local entity does not repeal the preempted ordinance or regulation, then “the director shall
maintain an action for declaratory relief to have the ordinance or regulation declared void
and of no force or effect, and shall also bring an action to enjoin enforcement of the
ordinance or regulation.” 7
2
See id., § 11501.
3
Id., § 11451.
4
See id., § 11454.
5
Id., § 11501, subd. (a).
6
Id., § 11501, subd. (b).
7
Ibid.
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Section 11501.1 thus focuses on preventing local agencies from enacting local
ordinances banning or otherwise regulating pesticide use, leaving the field clear for
statewide control. With respect to fellow state agencies, subdivision (c) states: “Neither
this division [6, Pest Control Operations] nor Division 7 [Agricultural Chemicals,
Livestock Remedies, and Commercial Feeds] is a limitation on the authority of a state
agency or department to enforce or administer any law that the agency or department is
authorized or required to enforce or administer.” 8
Although section 11501.1 generally prohibits local governments from enacting
pesticide-related regulations or ordinances on their own, local governments are not
powerless to shape the regulation of pesticides in their communities. Specifically, Food
and Agricultural Code sections 11503 and 11503.5 establish a process by which local
governments may seek the Department’s approval to adopt proposed local pesticide
ordinances or regulations. Those sections authorize a county agricultural commissioner
to adopt such ordinances or regulations after review and approval by the director of the
Department of Pesticide Regulation. 9
The California Coastal Act governs development in the coastal zone and provides
for the local implementation of state policy objectives.
Resource conservation is fundamentally important to the welfare of the people of
California. 10 The Legislature has adopted measures to protect various aspects of
California’s environment, including its air, water, fields, forests, wildlife, and—relevant
here—its coastal areas. 11 The questions presented for our analysis involve the “coastal
zone,” where development is governed by the California Coastal Act of 1976. 12 To
protect the delicately balanced ecosystem in the coastal zone, the Coastal Act seeks to
conserve the natural environment and to ensure carefully planned development. 13
8
Id., § 11501.1, subd. (c).
9
Id., §§ 11503, 11503.5.
10
See Pub. Resources Code, § 9001, subd. (a).
11
See 50 Cal.Jur.3d (2022) Pollution and Conservation Laws, § 1.
12
Pub. Resources Code, § 30000 et seq. “‘Coastal zone’ means that land and water area
of the State of California from the Oregon border to the border of the Republic of Mexico
. . . extending seaward to the state’s outer limit of jurisdiction, including all offshore
islands, and extending inland generally 1,000 yards from the mean high tide line of the
sea. . . .” (Id., § 30103, subd. (a).)
13
Id., § 30000 et seq. (Coastal Act).
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The Legislature designed the Coastal Act to align local land use zoning and
planning with statewide policies, such as sustaining the biological productivity of coastal
waters and preventing the disruption of sensitive habitat areas. 14 The Legislature charged
the California Coastal Commission with responsibility for implementing the core goals of
the Act, which are to:
(a) Protect, maintain, and, where feasible, enhance and restore the
overall quality of the coastal zone environment and its natural and artificial
resources.
(b) Ensure orderly, balanced utilization and conservation of
coastal zone resources taking into account the social and economic needs of
the people of the state.
(c) Maximize public access to and along the coast and maximize
public recreational opportunities in the coastal zone consistent with sound
resources conservation principles and constitutionally protected rights of
private property owners.
(d) Ensure priority for coastal-dependent and coastal-related
development over other development on the coast.
(e) Encourage state and local initiatives and cooperation in preparing
procedures to implement coordinated planning and development for
mutually beneficial uses, including educational uses, in the coastal zone.
(f) Anticipate, assess, plan for, and, to the extent feasible, avoid,
minimize, and mitigate the adverse environmental and economic effects of
sea level rise within the coastal zone. 15
The primary means of implementing the Coastal Act in a particular area is a Local
Coastal Program, or LCP, which is a local government’s legal framework for applying
state coastal policies to the conditions existing within the local jurisdiction. 16 Public
Resources Code section 30500(a) requires local governments to either prepare an LCP or
to ask the Commission to do so on their behalf. In any case, section 30500(c) requires
that the “precise content of each local coastal program shall be determined by the local
government, in full consultation with the commission and with full public
14
Id., § 30001.5; see id., §§ 30230 (marine environment), 30231 (water quality), 30240
(sensitive habitat), 30270 (sea level rise).
