State v. Clara

2024 UT 10

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

Appellant,

v.

JON MICHAEL CLARA,

Appellee.

No. 20220325

Heard May 8, 2023

Filed March 14, 2024

On Certification from the Court of Appeals

Third District, Salt Lake

The Honorable Todd M. Shaughnessy

No. 191912251

Attorneys:

Sean D. Reyes, Att’y Gen., Andrew F. Peterson, Deputy Solic.

Gen., Salt Lake City, for appellant

Ann M. Taliaferro, Kristin G. Wilson, Salt Lake City, for appellee

JUSTICE PETERSEN authored the opinion of the Court, in which

CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE PEARCE,

JUSTICE HAGEN, and JUSTICE POHLMAN joined.

JUSTICE PETERSEN, opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶1 This appeal involves the dismissal of a criminal case under

the Pretrial Justification Statute. UTAH CODE § 76-2-309(3). The

Statute allows a criminal defendant who makes a claim of self-

defense to have that claim assessed by a judge at an evidentiary

hearing before trial, rather than waiting until trial to have the

matter decided by a jury. At the pretrial evidentiary hearing, the

Statute first requires the defendant to make a prima facie claim of

self-defense. If the defendant can do that, the burden then shifts to

the prosecution to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the

STATE v. CLARA

Opinion of the Court

defendant’s use or threatened use of force was not justified. If the

district court concludes that the State has not met its burden, the

court will dismiss the criminal charges with prejudice. But if the

court concludes the State did meet its burden, the case proceeds,

and the defendant may still raise a claim of self-defense at trial.

¶2 In this case, defendant Jon Michael Clara was driving his

SUV in Salt Lake City when his vehicle was rear-ended and then

rammed repeatedly by a truck with a snowplow on the front of it

(snowplow). The snowplow finally started to drive away. But it

then stopped abruptly and began to turn to the right. Clara believed

the snowplow was in the process of making a U-turn to come back

and attack him or his passenger again. He fired a gun seven times

in the direction of the snowplow. None of the shots hit the

snowplow, but one bullet pierced the back window of a pickup

truck that happened to be in the area. The bullet came within inches

of hitting a young girl’s head. Clara was arrested and charged with

seven counts of felony discharge of a firearm.

¶3 Early in the criminal proceedings, Clara moved for an

evidentiary hearing under the Pretrial Justification Statute. After

the hearing, the district court ruled that Clara had made a prima

facie claim of self-defense, and that the State had not disproved the

self-defense claim by clear and convincing evidence. So the district

court dismissed the criminal charges against Clara.

¶4 The State appeals. It argues that the district court should

not have dismissed the charges against Clara because he failed to

make a prima facie claim of self-defense at the evidentiary hearing,

as required by the Pretrial Justification Statute. Specifically, the

State contends that none of the evidence adduced at the hearing

showed that Clara had a reasonable belief that the snowplow posed

an imminent threat of harm because, when Clara fired the shots,

the snowplow had not turned back around to face him.

¶5 We agree with the district court that Clara presented

evidence sufficient to make a prima facie claim of self-defense.

Clara testified that the snowplow struck his SUV four times with

increasing intensity. Then, when the snowplow finally started to

drive away, it skidded to a stop a mere fifty feet from Clara and

started turning to the right. At that point, Clara believed his SUV

was disabled and that his passenger was injured. Fearing that the

snowplow was turning around to attack them again, Clara testified

that he fired the shots as a warning to stop the snowplow driver

from returning. On these facts, we agree with the district court that

Clara presented evidence showing a reasonable belief that the

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snowplow posed an imminent threat of death or serious bodily

injury to him and his passenger. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶6 Police responded to the scene of a shooting on 900 West

just north of 100 South in Salt Lake City. A family had been driving

in their pickup truck northbound on 900 West, when a bullet

pierced the back window, travelled through the passenger cab, and

exited through the windshield. The bullet came within inches of

hitting a young girl’s head. Glass was scattered across the backseat

and the girl had glass in her hair. Thankfully, she was not

physically injured.

