The opinion
FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
18-MAR-2024
07:56 AM
Dkt. 156 OP
IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
---o0o---
MAUNALUA BAY BEACH OHANA 28, a Hawai#i Non-Profit Corporation;
MAUNALUA BAY BEACH OHANA 29, a Hawai#i Non-Profit Corporation;
and MAUNALUA BAY BEACH OHANA 38, a Hawai#i Non-Profit
Corporation, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellee, v.
STATE OF HAWAI#I, Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant
NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(CIVIL NO. 1CC051000904)
MARCH 18, 2024
HIRAOKA, PRESIDING JUDGE, NAKASONE AND McCULLEN, JJ.
OPINION OF THE COURT BY HIRAOKA, J.
Maunalua Bay Beach Ohana 28, Maunalua Bay Beach
Ohana 29, and Maunalua Bay Beach Ohana 38 (the Beach Lot Owners)
own thin strips of beach in the Portlock area of east O#ahu (the
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Beach Lots).1 They sued the State of Hawai#i. They sought a
declaration that the State, by enacting 2003 Haw. Sess. Laws Act
73, took existing and future accreted land2 without paying just
compensation. The circuit court agreed, but let the State take
an interlocutory appeal. We held that "Act 73 effectuated a
permanent taking of" ownership rights in accreted land existing
and unregistered as of Act 73's effective date. Maunalua Bay
Beach Ohana 28 v. State, 122 Hawai#i 34, 57, 222 P.3d 441, 464
(App. 2009), cert. rejected, No. 28175, 2010 WL 2329366 (Haw.
June 9, 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1005, 131 S. Ct. 529, 178
L. Ed. 2d 374 (2010). We remanded for the circuit court to
decide whether Beach Lot Owners owned land that had accreted
before Act 73's effective date and, if so, to determine just
compensation for the taking. Id.
On remand, the parties stipulated that the Beach Lots
included land that accreted before Act 73 took effect (the
Accreted Land). The circuit court held a bench trial.3 It found
that just compensation was $0. It also granted the State's
motion for costs and denied Beach Lot Owners' motion for
attorneys fees. Beach Lot Owners appeal from the resulting Final
Judgment. We hold: (1) the law of the case doctrine did not
1
According to the parties' stipulated facts, Beach Lot Owners are
Hawai#i non-profit corporations "established by homeowners in the Portlock
area for the specific and sole purpose of owning" the Beach Lots.
2
"Accreted land" is land formed by gradual accumulation on a beach
or shore along the ocean by the action of natural forces. See Hawaii Revised
Statutes (HRS) § 171-1 (Supp. 2003).
3
The Honorable Virginia Lea Crandall presided.
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prevent the circuit court from considering a change in the
controlling legislation enacted after we decided Maunalua Bay;
(2) the circuit court's finding that just compensation was $0 was
not clearly erroneous; (3) Beach Lot Owners were not entitled to
nominal damages; (4) Beach Lot Owners were not entitled to
attorneys fees; (5) the circuit court did not abuse its
discretion by denying certification of a damages class; and
(6) the circuit court's determination that the State was the
prevailing party is not material to the issues presented by this
appeal, and moot. We affirm the Final Judgment.
I. BACKGROUND4
The Estate of Bernice Pauahi Bishop (Bishop Estate)
owned the land in the Portlock area of east O#ahu. In the 1930s
Bishop Estate subdivided the land into Home Lots. It kept the
fee interest and leased the Home Lots. Many of the Home Lots
were near the beach, but Bishop Estate never leased the Beach
Lots — long, narrow strips of beach between the Home Lots and the
ocean.
Bishop Estate never restricted the Beach Lots for
exclusive use by lessees of Home Lots bordering the Beach Lots.
In the 1990s Bishop Estate sold the fee interests in the Home
Lots to their lessees, but continued to own the Beach Lots.
4
Some of the background comes from the parties' stipulated facts
and from the circuit court's unchallenged findings of fact. See Okada
Trucking Co. v. Bd. of Water Supply, 97 Hawai#i 450, 459, 40 P.3d 73, 82
(2002) (noting that unchallenged factual findings are deemed to be binding on
appeal).
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Bishop Estate never restricted the Beach Lots for exclusive use
of owners of Home Lots bordering the Beach Lots.
