Paul Andrew Frutiger

United States Tax Court

162 T.C. No. 5

PAUL ANDREW FRUTIGER,

Petitioner

v.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

Respondent

—————

Docket No. 31153-21. Filed March 11, 2024.

—————

R issued a Notice of Determination to P denying his

claim for innocent spouse relief. P filed an untimely

Petition with the Tax Court seeking review of R’s

determination. R asks the Court to dismiss this case for

lack of jurisdiction. P argues that the deadline to file a

petition from a denial of innocent spouse relief is not

jurisdictional and asks that the Court hear his case on

equitable grounds.

A filing deadline is jurisdictional if Congress clearly

states that it is.

Held: The 90-day filing deadline in I.R.C.

§ 6015(e)(1)(A) is jurisdictional.

Held, further, because P failed to file his Petition

within the 90-day deadline, we do not have jurisdiction to

hear his case.

—————

Served 03/11/24

2

Paul Andrew Frutiger, pro se. 1

Michael S. Hensley and Julia Kapchinskiy, for respondent.

OPINION

BUCH, Judge: Paul Frutiger filed an untimely Petition for review

of the Commissioner’s final determination denying Mr. Frutiger

innocent spouse relief. The Commissioner asserts that this case should

be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, while Mr. Frutiger asserts that the

Tax Court should hear his case on equitable grounds.

The Tax Court has jurisdiction to hear cases only to the extent

provided by Congress. Although filing deadlines are presumptively not

jurisdictional, Congress can make a filing deadline jurisdictional by

making a clear statement that it intended for the filing deadline to be

jurisdictional.

Congress clearly stated that the 90-day filing deadline of section

6015(e)(1)(A) 2 is jurisdictional. Because Mr. Frutiger failed to file a

petition with the Tax Court within the 90-day deadline, the Tax Court

does not have jurisdiction to hear his case.

Background

On June 16, 2021, the Commissioner issued separate notices of

determination to Paola Frutiger and Paul Frutiger, denying each of

their requests for innocent spouse relief for 2018. Within 90 days of

when the Commissioner issued the notice to her, Ms. Frutiger filed a

timely petition seeking review of the notice of determination. See

Frutiger v. Commissioner, No. 25835-21 (T.C. filed July 13, 2021). While

residing in California, Mr. Frutiger mailed a Petition seeking review of

his Notice of Determination 92 days after the Commissioner issued that

notice. The Court received the Petition 96 days after the Commissioner

issued the Notice of Determination to Mr. Frutiger. The Court

consolidated the Frutigers’ cases.

1 Brief amicus curiae was filed by Mandi L. Matlock and T. Keith Fogg as

counsel for the Center for Taxpayer Rights.

2 Unless otherwise indicated, statutory references are to the Internal Revenue

Code, Title 26 U.S.C. (Code), in effect at all relevant times.

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The Court issued an order requesting that Mr. Frutiger and the

Commissioner address whether Mr. Frutiger’s Petition was timely, and

if not, the consequences of filing an untimely petition in an innocent

spouse case. In response, the Commissioner argues that Mr. Frutiger’s

Petition was untimely and that the Court should dismiss his case for

lack of jurisdiction. Mr. Frutiger acknowledges that his Petition was

untimely but argues that the Court should hear his case on equitable

grounds. The Center for Taxpayers Rights, as amicus curiae, submitted

a brief in support of Mr. Frutiger arguing that the 90-day deadline for

filing a petition under section 6015(e)(1)(A) is not jurisdictional.

Discussion

We must decide whether we have jurisdiction over Mr. Frutiger’s

Petition challenging the Commissioner’s determination denying him

innocent spouse relief for 2018. To answer this question, we must decide

whether Congress clearly stated that the section 6015(e)(1)(A) deadline

of 90 days within which to file a petition from a denial of innocent spouse

relief is jurisdictional.

I. Background on the Tax Court’s Jurisdiction

Like other federal courts, the Tax Court is a court of limited

jurisdiction and can exercise its jurisdiction only to the extent provided

by Congress. I.R.C. § 7442; Judge v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1175,

1180–81 (1987). And of course, the Tax Court has jurisdiction to

determine whether it has jurisdiction. Bongam v. Commissioner, 146

T.C. 52, 54 (2016); Kluger v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 309, 314 (1984).

Section 6015(e)(1)(A) confers jurisdiction on this Court to review a

petition for innocent spouse relief if the taxpayer files that petition not

later than 90 days after the Commissioner issues a final determination

denying relief. I.R.C. § 6015(e)(1)(A)(ii); Sutherland v. Commissioner,

155 T.C. 95, 99 (2020). We must determine whether Congress authorized

us to exercise jurisdiction over petitions for innocent spouse relief when

the petition is not filed within the time limits prescribed by section

6015(e)(1)(A).