15
Id., § 30001.5.
16
See id., §§ 30500, 30519, 30600.
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participation.” 17 An LCP consists of land use plans, zoning maps, zoning ordinances, and
other actions intended to ensure that local development is consistent with state coastal
policies. 18
A proposed LCP must be submitted to the Coastal Commission for review
pursuant to a resolution adopted by the local government, after public hearing. 19 After a
local government presents its proposed LCP to the Commission, the Commission reviews
the plan for conformity with the policies contained in the Coastal Act. 20
Public Resources Code section 30512 states that the Commission, in reviewing the
“land use plan” component of an LCP, “shall” certify the plan if it “meets the
requirements of, and is in conformity with, the policies” set forth in Chapter 3 of the
Coastal Act. 21 The Commission’s review of the plan “shall be limited to its
administrative determination that the land use plan submitted by the local government
does, or does not, conform with the requirements of” the Coastal Act. 22 The Commission
“is not authorized . . . to diminish or abridge the authority of a local government to adopt
and establish, by ordinance, the precise content of its land use plan.” 23
Similarly, a local government “shall” submit to the Commission for review “the
zoning ordinances, zoning district maps, and . . . other implementing actions” that it
proposes for carrying out its land use plan and that are otherwise necessary to implement
its proposed LCP. 24 But the Commission “may only reject ordinances, zoning district
maps, or other implementing actions on the grounds that they do not conform with, or are
inadequate to carry out, the provisions of the certified land use plan.” 25
Once the Commission certifies an LCP affecting a given area and all
implementing actions within the area have become effective, the Commission delegates
17
Id., § 30500, subd. (c).
18
See id., §§ 30108.5, 30108.6, 30122; see generally id., §§ 30210-30265.5 (state coastal
policies).
19
Id., § 30510, subd. (a).
20
Id., §§ 30500, 30512, 30512.2.
Id., § 30512, subd. (c); see Coastal Act, ch. 3 (Coastal Resources Planning and
21
Management Policies) § 30200 et seq.
22
Id., § 30512.2, subd. (a).
23
Ibid.
24
Id., § 30513, subd. (a).
25
Id., subd. (b).
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its authority to issue coastal development permits to the local government that is
implementing the LCP. 26 In that respect, it may be said that a certified Local Coastal
Program is “not solely a matter of local law.” 27 State and local authorities work in
tandem to administer state policy governing development in the coastal zone.
Submissions from interested parties
We received a number of thoughtful submissions on whether, despite the
preemptive language of Food and Agricultural Code section 11501(a), a county may
adopt ordinances to regulate pesticides in the coastal zone to implement an LCP, or
otherwise adopt policies in an LCP to address the environmental impacts of pesticides. 28
We summarize a few of those submissions here.
The Department of Pesticide Regulation stressed the preemptive effect of section
11501.1 on local government attempts to adopt ordinances that regulate the use of
pesticides. It also identified several policy areas that fall outside the statute’s preemptive
reach. These include regulations that apply exclusively to a local agency’s personnel and
properties, advisory guidelines and other educational material, policies addressing the
post-use effects of pesticides, and case-by-case decisions on applications for development
permits. 29
The California Coastal Commission also identified non-regulatory methods of
policy making that are not preempted by section 11501.1, including rules that apply to the
local agency itself, studies and education materials, regulations addressing the post-use
26
Id., § 30519, subd. (a). If there is no certified LCP covering the area where a
development is proposed, or if the area lies within certain original jurisdiction areas, the
authority to issue a coastal development permit remains with the Commission. (Id.,
§ 30519, subds. (a)-(b).)
27
Pacific Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 55 Cal.4th
783, 794, quoting Charles Pratt Const. Co., Inc. v. California Coastal Com. (2008) 162
Cal.App.4th 1068, 1075.