¶7 Nearby, officers discovered an SUV with a damaged

bumper and passenger side, facing the wrong way in the

northbound lane of 900 West. Clara and a passenger were standing

near the SUV. Clara told the officers that he had been driving the

SUV when he was rammed repeatedly by a truck with a snowplow

on the front of it. He explained that the snowplow finally started to

drive away, but then stopped abruptly and appeared to be making

a U-turn to come back at them. At that point, he shot seven times

in the direction of the snowplow, hoping to warn the driver away.

¶8 Clara was arrested and charged with seven counts of

felony discharge of a firearm.

Criminal Proceedings

¶9 Early in the criminal proceedings, Clara sought to invoke

the recently enacted Pretrial Justification Statute, which allows for

a district court to assess claims of self-defense at an earlier stage in

a criminal case. See UTAH CODE § 76-2-309(3). The Statute provides

that if a criminal defendant files a motion requesting a pretrial

justification hearing, then the district court must hold an

evidentiary hearing to “determine as a matter of fact and law

whether the defendant was justified in the use or threatened use of

force.” Id. § 76-2-309(3)(a). At the evidentiary hearing, the

defendant must first “make[] a prima facie claim of justification.”

Id. § 76-2-309(3)(b). If the court determines the defendant has made

a prima facie claim, then “the state has the burden to prove by clear

and convincing evidence that the defendant’s use or threatened use

of force was not justified.” Id. If the State meets this burden, the

defendant’s motion is denied, the case proceeds, and the defendant

may raise the issue of justification to the jury at trial. Id. § 76-2-

309(3)(c)(iii). But if the State fails to meet its burden, the district

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Opinion of the Court

court must dismiss the relevant charges against the defendant. Id.

§ 76-2-309(3)(c)(i).

¶10 Clara moved for a pretrial justification hearing in the

district court, asserting that he shot at the snowplow in self-defense

under Utah Code subsection 76-2-402(2)(b). That subsection states,

An individual is justified in using force intended or

likely to cause death or serious bodily injury only if

the individual reasonably believes that force is

necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury to

the individual or another individual as a result of

imminent use of unlawful force, or to prevent the

commission of a forcible felony.

Id. § 76-2-402(2)(b).

The Pretrial Justification Evidentiary Hearing

¶11 In response to Clara’s motion, the district court held an

evidentiary hearing as required by the Pretrial Justification Statute.

At the beginning of the hearing, the court explained the procedure

that it had used in a prior hearing of this type, since “the process is

new and the procedure is . . . a little bit new.” The court stated that

it had

required the parties . . . to present starting with the

defense—since the defense has an initial burden of

making [a prima facie] showing, had all the parties

put on all of their evidence, and then I simply made a

determination at the end as to—as to Step No. 1,

whether the . . . Defense met its burden of showing

that self-defense may be an issue in the case, and then

if so, making findings with respect to the State and its

burden.

The parties agreed to this procedure. And Clara’s counsel stated

that he was “ready to proceed.”

¶12 Defense counsel called Clara as the defense’s first witness,

followed by the passenger who was riding with Clara on the night

in question, and some of the responding police officers. The State

cross-examined each of Clara’s witnesses, including Clara himself.

The State did not call any witnesses of its own to testify at the

hearing.

¶13 Clara and his passenger testified about the events leading

up to the shooting. Clara had been driving his SUV eastbound on

Euclid Avenue in Salt Lake City and was about to turn north onto

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900 West. Suddenly, Clara’s vehicle was rear-ended by the driver

of a pickup truck that had a snowplow attached to its front.

Thinking this was just an accident, Clara moved his vehicle to the

side of the road.

¶14 But the snowplow struck Clara’s vehicle again—this time

with more intensity. The snowplow then hit Clara’s vehicle a third

time. The third strike caused Clara’s SUV to spin around and face

oncoming traffic. Finally, the snowplow hit the SUV a fourth time,

“t-boning” it on the passenger side and causing some airbags to

deploy.

¶15 At this point, the snowplow began driving away and Clara

got out of his SUV. Based on the damage caused by the contact,

Clara believed that his vehicle was inoperable. And due to the final

blow to the passenger side, Clara believed that his passenger might

be injured and trapped in the vehicle.

