The opinion
Cite as 2024 Ark. 44
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No. CV-23-518
Opinion Delivered: April 4, 2024
CHRIS CORBITT, ESQ.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE CRAIGHEAD
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 16JCV-22-1659]
HONORABLE MELISSA
ARKANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY;
RICHARDSON, JUDGE
TRUSTEES CHRISTY CLARK, PRICE
GARDNER, NIEL CROWSON,
JERRY MORGAN, STEVE AFFIRMED.
EDDINGTON, BISHOP ROBERT G.
RUDOLPH, JR., PAUL ROWTON, IN
THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES AS
TRUSTEES OF ARKANSAS STATE
UNIVERSITY
APPELLEES
BARBARA W. WEBB, Justice
Appellant Chris Corbitt appeals from the Craighead County Circuit Court’s order
granting summary judgment in favor of the State. For reversal, Corbitt argues that the circuit
court erred in finding that Arkansas State University (ASU) can prohibit firearms in its on-
campus arena, First National Bank Arena (FNB Arena), because the facility is covered by
an alcohol permit. We affirm.
I. Background
The undisputed facts are as follows. FNB Arena is located on ASU’s campus. The
arena is covered by an Alcoholic Beverage Control (ABC) permit, held by NEA Sports
Club, which authorizes consumption and sale of beer and wine on the premises during
designated events. FNB Arena has been covered by an ABC permit since 2015.
There is written notice clearly readable at a distance of more than ten feet at each
entrance to FNB Arena, which states “Carrying a Handgun is Prohibited” and “All
Weapons are Prohibited.” The written sign and notice prohibiting firearms in FNB Arena
complies with the requirements of Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-73-306(18).
Corbitt filed in the circuit court a complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive
relief. He sought a declaration that, as a holder of an “Enhanced Concealed Carry License”
(ECCL), he was entitled to enter FNB Arena with a firearm except for those areas then
hosting a collegiate sporting event. Corbitt further sought an order enjoining ASU from
prohibiting ECCL holders from entering FNB Arena with a firearm. Corbitt holds an ECCL
pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-73-322(g).
The parties filed competing motions for summary judgment. Following a hearing,
the circuit court entered an order granting ASU’s motion for summary judgment. The
circuit court found that “[u]nder current Arkansas law, FNB Arena can be covered by an
[ABC] permit and ASU can lawfully prohibit firearms in FNB Arena to maintain the alcohol
permit while complying with Ark. Code Ann. § 5-73-306(11)(B) as well as Title 3 permit
requirements and ABC regulations.” Corbitt appeals from this order.1
There are two dissenting opinions in this case. This opinion responds to Justice
1
Wood’s dissent.
2
II. Discussion
Ordinarily, on appeal from a summary-judgment disposition, the evidence is viewed
in the light most favorable to the party resisting the motion, and any doubts and inferences
are resolved against the moving party. Abraham v. Beck, 2015 Ark. 80, at 8, 456 S.W.3d 744,
751. However, when the parties agree on the facts, courts simply determine whether the
appellee was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Hendrix v. Mun. Health Ben. Fund,
2022 Ark. 218, at 7, 655 S.W.3d 678, 682. When parties file cross-motions for summary
judgment, as in this case, they essentially agree that there are no material facts remaining and
that summary judgment is an appropriate means of resolving the case. Convent Corp. v. City
of N. Little Rock, 2021 Ark. 7, at 17, 615 S.W.3d 706, 716. As to issues of law presented,
our review is de novo. Id.
On appeal, Corbitt argues that the circuit court erred by misinterpreting Arkansas
Code Annotated sections 5-73-306 (Supp. 2021) and 5-73-322 (Supp. 2021), which he
claims permits holders of ECCLs to enter FNB Arena with a firearm, despite the alcohol
permit covering the facility.
The first rule in considering the meaning and effect of a statute is to construe it just
as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common
language. Miller v. Thurston, 2020 Ark. 267, at 7, 605 S.W.3d 255, 258–59. The basic rule
of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Steve’s Auto Ctr. of
Conway, Inc. v. Ark. State Police, 2020 Ark. 58, at 5, 592 S.W.3d 695, 699. Additionally, in
construing any statute, we place it beside other statutes relevant to the subject matter in
question and ascribe meaning and effect to be derived from the whole. Lawhon Farm Servs.
