Mason v. Griffin-Valade

No. 188 March 27, 2024 599

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE

STATE OF OREGON

Christine MASON,

an individual,

Plaintiff-Respondent

Cross-Appellant,

v.

Lavonne GRIFFIN-VALADE,

Oregon Secretary of State,

Defendant-Appellant

Cross-Respondent,

and

Eric RICHARDSON,

Gary Wilhelms, and Chris Telfer,

Intervenors-Appellants

Cross-Respondents.

Marion County Circuit Court

22CV42660; A181565

Jennifer K. Gardiner, Judge.

Argued and submitted February 21, 2024.

Christopher A. Perdue, Assistant Attorney General,

argued the cause for appellant-cross-respondent, Lavonne

Griffin-Valade. Also on the briefs were Ellen F. Rosenblum,

Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.

Daniel Meek argued the cause and filed the brief for

intervenors-appellants-cross-respondents, Eric Richardson,

Gary Wilhelms, and Chris Telfer.

Steven C. Berman argued the cause for respondent-cross-

appellant. Also on the brief were Lydia Anderson-Dana and

Stoll Stoll Berne Lokting & Shlachter P.C.

Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, Joyce, Judge, and

Jacquot, Judge.

JOYCE, J.

600 Mason v. Griffin-Valade

Reversed and remanded on appeal; cross-appeal dis-

missed as moot.

Cite as 331 Or App 599 (2024) 601

JOYCE, J.

Article XVII, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution

requires proposed amendments to the constitution to be sub-

mitted to voters in a manner that allows each amendment to

be “voted on separately.” Initiative petition 2024-14 (IP 14)

is a proposed amendment to the constitution that aims to

replace the current framework for redrawing state legisla-

tive districts after each federal census with a framework

better able to minimize partisanship. It is a multifaceted

proposal that revolves around the creation of an independent

commission tasked with drawing district boundaries accord-

ing to specified mapping criteria. Among other things, IP 14

would insulate the commission from outside interference by

limiting the legislature’s ability to pass laws concerning the

commission’s operation and by imposing a number of qualifi-

cations and disqualifications for commissioners based on the

political affiliations and activities of the commissioners and

their family members. It also establishes procedural, bud-

getary, and staffing provisions necessary to carry out the

day-to-day operation of the commission. The question before

us is whether this multifaceted initiative complies with our

constitution’s “separate vote” requirement. We conclude that

it does.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The chief petitioners filed the prospective petition

for IP 14 with the Secretary of State. Plaintiff submitted

comments to the secretary, asserting that IP 14 failed to

comply with the separate-vote requirement. The secretary

disagreed, concluding that IP 14 conformed to all proce-

dural requirements of the constitution. Plaintiff then initi-

ated this proceeding, challenging the secretary’s determina-

tion and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The trial

court allowed chief petitioners to intervene in opposition to

plaintiff’s claims.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judg-

ment. After a hearing on those motions, the court ruled

that IP 14 violated the separate-vote requirement, grant-

ing plaintiff’s motion in part and denying the secretary’s

motion. The court stayed its judgment pending the outcome

602 Mason v. Griffin-Valade

of an appeal, and it denied plaintiff’s request for additional

declaratory and injunctive relief, which would have pre-

vented IP 14 from continuing through the initiative process

while awaiting the resolution of an appeal.

The secretary and intervenors appeal, challeng-

ing the denial of their summary-judgment motions and

the granting in part of plaintiff’s motion. Plaintiff cross-

appeals, challenging the denial of the additional declaratory

and injunctive relief described above.

There are no factual disputes in this case; therefore,

the question of whether IP 14 complies with the separate-

vote requirement is an issue of law that we review for legal

error. See Anantha v. Clarno, 302 Or App 196, 200, 461 P3d

282 (2020) (applying that standard in an analogous con-

text). We ultimately conclude that the court erred in ruling

that IP 14 violated the separate-vote requirement, and we

reverse and remand the judgment on that basis, which ren-

ders plaintiff’s cross-appeal moot.

