Sydney Rieman v. Gloria Vazquez

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SYDNEY RIEMAN; K. B., a minor No. 22-56054

by and through his Guardian Ad

Litem, Steven L. Rieman, D.C. No.

5:20-cv-00362-

Plaintiffs-Appellees, CBM-SP

v.

AMENDED

GLORIA VAZQUEZ; MIRTA OPINION

JOHNSON,

Defendants-Appellants,

and

DOES, 2-10 inclusive; KRISTINE

BROWN, also known as Doe 2,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Consuelo B. Marshall, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted December 4, 2023

Pasadena, California

2 RIEMAN V. VAZQUEZ

Filed March 5, 2024

Amended April 2, 2024

Before: CARLOS T. BEA, MILAN D. SMITH, JR., and

LAWRENCE VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.

SUMMARY*

Social Worker Immunity

The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of absolute

and qualified immunity to two County of San Bernardino

social workers in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 by Sydney Rieman and her child, K.B., by and

through his guardian ad litem Steven Rieman, alleging that

defendants violated plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights by (1) failing to provide them with notice

of a juvenile detention hearing in which the County’s Child

and Family Services sought custody of K.B.; and (2)

providing false information to the Juvenile Court about why

Ms. Rieman was not noticed for the hearing.

The panel rejected defendants’ assertion that they were

entitled to absolute immunity for actions taken in their quasi-

prosecutorial role as social workers. Although social

workers may enjoy absolute immunity from suit for

discretionary, quasi-prosecutorial decisions to institute court

*

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

RIEMAN V. VAZQUEZ 3

dependency proceedings to take custody away from parents,

here neither the actions nor omissions for which defendants

were being sued—i.e., providing false information to the

Juvenile Court and failing to give notice of the detention

hearing—were similar to discretionary decisions about

whether to prosecute. Moreover, absolute immunity did not

apply to the Riemans’ claim that defendants failed to give

them notice of the detention hearing as such notice was

mandatory and, therefore, unlike the discretionary decision

to initiate prosecution.

The panel held that defendants were not entitled to

qualified immunity from suit for failing to provide notice of

the hearing. Ms. Rieman had a due process right to such

notice and that right was clearly established. It was clear at

the time that parents could not be summarily deprived of the

care and custody of their children without notice and a

hearing, except when the children were in imminent danger.

The panel held that defendants were not entitled to

qualified immunity for their misrepresentation to the

Juvenile Court about why Ms. Rieman was not noticed for

the hearing. A reasonable social worker in defendants’ shoes

would have understood, based on prior decisional law, that

providing incomplete and false information to the Juvenile

Court about Ms. Rieman’s whereabouts to convince the

court that the social workers had satisfied the due process

notice requirement constituted judicial deception.

4 RIEMAN V. VAZQUEZ

COUNSEL

Donnie R. Cox (argued), Law Office of Donnie R. Cox,

Carlsbad, California; Sarah E. Marinho, Marinho Law Firm,

San Jose, California; Paul W. Leehey, Law Office of Paul

W. Leehey, Fallbrook, California; for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

James C. Jardin (argued), Collins and Collins LLP, Orange,

California; Adam A. Ainslie, Collins and Collins LLP,

Pasadena, California; Christie B. Swiss, Collins and Collins

LLP, Carlsbad, California; for Defendants-Appellants.

OPINION

M. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

Sydney Rieman (Ms. Rieman) and her child, K. B., a

minor by and through his guardian ad litem, Steven L.

Rieman, filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that

social workers Mirta Johnson and Gloria Vazquez, among

others, violated the Riemans’ constitutional rights. Vazquez

and Johnson appeal from the district court’s order denying

them absolute and qualified immunity. We affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On the afternoon of September 6, 2018, twenty-day-old

K. B. fell off the bed where Ms. Rieman had placed him

shortly before she went to the bathroom to wash her hands.