¶16 Once outside the vehicle, Clara noticed that the

snowplow’s brake lights were on, and he heard the snowplow

“skid on the street” roughly fifty feet away. Then, to Clara’s

dismay, he saw the snowplow begin to turn to the right into “some

business or driveway to make a U-turn.” Once the snowplow began

this maneuver, Clara believed it was turning around to hit him or

his vehicle with the passenger still inside. Fearing for his and his

passenger’s lives, Clara pulled out a gun and fired seven rounds in

the direction of the snowplow. According to video timestamps

taken from a dashcam in Clara’s SUV, only about six seconds

passed between the final strike by the snowplow and when Clara

began shooting.

¶17 When Clara fired at the snowplow, it had not turned all

the way around. It was facing in a northeast direction, generally

away from Clara and the SUV. Clara “was just aiming [toward the

snowplow] to let [the driver] know if you come back this way . . .

you’re going to get shot.” And although the snowplow was not

facing Clara when he shot, he believed he had to fire his weapon

before the snowplow had fully turned to face him because the

“snowplow thing in front . . . [would] act[] like this bulletproof

shield . . . . [T]hen I wouldn’t have been able to do anything for

myself or my passenger.”

¶18 After Clara fired, the snowplow drove a little farther up

the road, away from Clara. But it began to turn around a second

time. Because the snowplow was farther away, Clara waited to see

“what’s [the driver] going to do.” He did not shoot at the snowplow

again. And the snowplow finally drove away.

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¶19 Following the hearing, the court requested briefing from

the parties regarding the application of the statute. The court

explained its conclusion that “what the statute means by a prima

facie showing is basically the showing that would be necessary to

get past a motion for a directed verdict at trial. In other words,

enough evidence that a juror acting reasonably could conclude that

self-defense applies.” The court noted that the more important

issue was likely whether the State had met its burden to “show by

clear and convincing evidence that self-defense does not apply.”

The court directed the State to file its memorandum first, and for

Clara to then respond. The court then scheduled oral argument to

be held after the memoranda were filed.

¶20 In their memoranda and at the subsequent oral argument,

the parties did not object to the district court’s description of the

applicable legal standard. And neither party disagreed with the

district court’s conclusion that the “prima facie claim” Clara had to

make at the evidentiary hearing was similar to the directed verdict

standard.

¶21 On the merits, the State’s primary argument was that there

was no evidence showing that Clara’s belief that the snowplow

posed an imminent threat of harm was objectively reasonable. The

State argued that Clara was “involved in a traffic accident that had

ended by the time he discharged his firearm.” The State contended

that by the time Clara fired at the snowplow, any threat of harm

had ended and his belief that the snowplow driver was turning

around to attack again was mere speculation—making his belief

objectively unreasonable. For his part, Clara referenced the

evidence adduced at the earlier justification hearing and argued

that when he fired at the snowplow, the threat to his safety was still

ongoing, and he “believed that the vehicle was coming back at

him.”

The District Court’s Decision

¶22 After considering the parties’ memoranda and oral

argument, as well as the evidence adduced at the hearing, the

district court ruled that Clara had made a prima facie claim of self-

defense. The court relied on a number of specific facts in arriving

at its conclusion. First, to the court, the fact that the snowplow

struck Clara’s vehicle not once, but four times, “undermine[d] the

idea that this was simply a traffic accident.” The court further noted

that “the position of the [snowplow] [and] its distance from [Clara]

. . . [were] critical factors in determining whether [Clara] acted in

self-defense.” As to the position of the snowplow when Clara fired,

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the district court highlighted Clara’s statement that the snowplow

“was either broadside to him or was facing . . . slightly away from

him.” And for the distance, the court relied on Clara’s statement

that when he fired the shots, “the [snowplow] was 50 feet away,”

or “approximately 16 yards.”

¶23 Notably, the district court stated,

If it was true that the [snowplow] was 50 feet away

and the [snowplow] was facing or turning to face the

defendant, then there would be little doubt that the

defendant would be justified in shooting at the driver

as a means to disable the [snowplow]. A vehicle could

in a matter of seconds travel 16 yards, and a vehicle

obviously could cause death or serious bodily injury

to someone in the path of that vehicle.

¶24 The district court ultimately concluded that “it’s pretty

clear that the defendant has at least made a prima facie claim of

justification in that using deadly force against the driver of the

[snowplow] may have been necessary to avoid death or serious

bodily injury to the defendant.”