3
v. Brown, 335 Ark. 272, 279, 984 S.W.2d 1, 4 (1998). Statutes relating to the same subject
must be construed together and in harmony, if possible. Haile v. Johnston, 2016 Ark. 52, at
7, 482 S.W.3d 323, 327.
Subsection (g) of section 5-73-322 sets forth the training requirements an individual
must complete to obtain an ECCL. A licensee who completes the training course and
obtains an ECCL under subsection (g) is exempted from the prohibitions and restrictions
on “[c]arrying a concealed handgun in a prohibited place listed under § 5-73-306(7)–(12).”
Ark. Code Ann. § 5-73-322(h)(2).
Meanwhile, Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-73-306 provides, “Except as
permitted under § 5-73-322(g), a license to carry a concealed handgun issued under this
subchapter does not authorize a person to carry a concealed handgun into” several
enumerated locations. Those include:
(11)(A) A portion of an establishment, except a restaurant as defined in § 3-5-1202,
licensed to dispense alcoholic beverages for consumption on the premises.
(B) A person with a concealed carry endorsement under § 5-73-322(g) and who is
carrying a concealed handgun may not enter an establishment under this section if
the establishment either places a written notice as permitted under subdivision (18)
of this section or provides notice under subdivision (19) of this section prohibiting a
person with a license to possess a concealed handgun at the physical location[.]
Ark. Code Ann. § 5-73-306(11). Thus, according to subdivision (11), an ECCL holder may
not carry a firearm into an establishment licensed to dispense alcohol if such establishment
places written notice as provided under subdivision (18).2
2
We are mindful that if read in a vacuum, section 5-73-322(h) would appear to
override the restrictions set forth in section 5-73-306(11). However, subdivision (11)(B)
specifically states that ECCL holders may not enter the premises of an establishment with
an alcohol permit if written notice is provided under subdivision (18). Because subdivision
4
Subdivision (18)(A) extends the prohibition of carrying a concealed firearm to include:
(A)(i) Any place at the discretion of the person or entity exercising control over
the physical location of the place by placing at each entrance to the place a
written notice clearly readable at a distance of not less than ten feet (10′) that
“carrying a handgun is prohibited.”
Ark. Code Ann. § 5-73-306(18)(A)(i) (emphasis added).
Corbitt correctly notes that Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-73-306(18)(B)(i)
provides that subdivision (18)(A) “does not apply if the place is [a] public university, public
college, or community college, as defined in § 5-73-322, and the licensee is carrying a
concealed handgun as provided under § 5-73-322.” Corbitt therefore contends that
subdivision (18)(B) controls and ASU cannot place signs under subdivision (18)(A) to
prevent ECCL holders from entering FNB Arena with firearms, despite the arena being
covered by an alcohol permit.
Notwithstanding Corbitt’s contention, the reference to subdivision (18) in
subdivision (11)(B) is limited to the nature of the notice required to prohibit the concealed
carrying of firearms into premises serving alcohol. Subdivision (18)(A)’s notice requirements
pertain to readability and location. Establishments licensed to dispense alcohol, as described
in subdivision (11)(A), must meet these requirements in order to prohibit ECCL holders
from carrying firearms into their premises. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-73-306(11)(B).
(11)(B) is the more specific provision, it controls over subsection (h). See Lambert v. LQ
Mgmt., L.L.C., 2013 Ark. 114, at 5–6, 426 S.W.3d 437, 440 (“This court has long held that
a general statute must yield to a specific statute involving a particular subject matter.”).
Moreover, this interpretation harmonizes the statutes and avoids an unnecessary
contradiction. Haile, supra.
5
At the same time, subdivision (18)(B) operates to prevent public universities from
having the discretion afforded to others under subdivision (18)(A) to choose to prohibit
firearms on their premises. Under Arkansas law, universities do not have the discretion to
prohibit firearms. But in this case, ASU is prohibiting firearms at FNB Arena because the
facility is covered by an alcohol permit, not because it is attempting to exercise discretion as
contemplated by subdivision (18)(A). Importantly, the General Assembly excluded
universities from subdivision (18)(A), but no such exclusion was included in subdivision
(11), which pertains to places covered by alcohol permits.