II. THE PROVISIONS OF IP 14

In the words of its preamble, IP 14 aims to prevent

gerrymandering by establishing “an independent commis-

sion to draw fair and impartial districts so that every vote

matters.” It contrasts its proposed framework with the cur-

rent one, in which “Oregon politicians draw the boundar-

ies for their own state legislative districts.” To accomplish

its goal, IP 14’s provisions are detailed and cover various

aspects of the commission’s operation.

First, IP 14 would repeal Article IV, section 6,1 of

the Oregon Constitution and replace it with a provision con-

sisting of 13 subsections. The new section would establish

the Citizens Redistricting Commission made up of 12 com-

missioners, and it would authorize the Secretary of State to

adopt rules to ensure the commission’s effectiveness and to

initiate a process to allow individuals to apply to the com-

mission. It would also establish the qualifications and dis-

qualifications for commissioners. For example, with some

exceptions, to qualify for the commission, applicants must

1

Article IV, section 6, sets out the current process for defining and appor-

tioning legislative districts.

Cite as 331 Or App 599 (2024) 603

be eligible to vote and must have been an Oregon resident

for the preceding two years, have been registered with the

same political party (or unaffiliated) for the last three years,

and have voted in two of the last three general or tribal elec-

tions. In contrast, a person is disqualified from the board if,

within three years of their application, the person or their

close family members have been:

• A holder of or candidate for elective office;

• An officer, employee, or paid consultant of a political

party;

• A member of a political party central committee;

• An employee or contractor for a campaign committee for

federal or state office;

• A registered lobbyist;

• A paid congressional or state legislative employee;

• A member of an elected official’s staff or a contractor of

an elected official; or

• An individual who has contributed more in a calendar

year to any single candidate for federal or state office

than the amount allowed per election by federal law for

contributions to federal candidates.

Additionally, after a commissioner’s term of service, they are

temporarily prohibited from seeking elected office, working

for an official appointed by the state or federal legislature,

serving as a consultant for a state or federal legislative can-

didate, and acting as a lobbyist.

The new section 6 would also establish a panel to

review applicants for the commission, which would iden-

tify a pool of qualified candidates, of which a third would

be members of the largest political party, a third would be

members of the second largest party, and a third would be

members of neither of those parties. From that pool, the

Secretary of State would randomly select six commissioners

(two from each category listed above), and those six commis-

sioners would select six additional commissioners (again,

two from each category listed above). The new section would

authorize the governor to remove commissioners in very

604 Mason v. Griffin-Valade

limited circumstances, and it would provide for the filling of

vacancies.

Additionally, the new section 6 would allow the

commission to hire necessary staff and consultants, and it

would authorize the Secretary of State to provide staff and

office support to the commission. It would authorize per diem

compensation for commissioners and protect commissioners

from negative employment consequences due to their partic-

ipation in the commission. It would require the legislature

to fund the commission as necessary to fulfill the commis-

sion’s obligations and prohibit the legislature from reducing

the commission’s budget below that of the preceding years.

Finally, the proposed section 6 would insulate the

commission from the legislature by prohibiting the legisla-

ture from passing laws that directly impact the functioning

of the commission, except to appropriate money to the com-

mission or to adopt verbatim legislative acts recommended

by the commission itself.

Next, IP 14 would repeal and replace Article IV, sec-

tion 7.2 The new section 7 would require open and transparent

processes to allow for public participation. It would establish

quorum and voting rules. It would establish specific criteria

for the drawing of legislative districts. Finally, it would autho-

rize the Oregon Supreme Court to review the maps proposed

by the commission and grant it original and exclusive juris-

diction over any challenge to a certified final map.

