Opinion

Wade Alford v. United States Postal Service

Court: Merit Systems Protection Board
Filed: Mar 14, 2024
Status: Unpublished
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 15.6%

The opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

WADE ALFORD, DOCKET NUMBER

Appellant, DE-0752-20-0208-I-2

DE-0752-21-0103-I-1

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, DATE: March 14, 2024

Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Wade Alford , Casa Grande, Arizona, pro se.

Samuel J. Schmidt , Esquire, Sandy, Utah, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman

Raymond A. Limon, Member

FINAL ORDER

The agency has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which

reversed the appellant’s removals and granted in part and denied in part the

appellant’s request for corrective action. For the reasons discussed below, we

GRANT the agency’s petition for review and DENY the appellant’s cross petition

for review. We REVERSE the administrative judge’s findings that the appellant

proved his affirmative defenses of whistleblower reprisal and race discrimination,

A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).

AFFIRM as MODIFIED the administrative judge’s analysis of the appellant’s

claim of reprisal for equal employment opportunity (EEO) activity to account for

the standards announced in Pridgen v. Office of Management and Budget,

2022 MSPB 31 ¶¶ 20-22, 30, and AFFIRM the remainder of the initial decision

without modification, still REVERSING the appellant’s removals.

BACKGROUND

The agency removed the appellant, a preference eligible City Carrier,

effective April 4, 2020, based on the charge of “violation of the [agency]

standards of conduct: unacceptable behavior,” for his role in a December 12,

2019 workplace altercation with a coworker. Alford v. U.S. Postal Service,

MSPB Docket No. DE-0752-20-0208-I-1, Initial Appeal File (0208 IAF), Tab 9

at 78-81, 91-96, Tab 10 at 107. The appellant appealed his removal to the Board,

to which he argued, among other things, that his removal constituted race

discrimination and whistleblower reprisal. 0208 IAF, Tab 1, Tab 11, Tab 17

at 7-10. During the hearing, the administrative judge noted that due process

issues would likely result in a reversal of the removal. Alford v. U.S. Postal

Service, MSPB Docket No. DE-0752-20-0208-I-2, Appeal File (0208 I-2 AF),

Tab 29 (Hearing Transcript (HT 1) at 100-02) (colloquy of the administrative

judge). Subsequently, the agency filed evidence showing that it had rescinded the

decision notice. 0208 IAF, Tab 43 at 7. The administrative judge then dismissed

the appeal without prejudice, at the appellant’s request. 0208 IAF, Tab 49.

The agency designated a new deciding official and removed the appellant

for a second time, effective January 29, 2021, based on the original proposal

notice. Alford v. U.S. Postal Service, MSPB Docket No. DE-0752-21-0103-I-1,

Initial Appeal File (0103 IAF), Tab 9 at 9-13. The appellant filed a new appeal

based on the second removal, which the administrative judge joined with the

refiled appeal of the appellant’s first removal. 0103 IAF, Tabs 1, 14.

0208 I-2 AF, Tab 9. The administrative judge accepted for adjudication the

appellant’s affirmative defenses raised in his first removal as defenses to his

second removal, and further accepted new defenses the appellant asserted.

0208 I-2 AF, Tab 15 at 15-16, Tab 18.

After reconvening the hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial

decision reversing the appellant’s removals and granting in part, and denying in

part, the appellant’s request for corrective action. 0208 I-2 AF, Tab 48, Initial

Decision (ID). The administrative judge first found that the appeal of the first

removal was not moot because the appellant’s affirmative defenses from that

removal remained to be adjudicated. ID at 3-4. She then determined that the first

deciding official’s consideration of the appellant’s prior misconduct as an

aggravating penalty factor without prior notice to the appellant violated the

appellant’s due process rights. ID at 4-5. Thus, she found that the first removal

must be reversed. ID at 5. Next, the administrative judge found that the agency

failed to prove its charge in the second removal action. ID at 7-17. Finally, the

administrative judge concluded that the appellant proved his whistleblower

reprisal and race discrimination affirmative defenses for both removals, but failed

to prove any other affirmative defenses. ID at 17-25. Among other remedies, the

administrative judge ordered the agency to provide the appellant with interim

relief if either party filed a petition for review. ID at 26-28.