¶25 The court then addressed whether the State had met its

burden to disprove Clara’s prima facie claim of self-defense by

clear and convincing evidence. In doing so, the district court

considered some of the factors listed in Utah Code subsection 76-2-

402(5). Relevant here, that subsection states, “In determining

imminence or reasonableness . . . the trier of fact may consider:

(a) the nature of the danger; (b) the immediacy of the danger; [and]

(c) the probability that the unlawful force would result in death or

serious bodily injury.” UTAH CODE § 76-2-402(5).

¶26 The court found the nature of the danger posed by the

snowplow to be “very high” because “an automobile is capable of

causing death or serious bodily injury in a matter of seconds.” As

to the immediacy of the danger, the district court stated that “there

is less danger involved here because there is no testimony and the

defendant doesn’t claim that the [snowplow] was either traveling

toward him or was pointed toward him.” The court found that this

fact “undermine[d] . . . the imminence” of the threat posed by the

snowplow.

¶27 With these factors in mind, the court ultimately concluded

that the State failed to meet its burden to disprove Clara’s self-

defense claim by clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, the

district court granted Clara’s motion and dismissed the charges.

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Opinion of the Court

¶28 The State appeals the decision. It makes a single objection

to the district court’s ruling. The State argues that Clara failed to

show the objective reasonableness of his belief that the snowplow

posed an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to him

or his passenger. And thus, Clara did not make a prima facie claim

of self-defense at the evidentiary hearing.

¶29 We have jurisdiction under Utah Code subsection 78A-3-

102(3)(b).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶30 The only issue presented in this case is whether, in

accordance with the Pretrial Justification Statute, Clara made a

prima facie claim of self-defense at the pretrial evidentiary hearing.

We review prima facie determinations for correctness. Bair v. Axiom

Design, L.L.C., 2001 UT 20, ¶ 13, 20 P.3d 388 (“[T]he determination

of whether a party has made out a prima facie case is a question of

law which we review for correctness, affording no deference to the

trial court’s judgment.”), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by

A.S. v. R.S., 2017 UT 77, 416 P.3d 465.

ANALYSIS

¶31 The State argues that the district court erred in ruling that

Clara made a prima facie claim of self-defense at the evidentiary

hearing. The State’s primary objection is that the district court

wrongly concluded Clara had shown that he reasonably believed

the snowplow was about to attack again—or, in the parlance of the

self-defense statute, that the snowplow was going to engage in the

“imminent use of unlawful force.” UTAH CODE § 76-2-402(2)(b). The

State argues that “Clara fired too late or too soon,” because he fired

after the snowplow ended its assault and drove up the street, but

before the snowplow made a sufficient movement indicating it was

turning back in Clara’s direction. For the reasons discussed below,

we agree with the district court’s ruling and affirm.1

__________________________________________________________

1 In describing the facts of this case, the State emphasizes that

Clara put a young girl and her family in extreme danger when he

fired seven shots up 900 West. None of the bullets hit the snowplow

that rammed Clara’s SUV. But one of the shots hit a pickup truck

carrying three people who had nothing to do with the incident, and

the bullet narrowly missed a young girl’s head. This was what

drew police officers to the scene in the first place. We agree that

Clara’s stray bullet endangered the girl and her family. But these

(continued . . .)

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The Pretrial Justification Statute

¶32 The Pretrial Justification Statute states that “[u]pon motion

of the defendant . . . , the court shall hear evidence on the issue of

justification . . . and shall determine as a matter of fact and law

whether the defendant was justified in the use or threatened use of

force.” UTAH CODE § 76-2-309(3)(a). Next, “[a]t the pretrial

justification hearing, after the defendant makes a prima facie claim

of justification, the state has the burden to prove by clear and

convincing evidence that the defendant’s use or threatened use of

force was not justified.” Id. § 76-2-309(3)(b). The State contends that

Clara failed to make out a prima facie claim of self-defense at the

evidentiary hearing, so the State should have never borne the

burden of disproving Clara’s claim by clear and convincing

evidence.