We have previously held that the 90-day deadline set forth in

section 6015(e)(1)(A) is jurisdictional. See Pollock v. Commissioner, 132

T.C. 21 (2009). In Pollock, 132 T.C. at 30–31, we focused principally on

the words of the statute in finding the petition deadline jurisdictional,

noting that section 6015(e)(1)(A) specifically uses the word

“jurisdiction.” We also noted the similarity between section 6015(e)(1)(A)

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and section 6330(d)(1), which we had previously held created a

jurisdictional deadline for filing a petition to challenge a collection

determination. Pollock, 132 T.C. at 31 (citing Boyd v. Commissioner, 124

T.C. 296, 303 (2005), aff’d, 451 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2006)).

But on April 21, 2022, the Supreme Court decided Boechler, P.C.

v. Commissioner, 142 S. Ct. 1493 (2022), holding that “[s]ection

6330(d)(1)’s 30-day time limit to file a petition for review of a collection

due process determination is an ordinary, nonjurisdictional deadline

subject to equitable tolling.” Id. at 1501. The statute at issue in Boechler

provided: “The person may, within 30 days of a determination under this

section, petition the Tax Court for review of such determination (and the

Tax Court shall have jurisdiction with respect to such matter).” I.R.C.

§ 6330(d)(1). The Supreme Court found the 30-day deadline

nonjurisdictional because (1) the term “such matter” in the jurisdictional

parenthetical lacked a clear antecedent thus creating many plausible

interpretations for what it referred to; and (2) there are similar

provisions in the Code that more clearly link a jurisdictional grant to a

filing deadline. Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner, 142 S. Ct. at 1497–99.

In the light of new precedent, we must revisit our holding in

Pollock. To the extent Pollock rested on our prior conclusion that

section 6330(d)(1) sets forth a jurisdictional deadline, Pollock no longer

rests on a sure foundation; that foundation was eroded by Boechler.

II. Whether Section 6015(e)(1)(A) Is Jurisdictional

The Supreme Court has characterized filing deadlines as

“quintessential claim-processing rules.” Henderson ex rel. Henderson v.

Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 435 (2011). Claim-processing rules are those

that “seek to promote the orderly progress of litigation by requiring that

the parties take certain procedural steps at certain specified times,” and

courts generally do not treat them as jurisdictional. Id. However, this

treatment is not absolute and can be rebutted. If Congress clearly states

that a filing deadline is jurisdictional, then we must treat it as such. See

Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515–16 (2006). Even so, in

applying the clear statement rule, it has been “made plain that most

time bars are nonjurisdictional.” United States v. Wong, 575 U.S. 402,

410 (2015).

Under the clear statement rule, Courts cannot find a rule to be

jurisdictional unless Congress made a clear statement that the “rule is

jurisdictional; absent such a clear statement, . . . ‘courts should treat the

5

restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.’” Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l

Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 145, 153 (2013) (quoting Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 516).

To make a clear statement, Congress “need not use magic words.”

Henderson, 562 U.S. at 436. “But traditional tools of statutory

construction must plainly show that Congress imbued a procedural bar

with jurisdictional consequences.” Wong, 575 U.S. at 410. Essentially,

“the statement must indeed be clear; it is insufficient that a

jurisdictional reading is ‘plausible,’ or even ‘better,’ than

nonjurisdictional alternatives.” MOAC Mall Holdings LLC v. Transform

Holdco LLC, 598 U.S. 288, 298 (2023) (quoting Boechler, P.C. v.

Commissioner, 142 S. Ct. at 1499).

To determine whether Congress made the necessary clear

statement, we examine the “text, context, and relevant historical

treatment” of the provision at issue. Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559

U.S. 154, 166 (2010). However, the text is the most important factor. See

Organic Cannabis Found., LLC v. Commissioner, No. 381-22L, 161 T.C.,

slip op. at 15 (Sept. 27, 2023) (citing Wong, 575 U.S. at 410).

A. Summary of the Parties’ Arguments

The Commissioner argues that the 90-day filing deadline of

section 6015(e)(1)(A) is jurisdictional because Congress clearly stated

that it was and the Supreme Court’s decision in Boechler, in addition to

numerous appellate cases, supports this argument. He further argues

that Pollock should be upheld.

Mr. Frutiger and the amicus disagree, arguing that Congress

failed to clearly state that the 90-day filing deadline is jurisdictional.

Mr. Frutiger specifically argues that, as in Boechler, “[t]here is no clear

statement that missing a filing deadline in as short as a few days defines

[sic] the Tax Court cannot hear [his] case.” Moreover, the amicus

specifically argues that Congress failed to clearly state that the section

6015(e)(1)(A) deadline is jurisdictional because (1) there are multiple

plausible interpretations of what the jurisdictional parenthetical in the

provision could refer to; (2) the provision’s statutory context suggests

that the 90-day filing deadline is not jurisdictional; (3) the reasoning

underlying our conclusion in Pollock in finding the provision

jurisdictional does not hold up in the light of recent Supreme Court

decisions, primarily Boechler; and (4) the three appellate opinions

holding the section 6015(e)(1)(A) filing deadline jurisdictional are no

longer good law after Boechler. For purposes of the pending Motion, we

6

will accept these latter two propositions and revisit the question of

whether the section 6015(e)(1)(A) deadline is jurisdictional.