28
Office of the Sonoma County Counsel, letter to Attorney General’s Office re: Opn. 21-
1001, Oct. 12, 2021; League of California Cities, letter to Attorney General’s Office re:
Opn. 21-1001, Dec. 12, 2021; Mosquito and Vector Control Association of California,
letter to Attorney General’s Office re: Opn. 21-1001, Dec. 21, 2021; Department of
Pesticide Regulation, letter to Attorney General’s Office re: Opn. 21-1001, May 27,
2022; California Coastal Commission, letter to Attorney General re: Opn. 21-1001,
May 31, 2022.
Department of Pesticide Regulation, letter to Attorney General re: Opn. 21-1001,
29
May 27, 2002, at pp. 4-5.
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effects of pesticides, and case-by-case decisions on applications for development
permits. 30 But the Commission’s view of the preemptive scope of section 11501.1
differed from the Department of Pesticide Regulation’s view. The Commission argued
that local governments operating under the terms of a Commission-approved LCP are
carrying out state law and policy, not local regulation subject to preemption under section
11501.1. It argued that, “Properly understood, Section 11501.1 should be interpreted to
mean that local governments may not adopt local regulations on pesticides, but that they
may regulate matters involving pesticides to the extent necessary to carry out state laws
such as the Coastal Act.” 31
Similarly, in its request letter to the Attorney General, the Sonoma County
Counsel argued that a certified LCP carries the status of state law. On that premise, the
County Counsel reasoned that a pesticide ordinance in a certified LCP falls within section
11501.1(c), which states that section 11501.1 is not “a limitation on the authority of a
state agency or department to enforce or administer any law that the agency or
department is authorized or required to enforce or administer.” 32
We address these competing views below in analyzing the questions presented by
the Sonoma County Counsel.
ANALYSIS
1. May a county adopt ordinances that regulate pesticides in order to implement
Local Coastal Program requirements?
Article XI, section 7 of the California Constitution provides that a county or city
“may make and enforce within its limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances
and regulations not in conflict with general laws.” But “local legislation that conflicts
with state law is void.” 33 A conflict exists when local legislation “duplicates,
contradicts, or enters an area fully occupied by general law . . . .” 34
30
California Coastal Commission, letter to Attorney General re: Opn. 21-1001, May 31,
2022, at pp. 2-3, 9-11.
31
Id. at p. 6; see id. at pp. 4-7.
32
Sonoma County Counsel, letter to Attorney General re: Opn. 21-1001, Oct. 12, 2021, at
pp. 3-4.
33
City of Riverside v. Inland Empire Patients Health & Wellness Center, Inc. (2013)
56 Cal.4th 729, 743.
34
Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1993) 4 Cal.4th 893, 897.
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Local legislation duplicates state law when it is “coextensive” with state law, such
as an ordinance imposing the same criminal prohibition that state law imposes. 35 Local
legislation contradicts state law when it is “inimical to or cannot be reconciled” with state
law, such as an ordinance setting the maximum speed limit for vehicles lower than that
set by state law. 36 Local legislation enters a field fully occupied by state law either when
the state statutory scheme expresses a legislative intent to occupy the field, or when the
state statutory scheme “impliedly” occupies the field. 37
We are dealing here with a question of express preemption. As mentioned, Food
and Agricultural Code section 11501.1(a) expressly preempts local regulation of
pesticides. The statute states its preemptive purposes in notably broad and emphatic
terms. It emphasizes that Division 6 of the Food and Agricultural Code (addressing “Pest
Control Operations”) and Division 7 (addressing “Agricultural Chemicals, Livestock
Remedies, and Commercial Feeds) are matters “of statewide concern and occupy the
whole field of regulation regarding the registration, sale, transportation, or use of
pesticides to the exclusion of all local regulation.” It goes on to direct that “no ordinance
or regulation of local government . . . may prohibit or in any way attempt to regulate any
matter relating to the registration, sale, transportation, or use of pesticides, and any of
these ordinances, laws or regulations are void and of no force or effect.”
The terms “ordinance” and “regulation” are not specifically defined for purposes
of this statute. A prominent dictionary definition of “regulation” is “an official rule or
order, having legal force . . . .” 38 The definition of “ordinance” is somewhat more
specific: “An authoritative law or decree; [specifically] a municipal regulation,
[especially] one that forbids or restricts an activity.” 39 And McQuillan’s treatise on the
Law of Municipal Ordinances provides that a local ordinance is commonly understood as
a duly-enacted local law that prescribes “general, uniform and permanent rules of
conduct” within the jurisdiction. 40 Altogether, the language of section 11501.1(a)
35
O’Connell v. City of Stockton (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1061, 1067; Sherwin-Williams Co. v.