¶33 The Statute does not define “prima facie.” However,

“prima facie” is a frequently used term of art that generally means

“[s]ufficient to establish a fact or raise a presumption unless

disproved or rebutted; based on what seems to be true on first

examination, even though it may later be proved to be untrue.” See

Prima Facie (adj.), BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). The

term’s meaning is also informed by the procedural posture in

which it arises. See, e.g., Bair v. Axiom Design, L.L.C., 2001 UT 20,

¶ 14, 20 P.3d 388, (explaining in the trial context that “[a] prima

facie case has been made when evidence has been received at trial

that, in the absence of contrary evidence, would entitle the party

having the burden of proof to judgment as a matter of law”),

abrogated on other grounds as recognized by A.S. v. R.S., 2017 UT 77,

416 P.3d 465; Blank v. Garff Enters. Inc., 2021 UT App 6, ¶ 26, 482

P.3d 258 (explaining that at the summary judgment stage, “[a]

plaintiff’s failure to present evidence that, if believed by the trier of

__________________________________________________________

facts are not part of our analysis on appeal, not because they are not

serious, but because the State has not raised an issue before us

involving Clara’s endangerment of the three uninvolved passers-

by. Although courts in other jurisdictions have addressed

circumstances where a defendant, acting in self-defense, has been

charged with recklessly injuring innocent bystanders, see, e.g., State

v. Betts, 514 P.3d 341, 349–52 (Kan. 2022), no such charges were filed

here. And the State has not raised an issue on appeal as to whether

Clara can be held criminally liable for recklessly endangering the

young girl and her family. However, the absence of these facts from

our analysis is not intended to minimize the seriousness of the

family’s experience.

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Opinion of the Court

fact, would establish any one of the elements of the prima facie case

justifies a grant of summary judgment to the defendant” (cleaned

up)).

¶34 The district court concluded that in this procedural

posture, the Statute’s requirement that Clara make out a prima facie

claim at the evidentiary hearing was similar to what is required to

survive a motion for a directed verdict. And neither party objected

to this.2 For a directed verdict under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure

50(a), a court may dismiss a claim if the factfinder “would not have

a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that

issue.” “[A] party who moves for a directed verdict has the very

difficult burden of showing that no evidence exists that raises a

question of material fact.” Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 UT 104, ¶ 18, 990

P.2d 933 (cleaned up). “Where there is any evidence that raises a

question of material fact, no matter how improbable the evidence

may appear,” a directed verdict is improper. Kleinert v. Kimball

Elevator Co., 905 P.2d 297, 299 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Thus, this

standard requires a party to clear a low bar by adducing at least

some evidence on each element of a claim.

The Elements of a Self-Defense Claim

¶35 The elements of self-defense are found in Utah Code

subsection 76-2-402(2)(b), which states, “An individual is justified

in using force intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily

injury only if the individual reasonably believes that force is

[1] necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury to the

__________________________________________________________

2 In their briefing, the parties provided extensive argument

regarding the procedure required for a defendant to “make[] a

prima facie claim of justification.” UTAH CODE § 76-2-309(3)(b). But

these issues were not preserved in the district court. The district

court explained to the parties how it would proceed in the

evidentiary hearing, and the parties agreed. Clara then went first at

the evidentiary hearing and put on evidence of his version of

events. There was no debate or discussion about whether this was

the correct way to proceed. Clara’s counsel agreed to this

procedure, stating, “Great. That’s all I needed to know. And then

. . . we’re ready to proceed.” Then after the hearing, when the

district court asked for briefing from the parties, it explained its

understanding of the term “prima facie claim” in the Statute. See

supra ¶¶ 11–20. Again, neither party objected to the court’s

explanation or directions. Accordingly, we do not address the

unpreserved issues raised by the parties.

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individual or another individual [2] as a result of imminent use of

unlawful force . . . .”

¶36 The key dispute in this case is whether Clara “reasonably

believe[d]” that the danger posed by the snowplow was

“imminent.” See id. We have stated that the imminence requirement

“distinguishes lawful defensive force from two forms of unlawful

force: that which comes too soon and that which comes too late.”

State v. Berriel, 2013 UT 19, ¶ 14, 299 P.3d 1133. Accordingly,

“[d]efensive force is . . . an act of emergency that is temporally and

materially confined[] with the narrow purpose of warding off the

pending threat.” Id. (cleaned up). In Berriel, we focused on common

definitions to interpret “imminence” in delineating this temporal

confinement. We noted that “imminent danger” was defined as “an

immediate, real threat to one’s safety” and as “the danger resulting

from an immediate threatened injury,” and that “imminent” was

defined “as ‘about to occur at any moment’ and as ‘impending.’”