The agency filed a petition for review in which it argues, among other

things, that the administrative judge erred in finding that the appellant established

his race discrimination and whistleblower reprisal affirmative defenses. Petition

for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. The appellant filed a response and a cross petition

for review. PFR File, Tab 8. The agency replied to the appellant’s response to its

petition for review and responded to the appellant’s cross petition for review.

PFR File, Tabs 1213. The appellant also filed a petition for enforcement of the

administrative judge’s interim relief order, to which the agency responded. PFR

File, Tabs 2, 4, 11.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW

The agency has substantially complied with the interim relief order.

The Board will not entertain a petition for enforcement of an interim relief

order before a final decision is issued; rather, it will treat such a petition as a

motion to dismiss the agency’s petition for review. Johnson v. Department of

Veterans Affairs, 2023 MSPB 9, ¶ 7. Accordingly, we consider the appellant’s

petition for enforcement as a request to dismiss the agency’s petition for review.

With its petition for review, the agency submitted evidence that the

appellant remained on the agency payroll as a City Carrier, that it determined that

it would be unduly disruptive to return him to duty during the pendency of the

petition for review, that he was placed on administrative leave beginning June 4,

2022, and that it was processing his back pay for the period from May 19, the

date of the initial decision, to June 4, 2022. PFR File, Tab 1 at 30-36. The

agency filed additional evidence of its compliance efforts on review. PFR File,

Tab 11 at 10-28. The agency thus substantially complied with the interim relief

order and the appellant’s motion to dismiss the petition for review is denied. See

Bryant v. Department of the Army, 2022 MSPB 1, ¶ 7 (considering an agency’s

petition for review when the agency was in the process of providing interim relief

when it filed its petition for review).

We affirm the reversals of the agency’s removal actions.

We affirm the administrative judge’s reversal of the agency’s first removal

action for due process issues and reversal of the second removal action due to the

agency’s failure to prove its charge, discerning no reason to disturb the rationales

underlying those dispositions. ID at 4-5, 7-17, 25. Although the agency objects

to having been required by the administrative judge to prove the elements of a

threat charge set forth in Metz v. Department of the Treasury, 780 F.2d 1001,

1002 (Fed. Cir. 1986), it raises the objection for the first time on review and fails

to show that its objection is based on new and material evidence not previously

available despite its due diligence. Rather, because the record shows that the

agency waived its objection during the appeal, we decline to consider it. Clay v.

Department of the Army, 123 M.S.P.R. 245, ¶ 6 (2016); Zaborowski v.

Department of the Army, 34 M.S.P.R. 299, 301-02 (1987), aff’d, 852 F.2d 1293

(Fed. Cir. 1988) (Table); 0208 I-2 AF, Tab 32 at 6-9.

The appellant failed to prove his affirmative defense of race discrimination.

Since the initial decision was issued, the Board has clarified the standards

for proving disparate treatment discrimination. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964, as amended, requires that actions “shall be made free from any

discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-16(a); see Desjardin v. U.S. Postal Service, 2023 MSPB 6, ¶ 31;

Pridgen, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶ 20. To prove discrimination under Title VII, an

appellant must prove that prohibited discrimination was at least a motivating

factor in the agency’s action. Pridgen, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶ 21.

The appellant failed to prove that his race was a motivating factor in his

removal. The appellant, who is African American, argued that he was

discriminated against on the basis of race because the proposing official in both

of his removals and the deciding official in the first removal are Hispanic, while

his coworker, who also is Hispanic, was not disciplined. 0208 IAF, Tab 11

at 4-5.

The administrative judge noted the races of the agency officials involved in

removing the appellant. ID at 21-22. She then determined that, because the

record was silent regarding the difference in treatment between the appellant and

his coworker, whom the deciding official in the second removal action conceded

at the hearing had used abusive language during the altercation, she “must infer”

that the agency was motivated by racial discrimination in its decision to remove

the appellant but not discipline the coworker. ID at 22. The administrative judge

then found that the proposing and deciding officials ignored certain evidence

because they were “determined to find the appellant solely responsible” for the

altercation, and that because of the lack of credible evidence to support both

deciding officials’ decisions, the appellant established his race discrimination

affirmative defense. ID at 22-23.