According to Ms. Rieman, she did not see what precipitated

the fall. Upon witnessing the fall, Ms. Rieman and her

mother rushed K. B. to the nearest hospital, High Desert

Medical Center (HDMC). The medical personnel at HDMC

examined K. B. and observed him for four hours, but they

RIEMAN V. VAZQUEZ 5

did not perform any diagnostic studies, such as a

computerized tomography (CT) scan, X-ray, or ultrasound

before K. B. left the hospital.

Out of an abundance of caution as a mandated reporter,

an HDMC nurse reported the incident to San Bernardino

County’s Child and Family Services (CFS) hotline. The

emergency response referral listed Ms. Rieman’s home

address and phone number. The following morning,

Johnson, a supervising social worker, picked up the

emergency response referral. Johnson assigned the case to

Vazquez. Shortly after receiving her case assignment,

Vazquez went to Ms. Rieman’s home to conduct her

investigation of the referral. When Vazquez advised Ms.

Rieman that the family should take the baby to Loma Linda

University Medical Center (LLUMC) for further evaluation,

the family asked for an opportunity to speak with Vazquez’s

supervisor, Johnson, which was granted.

Ms. Rieman, her mother, and her stepfather then drove

to the Yucca Valley CFS office to meet with Johnson. On

the way, the family made an appointment for K. B. to be seen

by Dr. Kasko, an obstetrician-gynecologist, for a follow-up

examination. Once they arrived at the CFS office, Johnson

expressed concern over the possibility of undetected internal

injuries and urged the family to consider taking K. B. to

LLUMC to be evaluated by another doctor. Ms. Rieman

informed Johnson that an HMDC doctor had expressed

concern over the level of radiation to which K. B. would be

exposed if a CT scan were performed. At no point during

this meeting or in any other conversations with CFS did its

representatives inform Ms. Rieman that CFS would seek a

warrant if she did not take K. B. to LLUMC.

6 RIEMAN V. VAZQUEZ

Shortly after the family left the CFS office, Vazquez and

Johnson began drafting an application for a detention

warrant. Upon reviewing the application and finding

probable cause, the Juvenile Court issued a temporary

detention warrant pursuant to § 306(a)(1) of the California

Welfare and Institutions Code. The warrant authorized law

enforcement to enter Ms. Rieman’s home in Yucca Valley,

to locate K. B., to temporarily detain K. B. for placement

with a licensed approved foster home or relative, and to seek

a forensic interview and forensic medical examinations

while excluding Ms. Rieman from those examinations.

Under California law, the temporary detainment could only

last for forty-eight hours, “excluding nonjudicial days,” after

which K. B. would be returned to Ms. Rieman’s custody

unless CFS filed a petition “within said period of time . . . to

declare [the child] a dependent child . . . .” Cal. Welf. & Inst.

Code § 313(a).

Law enforcement and Vazquez attempted to serve the

temporary detention warrant at Ms. Rieman’s home address

twice that evening, but no one answered the door. The next

morning, on September 8, 2018, another law enforcement

officer attempted to serve the warrant at Ms. Rieman’s

home, but again, there was no response. Vazquez and the

officer made a fourth and final attempt later that afternoon

to no avail. The parties dispute exactly why these service

attempts were unsuccessful. Some facts in the record

suggest that Ms. Rieman and her family were deliberately

evading service of the warrant. The Riemans, however,

contend they were unaware of the warrant and were merely

avoiding contact with Vazquez, whom they viewed as

hostile.

In the days following the unsuccessful service attempts

of the warrant, Vazquez began preparing a juvenile

RIEMAN V. VAZQUEZ 7

dependency petition and detention report pursuant to § 300

of the California Welfare and Institutions Code. In preparing

these documents, Vazquez scheduled the accompanying

detention hearing for September 12, 2018, at 8:00 AM. In

the detention report, which both Vazquez and Johnson

ultimately signed, they claimed that Ms. Rieman was “not

noticed” for the detention hearing because her “whereabouts

[were] unknown.” They also listed a different telephone

number than the one that was listed for Ms. Rieman in the

original emergency response referral compiled by CFS.

Vazquez ultimately filed the petition and report on

September 11, 2018.