Before May 20, 2003, Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS)
§ 171-2 provided:
Definition of public lands. "Public lands" means all lands
or interest therein in the State classed as government or
crown lands previous to August 15, 1895, or acquired or
reserved by the government upon or subsequent to that date
by purchase, exchange, escheat, or the exercise of the right
of eminent domain, or in any other manner; including
submerged lands, and lands beneath tidal waters which are
suitable for reclamation, together with reclaimed lands
which have been given the status of public lands under this
chapter, [subject to exceptions not at issue in this case.]
HRS § 171-2 (Supp. 2002).
Act 73 amended HRS § 171-2 by adding "accreted lands
not otherwise awarded" to the definition of "public lands." 2003
Haw. Sess. Laws Act 73, § 2 at 128. It took effect on May 20,
2003. Id., § 8 at 130. It effectively made any land accreted to
the Beach Lots after May 20, 2003, public land not owned by
Bishop Estate.5
On May 6, 2005, Bishop Estate sold the Beach Lots to
Beach Lot Owners for $3,000. Each Beach Lot owner paid $1,000
for its lot. The deeds had a "restriction limiting the use of
the parcels for non-residential use only." They also had
restrictive covenants running with the land. The covenants
require that the Beach Lots be "used by the public for access,
customary beach activities and related recreational and community
purposes . . . in perpetuity[.]"
5
Act 73 also restricted the ability of private landowners to
register accreted land in land court, 2003 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 73, § 4 at 129,
and to quiet title to accreted land, id., § 5 at 129.
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Two weeks after buying the Beach Lots, Beach Lot Owners
sued the State for inverse condemnation. They sought a
declaration that Act 73 took the Accreted Land, an injunction
against enforcement of Act 73 without payment of just
compensation, and payment of just compensation. The circuit
court certified a plaintiff class "consisting of all non-
governmental owners of oceanfront real property in the State of
Hawai#i on and/or after May 19, 2003."
The circuit court granted Beach Lot Owners' motion for
partial summary judgment, declaring that Act 73 "effected an
uncompensated taking of, and injury to, [Beach Lot Owners']
accreted land[.]"6 Maunalua Bay, 122 Hawai#i at 36, 222 P.3d
at 443. The State took an interlocutory appeal. We held that
Act 73 "effectuated a permanent taking of" accretions existing
and unregistered as of Act 73's effective date. Id. at 57, 222
P.3d at 464. But we also held that Beach Lot Owners "and the
class they represented had no vested property rights to future
accretions to their oceanfront land and, therefore, Act 73 did
not effect an uncompensated taking of future accretions[.]" Id.
We remanded for the circuit court to decide whether Beach Lot
Owners owned land that had accreted before Act 73's effective
date and, if so, to determine just compensation for the taking.
Id.
On remand, Beach Lot Owners moved to certify a damages
class of "[a]ll private owners of oceanfront property in the
6
The Honorable Eden Elizabeth Hifo presided.
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State of Hawai#i who, as of May 19, 2003, owned accreted land[.]"
The circuit court denied class certification. The parties
stipulated that Beach Lot Owners owned land that accreted before
Act 73 took effect, and that "[j]ust compensation, if any, shall
be based on the fair rental value of the accreted land as of
[Act 73's effective date], but taking into account restrictions
on [Beach Lot Owners'] use of the property, if appropriate."
The circuit court held a bench trial to determine just
compensation. It found that just compensation was $0. It
granted the State's motion for costs, denied Beach Lot Owners'
motion for attorneys fees, and entered the Final Judgment for the
State and against Beach Lot Owners.7 Beach Lot Owners appealed.8
Beach Lot Owners contend that the circuit court erred
by: (1) concluding that no permanent taking occurred; (2) not
awarding damages; (3) not awarding nominal damages; (4) denying
their motion for attorneys fees; (5) denying their motion to
certify a damages class; and (6) determining that the State was
the prevailing party.
7
The Honorable James C. McWhinnie entered the orders on costs and
attorneys fees and the Final Judgment.
8
The State cross-appealed but the cross-appeal is moot because we
affirm the Final Judgment. See Leone v. County of Maui, 141 Hawai#i 68, 89,
404 P.3d 1257, 1278 (2017) (concluding that cross-appeal was moot because
circuit court's judgment was affirmed).