As discussed, FNB Arena is covered by an alcohol permit and has provided the
requisite notice under subdivision (18)(A) that firearms are prohibited on the premises. The
unambiguous language of subdivision (11)(B) supports ASU’s position that an ECCL holder
may not enter FNB Arena with a firearm.3 Accordingly, ASU can lawfully prohibit firearm
possession at FNB Arena under section 5-73-306.4
3
The dissenting justice attacks the integrity of the majority with her suggestion that
we have ignored the rules of statutory construction to reach our “preferred result.” Our
decision was reached by applying longstanding principles of statutory interpretation rather
than advancing a personal policy preference. This court views all statutes on the same subject
as in pari materia and construes them together and made to stand if capable of being
reconciled. See, e.g., Ft. Smith v. Tate, 311 Ark. 405, 410, 844 S.W.2d 356, 359 (1993).
This case required us to reconcile section 5-73-322(h), which seemingly exempts ECCL
holders from concealed carry restrictions, with section 5-73-306(11), which specifically
prohibits an ECCL holder from entering an establishment covered by an alcohol permit if
certain notice requirements are met. The General Assembly, as the policy-making branch
of government, is presumed to be familiar with our interpretation of its statutes, and if it
disagrees with those interpretations, it can amend the statutes accordingly. Corn v. Farmers
Ins. Co., 2013 Ark. 444, at 8, 430 S.W.3d 655, 660. Our construction of these two statutes
avoids an unnecessary contradiction.
4
Corbitt also argues that the circuit court misinterpreted the alcohol statutes. Arkansas
Code Annotated section 3-4-403(21) (Repl. 2017) provides that “[p]ossession of a weapon
6
We affirm the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of ASU.
Affirmed.
WOOD, WOMACK, and HILAND, JJ., dissent.
RHONDA K. WOOD, Justice, dissenting. The Arkansas General Assembly created
a legal means for individuals with endorsed concealed-carry licenses to bring their firearms
onto the campuses and into the buildings of public universities, colleges, and community
colleges. Appellant Chris Corbitt has such an endorsed license and desires to carry his firearm
into ASU’s FNB Arena for nonathletic events.1 ASU objects because it sells alcohol in FNB
Arena and it has posted a notice prohibiting firearms. Because the statutes provide that
Corbitt may carry his concealed firearm in this context and the majority departs from
established rules of statutory interpretation, I dissent.
We interpret a statute by its clear and ordinary meaning. If we do this in a
straightforward manner, the interpretation is simple and the result is obvious. I find that
because Corbitt had the endorsement on his concealed-carry license under Arkansas Code
Annotated section 5-73-322(b), subdivision 322(h) exempted Corbitt from section 5-73-
306(11)(B)’s restrictions on carrying a firearm in some establishments permitted to sell
on the permitted premises by a person without a possessory or proprietary interest in the
permitted premises” is a Class A alcohol permit violation. The circuit court found that
sections 5-73-306(11)(B) and 3-4-403(21) “both address weapons on the premises of alcohol
permit holders, such provides further support for finding ASU’s firearm prohibition at FNB
Arena lawful.” We agree. The plain language of section 3-4-403(21) makes it a violation to
bring a firearm into a facility covered by an alcohol permit, such as FNB Arena.
1
Corbitt does not seek relief to carry a concealed firearm in FNB Arena for collegiate
athletic events as he recognizes there is a specific statute addressing it. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-
72-306(20)(C) (Supp. 2021).
7
alcohol for consumption on the premises. And ASU could not use the notice provisions in
subdivision 306(18) to bar Corbitt from carrying a firearm in a public university setting
permitted to sell alcohol because the General Assembly passed an Act with language directly
stating that subdivision 306(18)’s notice provisions are inapplicable to Corbitt’s endorsed
concealed-carry license. We must interpret and apply the language as the General Assembly
wrote it.
I. Statutory Provisions for Carrying a Concealed Handgun on a Public University,
College, or Community College Campus
The General Assembly constructed a specific statutory scheme for individuals to
obtain an endorsement for a license to carry a concealed handgun on the campus and within
buildings of a public university, college, or community college. Relevant here is Arkansas
Code Annotated sections 5-73-322(b), (g)(1), and (h) (Supp. 2021):
“Concealed Handguns in a university, college, or community college building.”