City of Los Angeles, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 897-898, citing In re Portnoy (1942)
21 Cal.2d 237, 240.
36
O’Connell v. City of Stockton, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1068; Sherwin–Williams Co. v.
City of Los Angeles, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 898, citing Ex Parte Daniels (1920) 183 Cal.
636, 641-648.
O’Connell v. City of Stockton, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 1067-1068; Sherwin–Williams
37
Co. v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 898.
38
Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019), at p. 1325.
39
Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019), at p. 1538.
40
See McQuillin, A Treatise on the Law of Municipal Ordinances 2-3 (1904).
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expresses a clear intention to prohibit local governments from adopting laws that ban or
restrict pesticides.
In addition to the express language of section 11501.1(a), the provisions
surrounding it underscore the significance of the preemption rule. As noted, section
11501.1(b) charges the Department of Pesticide Regulation with notifying local
governments if they have adopted an ordinance that is preempted by section 11051.1(a)
because it attempts to regulate pesticides. 41 If the local entity, after receiving notice that
its pesticide measure is preempted by state law, “does not repeal its ordinance or
regulation, the director shall maintain an action for declaratory relief to have the
ordinance or regulation declared void and of no force or effect, and shall also bring an
action to enjoin enforcement of the ordinance or regulation.” 42 This directly enforces the
Legislature’s express intent that local governments may not unilaterally impose pesticide
regulations.
The history of section 11501.1 also confirms that the Legislature intended it to
have broad preemptive effect. The statute was adopted in 1984 with the express purpose
of overturning the then-recent decision of the Supreme Court of California in People ex
rel. Deukmejian v. County of Mendocino. 43 In that case, the Court had upheld a
Mendocino County regulation prohibiting the aerial application of phenoxy herbicides
against a claim that state law preempted the regulation. 44 An uncodified section of the
1984 statute states that “the intent of the Legislature by this act [is] to overturn the
holding of People ex rel. George Deukmejian v. County of Mendocino et al., and to
reassert the Legislature’s intention that matters relating to economic poisons [i.e.,
pesticides] are of a statewide interest and concern and are to be administered on a
statewide basis by the state unless specific exceptions are made in state legislation for
local administration.” 45 In addition, legislative reports and analyses reflect the
proponents’ argument that preemption “is necessary to the continued viability of
California’s agricultural industry. Local communities do not have the expertise or
41
Id., § 11501.1, subd. (b).
42
Ibid.
43
Stats.1984, ch. 1386; see People ex rel. George Deukmejian v. County of Mendocino et
al. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 476.
44
See People ex rel. George Deukmejian v. County of Mendocino et al., supra, 36 Cal.3d
at pp. 485-488.
45
Stats. 1984, ch. 1386, § 3.
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perspective with which to understand the broad implications of decisions relating to
pesticide use and regulation.” 46
The first question presented to us asks whether a county may “adopt ordinances to
regulate pesticides in the coastal area to implement Local Coastal Program
requirements.” As a general matter, an “ordinance[] to regulate pesticides” (if adopted
outside of the process for state Department of Pesticide Regulation approval
contemplated by section 11503) falls squarely within the intended scope of section
11501.1. The question we must resolve here is whether it changes the analysis if such an
ordinance is intended “to implement Local Coastal Program requirements” under the
Coastal Act. We conclude that it does not.
In harmonizing disparate statutory provisions, we are guided by the principle that
later and more specific enactments prevail over earlier and more general ones. 47 Here,
section 11501.1 of the Food and Agricultural Code specifically addresses local
regulations and ordinances concerning pesticides, and it was enacted more recently than
the Coastal Act of 1976. 48 Moreover, section 11501.1 contains no exception for
ordinances or regulations contained in LCPs, or that otherwise relate to the coastal zone.
46
Sen. Democratic Caucus, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill 2635 (1983-1984 Reg.
Sess.) as amended August 28, 1984, p. 2; see also Cal. Dept. Finance, Analysis of Assem.