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II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
We review findings of fact under the clearly erroneous
standard. Est. of Klink ex rel. Klink v. State, 113 Hawai#i 332,
351, 152 P.3d 504, 523 (2007). A finding of fact is clearly
erroneous when the record lacks substantial evidence to support
the finding or when, despite substantial evidence to support the
finding, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made. Id. "Substantial evidence" is "credible
evidence which is of sufficient quality and probative value to
enable a person of reasonable caution to support a conclusion."
Id. (citations omitted).
We review conclusions of law de novo under the
right/wrong standard. Klink, 113 Hawai#i at 351, 152 P.3d at
523. But a conclusion of law presenting mixed questions of fact
and law is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard because
the court's conclusion depends on the facts and circumstances of
the individual case. Id. A conclusion of law supported by the
trial court's findings of fact and applying the correct rule of
law will not be overturned. Id.
B. Attorneys Fees Under the Private Attorney
General Doctrine
We review a denial of attorneys fees under the private
attorney general doctrine de novo under the right/wrong standard.
Pub. Access Trails Haw. v. Haleakala Ranch Co., 153 Hawai#i 1,
21, 526 P.3d 526, 546 (2023).
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C. Class Certification
We review the denial of class certification for abuse
of discretion. Gurrobat v. HTH Corp., 133 Hawai#i 1, 14, 323
P.3d 792, 805 (2014).
D. Prevailing Party Determination
We review a trial court's determination of who is the
prevailing party de novo under the right/wrong standard. Molinar
v. Schweizer, 95 Hawai#i 331, 334–35, 22 P.3d 978, 981–82 (2001).
III. DISCUSSION
A. The circuit court did not err by concluding,
given Act 56 (2012), that Act 73 effected a
temporary taking.
Beach Lot Owners argue that the circuit court "erred in
disregarding the law of the case . . . and concluding that there
was no taking" of the Accreted Land. The argument fails for two
reasons.
First, the circuit court did not conclude there was no
taking; had it done so, it would not have had to try the claim
for just compensation. Beach Lot Owners cite to the circuit
court's conclusions that Act 73 did not effect a regulatory
taking under various tests commonly called Loretto, Lucas, and
Penn Central. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528,
538–39, 125 S. Ct. 2074, 161 L. Ed. 2d 876 (2005); see also Leone
v. County of Maui, 141 Hawai#i 68, 81, 404 P.3d 1257, 1270 (2017)
(summarizing law on regulatory takings). But the circuit court
also concluded:
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11. In addition to reaffirming its conclusion that
Act 73 effected a temporary taking of [Beach Lot Owners']
accreted lands, this Court further concludes that, by
repealing portions of Act 73, Act 56 ended the taking of
accreted lands, effective April 23, 2012. In other words,
the State effected a temporary taking of [Beach Lot Owners']
accreted lands from May 20, 2003 to April 23, 2012.
(Emphasis added.) The conclusion was not wrong. And it follows
Beach Lot Owners' argument (in its opening brief) that Act 56
"merely limited the taking to a period of nine years."
Second, the circuit court did not violate the law of
the case. Under the law of the case doctrine, "a determination
of a question of law made by an appellate court in the course of
an action becomes the law of the case and may not be disputed by
a reopening of the question at a later stage of the litigation."
Hussey v. Say, 139 Hawai#i 181, 185, 384 P.3d 1282, 1286 (2016)
(citation omitted). On December 30, 2009, we held that Act 73
"effectuated a permanent taking of" accretions existing and
unregistered as of Act 73's effective date. Maunalua Bay, 122
Hawai#i at 57, 222 P.3d at 464 (emphasis added). Three years
later, Act 56 of the 2012 legislature changed the law by
terminating the taking effectuated by Act 73. Act 56 further
amended the definition of "public lands" in HRS § 171-2. 2012
Haw. Sess. Laws Act 56, § 1 at 122. Under Act 56, only land that
accreted after the effective date of Act 76 were public lands.
Id. Act 56 took effect on April 23, 2012. Id. § 5 at 123.
Act 56 thus limited the effect Act 73 had on Beach Lot Owners to
the period from May 20, 2003 (the effective date of Act 73) to
April 23, 2012.
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[A] governmental body may acquiesce in a judicial
declaration that one of its ordinances has effected an
unconstitutional taking of property; the landowner has no
right under the Just Compensation Clause [of the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution] to insist that
a "temporary" taking be deemed a permanent taking.