Id. (cleaned up).

¶37 Further, the imminence element has both a subjective and

an objective component. At the time defensive force is used, the

defendant must have had an actual subjective belief in the

imminence of the threat of unlawful force and the defendant’s belief

must have been objectively reasonable. Cf. State v. Sorbonne, 2022 UT

5, ¶ 42, 506 P.3d 545 (noting, in the context of the necessity element

of self-defense, that a defendant’s reasonable belief in the necessity

of defensive force has both a subjective and an objective

component). The objective component is satisfied if the proverbial

reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have also

believed that the threat of unlawful force was imminent.

¶38 We address the subjective and objective components of

Clara’s imminence showing in turn.

The Subject Belief Requirement

¶39 We conclude Clara adduced evidence sufficient to make a

prima facie showing that he had an actual, subjective belief that the

snowplow posed an imminent threat to him and his passenger.

Clara testified that once he exited his vehicle, he saw the snowplow

stop about fifty feet away and “start[] turning right, like, you know,

into like some business or driveway to make a U-turn.” (Emphasis

added.) And in response to the question, “So you believe[d] this . . .

[snowplow] was U-turning,” Clara responded, “Yes.” Clara also

testified that he thought the snowplow was “coming back to hit or

run over me . . . or hit my vehicle with my passenger . . . in it.” And

in response to being asked, “So you[] [were] concerned about your

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safety and your passenger’s safety,” Clara responded,

“Absolutely.” Finally, Clara testified that he believed he had to

shoot at the snowplow before it was fully turned around and facing

him because the “snowplow thing in front of [the snowplow] . . .

acts like [a] bulletproof shield.”

¶40 The State cites a line from Clara’s testimony that it argues

demonstrates Clara did not have a subjective belief that the threat

from the snowplow was imminent. After Clara shot at the

snowplow, it drove farther away and then began to turn around a

second time. When asked why he did not shoot at the snowplow

again, Clara testified, “[T]hat’s some distance[,] [l]et me see, you

know, what’s [the snowplow driver] going to do.” For the State,

this testimony belies any subjective belief Clara claimed to have

had because he paused the second time to assess the situation, but

not the first.

¶41 We reject this argument. Whether Clara had a different

belief the second time the snowplow stopped (a greater distance

away and following the initial volley of defensive shots) does not

negate his testimony about his belief when he exercised the

defensive force. While the State may believe that it would have

been a better choice for Clara to wait to fire the first time, the

subjective component of the imminence element does not turn on

the quality of the defendant’s decision-making. Clara testified that

the first time the snowplow stopped, he believed it was turning

around and thus posed an imminent threat of harm. Accordingly,

Clara adduced evidence regarding the subjective component of the

imminence element.

The Objective, Reasonable Belief Requirement

¶42 We also agree with the district court’s finding that Clara

made a prima facie showing of the imminence element’s objective

component. The State argues that the evidence regarding the

imminence of the harm posed by the snowplow does not show that

Clara’s belief was objectively reasonable because his belief rested

entirely on prediction and speculation about what the snowplow

might do in the future. To the State, “Clara’s entire justification

defense rests on his subjective feelings, his speculation about the

driver’s future intentions, but w[as] not based on any externally

verifiable phenomena perceivable by others that would lead a

reasonable person to believe another attack was imminent.” In all,

Clara “simply guessed that another attack might come.”

¶43 The State also contends that when the district court

analyzed whether the State had disproven self-defense by clear and

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convincing evidence, the court “note[d] a total absence of evidence

on immediacy.” The district court stated that “there is no

testimony[,] and the defendant doesn’t claim that the [snowplow]

was either traveling toward him or was pointed toward him. So

that undermines . . . the imminence . . . .” To the State, “[t]hat single

fact should have been the end of Clara’s self-defense motion.”