Bill 2635 (1984-1985 Reg. Sess.) as amended August 31, 1984 (“If the bill does not
become law . . . the State will lose control over the regulation of pesticides in California.
County and local entities will be free to enact their own laws regarding pesticides, which
will completely fragment and destroy the statewide interest in controlling agricultural
pests.”); Cal. Dept. Food & Agriculture, Enrolled Bill Report for Assem. Bill 2635
(1984-1985 Reg. Sess.) (“The safe and efficient use of pesticides is vitally important to
California’s number one industry – agriculture. Local officials do not have sufficient
training or information to make the decisions, which need to be made in this controversial
area. California’s state regulatory program is the best in the nation and the world. In
order to maintain an effective statewide program there must be preemption of local
regulation.”); Assem. Bruce Bronzman letter to Gov. George Deukmejian re: Assem. Bill
2635 (1983-1984 Reg. Sess.) September 4, 1984 ([T]he regulation of agricultural
pesticides requires a coordinated, statewide system and should not be left to the
independent decisions of each one of our cities, county, and local districts. Without [the
statute], an impossible and chaotic patchwork system of regulations could develop.”).
47
State Dept. of Pub. Health v. Super. Ct. (2015) 60 Cal.4th 940, 960; Wells v. One2One
Learning Foundation (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1164, 1208; Code Civ. Proc., § 1859.
48
Id., § 11501.1 adopted 1984 (Stats. 1984, ch. 1386, § 1); California Coastal Act of
1976 (Public Resources Code, §§ 30000 et seq.) adopted 1976 (Stats. 1976, ch. 1330,
§ 1.)
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Significantly, in other contexts the Legislature has enacted express statutory exceptions
related to the Coastal Act. 49 Here, however, it chose not to do so. By its terms, section
11501.1 preempts ordinances that regulate pesticides—even when they are intended to
implement coastal conservation requirements.
The Coastal Act does not alter our conclusion. While the Coastal Act speaks in
broad terms about protecting the environment in the coastal zone, it does not specifically
address pesticides or contain any exception to the preemption provision in section
11501.1. Nothing in the Coastal Act indicates that the ordinances and regulations that
comprise an LCP are not “ordinance[s] or regulation[s] of local government” subject to
preemption by section 11501.1.
To the contrary, the Coastal Act confirms the local nature of the contents of an
LCP. The Act emphasizes, for example, that “[t]he precise content of each local coastal
program shall be determined by the local government . . . .” 50 The Commission’s role in
reviewing an LCP is to determine whether the plan conforms with the Coastal Act; if so,
the Commission “shall” certify the plan. 51 The Commission may reject proposed zoning
ordinances, maps, or other measures only if they “do not conform with, or are inadequate
to carry out” the LCP’s land use plan. 52 The Commission may not “diminish or abridge
the authority of a local government to adopt and establish, by ordinance, the precise
content of its land use plan.” 53 These provisions convey a clear legislative intent that
ordinances and regulations comprising an LCP are local in nature—and that they remain
so even after the Coastal Commission has certified them.
This conclusion accords with the opinion in Yost v. Thomas, in which the
California Supreme Court held that amendments to the land-use portion of an LCP are
legislative acts of a local governing body and therefore subject to referendum. 54 The Yost
Court observed that the Coastal Act “leaves wide discretion to a local government not
only to determine the contents of its land use plans but to choose how to implement these
49
See Gov. Code, §§ 65589.4, subd. (e) (attached housing developments; section “does
not apply to the issuance of coastal development permits” under Coastal Act); 65852.2,
subd. (l) (accessory dwelling units; section “does not supersede or in any way alter or
lessen the effect or application” of Coastal Act).
50
Pub. Resources Code, § 30500, subd. (c).
51
Id., § 30512, subd. (c); see § 30512.2, subd. (a).
52
Id., § 30513, subd. (b).
53
Pub. Resources Code, § 30512.2, subd. (a).
54
Yost v. Thomas (1984) 36 Cal.3d 561, 574.
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plans.” 55 To be sure, when a local government with a certified LCP issues a coastal
development permit, it may be said to be exercising delegated state authority. 56 But that
does not undermine our conclusion that an ordinance or regulation that is part of an LCP
is still an “ordinance or regulation of local government” for purposes of section 11501.