The proposing official and both deciding officials testified that, based on

their reviews of the agency’s evidence, they viewed the appellant as the instigator

of, and aggressor in, the altercation, to the point of initiating physical contact.

HT 1 at 10-11, 19-24 (testimony of the first deciding official); 0208 I-2 AF,

Tab 27, Hearing Transcript 2 (HT 2) at 24-26 (testimony of the second deciding

official), 78-79 (testimony of the proposing official). The witness statements in

the agency investigation show no reason to doubt that those officials’

understandings of the altercation were genuine. 2 0208 IAF, Tab 10 at 98-105.

For employees to be deemed similarly situated for purposes of an

affirmative defense of discrimination based on disparate treatment, comparators

must have engaged in conduct similar to the appellant’s without differentiating or

mitigating circumstances. Hooper v. Department of Interior, 120 M.S.P.R. 658,

¶ 6 (2014). Here, the evidence available to the agency at the time of its decisions

showed differentiating circumstances between the conduct of the appellant and

his coworker. Thus, the two were not similarly situated. See Gregory v.

Department of the Army, 114 M.S.P.R. 607, ¶¶ 43-44 (2010) (finding that a

coworker was not similarly situated to an appellant because the coworker’s

misconduct was not sufficiently similar to the appellant’s). The appellant

presented no additional evidence, under the various methods of proof that the

Board set forth in Pridgen, to show that race was at least a motivating factor in

The administrative judge found that the proposing and deciding officials, being

“determined to find the appellant solely responsible” for the altercation, ignored written

statements of three witnesses purportedly indicating that they did not feel threatened or

fear working at the appellant’s post office. ID at 22-23. However, only one of those

three witnesses wrote in a statement that she was not afraid to work in the appellant’s

post office. 0208 IAF, Tab 10 at 100, 104-105. Another one of those witnesses wrote

that the appellant has anger issues and has had prior confrontations with several

employees. Id. at 104. On the other hand, more than one witness wrote that the

appellant’s actions aroused feelings of fear. Id. at 98, 103. The administrative judge’s

finding that the agency ignored evidence and her depiction of the purportedly ignored

evidence were thus erroneous.

the removal. Thus, although we agree with the administrative judge that the

agency failed to prove the charge, we also find that the appellant failed to

establish his race discrimination affirmative defense. Accordingly, we reverse

the administrative judge’s finding of race discrimination.

We modify the administrative judge’s analysis of the appellant’s EEO reprisal

affirmative defense to account for the standard articulated in Pridgen .

We also modify the administrative judge’s analysis of the appellant’s EEO

reprisal affirmative defense, to which she applied the test announced in Warren v.

Department of the Army, 804 F.2d 654, 656-58 (Fed. Cir. 1986) in finding that the

appellant failed to show that the deciding officials were “in anyway motivated to

retaliate against the appellant.” ID at 23. In Pridgen, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶ 30, we

stated that claims of retaliation for opposing discrimination in violation of

Title VII are analyzed under the same framework used for Title VII

discrimination claims discussed above. The application of the standards

articulated in Pridgen would not, however, require disturbing the administrative

judge’s conclusion that the appellant failed to prove his EEO reprisal affirmative

defense.

The appellant failed to prove his affirmative defense of whistleblower reprisal.

To prove whistleblower reprisal in a case involving an employee of the

U.S. Postal Service, an appellant must show: (1) a protected disclosure was

made; (2) the accused official knew of the disclosure; (3) the adverse action under

review could have been retaliation under the circumstances; and (4) there was a

genuine nexus between the alleged retaliation and the adverse action. See

Warren, 804 F.2d at 656-58; Mack v. U.S. Postal Service, 48 M.S.P.R. 617,

621-22 (1991). To establish a genuine nexus, an appellant must show that the

adverse action was taken because of his protected activity. Mattison v.