Meanwhile, it is undisputed that Ms. Rieman’s family

attempted to contact CFS on several occasions. Despite their

acknowledged attempts to get in touch with CFS, Vazquez

and Johnson never called or otherwise attempted to notify

Ms. Rieman that a detention hearing concerning her child

was scheduled to take place on the morning of September

12, 2018. Therefore, when the Juvenile Court held the

detention hearing on the morning of September 12, 2018,

Ms. Rieman did not appear.

At the hearing, the court ordered K. B. to be detained and

removed from his mother’s care and custody and placed in

the custody of CFS. The court also ordered supervised

visitation between the child and the mother once a week for

two hours and that an evidentiary forensic medical

examination be performed. Lastly, the court issued a

warrant of apprehension and set the matter for another

conference to take place nearly a month later, on October 10,

2018.

Two days after the hearing, Ms. Rieman learned of its

occurrence and that there was an active warrant of

8 RIEMAN V. VAZQUEZ

apprehension for K. B. Shortly after learning these facts,

Ms. Rieman and the family provided CFS with additional

medical records regarding K. B. from the prior week.

However, representatives of CFS informed Ms. Rieman that

the issue was out of their hands, as CFS could no longer

withdraw the warrant. Three days later, Ms. Rieman took K.

B. to LLUMC. At the hospital, Ms. Rieman was forced to

relinquish custody of K. B. to a law enforcement officer who

arrived at the hospital pursuant to the warrant of

apprehension. K. B. was not returned to Ms. Rieman’s

custody until November 20, 2018, almost two months later.

Two months after that, the court dismissed the dependency

proceedings upon CFS’s request. Because the proceedings

were dismissed, the California Court of Appeal held that Ms.

Rieman’s appeals of the Juvenile Court’s orders were moot.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 24, 2020, the Riemans filed suit in federal

district court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In their first

amended complaint, the Riemans alleged that Vazquez and

Johnson, among others, violated the Riemans’ Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights (1) by failing to provide them

with notice of the detention hearing and (2) by providing

false information to the Juvenile Court about why Ms.

Rieman was not noticed for the hearing. On July 12, 2022,

the parties filed dueling summary judgment motions. In

their motion, Vazquez and Johnson argued to the district

court that they are entitled to absolute immunity for their

quasi-prosecutorial decisions in instituting the juvenile

dependency proceedings and entitled to qualified immunity

because they did not violate any clearly established

constitutional rights.

RIEMAN V. VAZQUEZ 9

On November 1, 2022, the district court held that

Vazquez and Johnson were not entitled to absolute or

qualified immunity. The court also granted the Riemans’

motion for summary judgment “as to [their] first and second

claims for violation of [their] Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights” on the grounds that Vazquez and

Johnson failed to provide the Riemans with notice of the

detention hearing and engaged in judicial deception.

Vazquez and Johnson timely appealed.

JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to

review Vazquez and Johnson’s interlocutory appeal of the

district court’s summary judgment order denying them

absolute and qualified immunity. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472

U.S. 511, 525–26, 530 (1985). We review de novo denials

of absolute and qualified immunity. Botello v. Gammick,

413 F.3d 971, 975 (9th Cir. 2005) (absolute immunity), cert.

denied, 546 U.S. 1208 (2006); Robinson v. Prunty, 249 F.3d

862, 865–66 (9th Cir. 2001) (qualified immunity). Where

disputed facts are relevant to the denial of qualified

immunity, however, we determine whether the denial was

appropriate by assuming that the version of material facts as

asserted by the nonmoving party is correct. Jeffers v.

Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 903 (9th Cir. 2001).

ANALYSIS

I. Vazquez and Johnson Are Not Entitled to Absolute

Immunity.

Vazquez and Johnson contend they are entitled to

absolute immunity because they are being sued for actions

taken in their quasi-prosecutorial role as social workers.