In its comment letter, the Coastal Commission invokes state appellate authority for
the proposition that “LCPs and CDPs ‘are not solely a matter of local law, but embody
state policy.’” 57 But none of the proffered cases interpreted or applied the preemption
provision in section 11501(a). For example, the Commission discusses Pratt
Construction Co., Inc. v. California Coastal Commission. 58 In that case, the Court of
Appeal considered a company’s argument that it had obtained vested rights to develop its
property under the Subdivision Map Act, and that the Coastal Commission violated its
rights by denying a development permit based on state coastal policies that postdated the
county’s tentative approval. 59 The court’s resolution of the issue turned on whether the
policy on which the denial was based was a matter local law, or of state law or policy. 60
In that context, the court observed that “under the Coastal Act’s legislative scheme . . .
55
Id. at p. 573.
56
Pub. Resources Code, § 30519, subd. (a) (“[A]fter a local coastal program, or any
portion thereof, has been certified and all implementing actions within the area affected
have become effective, the development review authority . . . shall no longer be exercised
by the commission over any new development proposed within the area to which the
certified local coastal program, or any portion thereof, applies and shall at that time be
delegated to the local government that is implementing the local coastal program or any
portion thereof.”) We address a local government’s issuance of coastal development
permits in more detail below in response to Question 2. (See infra, at pp. 15-17.)
57
California Coastal Commission, letter to Attorney General re: Opn. 21-1001, May 31,
2022, at p. 5, citing Pacific Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates, LLC v. City of Los Angeles,
supra, 55 Cal.4th 783, 794.
58
Charles A. Pratt Construction Co., Inc. v. California Coastal Com., supra, 162
Cal.App.4th 1068.
59
Id. at p. 1075.
60
See Gov. Code. § 66474.2, subd. (a) (vested rights require local agency to apply only
rules that were in effect when tentative map application was complete); Gov. Code,
§ 66498.6, subd. (b) (“The rights conferred by this chapter shall relate only to the
imposition by local agencies of conditions or requirements created and imposed by local
ordinances. Nothing in this chapter removes, diminishes, or affects the obligation of any
subdivider to comply with the conditions and requirements of any state or federal laws,
regulations, or policies and does not grant local agencies the option to disregard any state
or federal laws, regulations, or policies.”).
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the LCP and the development permits issued by local agencies pursuant to the Coastal
Act are not solely a matter of local law, but embody state policy.” 61 Applying the terms
of the Subdivision Map Act with that observation in mind, the court concluded that the
laws and policies considered by the Coastal Commission in denying the development
permit “are not subject to the vesting provisions of Government Code section 66498.1,
subdivision (b).” 62 But it does not follow from that conclusion that an ordinance in an
LCP purporting to prohibit or regulate the use of pesticides is not an “ordinance or
regulation of local government” for purposes of preemption under section Food and
Agricultural Code section 11501.1. Indeed, Pratt itself was careful to emphasize that “[a]
case is not authority for issues it does not consider.” 63
The Commission also discusses Pacific Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates, LLC v.
City of Los Angeles. 64 In that case, the owner of a mobile home park argued that a
uniform statewide procedure for conversion from tenant occupancy to resident ownership
set forth in the Subdivision Map Act superseded the requirements of the Coastal Act. 65
The California Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the Subdivision Map Act and the
Coastal Act could be harmonized. 66 In a background discussion of how the Coastal Act
operates, the Court quoted Pratt’s statement that LCPs “and the development permits
issued by local agencies pursuant to the Coastal Act are not solely a matter of local law,
but embody state policy.” 67 Again, however, neither that quotation nor the Court’s
ultimate holding addresses or resolves the separate issue of whether a local ordinance
purporting to regulate pesticide use would fall within, or outside, the preemptive scope of
Food and Agricultural Code section 11501.1(a). Nothing in Pratt alters our conclusion
based on the text, context, and history of section 11501.1(a). 68
61
Charles A. Pratt Construction Co., Inc. v. California Coastal Com., supra, 162
Cal.App.4th at p. 1075.
62
Id. at p. 1076.
63
Ibid.
