United States v. Clayton

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals

____________ Fifth Circuit

FILED

No. 23-30231 April 4, 2024

____________ Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

United States of America,

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Courtney D. Clayton,

Defendant—Appellant.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC No. 3:21-CR-91-1

______________________________

Before King, Ho, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:

On December 16, 2021, a grand jury indicted Courtney D. Clayton on

one count of possession with intent to distribute heroin, fentanyl, and

cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). During pretrial proceedings,

Clayton filed a motion to suppress evidence. After holding a hearing and

considering the parties’ post-argument briefs, the district court denied

Clayton’s motion. Clayton entered a conditional guilty plea but preserved his

right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. He does so now.

We AFFIRM.

No. 23-30231

I.

As part of a three-month drug trafficking investigation, officers in the

East Baton Rouge Sheriff’s Office began conducting recorded video

surveillance of Courtney D. Clayton’s home, which he shared with his

mother. In addition, officers placed GPS tracking devices on a black

Mercedes Benz and a silver Land Rover associated with the Claytons.

Officers began to observe activities often associated with drug trafficking,

including Clayton’s mother visiting multiple different pharmacies in Texas

and repeatedly driving between Texas and Louisiana in a single day.

Moreover, a reliable confidential informant claimed that he bought heroin

from Clayton at his home, and that Clayton had a courier who would pick up

two kilograms of heroin “somewhere west of Baton Rouge” twice a month.

Based on this information, officers applied for, and received, search

warrants for both Clayton’s home and his Mercedes. However, as officers

prepared to execute the warrants, they observed burglars break into and

remove items from Clayton’s home. Believing that evidence of drug

trafficking may have been stolen, officers continued their investigation for

another two weeks before seeking a new warrant for Clayton’s residence. The

officers did not renew their search warrant for the Mercedes. Rather, their

new search warrant specified that officers could search Clayton’s residence,

as well as “all other structures, vehicles, and places on the premises where

[evidence] may be found.” 1

On the morning of the execution of the search warrant, officers

observed Clayton exit his home and drive away from the residence.

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1

When asked why officers did not renew the specific warrant for the Mercedes,

former Narcotics Agent Joshua Clark indicated that it was because they felt that the old

warrant “fell within the scope of the [new] warrant [they] had received.”

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According to the post-execution Incident Report, officers “immediately

conducted” a stop of Clayton’s car, detained Clayton, and proceeded to

search his residence and vehicle. Officers discovered a large amount of cash,

three cell phones, and controlled substances—specifically heroin, fentanyl,

oxycodone, and cocaine—in the Mercedes. Clayton was arrested and

transported to the East Baton Rouge Narcotics Office for processing and

further investigation. After arriving at the Narcotics Office, Clayton denied

selling drugs, but stated that all the items in the car—including the narcotics

and cash—belonged to him.

Clayton was subsequently charged with possession with intent to

distribute one kilogram or more of a mixture or substance containing heroin,

forty grams or more of a mixture or substance containing fentanyl, and a

mixture or substance containing cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1). Clayton filed a motion to suppress the evidence discovered in the

Mercedes, as well as Clayton’s incriminating statement to law enforcement.

Clayton contended that the search warrant of the Mercedes had become

stale, and that officers did not have probable cause to arrest him. Clayton also

contended that the Government failed to meet its burden to show that

officers advised him of his constitutional rights pursuant to Miranda v.

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 2

The district court held a hearing on Clayton’s motion to suppress. At

the hearing, the Government introduced the testimony of Sergeant Eric

David and former Narcotics Agent Joshua Clark, two officers who conducted

the vehicle stop on the Mercedes. In relevant part, former Agent Clark

testified that the two had intended to stop Clayton “immediately”—i.e., as

_____________________

2

Clayton now concedes that he was properly given a Miranda warning, but argues

that officers did not honor his invocation of his right to remain silent.