They argue that “the fundamental question” in evaluating

10 RIEMAN V. VAZQUEZ

their claim to absolute immunity is “whether conduct

relate[s] to the initiation of a [juvenile] dependency

proceeding,” and that the conduct they are being sued for

“unquestionably is.” They also emphasize that the

discretionary nature of how they were supposed to give

notice of the detention hearing also weighs in favor of their

being entitled to absolute immunity.

Defendants in § 1983 suits are generally entitled to only

immunities that existed at common law. See Imbler v.

Pachtman, 542 U.S. 409, 417–18 (1976). Courts have thus

“granted state actors absolute immunity only for those

functions that were critical to the judicial process itself,”

such as “‘initiating a prosecution.’” Miller v. Gammie, 335

F.3d 889, 896 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (quoting Imbler, 424

U.S. at 431).1 It therefore follows that social workers may

enjoy absolute immunity from suit when they make

“discretionary, quasi-prosecutorial decisions to institute

court dependency proceedings to take custody away from

parents.” Id. at 898.

However, social workers “are not entitled to absolute

immunity from claims that they fabricated evidence during

an investigation or made false statements in a dependency

petition affidavit that they signed under penalty of perjury,

because such actions aren’t similar to discretionary decisions

about whether to prosecute.” Beltran v. Santa Clara Cnty.,

514 F.3d 906, 908 (9th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). Put simply,

“as prosecutors and others investigating criminal matters

have no absolute immunity for their investigatory conduct,”

1

We have amended this opinion to remove the following phrase from

our citation to Miller: “overruled on other grounds, Sanchez v.

Mayorkas, 141 S. Ct. 1809 (2021).” The Supreme Court’s decision in

Sanchez did not overrule any aspect of our decision in Miller.

RIEMAN V. VAZQUEZ 11

it follows that “social workers conducting investigations

have no such immunity” as well. Id. at 908–09.

In this case, had the Riemans sued Vazquez and Johnson

for their discretionary decision to institute juvenile

dependency proceedings to take custody of K. B. away from

Ms. Rieman, they likely would have been entitled to absolute

immunity since that decision is inherently prosecutorial. See

Miller, 335 F.3d at 898. However, the Riemans’ suit did not

challenge that quasi-prosecutorial decision. Rather, the

Riemans sued Vazquez and Johnson for their failure to

provide Ms. Rieman with notice of the detention hearing,

despite knowing how to contact her and her parents, and

their acts of judicial deception regarding Ms. Rieman’s

whereabouts.

The crux of Vazquez and Johnson’s argument is that

since they are being sued for conduct that “relate[s] to the

initiation of a dependency proceeding,” they are absolutely

immune from suit. However, that argument relies upon an

overly broad conception of absolute immunity’s scope. As

we noted in Beltran, a social worker is “not entitled to

absolute immunity from claims that they . . . made false

statements in a dependency petition affidavit . . . because

such actions aren’t similar to discretionary decisions about

whether to prosecute.” 514 F.3d at 908. Surely, the making

of such statements in a dependency petition affidavit

“relate[s]” in some broad sense “to the initiation of a

dependency proceeding,” as Vazquez and Johnson contend,

but such a loose relation is not enough to render those actions

absolutely immune from suit. The actions themselves must

be “similar to discretionary decisions about whether to

prosecute.” Beltran, 514 F.3d at 908. Here, neither the

actions nor omissions for which Vazquez and Johnson are

being sued—i.e., providing false information to the Juvenile

12 RIEMAN V. VAZQUEZ

Court and failing to give notice of the hearing—are “similar

to discretionary decisions about whether to prosecute.” Id.

Accordingly, Vazquez and Johnson do not enjoy absolute

immunity from suit.

Moreover, Vazquez and Johnson’s related argument that

“the method of notice” is “discretionary,” does not save their

defenses of absolute immunity. The fact that social workers

have some discretion in how they give notice of a detention

hearing to a parent does not render decisions regarding the

method of notice “similar to discretionary decisions about

whether to prosecute.” Beltran, 514 F.3d at 908. And even

so, the Riemans have not sued Vazquez and Johnson for their

method of notice; the Riemans have sued them for failing to

provide any notice at all. The parties agree that giving notice

of a detention hearing is mandatory under the law. It follows

that giving notice is non-discretionary and very much unlike

the discretionary decision to initiate a prosecution. See

Beltran, 514 F.3d at 908; cf. Antoine v. Byers & Anderson,

Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 436 (1993) (denying absolute immunity

to a court reporter who was “required by statute to ‘recor[d]

verbatim’ court proceedings in their entirety”).