Department of Veterans Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 492, ¶ 8 (2016). This requires the

Board to weigh the severity of the appellant’s alleged misconduct against the

intensity of the agency’s motive to retaliate. Id.; see Warren, 804 F.2d at 658.

In concluding that the appellant met his burden under the Warren test, the

administrative judge found that there was direct evidence that the appellant’s

2011 Office of the Special Counsel (OSC) complaint played an “essential role” in

both decisions to remove the appellant. ID at 19. According to the

administrative judge, this evidence consisted of testimony in which the deciding

officials agreed with a note the proposing official wrote in support of the

proposed removal purportedly stating that the appellant’s statements in the

investigation of the altercation were less credible because he had made “false or

exaggerated” claims in his 2011 OSC complaint. ID at 19-20.

Upon review, we find that the administrative judge misinterpreted this

evidence. Looking at the text of the proposing official’s note, the reference to

“false or exaggerated” statements does not refer to the appellant’s allegations in

his OSC complaint, but rather to his allegation that management and his coworker

conspired to remove him due to past issues, possibly including his EEO activity,

OSC complaint, and union activity. 0208 IAF, Tab 9 at 103-04. Consistent with

this interpretation of the note, the proposing official testified that he did not know

anything about the appellant’s accusations in his 2011 OSC complaint, which was

“prior to [him].” HT 2 at 105 (testimony of the proposing official). Although

both deciding officials testified that they interpreted the “false or exaggerated”

language to refer to the appellant’s protected activity, namely his 2011 OSC

complaint, they also testified that they did not consider the proposing official’s

statements regarding the appellant’s credibility in deciding to remove the

appellant. HT 1 at 35-36, 92, 97 (testimony of the first deciding official); HT 2

at 48, 69 (testimony of the second deciding official). Nothing in the record

provides any basis to doubt the veracity of this testimony.

Returning to the Warren test, the appellant has not shown that he was

removed because of his OSC complaint—which was made over 8 years prior to

his proposed removal—precluding a finding of genuine nexus. See Carter v.

Small Business Administration, 61 M.S.P.R. 656, 668-69 (1994) (finding that the

passage of 10 years between an appellant’s EEO complaint and her proposed

removal supported a lack of genuine nexus); 0208 IAF, Tab 3 at 21, Tab 9 at 91.

Even if the proposing or deciding officials could be said to have had some

retaliatory motive due to any of the appellant’s protected activity, including the

2011 OSC complaint, there is no reason to believe that it outweighed the severity

of the appellant’s misconduct as depicted in the agency’s evidence as discussed,

or that the appellant was removed because of that protected activity. See Pyun v.

Social Security Administration, 111 M.S.P.R. 249, ¶ 14 (2009) (finding that there

was no genuine nexus when the inadequacy of the appellant’s performance

substantially outweighed the intensity of the agency’s motive to retaliate, of

which there was little evidence). We discern no evidence which would show that

the appellant otherwise established his whistleblower reprisal affirmative defense,

and we thus reverse the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant

established that defense. 3

We decline to consider the agency’s claim in its reply to the appellant’s response to its

petition for review that the administrative judge erred by not dismissing the case on

grounds of adjudicatory efficiency because the agency failed to raise the claim in its

petition for review. Lin v. Department of the Air Force, 2023 MSPB 2, ¶ 8 n.4;

5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(a)(4); PFR File, Tab 12 at 12. In any event, because the

appellant’s claims adjudicated in his appeal under the Uniformed Services Employment

and Reemployment Rights Act differed from those in the present appeal, dismissal on

adjudicatory efficiency grounds would be inappropriate. Alford v. U.S. Postal Service,

MSPB Docket No. DE-4324-20-0132-I-1, Initial Decision (Apr. 16, 2020). Next,

regarding the appellant’s claim in his cross petition for review that the administrative

judge erred in denying an exhibit he filed during the appeal and his motions to file

evidence and argument after the record closed, the administrative judge had wide

discretion to exclude irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence. We find

that she did not abuse this discretion in excluding the appellant’s hearing exhibit, which

was not material to the issues in this case. Dieter v. Department of Veterans Affairs,

2022 MSPB 32, ¶ 23; PFR File, Tab 8 at 28-29; 0208 I-2 AF, Tab 16 at 7-34. Further,

the administrative judge correctly denied the appellant’s motions to admit new evidence

or argument because the appellant failed to show that such new evidence or argument

was not readily available before the record closed or that it was in rebuttal to new

evidence or argument submitted by the agency just before the close of the record.