III. THE SEPARATE-VOTE REQUIREMENT

Having described IP 14, we turn to the question

whether it violates the separate-vote requirement. Article

XVII, section 1, provides that, “[w]hen two or more amend-

ments shall be submitted * * * to the voters of this state

2

Article IV, section 7, provides:

“A senatorial district, when more than one county shall constitute the same,

shall be composed of contiguous counties, and no county shall be divided in

creating such senatorial districts. Senatorial or representative districts com-

prising not more than one county may be divided into subdistricts from time

to time by law. Subdistricts shall be composed of contiguous territory within

the district; and the ratios to population of senators or representatives, as

the case may be, elected from the subdistricts, shall be substantially equal

within the district.”

Cite as 331 Or App 599 (2024) 605

at the same election, they shall be so submitted that each

amendment shall be voted on separately.” The purpose of

that requirement, which we further explore below, is to

ensure that voters are not forced to cast a single vote for or

against what are, essentially, multiple standalone constitu-

tional amendments. Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 327 Or 250, 275,

277, 959 P2d 49 (1998).

To analyze whether a proposal satisfies the separate-

vote requirement, we follow the framework established

in Armatta. That framework looks to (1) whether the pro-

posal would make two or more changes to the constitution,

(2) whether those changes are “substantive,” and (3) whether

those changes are “closely related.” Id. at 277. Under that

rubric, a proposal satisfies the separate-vote requirement if

it makes only a single substantive change or if its multiple

substantive changes are “closely related.” Id.

Here, the parties agree that IP 14 proposes multi-

ple substantive changes to the constitution—although they

disagree as to the number and nature of those changes. The

mere existence of more than one substantive change means

that our analysis necessarily turns on whether the multiple

substantive changes are “closely related.”

A. Understanding the “Closely Related” Standard within the

Context and Purpose of the Separate-Vote Requirement

Determining whether changes are “closely related”

is a challenging endeavor because, by its very nature, it is

not an analysis well-suited to brightline or categorical rules.

The Oregon Supreme Court has primarily employed two

factors to help determine whether substantive changes are

“closely related” or not. In the first factor, the court exam-

ines the preexisting provisions of the constitution that will

be affected either explicitly or implicitly by the proposal and

asks whether those provisions are closely related. Lehman

v. Bradbury, 333 Or 231, 246, 37 P3d 989 (2002). In the sec-

ond factor, the court examines the changes that would be

implemented by the proposal itself to determine whether

those changes are closely related to each other. Id. Because

those two factors can only be understood and applied with

an understanding of their greater context and purpose, we

606 Mason v. Griffin-Valade

turn back to Armatta and its description of the principles

animating the separate-vote requirement and, by extension,

the “closely related” inquiry.

First, in Armatta, the court observed that the

separate-vote requirement originated as part of a larger

provision aimed at allowing the constitution to adapt to “a

change of popular sentiment” about subjects like the estab-

lishment of a state bank, slavery, or the rights of women.

Armatta, 327 Or at 265 (quoting H. Fowler, 2 Report of the

Debates and Proceedings of the Convention for the Revision

of the Constitution of the State of Indiana, 1258-59 (1850)

(statement of James G. Read) (emphasis omitted)). From

that origin, the court recognized that the separate-vote

requirement operates to restrict such proposals in scope to

making “particular, specific changes to the constitution.” Id.

Second, drawing on Baum v. Newbry et al., 200

Or 576, 267 P2d 220 (1954), the court explained that the

separate-vote requirement aims to ensure that “voters are

able to express their will in one vote as to only one consti-

tutional change.” Armatta, 327 Or at 269. That is, “the pur-

pose of the separate-vote requirement is to allow the voters to

decide upon separate constitutional changes separately.” Id.