Accordingly, absolute immunity does not apply to the

Riemans’ claim that Vazquez and Johnson failed to give

them notice of the detention hearing as such notice was

mandatory. We therefore affirm the district court’s order

denying Vazquez and Johnson absolute immunity.

II. Vazquez and Johnson Are Not Entitled to Qualified

Immunity.

Vazquez and Johnson also contend that they are entitled

to qualified immunity for their conduct relating to the

juvenile dependency proceedings. First, they argue that their

representations to the Juvenile Court about Ms. Rieman’s

RIEMAN V. VAZQUEZ 13

whereabouts do not amount to judicial deception, and even

if they did, the constitutional violation was not clearly

established when they made the statements, and thus

qualified immunity applies.

Second, Vazquez and Johnson argue on appeal that they

did their best to give Ms. Rieman notice of the detention

hearing through their attempts to serve the temporary

detention warrant, and therefore they did not violate her due

process rights when they failed to contact her about the

detention hearing. They suggest that because no court has

decided these exact set of circumstances regarding notice,

the law is not clearly established, and thus qualified

immunity applies to their failure to give actual notice of the

detention hearing.

Qualified immunity shields government actors from civil

liability pursuant to § 1983 if “their conduct does not violate

clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which

a reasonable person would have known.” Benavidez v. Cnty.

of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1151 (9th Cir. 2021). “In

determining whether an officer is entitled to qualified

immunity, [courts] consider (1) whether there has been a

violation of a constitutional right; and (2) whether that right

was clearly established at the time of the officer’s alleged

misconduct.” Lal v. California, 746 F.3d 1112, 1116 (9th

Cir. 2014). A clearly established constitutional right “must

be particularized to the facts of the case.” Davis v. United

States, 854 F.3d 594, 599 (2017) (cleaned up). “Because the

focus is on whether the officer had fair notice that her

conduct was unlawful, reasonableness is judged against the

backdrop of the law at the time of the conduct.” Kisela v.

Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018).

14 RIEMAN V. VAZQUEZ

A. Vazquez and Johnson Are Not Entitled to

Qualified Immunity from Suit for Failing to

Provide Notice of the Detention Hearing.

Vazquez and Johnson do not dispute the district court’s

conclusion that Ms. Rieman had a constitutionally protected

due process right to receive notice of (and an opportunity to

be heard at) the detention hearing where CFS sought custody

of her child. Rather, they suggest that they did not ultimately

violate her rights because they “attempted personal service

of the detention warrant four times over the course of two

days,” and Ms. Rieman evaded those service attempts,

thereby excusing the formal notice requirement.

However, in the very same sentence in their opening

brief, Vazquez and Johnson acknowledge that all their

service attempts took place “before [they] decid[ed] to

initiate a dependency proceeding.” As the Riemans

correctly point out in their answering brief, “[t]here is no

date [for the detention hearing] on the [temporary]

[d]etention [w]arrant[,] [n]or could there have been, since

the [d]etention [h]earing was not scheduled until after the

attempts were made to serve the [d]etention [w]arrant.”

Therefore, Vazquez and Johnson’s argument that their

unsuccessful attempts to serve the temporary detention

warrant somehow excused or remedied their failure to call

or otherwise notify Ms. Rieman of the detention hearing is

unavailing. The district court was therefore correct to

conclude that Vazquez and Johnson failed to give Ms.

Rieman notice of the detention hearing, thereby violating her

right to such notice.

A parent’s “whereabouts” being “unknown” only

excuses the notice requirement after “there has been a good

faith attempt to provide notice to a parent” of the detention

RIEMAN V. VAZQUEZ 15

hearing. In re Justice P., 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 801, 806 (Cal.