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Clayton was “leaving his house” in his car—“for [the] overall safety of the

operation,” but Sergeant David testified that they were unable to do so

because an elderly woman “froze in the middle of the intersection,” causing

a delay. Still, former Agent Clark testified that they were able to stop Taylor

approximately one block—250 yards—away from his home. After the stop,

Clayton was handcuffed, placed in the back of a marked police car, and driven

back to his residence. Former Agent Clark testified that after returning to

Clayton’s home, he provided Clayton with a Miranda warning. Clark stated

that, as far as he could recall, Clayton did not make any statement verbally

responding to the Miranda warning, but that he indicated through “body

language”—the exact nature of which is not apparent from the record—that

he did not wish to talk to the officers.

As to the sufficiency of the probable cause supporting the warrant,

former Agent Clark testified that he had viewed surveillance video of

Clayton’s home and had observed activities he believed were consistent with

drug transactions. He also testified that he interviewed the confidential

informant who had implicated Clayton in drug trafficking and had seized 1.2

pounds of heroin from the informant.

The Government also called Lieutenant James Cooper, who testified

that, after being detained, Clayton was brought to the Narcotics Office for

booking. Lieutenant Cooper explained that he had presented Clayton with a

notice of pending forfeiture detailing the items seized from the Mercedes and

had asked Clayton to verify the list. As part of that procedure, Lieutenant

Cooper asked Clayton whether the money and narcotics belonged to him.

Clayton responded by taking responsibility for all the property in the vehicle,

but he denied that he had trafficked drugs. Lieutenant Cooper testified that

he did not read Clayton his Miranda rights prior to this confession and stated

that he did not threaten or coerce Clayton into making the statement.

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Following the hearing, both parties filed briefs restating their

arguments. The district court issued a written order denying Clayton’s

motion to suppress. First, the district court determined that the search

warrant was supported by sufficient probable cause. Next, citing Bailey v.

United States, 568 U.S. 186 (2013), the district court held that the Mercedes

was stopped within the “immediate vicinity” of Clayton’s residence, and

thus the warrant for Taylor’s home encompassed the search of the Mercedes.

Finally, the district court concluded that Taylor was properly provided a

Miranda warning.

Following the denial of his motion to suppress, Clayton pleaded guilty

pursuant to a written agreement that would allow him to challenge the denial

of his motion to suppress on appeal. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2). He was

sentenced to 175 months of imprisonment, followed by five years of

supervised release. Clayton timely appealed.

II.

On appeal, Clayton challenges the denial of his motion to suppress on

two grounds. First, Clayton contends that officers conducted an

unconstitutional warrantless search of his Mercedes. Second, Clayton argues

that, after former Agent Clark read him his Miranda rights, he validly

asserted his right to remain silent by refusing to speak to former Agent Clark.

Thus, Clayton contends that Lieutenant Cooper, by questioning him at the

Narcotics Office, failed to “scrupulously” honor his invocation of his right

to remain silent, and that the district court erred by failing to suppress his

confession.

Generally, “[w]hen reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress

evidence, we review factual findings for clear error and the ultimate

constitutionality of law enforcement action de novo.” United States v.

Scroggins, 599 F.3d 433, 440 (5th Cir. 2010). “Where, as here, the district

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No. 23-30231

court heard live testimony, our review is particularly deferential.” United

States v. Mendez, 885 F.3d 899, 907 (5th Cir. 2018). And, in addition to

deferring to the district court’s factual findings, “the court must view the

evidence Bmost favorably to the party prevailing below, except where such a

view is inconsistent with the trial court’s findings or is clearly erroneous

considering the evidence as a whole.’” Scroggins, 599 F.3d at 440 (quoting

United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1993)). “A finding is

clearly erroneous only if the court is left with a definite and firm conviction

that a mistake has been committed.” Id. Thus, we will uphold a district

court’s ruling “if there is any reasonable view of the evidence to support it.”

Mendez, 885 F.3d at 908 (internal quotation omitted).

The Government concedes that this standard applies to Clayton’s

first argument that officers conducted an unconstitutional warrantless search

of his Mercedes. However, the Government argues that plain-error review

applies to Clayton’s second argument regarding his confession to Lieutenant

Cooper because “the basis for [Clayton’s] objection during trial [was]

different from the theory he now raises on appeal.” See United States v.

Green, 324 F.3d 375, 381 (5th Cir. 2003). As we discuss infra, Clayton’s

arguments fail under either standard. 3 See United States v. Pursley, 22 F.4th

586, 591 (5th Cir. 2022); United States v. Holguin-Hernandez, 955 F.3d 519,

520 n.1 (5th Cir. 2020).