64
Pacific Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates, LLC v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 55 Cal.4th
783.
65
Id. at pp. 792-793.
66
Id. at pp. 805-806.
67
Id. at p. 794.
68
The Coastal Commission also discusses a superior court case from 2017. (See
California Coastal Commission, letter to Attorney General re: Opn. 21-1001, May 31,
2022, at pp. 6-7, discussing Mountainlands Conservancy, LLC v. California Coastal
Commission, BS 149063, Los Angeles Superior Court (2017); see also Department of
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Importantly, however, although section 11501.1 generally preempts local
government attempts to regulate the use of pesticides via the enactment of an ordinance,
regulation, or law of general application, Food and Agricultural Code section 11503
allows counties to seek authority to adopt such ordinances or regulations when done in
cooperation with the county agricultural commissioner and with approval from the
Department of Pesticide Regulation. The Department regulations describing this process
require county agricultural commissioners to consult “[a]t least quarterly” with public
agencies “that have jurisdiction by law with respect to resources that may be affected by
use of pesticides in the county.” 69 These consultations “shall include the identification of
past or potential problems associated with the use of pesticides, appropriate alternatives
and mitigation measures, and appropriate permit conditions which substantially reduce
any problem.” 70 In appropriate circumstances, a county agricultural commissioner “may
adopt regulations applicable in his or her county which are supplemental to those of the
director which govern the conduct of pest control operations and records and reports of
those operations. The regulations may include provisions pertaining to any matter related
to the accomplishment of the purposes of [Food and Agricultural Code] Section
11737.” 71
Pesticide Regulation, letter to Attorney General re: Opn. 21-1001, May 27, 2002, at pp.
8-9.) In that case, the Commission principally argued that section 11501.1 was
inapplicable on its face because the challenge was to an action by the Commission—a
state agency—not a local government. In the alternative, the Commission argued that if
the Commission required a local government to adopt specific LCP regulations, those
regulations would not be preempted in light of section 11501.1(c). (See Food & Agr.
Code, § 11501.1, subd. (c) [stating that section 11501.1 is not “a limitation on the
authority of a state agency or department to enforce or administer any law that the agency
or department is authorized or required to enforce or administer”].) The superior court
agreed with the alternative contention, but its decision was not published, is not
precedential, and does not directly address the type of unilateral regulatory action
described by the requester here. Moreover, on appeal, the Court of Appeal’s opinion was
silent on the scope and application of section 11501.1. (See Mountainlands
Conservancy, LLC v. California Coastal Commission (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 214.)
69
Cal. Code Regs., tit. 3, § 6122; see Cal. Code Regs., tit. 3, § 6100, subd. (7) (“For the
purposes of this article [establishing statewide pesticide regulatory program] any county
agricultural commissioner shall be considered a state agency. Under authority of the
Food and Agricultural Code, each commissioner shall administer the local enforcement
of the pesticide regulatory program under the supervision of the director.”); see generally
Food & Agr. Code, § 2121 et seq. (county agricultural commissioners).
70
Cal. Code Regs., tit. 3, § 6122, subd. (a).
71
Food & Agr. Code, § 11503; see generally Food & Agr. Code, §§ 11737 (county
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No local ordinance or regulation can become operative until the Director of the
Department reviews and approves it. In its review, the Director must follow the
Administrative Procedure Act “insofar as practicable.” 72 This process fosters local
initiative and allows for ordinances and regulations addressing local conditions, while
also ensuring their evaluation and approval at the state level.
Thus, in response to the first question, we conclude that a county may not enact
ordinances to regulate the use of pesticides for the stated purpose of implementing an
LCP without Department approval. A county may, however, seek to regulate the use of
pesticides by working with the county agricultural commissioner and submitting
proposed ordinances or regulations to the Department for approval.
2. May a county take other actions—legislative, regulatory or otherwise—in a
Local Coastal Program to address the environmental impacts of pesticides
without violating Food and Agricultural Code section 11501.1?