(b) A licensee who has completed the training under subsection (g) of this section
may possess a concealed handgun in the buildings and on the grounds of a public university,
public college, or community college, unless otherwise prohibited by this section or §
5-73-306.
(g)(1) A licensee who intends to carry a concealed handgun in the buildings and
on the grounds of a public university, public college, or community college is
required to complete a training course approved by the Director of the Division
of Arkansas State Police.
(h) A licensee who completes a training course and obtains a concealed carry
endorsement . . . is exempted from the prohibitions and restrictions on:
(1) Carrying a firearm in a publicly owned building or facility under § 5-73-122,
if the firearm is a concealed handgun; and
(2) Carrying a concealed handgun in a prohibited place listed under § 5-73-
306(7)–(12), (14), (15), and (17), unless otherwise prohibited under § 5-73-
306(19) or § 5-73-306(20).
(Emphasis added.)
8
Further, the General Assembly included within the chapter another statutory
provision, Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-73-306 (Supp. 2021):
“Prohibited places.”
Except as permitted under § 5-73-322(g), a license to carry a concealed handgun issued
under this subchapter does not authorize a person to carry a concealed handgun into:
(11)(A) A portion of an establishment . . . licensed to dispense alcoholic
beverages for consumption on the premises.
(B) A person with a concealed carry endorsement under 5-73-322(g) and who
is carrying a concealed handgun may not enter an establishment under this
section if the establishment either places a written notice as permitted under
subdivision (18) of this section or provides notice under subdivision (19) of
this section . . . .
(18)(A) Any place at the discretion of the person or entity exercising control
over the physical location of the place by placing at each entrance to the place
a written notice clearly readable at a distance of not less than ten feet (10’) that
‘carrying a handgun is prohibited’.
(B) Subdivision (18)(A) of this section does not apply if the place is:
(i) A public university, public college, or community college as defined in
§ 5-73-322, and the licensee is carrying a concealed handgun as provided under § 5-
73-322.
(19)(A)(i) A place owned or operated by a private entity that prohibits the
carrying of a concealed handgun that posts a written notice as described under
subdivision (18)(A) of this section. . . .
(B) A place owned or operated by a private entity under this subdivision (19)
includes without limitation:
(i) A private university or private college . . . .
(Emphasis added.)
9
II. Analysis
Corbitt is licensed to carry a concealed firearm, and his license has the endorsement
that enables him to carry it on the campus of a public university and in its buildings. Our
rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the legislature.2 “In considering
the meaning of a statute, we construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and
usually accepted meaning . . . .”3
Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-73-322(h)(2) provides that Corbitt “is exempted
from the prohibitions and restrictions on . . . [c]arrying a concealed handgun in a prohibited
place listed under §5-73-306(7)-(12) . . . .” Reading the plain and ordinary language,
excluding subdivisions “306(7)–(12)” means those with an endorsed license are explicitly
excluded from subdivision 306(11) and its restrictions on carrying a firearm in an
establishment permitted to sell alcohol for consumption on the premises. There is no other
way to read this.
Yet the majority ignores this and argues that 306(11)(B) states a person with a
concealed carry endorsement under 322 “may not enter an establishment that posts a notice
under subsection 5-73-306(18).”4 But this argument fails for three reasons. First, as just
explained, the plain language of subsection 322(h) specifically states those with endorsed
2
Pritchett v. City of Hot Springs, 2017 Ark. 95, at 5, 514 S.W.3d 447, 451.
3
Id.
4
Ark. Code Ann. § 5-73-306(11)(B).
10
concealed-carry licenses are exempt from subdivision 306(11)(B).5 With the clear
exemption, the General Assembly made all of subdivision 306(11) unavailable.
Second, the first sentence of section 5-73-306 also emphasizes the intent to exempt
these licenses: “[e]xcept as permitted under § 5-73-322(g), a license to carry a concealed
handgun issued under this subchapter does not authorize a person to carry a concealed
handgun into . . . [,]” and then it sets out the prohibited places. 6 This implies that section
306 is subordinate to section 322 rather than the majority’s suggestion to the contrary. The
majority, relying on Lambert, also argues that section 306 is a more specific statute and
supersedes section 322 (which the majority contends is the general one). 7 This case is
inapplicable. Lambert involved whether a newer, generic statute revived a cause of action
for employees when a preexisting, specific Arkansas code provision expressly annulled said
cause of action.8 This is different. The present statutes were passed in the same session. And
even if we did weigh which statutes were more specific or general, the scale would tip the
other way.