First Eng. Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles
County, 482 U.S. 304, 317, 107 S. Ct. 2378, 96 L. Ed. 2d 250
(1987). Under some circumstances, a change in controlling law
could support relief under Hawai#i Rules of Civil Procedure
(HRCP) Rule 60(b)(6). See Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 531,
125 S. Ct. 2641, 162 L. Ed 2d 480 (2005) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(b)(6)). Instead, Beach Lot Owners stipulated that the circuit
court would decide "whether Act 73 effected and Act 56 ended a
temporary taking of any accreted lands from May 19, 2003, to
April 23, 2012 (or any part of that time) and if so the amount of
just compensation, if any, that is due to [Beach Lot Owners] for
the taking." (Emphasis added.) The law of the case doctrine did
not prevent the circuit court from considering the change in the
controlling law, particularly given Beach Lot Owners'
stipulation.
B. The circuit court's finding that just
compensation to Beach Lot Owners was $0 was
not clearly erroneous.
Beach Lot Owners argue that "depriving [them] of ocean-
front property in Maunalua Bay for 9 years cannot possibly be
valued at $0." The parties stipulated that "[j]ust compensation,
if any, shall be based on the fair rental value of the accreted
land as of May 19, 2003, but taking into account restrictions on
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plaintiffs' use of the property, if appropriate." The
restrictions included limiting the Beach Lots to non-residential
use and requiring that they be open to the public for access,
customary beach activities, and related recreational and
community purposes, in perpetuity.
Beach Lot Owners argue that their "[o]wnership of the
[Beach Lots] was expected to enhance the value of the adjoining
[Home Lots] and protect the solitude, peace, and quiet the owners
enjoyed. The purchase was made to protect the investments made
in their existing lots." (Citations to the record omitted.)
Beach Lot Owners do not own any Home Lots. Beach Lot Owners
conflate their entitlement to just compensation with the
interests of owners of the Home Lots, who are not parties to this
case.
Beach Lot Owners' evidence of fair rental value was
based on the testimony of Stephany Sofos. The circuit court "did
not find Ms. Sofos to be a credible witness" and gave "no weight
to her testimony." "It is well-settled that an appellate court
will not pass upon issues dependent upon the credibility of
witnesses and the weight of evidence; this is the province of the
trier of fact." Fisher v. Fisher, 111 Hawai#i 41, 46, 137 P.3d
355, 360 (2006) (citation omitted).
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The circuit court instead credited the testimony of
Craig Leong, a licensed real estate appraiser who holds the MAI
designation.9 The circuit court found:
108. Mr. Leong based his conclusion on highest-and-
best use on, among other things, the irregular shapes and
narrow widths of the parcels; limited access; conservation-
district regulations; the restrictive covenants in the KS
deeds to plaintiffs; the State's non-interference with
plaintiffs use; the lack of any history of financial gain
from the makai land, and the fact that [Bishop Estate] sold
the three beach reserve lots for $1,000 each. The Court
finds that Mr. Leong's analysis is credible.
109. The Court agrees with Mr. Leong's conclusion:
"Given the highly irregular, and narrow property
characteristics of the accreted land, and after
consideration of the restricted street access to the subject
property, and perhaps, more importantly, as both government
and private land use regulations and covenants restrict the
legally permissible use of the accreted land area to public
access, customary beach activities, and related recreational
and community purposes, the appraiser concludes that no
known market buyer exists for the subject accreted land."
110. Mr. Leong concludes that there was a $0 market
rent attributable to the land with a retrospective date of
2003.
111. The Court finds Mr. Leong's ultimate conclusion
of value to be credible, logical, and well founded. The
Court finds that the fair market rent as of May 2003 was $0.
(Citations to the record omitted.)
Beach Lot Owners' statement of the points of error
challenges these findings, but their opening brief presents no
argument about why they were clearly erroneous. See Hawai#i
Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 28(b)(7) ("Points not argued
may be deemed waived."). At any rate, the findings are supported
9
MAI means Member, Appraisal Institute. "The Appraisal Institute
is a global professional association with over 16,000 professionals in almost
50 countries throughout the world." See Appraisal Institute,
https://www.appraisalinstitute.org/about [https://perma.cc/L27X-7E3E] (last
visited Mar. 8, 2024).