App. 2004). It is undisputed that no such attempt was ever

made. That the parties dispute whether the Riemans were

aware of the temporary detention warrant and were therefore

evading it by hiding out in a different county is immaterial.

Vazquez and Johnson knew how to contact Ms. Rieman

about the detention hearing, but they chose not to even try.

To the extent that Vazquez and Johnson imply that Ms.

Rieman’s right to notice was not “clearly established” at the

time they violated it, that argument is foreclosed by the fact

that long before September 2018, “it was clear that a parent

. . . could not be summarily deprived of th[e care and]

custody [of his children] without notice and a hearing, except

when the children were in imminent danger.”2 Ram v.

Rubin, 118 F.3d 1306, 1310 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Caldwell

v. LeFaver, 928 F.2d 331, 333 (9th Cir. 1991)). Vazquez

and Johnson’s argument is further undermined by the fact

that long before September 2018, it was clear under

California law that after a social worker files a dependency

petition, she must give notice to the child’s parents “as soon

as possible . . . .” Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 290.1(c).

“Service of the notice shall be written or oral,” id. § 290.1(e),

and the notice must include “[t]he date, time, and place of

the hearing,” id. § 290.1(d)(1). And the means of giving

notice to the parent “must be such as one desirous of actually

informing the [parent] might reasonably adopt to accomplish

2

Vazquez and Johnson never asked the Juvenile Court to excuse the

notice requirement because K. B. was in imminent danger. Instead, they

represented to the court that Ms. Rieman was “not noticed” for the

hearing because her “whereabouts [were] unknown.” Vazquez and

Johnson only discussed “substantial danger to [K. B.’s] physical health”

with respect to why they believed the court should ultimately order his

removal from Ms. Rieman’s custody and care.

16 RIEMAN V. VAZQUEZ

it.” In re Antonio E., 144 Cal. Rptr. 466, 472 (Cal. Ct. App.

1978). Considering these clear statements of law, we

conclude that “any reasonable official in [Vazquez or

Johnson’s] positions would have understood that he was

violating” Ms. Rieman’s due process rights by failing to

provide her with notice of the detention hearing. Kisela, 138

S. Ct. at 1153. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s

denial of qualified immunity with respect to Vazquez and

Johnson’s failure to provide Ms. Rieman with notice of the

hearing.

B. Vazquez and Johnson Are Not Entitled to

Qualified Immunity for Their Misrepresentation

to the Juvenile Court About Why Ms. Rieman

Was Not Noticed for the Hearing.

An individual has a well-established constitutional right

to be free from deception in the presentation of evidence

during juvenile dependency proceedings. Greene v.

Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1034–35 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated

in part on other grounds, 563 U.S. 692 (2011); see also

Whitaker v. Garcetti, 486 F.3d 572, 581 (9th Cir. 2007) (“A

seizure conducted pursuant to a warrant obtained by judicial

deception violates the Fourth Amendment.”); Costanich v.

Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 627 F.3d 1101, 1108 (9th Cir.

2010) (“[D]eliberately fabricating evidence in civil child

abuse proceedings violates the Due Process clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment when a liberty or property interest is

at stake . . . .”). “[G]overnment perjury and the knowing use

of false evidence are absolutely and obviously irreconcilable

with the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of Due Process

in [the] courts.” Hardwick v. Cnty. of Orange, 844 F.3d

1112, 1119 (9th Cir. 2017). “There are no circumstances in

a dependency proceeding that would permit government

officials to bear false witness against a parent.” Id.

RIEMAN V. VAZQUEZ 17

To support a § 1983 claim that a social worker engaged

in judicial deception, a plaintiff must show “(1) a

misrepresentation or omission (2) made deliberately or with

a reckless disregard for the truth, that was (3) material to the

judicial decision.” Scanlon v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 92 F.4th

781, 799 (9th Cir. 2024). Misrepresentations or omissions

are “‘material’ . . . if the Juvenile Court would have declined

to issue the order had [the social worker] been truthful.”