Third—again drawing on Baum, in which the court

upheld a lengthy and detailed amendment regarding leg-

islative redistricting in the face of a separate-vote chal-

lenge—the court recognized that a single proposal “may

affect one or more constitutional provisions without offend-

ing the separate-vote requirement.” Id. Put differently,

the separate-vote requirement does not restrict a proposal

based solely on the breadth of its impact on existing pro-

visions of the constitution—it is not a rule that limits the

complexity of a proposal. See Lincoln Interagency Narcotics

Team v. Kitzhaber, 341 Or 496, 503, 513, 145 P3d 151 (2006)

(LINT) (holding that a lengthy measure complied with the

separate-vote requirement despite the fact that it had “more

in common, both in appearance and in substance, with leg-

islation than with constitutional amendments”).

Finally, the separate-vote requirement “encom-

passes, to some extent, the notion that a single amendment

Cite as 331 Or App 599 (2024) 607

must contain a single ‘subject.’ ” Armatta, 327 Or at 269. In

fact, this principle necessarily emerges from the two that

precede it. After all, if voters cannot be compelled to cast a

single vote for multiple proposals—and yet a proposal is not

restricted merely by its complexity or the breadth of its effect

on existing constitutional provisions—then the separate-

vote requirement must establish some type of content-based

limitation. The court explained the nature of that limita-

tion by comparing the separate-vote requirement with the

single-subject requirement of Article IV, section 1(2)(d). Id.

at 272-75.

The single-subject requirement exists to prevent

“log-rolling,” i.e., “the practice of inserting two or more unre-

lated provisions into a single bill * * * so that legislators

favoring one provision would be compelled to vote for the bill

despite their opposition to the other provisions.” Id. at 273. It

requires a measure to contain “a unifying principle logically

connecting all provisions in the act [or amendment], such

that it can be said that the measure embraces one subject

only.” Id. (quoting State ex rel Caleb v. Beesley, 326 Or 83, 91,

949 P2d 724 (1997) (brackets in Armatta)).

The main similarity between the single-subject and

separate-vote requirements is that “[b]oth serve to ensure

that the voters will not be compelled to vote upon multi-

ple ‘subjects’ or multiple constitutional changes in a single

vote.” Id. at 275. The main difference is that the single-

subject requirement “concerns only the text of the proposed

amendment viewed in isolation,” id. at 270 (emphasis in

original), whereas the separate-vote requirement “focuses

upon the form of the submission of the amendment, as well

as the potential change to the existing constitution,” id. at

276 (emphasis in original). Stated slightly differently, the

separate-vote requirement incorporates the single-subject

analysis, but it goes further. Id. at 277. It examines the

effects of a proposal on the constitution itself.

From those principles, the Supreme Court con-

cluded that “the proper inquiry” in applying the separate-

vote requirement “is to determine whether, if adopted, the

proposal would make two or more changes to the constitution

that are substantive and that are not closely related.” Id. If

608 Mason v. Griffin-Valade

it would, “the proposal violates the separate-vote require-

ment * * * because it would prevent voters from expressing

their opinions as to each proposed change separately.” Id.

Given the nature of those animating principles, it is evident

that the simple phrase “closely related” describes a rather

complex concept. Ultimately, the touchstone is whether a

proposal contains in a single package what could just as

effectively be broken into two.

B. Using the Two Factors Identified in Lehman to Apply the

“Closely Related” Standard

The challenge lies in answering that question of

divisibility: When can a proposal just as effectively be broken

into two? It is not the court’s role to judge the motivations of

the drafters of a measure or the substantive merits, viabil-

ity, or advisability of a given proposal—our role is simply to

make sure a proposal complies with the form required by the

constitution. See id. at 284 (“* * * Article IV, section 1, grants

the people the power to change the Oregon Constitution as

they so desire, including modifying or repealing a provi-

sion of the Bill of Rights, so long as the proposed change

or changes comply with the constitutional requirements for

amending the constitution.”). Mindful of that limitation, we

return to the two factors identified by the Supreme Court in

Lehman and the different ways in which those factors have

functioned as a diagnostic tool in different circumstances.