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by substantial evidence in the record, and were not clearly
erroneous.
The circuit court concluded:
69. For all of the reasons set forth in the findings
of fact, including the credible testimony of Mr. Leong, the
Court finds that the fair market rent for the [Accreted
Land] on May 19, 2003 was $0.
This conclusion of law was actually a finding of fact.10 It was
supported by substantial evidence in the record, and was not
clearly erroneous.
C. Beach Lot Owners were not entitled to nominal
damages.
Beach Lot Owners argue that "the lower court should
have awarded $1 nominal damages to each Appellant." "[N]ominal
damages are a small and trivial sum awarded for a technical
injury due to a violation of some legal right and as a
consequence of which some damages must be awarded to determine
the right." Kanahele v. Han, 125 Hawai#i 446, 457–58, 263 P.3d
726, 737–38 (2011) (cleaned up).
"A takings claim seeks compensation for something the
government is entitled to do; a taking is not a legal injury, but
rather an entitlement to just compensation." DW Aina Le#a Dev.,
LLC v. State Land Use Comm'n, 148 Hawai#i 396, 404, 477 P.3d 836,
844 (2020) (citations omitted). The circuit court found that
10
The label of a finding of fact or a conclusion of law does not
determine the standard of review because the accuracy of the label affixed by
the trial court is freely reviewable by an appellate court. Cf. Kilauea
Neighborhood Ass'n v. Land Use Comm'n, 7 Haw. App. 227, 229, 751 P.2d 1031,
1034 (1988) (concerning an administrative agency's findings and conclusions).
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just compensation for Act 73's temporary taking of the Accreted
Land was $0. Beach Lot Owners did not sustain a "technical
injury due to a violation of some legal right[.]" Kanahele, 125
Hawai#i at 457–58, 263 P.3d at 737–38. They were not entitled to
nominal damages.
D. Beach Lot Owners were not entitled to
attorneys fees under the private attorney
general doctrine.
Beach Lot Owners sought attorneys fees under the
equitable doctrine of private attorney general. The doctrine is
an exception to the "American Rule" that each party must pay
their own litigation expenses. Pub. Access Trails Haw., 153
Hawai#i at 22, 526 P.3d at 547.
(1) The claim is barred by sovereign immunity under
the circumstances of this case. The State argues that sovereign
immunity bars an award of attorneys fees. The only claim on
which Beach Lot Owners prevailed was for a declaration that
Act 73 was an uncompensated taking of unregistered land that had
accreted between the effective dates of Act 73 (May 20, 2003) and
Act 56 (April 23, 2012). When a party seeks declaratory relief
against the State,
the ability to sue the state does not stem from a waiver of
sovereign immunity, but from the fact that sovereign
immunity does not bar the suit in the first place.
Therefore, no clear statutory waiver that could be extended
to attorney's fees is present when the underlying claim is
for declaratory and/or injunctive relief.
Nelson v. Hawaiian Homes Comm'n, 130 Hawai#i 162, 170, 307 P.3d
142, 150 (2013) (emphasis added) (cleaned up) (quoting Sierra
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Club v. Haw. Dep't of Transp., 120 Hawai#i 181, 229 n.30, 202
P.3d 1226, 1274 n.30 (2009)); see also Gold Coast Neighborhood
Ass'n v. State, 140 Hawai#i 437, 466-67, 403 P.3d 214, 243-44
(2017) (denying claim for attorneys fees against State under
private attorney general doctrine where plaintiff sought
declaratory relief over State's responsibility to maintain
seawall); Kaleikini v. Yoshioka, 129 Hawai#i 454, 468, 304 P.3d
252, 266 (2013) (disallowing claim for attorneys fees against
State under private attorney general doctrine because statutory
provision allowing declaratory or injunctive relief is not a
waiver of the State's sovereign immunity, but an exception to
sovereign immunity doctrine for which no waiver is necessary).
Beach Lot Owners cite Sierra Club, but attorneys fees
were awarded in that case because Sierra Club's claim was brought
under HRS § 343-7, which waived the State's sovereign immunity
against suits over environmental assessments and environmental
impact statements. Id. at 228, 202 P.3d at 1273. Beach Lot
Owners did not seek relief under HRS § 343-7.