¶44 The “reasonably believe[s]” language in Utah Code

subsections 76-2-402(2)(a) and (b) “introduces a component of

objectivity” to the self-defense analysis. State v. Sorbonne, 2022 UT

5, ¶ 28, 506 P.3d 545. In Sorbonne, which focused on the necessity

element of self-defense, we noted that “the reasonableness inquiry

is a hypothetical one, which asks [us] to decide whether a person in

the defendant’s circumstances would have reasonably believed

that a threat or use of force was necessary.” Id. ¶ 29. Although we

addressed the necessity element in Sorbonne, the same analysis

applies to the question of whether a person “reasonably believes”

the use of unlawful force against them is imminent. This inquiry is

an objective one—requiring courts to ask whether a reasonable

person in the defendant’s position would have believed they were

facing an imminent use of unlawful force.

¶45 We conclude there is evidence in the record supporting the

district court’s finding that Clara reasonably believed another

attack by the snowplow was imminent. First, the snowplow had

already rammed Clara’s SUV four times, with the intensity of the

strikes increasing in degree. Second, Clara testified that after the

fourth hit, some airbags in the vehicle deployed. He believed his

SUV was inoperable and that his passenger might be injured and

unable to get out. Third, after the snowplow finally started to drive

away, it almost immediately came to an abrupt stop. Within

seconds of driving away, Clara saw the snowplow’s brake lights

come on, and he heard it “skid on the street” and come to a stop

about fifty feet away. And fourth, Clara saw the snowplow begin

to make a right turn either into a business or a driveway of some

sort. It was at this point that Clara fired his gun.

¶46 The State argues that Clara’s belief was unreasonable

unless “the [snowplow] was in fact pointed more south than

north,” or at least “east-southeast.” So in the State’s view, the fact

that the snowplow was facing “north or northeast made [Clara’s

showing] insufficient” to make a prima facie claim as to imminence.

The State provided the following example at oral argument:

This morning I was crossing the street . . . and I saw a

car on State Street make a U-turn at the left turn

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Opinion of the Court

light. . . . And it occurred to me, if I was behind that

car . . . and I watched that car make a U-turn, at what

point in his U-turn would I have been able to perceive

as an objectively verifiable phenomenon that this was

a U-turn and not a left turn? And the only way to tell,

the only difference . . . to the observer is once the

driver reverses orientation, goes beyond the left turn

to something more like a reverse orientation.

In other words, the State contends that for Clara’s belief that he was

in imminent danger to have been objectively reasonable, the

snowplow would “have [had] to cross the east orientation and go

something south of east in his orientation.”

¶47 But this hypothetical highlights the importance of the

surrounding circumstances that informed Clara’s belief. The

person observing the car in the hypothetical could reasonably

perceive the car’s intentions differently if, like Clara’s experience,

the car making the turn had just hit the person four times. And

then, as the person watched with relief as the car finally started to

drive away, it would seem reasonable for the person to be fear-

stricken if the car stopped abruptly within seconds of departing

and began to make a turn.

¶48 The law does not expect the hypothetical reasonable

person in such a fraught scenario to perceive, in a split second,

whether a vehicle has turned just enough to indicate it is making a

U-turn. The reasonable person we look to in making such objective

inquiries is not an infallible individual who has the benefit of

hindsight or plentiful time to contemplate the imminence of a given

threat of harm in the moment. “Detached reflection cannot be

demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife.” Brown v. United

States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921) (Holmes, J.).

¶49 And when we apply this understanding of the reasonable

person standard here, we are persuaded that a reasonable person

in Clara’s shoes could have believed that the snowplow was an

imminent threat. Clara had just been inside an SUV that was

rammed four times by the snowplow. When the snowplow finally

began to drive up the road, it skidded to a stop within seconds and

began to turn right into a business on the side of the road. In this

moment, a reasonable person could believe that the demonstrably

violent snowplow driver had reengaged and was going to attack

again. And Clara did not know if he could get his passenger out of

the snowplow’s way in time, considering the state of his SUV and

the passenger.

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Opinion of the Court

¶50 The State points out the district court’s observation that

there was no evidence showing the snowplow turned all the way

around to face Clara. And we agree that this weighs against a

finding of imminence when determining whether the State

disproved that Clara acted in self-defense. But viewed in factual

context, and in light of the prima facie standard, this deficiency

does not negate all the evidence that cuts in the other direction. And

that evidence suffices to make a prima facie showing that Clara

reasonably believed the snowplow posed an imminent threat.

CONCLUSION

¶51 We conclude that the district court did not err in ruling

that Clara made a prima facie claim of self-defense at the

evidentiary hearing. We affirm.

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