Again, the first factor asks whether the preexisting provi-

sions of the constitution that will be affected either explic-

itly or implicitly by the proposal are closely related. Lehman,

333 Or at 246. The second asks whether the changes made

by the proposal itself are closely related. Id. The court’s reli-

ance on one or both of those factors has varied depending on

the nature of the proposal at issue.

League of Oregon Cities v. State of Oregon, 334 Or

645, 56 P3d 892 (2002), is an example of a case in which the

separate-vote analysis turned primarily on the first factor.

There, the court addressed Ballot Measure 7 (2000), which

sought to amend Article I, section 18, to require the state

to pay just compensation to property owners for any reduc-

tion in the value of real property resulting from a restrictive

regulation. Id. at 665-67. However, the measure contained

Cite as 331 Or App 599 (2024) 609

an important caveat to its property protection—it did not

require compensation for regulations that prohibited “selling

pornography, performing nude dancing, selling alcoholic bev-

erages or other controlled substances, or operating a casino or

gaming parlor.” Id. at 668. The court found that that caveat

had a rather profound impact on the Article I, section 8, right

to free expression. Id. at 671-72. Under Article I, section 8,

the state or a local government may not deny a generally

available benefit to a property owner due to expressive activ-

ity. Id. at 671. But Measure 7 explicitly allowed that dispa-

rate treatment and “essentially plac[ed] a price tag upon the

property owner’s right of free expression.” Id. at 672.

Ultimately, the court held that the existing consti-

tutional provisions affected by the measure—Article I, sec-

tion 18 (a regulatory-takings provision) and Article I, sec-

tion 8 (a free-speech provision)—bore “no relation to each

other.” Id. at 674. That lack of relationship highlighted the

core problem with the measure. Rather than presenting one

core proposal to voters, Ballot Measure 7 contained one core

proposal and a constitutional non sequitur that restricted

the freedom of expression.

Swett v. Bradbury, 333 Or 597, 43 P3d 1094 (2002),

is an example of a case in which the second factor was most

useful. In Swett, the court evaluated Ballot Measure 62

(1998), which required the disclosure of certain political con-

tributions and required that petition-signature gatherers be

registered Oregon voters. Id. at 599-600. In applying the

second factor, the court considered the purported purpose

of the measure, which was “designed to prevent, control, or

expose the influence of money in the initiative [and] referen-

dum * * * process.” Id. at 608-09 (alterations in Swett). The

court took issue with the voter-registration requirement

for signature gatherers, noting that the defendants “fail to

explain how * * * [that] requirement * * * bears any relation-

ship to the suggested design.” Id. That discrepancy revealed

that the measure actually contained two freestanding pro-

posals, and it could have been broken apart to allow vot-

ers to separately decide “whether to require disclosure of

campaign contributions and/or impose a requirement that

signature gatherers for initiative petitions be registered

610 Mason v. Griffin-Valade

Oregon voters.” State v. Rogers, 352 Or 510, 523, 288 P3d

544 (2012).

The Supreme Court also found the second factor

to be largely dispositive in Rogers—in that instance, to

confirm that a proposal complied with the separate-vote

requirement. Id. at 522-24. In Rogers, the court analyzed

Ballot Measure 6 (1984), which provided:

“Notwithstanding sections 15 and 16 of this Article, the

penalty for aggravated murder as defined by law shall be

death upon unanimous affirmative jury findings as pro-

vided by law and otherwise shall be life imprisonment with

minimum sentence as provided by law.”

Id. at 514. Challenging the measure on separate-vote

grounds, the defendant argued that the measure made mul-

tiple changes to the existing provisions of the constitution,

because it limited the scope of the constitution’s ban on “vin-

dictive justice,” its ban on “cruel and unusual punishment,”

and its requirement of proportionate penalties. Id. at 518.