Greene, 588 F.3d at 1035.

Here, it is undisputed that, despite having Ms. Rieman’s

correct telephone number, and despite the Riemans’ repeated

attempts to contact CFS, Vazquez and Johnson never

attempted to call Ms. Rieman or otherwise inform her or her

family about the time and place of the detention hearing.

Had they told the Juvenile Court that they did not provide

notice to Ms. Rieman because they had never attempted to

do so, the Juvenile Court could not (and would not) have

proceeded with the hearing and ordered that K. B. be

removed from Ms. Rieman’s care and custody.3 Therefore,

Vazquez and Johnson’s representation to the Juvenile Court

that Ms. Rieman was “not noticed” because her

“whereabouts [were] unknown” was materially false.4

Vazquez and Johnson’s related argument that qualified

immunity should still apply because “it is not ‘clearly

established’ that it would be a due process violation to claim

a parent’s whereabouts were unknown based on the facts as

3

Counsel for Vazquez and Johnson conceded this point at oral argument.

4

In the parties’ joint statement of undisputed facts, Vazquez and Johnson

conceded this interpretation of the detention report, i.e., they “informed

the [c]ourt in the [d]etention [r]eport that [Ms. Rieman] was ‘not noticed’

for the [d]etention [h]earing because her ‘whereabouts [were]

unknown.’”

18 RIEMAN V. VAZQUEZ

known to [them],” is foreclosed by our decision in

Hardwick, 844 F.3d 1112. In that case, we observed that

“general statements of the law are not inherently incapable

of giving fair and clear warning, and in some instances a

general constitutional rule already identified in the

decisional law may apply with obvious clarity to the specific

conduct in question, even though the very action in question

has not previously been held unlawful.” Id. at 1117 (cleaned

up). The “salient question . . . is whether the state of the law”

at the time of their misconduct gave the social workers “fair

warning that their [misconduct] was unconstitutional.” Id.

(cleaned up).

Here, a reasonable social worker in Vazquez and

Johnson’s shoes would have understood, based on prior

decisional law, that providing incomplete and false

information to the Juvenile Court to convince the court the

social worker had satisfied the due process notice

requirement constitutes judicial deception. Long before

September 2018, it was clear that “[t]here are no

circumstances in a dependency proceeding that would

permit government officials to bear false witness against a

parent.” Id. at 1119; see also Scanlon, 92 F.4th at 805

(observing that “[t]he right to be free from judicial

deception” in child custody matters “was clearly established

prior to 2016”). That the Riemans have failed to identify a

case that specifically evaluates “the very action in question”

does not change the analysis. Hardwick, 844 F.3d at 1117.

It is obvious that the prohibition against bearing false

witness applies to representations that a social worker makes

about a parent’s whereabouts, especially when those

representations will determine whether a juvenile court will

proceed with a hearing to remove a child from that parent’s

custody without hearing from the parent first.

RIEMAN V. VAZQUEZ 19

The fact that the right to be free from judicial deception

arises in part under the Fourth Amendment also does not

save Vazquez and Johnson’s qualified immunity defense.

While it is true that specificity in past decisional law is

especially important in the Fourth Amendment context

where law enforcement officers often have to make quick

decisions with significant consequences, that principle more

appropriately applies in excessive force cases arising under

the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 1119. In this case,

Vazquez and Johnson’s acts of judicial deception “were not

made under pressing circumstances requiring prompt action,

or those providing ambiguous or conflicting guidance,” such

as when a law enforcement officer is faced with a sudden

threat of deadly force in a public setting. Id. Rather,

Vazquez and Johnson were able to draft the juvenile

dependency petition and detention report over the course of

several days and had ample time to attempt to contact Ms.

Rieman about the time and place of the detention hearing,

which was mandatory under the law. Accordingly, we

affirm the district court’s order denying Vazquez and

Johnson qualified immunity from suit for their

representations to the Juvenile Court about Ms. Rieman’s

whereabouts.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district

court’s order denying absolute and qualified immunity to

Vazquez and Johnson.