Beach Lot Owners also cite HRS § 661-5, the statute of
limitations for claims against the State under HRS Chapter 661.
See Maunalua Bay, 122 Hawai#i at 51 n.12, 222 P.3d at 458 n.12.
HRS § 661-1 waives sovereign immunity for claims against the
State under article I, section 20 of the Hawai#i Constitution,
which states: "Private property shall not be taken or damaged for
public use without just compensation." A claim under Haw. Const.
art. I, § 20 seeks compensation for something the government has
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the right to do. DW Aina Le#a Dev., LLC, 148 Hawai#i at 404, 477
P.3d at 844. The circuit court found that just compensation for
Act 73's temporary taking of the Accreted Land was $0. The only
claim on which Beach Lot Owners prevailed (partially) was one for
declaratory relief. But their claim for attorneys fees against
the State for obtaining declaratory relief is barred by sovereign
immunity. Nelson, 130 Hawai#i at 170, 307 P.3d at 150.
(2) Beach Lot Owners did not satisfy the legal test.
Even if sovereign immunity had not barred Beach Lot Owners' claim
for attorneys fees, they did not satisfy the legal test. Courts
consider three factors to determine whether the private attorney
general doctrine applies:
(1) the strength or societal importance of the public
policy vindicated by the litigation,
(2) the necessity for private enforcement and the
magnitude of the resultant burden on the plaintiff,
and
(3) the number of people standing to benefit from the
decision.
Pub. Access Trails Haw., 153 Hawai#i at 22, 526 P.3d at 547
(cleaned up) (reformatted).
(a) A case vindicates public policy of strong or
societal importance when "all of the citizens of the state,
present and future, [stand] to benefit from the decision." In re
Water Use Permit Applications, 96 Hawai#i 27, 31, 25 P.3d 802,
806 (2001). The circuit court certified a plaintiff class for
its declaratory ruling, but the record isn't clear about how many
people the plaintiff class actually encompasses. Or whether
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there are actually any class members other than the Beach Lot
Owners.
Land in Portlock was awarded to Princess Victoria
Kamāmalu11 as Land Commission Award 7713, #Āpana,12 and passed from
her to Princess Bernice Pauahi Pākī Bishop (great-granddaughter
of Kamehameha I).13 Bishop's estate owned the land during the
twentieth century.14 Beach Lot Owners and the State disagreed
about the location of the shoreline boundary in the land
commission award, and whether or when any part of the Beach Lots
was awarded to Kamāmalu. The State stipulated on remand that
Beach Lot Owners owned the Beach Lots and the Accreted Land.
That stipulation binds us. But under Hawai#i common law the
boundary between private oceanfront property and public beach
property is marked by "the debris line or vegetation line,
whichever is furthest mauka [(inland).]" Diamond v. Dobbin, 132
Hawai#i 9, 31, 319 P.3d 1017, 1039 (2014) (citation omitted).
That is so "notwithstanding that the deed for the oceanfront
property describes the property by 'certain distances and
11
See Victoria Kamāmalu, Hawai#i Dept. of Acct. and Gen. Servs.,
https://ags.hawaii.gov/archives/online-exhibitions/centennial-
exhibit/victoria-kamamalu [https://perma.cc/5FAU-WZYX] (last visited Mar. 11,
2024).
12
"#Āpana" is defined as a "[p]iece, slice, portion, fragment,
section, segment, installment, part, land parcel, lot, district, sector, ward,
precinct[.]" Makila Land Co. v. Kapu, 152 Hawai#i 112, 115 n.5, 522 P.3d 259,
262 n.5 (2022).
13
See About Pauahi, Kamehameha Schools,
https://www.ksbe.edu/about-us/about-pauahi [https://perma.cc/3QMP-V8KT] (last
visited Mar. 11, 2024).
14
See First Amended and Supplemental Stipulation of Facts at ¶18,
Maunalua Bay Beach Ohana 28 v. State, Judiciary Information Management System,
(No. 185 Civ. 1CC051000904).