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3

The Government also argues that Clayton’s appellate waiver bars this court’s

review of his Miranda claim. For the same reason, we do not reach this issue. See United

States v. Thompson, 54 F.4th 849, 851 (5th Cir. 2022).

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No. 23-30231

III.

A.

We begin with the search of Clayton’s Mercedes. The Fourth

Amendment guarantees individuals the right “to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”

U.S. Const. amend. IV. “[O]fficial intrusion into that private sphere

generally qualifies as a search and requires a warrant supported by probable

cause.” United States v. Johnlouis, 44 F.4th 331, 334–35 (5th Cir. 2022)

(quoting Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 304 (2018)). Therefore, a

warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable unless the circumstances

fall under an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.

United States v. Guzman, 739 F.3d 241, 245–46 (5th Cir. 2014). Evidence

seized in violation of the Constitution—such as evidence unlawfully obtained

without a warrant—is subject to suppression. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547

U.S. 586, 590 (2006). Here, Clayton argues that the search of the Mercedes

was improper because the vehicle was not “on the premises” to be searched,

and he was not stopped and detained within the “immediate vicinity” of his

home.

In Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981), the Supreme Court

held that a search warrant supported by probable cause “implicitly carries

with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a

proper search is conducted.” The Court reasoned that three important law

enforcement interests, taken together, justify the detention of an occupant

who is on the premises during the execution of a search warrant: (1) officer

safety, (2) facilitating the completion of the search, and (3) preventing flight.

Id. at 702–03. In cases following Summers, this court extended Summers’s

logic to vehicle stops of suspects made during the execution of search

warrants. See, e.g., United States v. Cavazos, 288 F.3d 706, 708, 711 (5th Cir.

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No. 23-30231

2002) (finding that Summers extended to vehicle stop two blocks from

suspect’s home where suspect’s behavior justified detention).

However, in Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S. 186, 193–201 (2013), the

Supreme Court limited its holding in Summers, confining it only to the

“immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched.” Id. at 202. The Court

reasoned that “[o]nce an occupant is beyond the immediate vicinity of the

premises to be searched, the search-related law enforcement interests are

diminished and the intrusiveness of the detention is more severe.” Id. at 201.

The Court specifically addressed each of the three important law

enforcement interests articulated in Summers. First, as to officer safety, the

Court reasoned that when a defendant leaves the premises without apparent

knowledge of the search, that defendant “pose[s] little risk to the officers at

the scene.” Id. at 196. While it is true that the suspect could return during

the execution of the warrant, or be alerted to the search by a third party,

“[u]nexpected arrivals by occupants or other persons accustomed to visiting

the premises might occur in many instances,” and “[o]fficers can and do

mitigate that risk . . . by taking routine precautions, for instance by erecting

barricades or posting someone on the perimeter or at the door.” Id. at 195–

96. And, even if a geographical constraint forces law enforcement officers to

“choose between detaining an individual immediately (and risk alerting

occupants still inside) or allowing the individual to leave (and risk not being

able to arrest him later if incriminating evidence were discovered),” that

“safety rationale rests on the false premise that a detention must take place.”

Id. at 196. “If the officers find that it would be dangerous to detain a departing

individual in front of a residence, they are not required to stop him. And,

where there are grounds to believe the departing occupant is dangerous, or

involved in criminal activity, police will generally not need Summers to detain

him,” as they can rely on other Fourth Amendment exceptions. Id. at 196–

97.

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Second, as to facilitating the completion of the search, the Court

reasoned that this rationale is based on assisting the actual effectuation of the

search on the premises. Id. 197–98. Specifically, “[i]f occupants are

permitted to wander around the premises, there is the potential for

interference with the execution of the search warrant. They can hide or

destroy evidence, seek to distract the officers, or simply get in the way.” Id.

at 197. However, “[t]hose risks are not presented by an occupant who departs

beforehand.” Id. And, to the idea that detention of occupants can assist

officers in, for example, opening locked doors or locked containers, the Court

held that “[t]his justification must be confined to those persons who are on

site and so in a position, when detained, to at once observe the progression of

the search.” Id. at 198. Otherwise, “it would have no limiting principle were

it to be applied to persons beyond the premises of the search.” Id.