Last, the third flaw is that the majority position disregards the language in subdivision
306(18)(B) stating that it “does not apply” to a licensee in “a public university” carrying a
concealed handgun with the endorsement.9 How much plainer can the language be? It is
5
Ark. Code Ann. § 5-73-322(h).
6
Ark. Code Ann. § 5-73-306 (emphasis added).
7
Lambert v. LQ Mgmt., L.L.C., 2013 Ark. 114, at 5–6, 426 S.W.3d 437, 440.
8
Id.
9
Ark. Code Ann. § 5-73-306(18)(B).
11
wrong and contrary to the express statutory language to impose the restrictions of
subdivisions 306(11)(B) and (18) on Corbitt when the General Assembly specifically
“exempted” him from such restrictions. As both sections 5-73-306 and 5-73-322 were
enacted in Act 562 of the Regular Session in 2017, we have no reason to doubt the
deliberateness of the General Assembly’s words and intent.
Additionally, the General Assembly was clear in its decision to treat private
universities differently from public universities. First, it created the list of exceptions in
Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-73-322(h)(2) and exempted private universities (“unless
otherwise prohibited under § 5-73-306(19)”). Second, in Arkansas Code Annotated section
5-73-306, it excluded public universities in subdivision 306(18)(B) but included private
universities in subdivision 306(19)(B).10 The General Assembly’s deliberate choice to carve
out exemptions for private universities and not public ones is not just implicit, it is explicit
and directs our interpretation of these statutes and their plain meaning.
Finally, ASU and the majority contend they must prohibit firearms to comply with
alcohol-and-beverage-control regulations, but this is not before the court. Corbitt filed suit
claiming that the General Assembly authorized him to carry his firearm into this setting.
ASU argued it was exempt. As it is not, that is where our analysis should end. Since it is not
exempt, whether it chooses to violate a permit it voluntarily elected to obtain is a separate
matter. It is this court’s role to interpret only what is before it. It is incumbent upon the
General Assembly to decide public policy. It must create harmonious laws and determine
10
Even the majority’s reference to 306(11)(B) including a mention of 322(g) makes
sense because 11(B) includes the notice requirements of 306(19) for private universities
which were exempt from both 322(h) and 306(11)(B).
12
whether it desires and can create an avenue for public universities to prohibit concealed
firearms in campus establishments that sell alcoholic beverages beyond the exception it
created for athletic events.
Although this statutory scheme was a grammatical obstacle course, we must clear
every hurdle presented and cannot bypass ones inconvenient to the preferred result. Nor
can we turn a blind eye to the legislative branches’ policy decision. It is not our court’s
constitutional role to make policy. As the Arkansas General Assembly does not restrict
Corbitt’s carrying his firearm in this context, I would reverse. For these reasons, I dissent.
HILAND, J., joins.
SHAWN A. WOMACK, Justice, dissenting. Article 5, section 20 of the Arkansas
Constitution requires this court to reverse and dismiss this case. 1 Without an express
constitutional provision to the contrary, the State can never properly be a defendant in any
of its courts.2 The circuit court was simply without jurisdiction to consider Mr. Corbitt’s
lawsuit because Article 5, section 20 affords the state immunity from suit in most instances,
and none of the limited, constitutionally based exceptions were present here. 3 The same is
true for this court. For these reasons, I would reverse and dismiss the case and I once again
call on the General Assembly to consider referring a constitutional amendment to the voters
to address the applicability and scope of the issue of sovereign immunity.
1
See Thurston v. League of Women Voters of Ark., 2022 Ark. 32, at 17, 639 S.W.3d 319,
327 (Womack, J., dissenting).
2
Id.
3
Id. at 17, 639 S.W.3d at 327.
13
I respectfully dissent.
Corbitt Law Firm, PLLC, by: Robert Steinbuch, for appellant.
Tim Griffin, Ark. Att’y Gen., by: Carl F. “Trey” Cooper III, Sr. Ass’t Att’y Gen., for
appellees.
14