McClenning v. Department of the Army, 2022 MSPB 3, ¶ 19; 5 C.F.R. § 1201.59(a)-(c);

0208 I-2 AF, Tabs 43-47.

ORDER

We ORDER the agency to cancel both removal actions and restore the

appellant to his position effective April 4, 2020. See Kerr v. National Endowment

for the Arts, 726 F.2d 730 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The agency must complete this

action no later than 20 days after the date of this decision.

We also ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the correct amount of

back pay, interest on back pay, and other benefits under the Back Pay Act and/or

Postal Service Regulations, as appropriate, no later than 60 calendar days after

the date of this decision. We ORDER the appellant to cooperate in good faith in

the agency’s efforts to calculate the amount of back pay, interest, and benefits

due, and to provide all necessary information the agency requests to help it carry

out the Board’s Order. If there is a dispute about the amount of back pay, interest

due, and/or other benefits, we ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the

undisputed amount no later than 60 calendar days after the date of this decision.

We further ORDER the agency to tell the appellant promptly in writing

when it believes it has fully carried out the Board’s Order and of the actions it has

taken to carry out the Board’s Order. The appellant, if not notified, should ask

the agency about its progress. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.181(b).

No later than 30 days after the agency tells the appellant that it has fully

carried out the Board’s Order, the appellant may file a petition for enforcement

with the office that issued the initial decision in this appeal if the appellant

believes that the agency did not fully carry out the Board’s Order. The petition

should contain specific reasons why the appellant believes that the agency has not

fully carried out the Board’s Order, and should include the dates and results of

any communications with the agency. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.182(a).

For agencies whose payroll is administered by either the National Finance

Center of the Department of Agriculture (NFC) or the Defense Finance and

Accounting Service (DFAS), two lists of the information and documentation

necessary to process payments and adjustments resulting from a Board decision

are attached. The agency is ORDERED to timely provide DFAS or NFC with all

documentation necessary to process payments and adjustments resulting from the

Board’s decision in accordance with the attached lists so that payment can be

made within the 60-day period set forth above.

This is the final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board in this

appeal. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.

NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT

REGARDING YOUR RIGHT TO REQUEST

ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

You may be entitled to be paid by the agency for your reasonable attorney

fees and costs. To be paid, you must meet the requirements set out at Title 5 of

the United States Code (U.S.C.), sections 7701(g), 1221(g), or 1214(g). The

regulations may be found at 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.201, 1202.202, and 1201.203. If

you believe you meet these requirements, you must file a motion for attorney fees

and costs WITHIN 60 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS DECISION.

You must file your motion for attorney fees and costs with the office that issued

the initial decision on your appeal.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 4

You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By

statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such

review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).

Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit

Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most

appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a

statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their

jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should

Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated

the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the

Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.

immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all

filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time

limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.

Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review

below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions

about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you

should contact that forum for more information.

(1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking

judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court

within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.

§ 7703(b)(1)(A).

If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the

following address:

U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20439

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that

any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of

discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you

were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action

was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain

judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination

claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you

receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems

Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file

with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative

receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on

race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be

entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any

requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.

Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective

websites, which can be accessed through the link below:

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .

Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding

all other issues . 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the

EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive

this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file

with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives

this decision.

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the

address of the EEOC is:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, D.C. 20013

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or

by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

131 M Street, N.E.

Suite 5SW12G

Washington, D.C. 20507

(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection

Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised

claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).

If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in

section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)

(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either

with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of

competent jurisdiction. 5 The court of appeals must receive your petition for

review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.

§ 7703(b)(1)(B).

The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain

whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on

December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on

July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of

MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.

The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,

132 Stat. 1510.

If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for

the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the