The court agreed that the measure implicated those

three constitutional provisions. Id. at 521-22. But it recog-

nized that “Measure 6 * * * contains only one provision and

proposes to do only one thing—prescribe the penalty for

aggravated murder.” Id. at 522. Its effects on existing con-

stitutional provisions were directed only “at eliminating the

potential constitutional barriers to the imposition of that

penalty.” Id. Stated differently, the court recognized that “the

three changes that the measure makes to Article I, sections

15 and 16, are necessary corollaries to the new provision that

permits the imposition of the death penalty.” Id. at 523.

What Rogers demonstrates is that, so long as a

measure’s provisions are themselves closely related and the

measure’s effects on existing constitutional provisions are

limited to those necessary to allow the measure to function,

the first factor is of little utility. Regardless of the relation-

ship between those existing provisions, the measure can-

not be broken apart and presented to the voters in separate

initiatives without compromising the “scheme that is at the

measure’s heart.” Id. at 525.

Cite as 331 Or App 599 (2024) 611

Although Rogers is the starkest example of that

principle, the plurality took a similar approach in LINT.

There, the Supreme Court addressed Ballot Measure 3

(2000), which “impose[d] various procedural and substan-

tive limitations on forfeiture proceedings, establishe[d] pri-

orities for and limitations on the distribution of forfeiture

proceeds (including proceeds from federal forfeiture pro-

ceedings that are available to the state), create[d] a state

agency to monitor and report on forfeitures, and provide[d]

a civil penalty for violating its provisions.” LINT, 341 Or at

503. As opposed to the short and simple provision at issue

in Rogers, the measure in LINT was rather lengthy and fol-

lowed “the unfortunate practice, sometimes questioned, of

inserting provisions in the state constitution that have more

in common, both in appearance and in substance, with leg-

islation than with constitutional amendments.” Id.

Nonetheless, the crux of the separate-vote issue was

the relationship between two parts of the measure. One part

of the measure set out constitutional protections for property

owners by prohibiting civil forfeiture unless the owner had

been convicted of a crime and there was clear and convincing

evidence that the property was an instrumentality or proceed

of that crime. Id. at 512. The second part set out an admin-

istrative process for collecting and disbursing funds derived

from forfeited property, including a provision that directed

those funds to be spent on drug-treatment services and pro-

hibited their use for law-enforcement purposes. Id. The mea-

sure itself did not affect preexisting provisions of the consti-

tution, id. at 509, so the question reduced to whether those

two parts of the measure were “closely related” to each other.

The opponents of the measure argued that those

two parts of the measure were no more closely related than

the measure that the court disapproved of in Armatta. Id.

at 511. In essence, they argued that a directive to the legis-

lative and executive branches about the permissible uses of

forfeiture proceeds was not a necessary corollary to increas-

ing property protections by narrowing the availability of

forfeiture in the first place. Id.

The plurality disagreed. It explained that those

objections required one to “stand[ ] as close as possible to

612 Mason v. Griffin-Valade

each provision and ignore[ ] the others.” Id. Taking into

account the purported goal of the measure—which was to

“rein[ ] in” forfeitures and “remov[e] the carrot, which other-

wise would tempt the two political branches of government

to treat the criminal law as a revenue-raising source”—the

court concluded that the “administrative funding and dis-

bursal scheme * * * ha[d] a place in the constitution because

of the new [more limited] civil forfeiture process.” Id. at

512. In other words, the second part of the measure “wholly

derive[d]” from the first. Id. at 513.

The plurality’s reasoning in LINT is consistent with

what we understand to be the rule in Rogers: Where applica-

tion of the second factor shows that a measure is incapable

of being broken apart and presented to voters in separate

freestanding proposals without undermining the “scheme

that is at the measure’s heart,” then the measure must nec-

essarily satisfy the separate-vote requirement. Rogers, 352

Or at 525. In such situations, the ripple effects that the mea-

sure may send throughout diverse provisions of our constitu-

tion do not offend the separate-vote requirement so long as

they are limited to those “necessary to give effect” to that

scheme. Id. In such situations, “a separate vote on whether

those effects should logically follow [is] not possible,” because

a voter cannot cast a vote in favor of measure’s core proposal

without endorsing the necessary corollaries that make the

proposal possible. Id.