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azimuths' that put the seaward boundary of the property below the
high-water mark[.]" Maunalua Bay, 122 Hawai#i at 46, 222 P.3d
at 453. Ordinarily, an owner of beachfront property would not
own land makai (seaward) of the debris or vegetation line
(whichever is further mauka), no matter what the deed's property
description states. If land accretes to property makai of that
line, the beachfront property owner would not own the accreted
land. Of the class certification, we noted:
While certification of a class for purposes of determining
generically whether Act 73 effectuated a taking of littoral
owners' future accretions might have been appropriate, we
have questions about whether the class certification was
proper for determining whether Act 73 effectuated a taking
of those accretions existing as of the effective date of
Act 73, since each littoral owner's factual situation
regarding existing accretions would be different and not
conducive to class adjudication.
Id. at 55-56, 222 P.3d at 462-63.
At any rate, Beach Lot Owners vindicated private, not
public, interests — those of people (if any) who owned property
makai of the highest reach of the highest wash of the waves, to
which unregistered land accreted between May 20, 2003 and April
23, 2012. The class comprises far less than "all of the citizens
of the state, present and future[.]" The public interest calls
for the beaches of Hawai#i to be available for use by all
citizens of the state, present and future, not just to a few
private beach owners. See Application of Ashford, 50 Haw. 314,
315, 440 P.2d 76, 77 (1968) (holding that the seaward boundary of
private property "is along the upper reaches of the wash of
waves, usually evidenced by the edge of vegetation or by the line
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of debris left by the wash of waves"); County of Hawaii v.
Sotomura, 55 Haw. 176, 181–82, 517 P.2d 57, 61–62 (1973) (noting
that "[t]he Ashford decision was a judicial recognition of long-
standing public use of Hawaii's beaches to an easily recognizable
boundary that has ripened into a customary right. Public policy,
as interpreted by this court, favors extending to public use and
ownership as much of Hawaii's shoreline as is reasonably
possible." (citation omitted)). The first factor for application
of the private attorney general doctrine was not satisfied.
(b) The second factor involves "the necessity for
private enforcement and the magnitude of the resultant burden on
the plaintiff[.]" Pub. Access Trails Haw., 153 Hawai#i at 22,
526 P.3d at 547. The supreme court has explained:
In the complex society in which we live it frequently occurs
that citizens in great numbers and across a broad spectrum
have interests in common. These, while of enormous
significance to the society as a whole, do not involve the
fortunes of a single individual to the extent necessary to
encourage their private vindication in the courts.
In re Water Use Permit Applications, 96 Hawai#i at 30, 25 P.3d
at 805 (citation omitted). Beach Lot Owners argue that "the
costs of litigating for more than a dozen years against the vast
resources of the State of Hawai#i dwarfs the potential recovery
of any individual non-governmental beachfront property owner."
But Beach Lot Owners sought compensation of more than $6 million
— $695,467.77 for the year beginning May 19, 2003 (based on
Sofos' opinion of fair rental value), going up two percent each
year for eight years, plus interest. This obviously is not a
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case where no single person would have an incentive to sue the
State for compensation under Act 73. The second factor was not
satisfied.
(c) The third factor is "the number of people standing
to benefit from the decision." Pub. Access Trails Haw., 153
Hawai#i at 22, 526 P.3d at 547. The number of people who would
actually qualify as members of the plaintiff declaratory class is
not shown, or even approximated, in the record. We question
whether such a plaintiff class could legally exist, in light of
Ashford and Sotomura. See Maunalua Bay, 122 Hawai#i at 46, 222
P.3d at 453. Beach Lot Owners' declaratory judgment did not
benefit "all of the citizens of the state, present and future[.]"
In re Water Use Permit Applications, 96 Hawai#i at 31, 25 P.3d
at 806. The third factor was not satisfied.
E. The circuit court did not abuse its
discretion by denying certification of a
damages class.
Beach Lot Owners sought certification of a damages
class under HRCP Rule 23(b)(2), (3). The rule provides:
(b) Class actions maintainable. An action may be
maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of
subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
. . . .
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or
refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class,
thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or
corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class
as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or
fact common to the members of the class predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members, and that a
class action is superior to other available methods for the
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The
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matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest
of members of the class in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent
and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy
already commenced by or against members of the class;
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the
litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the
difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a
class action.
(Emphasis added.)
Beach Lot Owners sought to certify a damages class
consisting of:
All private owners of oceanfront property in the State of
Hawai#i who, as of May 19, 2003, owned accreted land that
had not previously been recorded or registered and that was
not, on that date, the subject of a then-pending
registration or quiet title proceeding.