Third, as to flight prevention, the Court specifically explained that

“[t]he concern over flight is not because of the danger of flight itself but

because of the damage that potential flight can cause to the integrity of the

search.” Id. at 199. Were the flight prevention justification unbounded, “the

rationale . . . would justify, for instance, detaining a suspect who is 10 miles

away, ready to board a plane.” Id. Instead, the concern here is about

“preserv[ing] the integrity of the search by controlling those persons who are

on the scene” and preventing them from “leaving with the evidence being

sought [at the premises].” Id. at 198. Therefore, “[t]his interest does not

independently justify detention of an occupant beyond the immediate

vicinity of the premises to be searched.” Id. at 199.

Finally, the Court was also concerned with the “additional level of

intrusiveness” that a public detention away from the home carries. Id. at 200.

“A public detention, even if merely incident to a search, will resemble a full-

fledged arrest,” and when the detention occurs beyond the “immediate

vicinity” of the home, it can involve “an initial detention away from the scene

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and a second detention at the residence.” Id. “In between, the individual will

suffer the additional indignity of a compelled transfer back to the premises,

giving all the appearances of an arrest.” Id. As such, the Court confined the

Summers holding to “the immediate vicinity of a premises to be searched,”

and specifically overturned a Court of Appeals interpretation of Summers that

allowed detention of departed occupants “as soon as reasonably

practicable,” without consideration of spatial limits. Id. at 201–02.

Since the Supreme Court decided Bailey in 2013, this court has not yet

had the opportunity to provide a more specific definition of “immediate

vicinity.” The Government contends that their stop of Clayton 250 yards

away from his home, and their subsequent transfer of Clayton back to the

premises to be searched, comported with Summers/Bailey, especially in light

of the fact that the officers would have stopped Clayton sooner had another

car not blocked the officers from effectuating the stop. Clayton, by contrast,

argues that 250 yards was too remote from his home as contemplated by

Bailey, and that none of the important law enforcement interests discussed in

Summers/Bailey were implicated in his stop.

Be that as it may, we do not, and need not, decide this question today.

We may affirm a suppression ruling on any basis supported by the record. See

United States v. McSween, 53 F.3d 684, 687 n.3 (5th Cir. 1995). Pursuant to

the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment, a warrantless search of

a readily mobile vehicle is permitted when law enforcement has probable

cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime. See

Rountree v. Lopinto, 976 F.3d 606, 609 (5th Cir. 2020); United States v. Fields,

456 F.3d 519, 523 (5th Cir. 2006); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580

(1991). A law enforcement officer has “probable cause to conduct a search

when the facts available to [him] would warrant a [person] of reasonable

caution in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime is present.”

Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 243 (2013) (internal quotations omitted).

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“The test for probable cause is not reducible to Bprecise definition or

quantification.’” Id. (quoting Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003)).

Rather, a showing of probable cause requires only “the kind of Bfair

probability’ on which Breasonable and prudent [people,] not legal

technicians, act.’” Id. at 244 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231, 238

(1983)). Probable cause is determined by examining the totality of the

circumstances. Fields, 456 F.3d at 523.

The district court found that the search warrant for the home

contained sufficient probable cause, a conclusion that Clayton does not

challenge on appeal. Many of the same uncontroverted facts that established

probable cause to search the home for evidence of drug trafficking also apply

to the search of the Mercedes. Those facts include the confidential

informant’s specific, detailed statements about Clayton’s drug trafficking

activities; the seizure of heroin from the informant; the officers’ surveillance

of Clayton’s home and observation of activity suggestive of drug trafficking;

a video-recorded incident in which a known drug trafficker visited Clayton at

this home; and GPS tracking data on the Land Rover—a car that Clayton

also used—that showed Clayton’s mother repeatedly visiting multiple

pharmacies in Texas.