IV. APPLICATION

Turning to IP 14, we recognize that the measure’s

stated purpose is to establish an independent commis-

sion that will draw “fair and impartial districts” and not

be unduly influenced in the execution of that duty by con-

flicts of interest or partisanship. Consequently, our analysis

turns on whether IP 14 is one standalone proposal aimed

at that goal or whether it is capable of being presented to

the voters in separate standalone proposals. We start our

analysis with the second factor because, tracking the rea-

soning of Rogers and the plurality in LINT, we find it to be

dispositive.

Cite as 331 Or App 599 (2024) 613

IP 14 seeks to completely replace Article IV, sec-

tions 6 and 7, of the constitution. Its replacement for sec-

tion 6 contains 13 subsections that establish a redistricting

commission:

• Subsection (1) establishes a Citizens Redistricting

Commission consisting of 12 commissioners.

• Subsection (2) authorizes the Secretary of State to adopt

rules necessary to facilitate the application and selec-

tion of commission members.

• Subsection (3) authorizes the Secretary of State to initi-

ate an application process that promotes “a diverse and

qualified applicant pool.” It then sets out a long list of

qualifications and disqualifications for applicants to the

commission.

• Subsection (4) provides for the creation of a review panel

made up of administrative law judges tasked with cre-

ating an applicant pool for the commission.

• Subsection (5) sets out a process by which the review

panel will select a pool of 150 applicants.

• Subsection (6) instructs the Secretary of State to “ran-

domly select by lot” six applicants from that pool to

serve as commissioners.

• Subsection (7) authorizes those six commissioners to

select six more from the applicant pool.

• Subsections (8) and (9) contain provisions regarding

the removal of commissioners for neglect, incapacity, or

misconduct and for the filling of out-of-cycle vacancies.

• Subsection (10) authorizes the commission to hire nec-

essary staff and consultants, orders the Secretary of

State to provide staffing and office support as needed,

provides for the payment of commission members, and

establishes employment protections for commissioners.

• Subsection (11) establishes the term of the commission-

ers’ service and sets a waiting period on a former com-

missioner’s ability to seek elective office, work or consult

for the state or federal legislature, or work as a lobbyist.

In short, subsections (1) through (11) provide for the creation

and day-to-day operation of the nonpartisan citizen commit-

tee that is at the very heart of IP 14. We find those provisions

614 Mason v. Griffin-Valade

to be “closely related,” as we are hard pressed to identify a

way that those provisions could logically be subdivided and

presented to voters as separate proposals—nor has plaintiff

proposed one. As was the case in LINT, all of the subsections

are “wholly derived” from the establishment of the Citizens

Redistricting Commission and have no function apart from

that commission.

Continuing to subsection (12), that subsection

requires the legislature to appropriate the funds “neces-

sary to permit the commission to fulfill the commission’s

obligations,” and it prohibits the legislature from reducing

the commission’s budget to a level below that of the previ-

ous redistricting cycle. Meanwhile, subsection (13) prohib-

its the legislature from enacting laws that directly impact

the functioning of the commission, unless three prerequi-

sites are satisfied: (1) the commission votes to seek legis-

lation that enhances its ability to carry out its function,

(2) the commission provides the requested language to the

legislature, and (3) the legislature enacts that language

verbatim.

Those two subsections serve to insulate the com-

mission from interference by the legislature—either by the

tightening of the purse strings or by direct legislative inter-

ference. As with the prior 11, subsections 12 and 13 exist

only to support the function of the commission and have

no independent purpose for existence in the absence of the

commission. Furthermore, we cannot see how those provi-

sions can be removed from IP 14 and presented to voters in

a separate amendment without undermining the scheme at

the heart of IP 14—a redistricting commission safe from the

influence of politically interested legislators.