(Emphasis added.) Beach Lot Owners acquired the Beach Lots on
May 6, 2005. They were not members of the class they sought to
certify. For this reason alone, the circuit court did not abuse
its discretion in denying class certification.
A prerequisite under HRCP Rule 23(b)(2) "is that final
injunctive or declaratory relief must be requested against the
party opposing the class." 7AA Charles Alan Wright & Arthur
R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1775 (3d. ed. updated
Apr. 2023). A claim for money damages does not qualify for class
certification under HRCP Rule 23(b)(2). Id. Nor does a claim
for just compensation, which is not a claim for injunctive or
declaratory relief.
Members of an HRCP Rule 23(b)(3) class must be notified
of their option to be excluded from the class. HRCP
Rule 23(c)(2). The circuit court ruled:
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Second, Rule 23(b)(3), unlike Rule 23(b)(2), requires
notice to the class members and an opportunity to opt out.
Thus, the members of a Rule 23(b)(3) class must be
ascertainable. The proposed class here is not readily
ascertainable. [Beach Lot Owners'] proposal to use tax map
data and recorded documents with the Land Court and Bureau
of Conveyances will be difficult to access and will not
account for resolutions of disputes in ownership. Marcus v.
BMW of North America, LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 591 (3rd Cir. 2012)
("If class members are impossible to identify without
extensive and individualized fact-finding or 'mini-trials,'
then a class action is inappropriate.").
Third, land is unique and there will be individualized
issues as to the claim for compensation and the right of the
State to raise individual challenges and defenses to the
claims. [Beach Lot Owners] proposal to determine damages
based on regional groupings does not take into consideration
variations in individual properties.
Fourth, [Beach Lot Owners] presented a method to
determine the area of accreted land on the islands of
[Kaua#i], [O#ahu] and Maui, but there is no method presented
to determine the area of accreted land on the islands of
Hawai#i, [Moloka#i], [Lāna#i], and [Ni#ihau]. The proposed
class is for all private owners of oceanfront property in
the State of Hawai#i, but the studies suggested by the
[Beach Lot Owners] to be used to determine the accreted land
do not include the entire state.
Fifth, Dr. Charles Fletcher, the lead author of the
shoreline change study that [Beach Lot Owners] propose to
use to determine the area of accreted land, stated in his
declaration that the material is not suitable for the use
proposed by [Beach Lot Owners].
Under these circumstances, we cannot say the circuit
court abused its discretion by denying certification of a damages
class.
F. The circuit court's conclusion that the State
was the prevailing party is not material to
the issues presented by this appeal.
The circuit court ruled that the State was the
prevailing party in the action below. The ruling let the State
move for costs under HRCP Rule 54(d)(1). But the State's motion
for costs was also based on the State having served an HRCP
Rule 68 offer of settlement for $5,000, to which Beach Lot Owners
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did not respond. Beach Lot Owners recovered no compensation.
Under HRCP Rule 68, Beach Lot Owners "must pay the costs incurred
after the making of the offer" of settlement. The State was
entitled to costs under HRCP Rule 68 whether or not it was the
prevailing party. Beach Lot Owners make no other argument about
why the circuit court's ruling that the State was the prevailing
party is material to this appeal. We need not decide the issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we hold: (1) the law of the case
doctrine did not prevent the circuit court from considering a
change in the controlling legislation enacted after we decided
Maunalua Bay; (2) the circuit court's finding that just
compensation was $0 was not clearly erroneous; (3) Beach Lot
Owners were not entitled to nominal damages; (4) Beach Lot Owners
were not entitled to attorneys fees; (5) the circuit court did
not abuse its discretion by denying certification of a damages
class; and (6) the circuit court's determination that the State
was the prevailing party is moot. We affirm the circuit court's
Final Judgment entered on October 2, 2019.
On the briefs: /s/ Keith K. Hiraoka
Presiding Judge
Paul Alston,
Claire Wong Black, /s/ Karen T. Nakasone
for Plaintiffs-Appellants/ Associate Judge
Cross-Appellees.
/s/ Sonja M.P. McCullen
David D. Day, Associate Judge
William J. Wynhoff,
Deputy Attorneys General,
State of Hawai#i,
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for Defendant-Appellee/
Cross-Appellant.
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