In addition, the record indicates that Clayton frequently used his

driveway and carport—places where the Mercedes was often parked—to set

up narcotics transactions, including one transaction involving a person

wearing a Buffalo Wild Wings t-shirt, the same place that Clayton worked

and traveled to via both the Land Rover and Mercedes, and the same place

that Clayton was headed when he was stopped by law enforcement. While

Clayton argues that no officer actually watched him put drugs, money, or cell

phones into the Mercedes, and that some of the evidence in the record is

arguably somewhat speculative, under the totality of the circumstances—and

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government—we

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No. 23-30231

hold that a reasonable person would have believed that evidence of drug

trafficking would be present in Clayton’s Mercedes at the time the stop was

effectuated. See Scroggins, 599 F.3d at 440. As a result, the police had

probable cause, the automobile exception applies, and officer’s search of

Clayton’s vehicle was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment. See Harris,

568 U.S. at 243–44. The district court did not err by denying Clayton’s

motion to suppress on these grounds.

B.

Having decided that the search of Clayton’s Mercedes was proper, we

move to the constitutionality of denying Clayton’s request to suppress his

confession to Lieutenant Cooper. Under the Fifth Amendment, no person

shall be “compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”

U.S. Const. amend. V. Accordingly, a suspect in custody “must be

warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent.”

Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 380 (2010) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S.

at 479). If a suspect makes an incriminating statement during a custodial

interrogation prior to receiving his or her Miranda warnings, that statement

is generally inadmissible. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 604, 608–09

(2004). And, if a suspect invokes his Fifth Amendment right to silence, that

invocation must be “scrupulously honored.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.

Here, the parties do not dispute that Clayton was in custody and was

subjected to an interrogation when he was questioned by former Agent Clark

and, later, Lieutenant Cooper.

Clayton’s principal argument is that by asking questions that were

likely to elicit an incriminating response, Lieutenant Cooper did not

“scrupulously” honor Clayton’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment right to

silence. However, this argument presupposes that Clayton validly invoked

his right to remain silent by failing to verbally respond to Clark’s warning and

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No. 23-30231

by indicating through body language that he did not wish to speak to officers.

In Berghuis v. Thompkins, the Supreme Court explained that a suspect’s

invocation of his right to remain silent must be unambiguous and

unequivocal. 560 U.S. at 380–82. If a suspect “makes no statement, the

police are not required to end the interrogation.” Id. at 381. Thus, in order to

properly exercise his right to remain silent and “cut off questioning,” a

suspect must either “say that he want[s] to remain silent or that he [does]

not want to talk with the police,” or make a similar “simple, unambiguous

statement[].” Id. at 382.

Here, the record does not show that Clayton made a “simple,

unambiguous statement” invoking his right to remain silent. Rather, former

Agent Clark testified that Clayton indicated that he did not want to talk

“through body language,” and that he did not remember Clayton saying

“any words.” And, to the extent that Clayton did say anything to former

Agent Clark, the record does not support the contention that whatever was

said qualifies as an “unambiguous” and unequivocal invocation of the right

to silence. See Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 380–82. Therefore, Clayton failed to

properly invoke his Fifth Amendment right to silence, and we need not

consider Clayton’s argument that the officers failed to “scrupulously” honor

his assertion of that right. 4 The district court’s decision to deny Clayton’s

motion to suppress was proper.

_____________________

4

To the extent that Clayton argues that Lieutenant Cooper was required to reissue

a Miranda warning to Clayton before questioning him at the station, his argument lacks

merit. Clayton does not cite any precedent in which this court required officers to reissue

Miranda warnings to an arrestee who did not properly invoke his or her rights, was

continually detained, and was questioned within a few hours of arrest. Moreover, this court

has “never held that a new recitation of rights is required with every break in

$)/ --*"/$*)6E.$/$.DB$)*(+- # ).$' C/#/*1 -/#- #*0-.+)[,] [a] defendant

[can go] from knowing and understanding the nature of his rights to forgetting them and

therefore making an unintelligent decision to speak to police,” absent coercion,

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No. 23-30231

IV.

Finding no error in the district court’s denial of Clayton’s motion to

suppress, we AFFIRM.

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intimidation, or deception. United States v. Cardenas, 410 F.3d 287, 294 (5th Cir. 2005)

(quoting Evans v. McCotter, 790 F.2d 1232, 1238 (5th Cir. 1986)).

14