Although Food and Agricultural Code section 11501.1 prohibits local government
from adopting ordinances or other local laws or rules of general application that purport
to regulate the registration, sale, transportation, or use of pesticides without the approval
of the Department of Pesticide Regulation, local governments may address environmental
effects of pesticides in the coastal zone by other means. In addition to working with its
county agricultural commissioner and the Department of Pesticide Regulation as just
described, a county has quasi-adjudicatory power to issue coastal development permits,
which it acquires by delegation from the Coastal Commission upon certification of the
county’s Local Coastal Program. 73 Importantly, section 11501.1 applies only to an
“ordinance or regulation of local government.” A county’s decision to grant a coastal
development permit subject to conditions regarding pesticides is not an “ordinance” or
“regulation.” Rather, a permitting decision is a quasi-judicial decision because it is based
on an individualized assessment of the circumstances pertaining to a single piece of
property, or a single permit application. 74
agricultural commissioner may halt pest control operations under certain circumstances,
such as operations that are illegal or unsafe, or that interfere with proper pest control),
14006.5 (county agricultural commissioner to review applications for restricted materials
permits, giving consideration to local conditions).
72
Id., § 11503; see also Gov. Code, § 11340 et seq. (Administrative Procedure Act); see
also 3 Cal. Code Regs. §§ 6110, 6116 (DPR regulations governing procedures for
adopting local regulations).
73
See Pub. Resources Code, § 30519.
74
See Miller and Starr California Real Estate (4th ed.) § 21:2 (differences between
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In the process of deciding whether to grant a permit for a development proposal, a
local government may attach conditions to a permit as necessary to carry out coastal
conservation policies. 75 Thus, for example, if a local government approves a permit for a
new golf course in the coastal zone, it may condition that permit in a way that restrains
pesticide use in designated areas of the property if necessary to protect adjacent
environmentally sensitive habitat areas. Section 11501.1 does not preempt such permit
conditions because they do not regulate pesticides generally, but rather are applied on a
case-by-case basis. 76 The key distinction is that such conditions may only be
implemented through review and permitting of a particular development. They may not
be imposed as ordinances or regulations that purport to regulate the use of pesticides
outside of the permit process.
Section 11501.1 also does not foreclose counties from adopting local policies or
ordinances, regulations, or other local laws or rules that mitigate the post-use effects of
pesticides within the coastal zone, without attempting to regulate the registration, sale,
transportation, or use of pesticides themselves. One example is a Los Angeles County
ordinance that regulates the way boats are cleaned in the Marina del Rey Harbor. 77 The
purpose of the ordinance is to mitigate the effects of copper antifouling paint, a pesticide
applied to boats to discourage the growth of barnacles. The Department of Pesticide
Control has sole jurisdiction to regulate the use of copper antifouling paint, and it does so
by prohibiting the use of paint that exceeds a specified copper leach rate. 78 Although Los
Angeles County lacks power to ban copper antifouling paint entirely, it retains power to
address the local environmental effects of pesticides. Its ordinance addresses the issue by
requiring training and certification in methods of cleaning that minimize copper leaching
for any person who cleans a boat in the Marina del Rey Harbor.
Further, counties may adopt local regulations or ordinances designed to reduce the
need for using pesticides, such as sanitary rules for the reduction of rodents and other
pests. In the same vein, counties are free to create and distribute educational materials
providing clear information about alternatives to pesticides. Such policies and regulatory
actions do not violate section 11501.1 because they do not purport to regulate pesticide
regulation, sale, transportation, or use.
legislative land use decisions and quasi-adjudicative land use decisions).
75
Pub. Resources Code, § 30607.
76
See Miller and Starr California Real Estate (4th ed.) §§ 21:10 (conditional permits),
21:41-21:42 (different standards of review for legislative and quasi-judicial decisions).
77
Los Angeles County Ord. No. 2018-0021.
78
See Food & Agr. Code, § 12995; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 3, § 6190.
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Finally, pesticide requirements that a local government imposes on its own
employees and on its own property are not preempted by section 11501.1. 79 For
example, a county might prohibit its employees from using certain pesticides on county
property. Rules of this kind do not conflict with section 11501.1.
We therefore conclude that a county may take a number of actions, such as
imposing pesticides restrictions as conditions in individual development permits, or
adopting regulations or other rules that aimed at reducing the need for pesticide use or
mitigating the local effects of pesticide use, without violating section 11501.1.
79
See Great Western Shows, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 853, 869.
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