That brings us to section 7 and its subsections.

Whereas section 6 would establish the commission and pro-

vide for its administrative functioning, section 7 sets out the

guidelines for the commission itself:

• Subsection (1) directs the commission to conduct an

open and transparent process, to draw district lines in

accordance with map criteria to follow, and to conduct

its business with integrity, impartiality, and fairness.

Cite as 331 Or App 599 (2024) 615

• Subsection (2) establishes quorum and voting rules.

• Subsection (3) requires public notice of meetings and

hearings and makes the commission’s records and data

publicly available.

• Subsection (4) sets out the mapping criteria that the

commission is directed to use.

• Subsection (5) orders the commission to hold a certain

number of public hearings and facilitate public accessi-

bility to those hearings.

• Subsection (6) sets a timeline for the adoption of final

maps and a procedure for use when the commission

does not approve a final map.

• Subsection (7) establishes a mechanism for judicial

review of redistricting maps.

• Subsection (8) provides that the measure supersedes

any conflicting provisions of the constitution and allows

for the severability of invalid portions of the measure.

Again, we find all of these subsections “closely

related” to each other and to the provisions in section 6.

Each subsection serves to set out the means by which the

commission is to carry out its task and provides alterna-

tives for conflicts that may arise—either between members

of the commission or before the courts. We cannot say that

any subsection could be separated from IP 14 and presented

to voters as its own amendment without compromising the

purpose of IP 14.

Turning back to the first Lehman factor, we

acknowledge plaintiff’s argument that IP 14 would have

wide-ranging effects on the existing provisions of our con-

stitution if enacted, and that those provisions are not them-

selves closely related. For example, plaintiff argues that

the qualifications and disqualifications for commissioners

alone would implicitly affect the freedom of expression con-

tained in Article I, section 8; the privileges-and-immunities

clause of Article I, section 20; the freedom of assembly in

Article I, section 26; and the political-contribution provision

of Article II, section 8(2)(a). With regard to the function of

the commission and its insulation from the budgetary and

legislative power of the legislature, plaintiff argues that

616 Mason v. Griffin-Valade

IP 14 would make implicit changes to Article III, sections 1

and 2, and Article VI, sections 1 and 18.

While we doubt that the implicit effects of IP 14 are

quite as extensive as plaintiff fears, we readily acknowl-

edge that IP 14 may make many implicit changes to exist-

ing provisions of our constitution. Even still, we conclude

that IP 14 complies with the separate-vote requirement.

That is because, insofar as IP 14 makes those changes, they

are limited in scope. Except for the explicit replacement of

Article IV, sections 6 and 7, IP 14 does not render other pro-

visions wholly inoperable. Instead, its implicit changes are

limited to those necessary to effectuate the “scheme at the

measure’s heart”—the creation of a nonpartisan redistrict-

ing commission. As was the case in Rogers, such implicit

changes are “necessary corollaries” to the creation and

function of that commission as intended.

In the end, we have a limited role to play in how

Oregonians employ the initiative process for their own

self-governance, asking only whether Oregonians are able

to cast one vote for each constitutional change proposed.

In keeping with the analysis in Rogers and LINT, we are

unable to conceptualize a way in which IP 14 could be subdi-

vided and presented to voters in separate proposals without

undermining the very function and goal of IP 14. As such,

we conclude that the multiple substantive changes that

it makes are “closely related” and, thus, comply with the

separate-vote requirement. Accordingly, we conclude that

the trial court erred in granting in part plaintiff’s motion

for summary judgment and denying defendant’s motion for

summary judgment, and we reverse and remand for entry of

judgment consistent with our decision.

Reversed and remanded on appeal; cross-appeal

dismissed as moot.