B. Applying the Clear Statement Rule

We must determine whether Congress clearly stated that the

90-day filing deadline of 6015(e)(1)(A) is jurisdictional. When

determining whether Congress has made a clear statement, we examine

the “text, context, and relevant historical treatment” of the provision at

issue. Reed Elsevier, Inc., 559 U.S. at 166. After reviewing the text and

statutory context of section 6015(e)(1)(A), we conclude that the 90-day

filing deadline of section 6015(e)(1)(A) is jurisdictional.

1. The Text

We will begin our analysis with the text of the provision. Section

6015(e) provides:

(1) In general.—In the case of an individual against

whom a deficiency has been asserted and who elects to

have subsection (b) or (c) apply, or in the case of an

individual who requests equitable relief under

subsection (f)—

(A) In general.—In addition to any other

remedy provided by law, the individual may petition

the Tax Court (and the Tax Court shall have

jurisdiction) to determine the appropriate relief

available to the individual under this section if such

petition is filed—

(i) at any time after the earlier of—

(I) the date the Secretary mails,

by certified or registered mail to the

taxpayer’s last known address, notice

of the Secretary’s final determination

of relief available to the individual, or

(II) the date which is 6 months

after the date such election is filed or

request is made with the Secretary,

and

(ii) not later than the close of the 90th

day after the date described in clause (i)(I).

“Statutory interpretation begins with the text of the statute

itself.” Blue Lake Rancheria v. United States, 653 F.3d 1112, 1115 (9th

7

Cir. 2011). If the text is unambiguous, the statute must be enforced in

accordance to its plain meaning. See King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 486

(2015); Green v. Commissioner, 707 F.2d 404, 405 (9th Cir. 1983).

“[W]hen deciding whether the language is plain, we must read the words

‘in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory

scheme.’” King, 576 U.S. at 486 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson

Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000)).

When we examine the text, it is apparent that Congress clearly

stated that the 90-day filing deadline of section 6015(e)(1)(A) is

jurisdictional. It provides that a “[taxpayer] may petition the Tax Court

(and the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction) to determine the appropriate

relief . . . if such petition is filed . . . not later than the close of the 90th

day after the date described in clause (i)(I).” I.R.C. § 6015(e)(1)(A)

(emphasis added). Section 6015(e)(1)(A) expressly provides

“jurisdiction” with respect to the Tax Court’s power to hear innocent

spouse cases. And while this alone is not enough, see Boechler, P.C. v.

Commissioner, 142 S. Ct. 1493, there is a clear link between the

parenthetical that contains the jurisdictional text and the 90-day filing

deadline; the filing deadline reads as a prerequisite to the Tax Court’s

jurisdiction.

Mr. Frutiger and the amicus argue to the contrary, but their

arguments are unpersuasive. First, they both assert that it is not clear

what the jurisdictional parenthetical modifies and cite Boechler as

support. Mr. Frutiger contends that we should follow the Supreme

Court’s ruling in Boechler because the jurisdictional parenthetical

analyzed in Boechler is similar to the section 6015(e)(1)(A) jurisdictional

parenthetical. The amicus contends that we should follow the ruling in

Boechler because, in the amicus’ view, the jurisdictional grant can be

interpreted to modify many parts of the provision and not specifically

the filing deadline. The amicus continues that, when there is ambiguity

as to whether a filing deadline is jurisdictional, the clear statement rule

is not satisfied.

While we agree that Boechler is relevant to our analysis, it is

distinguishable from this case. In Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner,

142 S. Ct. at 1497, the Supreme Court’s determination whether the

statute at issue contained a clear statement focused on ambiguity in the

reference intended by the phrase “such matter.” Because the term was

ambiguous, and there were multiple plausible interpretations of what

Congress intended, the Supreme Court found that Congress did not

clearly state that the filing deadline was jurisdictional. Id. at 1498. But

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that is not the case here. On the basis of statutory interpretation

principles, the jurisdictional parenthetical in section 6015(e)(1)(A) is

unambiguous. 3 It does not contain any ambiguous terms such as “such

matter,” and there is a clear link between the jurisdictional

parenthetical and the filing deadline. Specifically, section 6015(e)(1)(A)

is a provision that solely sets forth deadlines. Reduced to its essential

terms, it provides that an “individual may petition the Tax Court (and

the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction) if such petition is filed” by a

specified deadline.

The Supreme Court’s opinion in Boechler expressly differentiated

section 6015(e)(1)(A) from section 6330(d)(1). The Supreme Court

specifically stated that section 6015(e)(1)(A) more clearly linked the

jurisdictional grant to the filing deadline than did section 6330(d)(1).

Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner, 142 S. Ct. at 1498–99. This statement

supports a holding that Boechler is distinguishable and that section

6015(e)(1)(A) is jurisdictional. The amicus asserts that we cannot rely

on the Supreme Court’s comments regarding section 6015(e). While we

cannot rely solely on the Supreme Court’s statement in Boechler, it is

relevant and can be given weight in analyzing issues. See United States

v. Montero-Carmargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1132 n.17 (9th Cir. 2000)

(“Supreme Court dicta ‘have a weight that is greater than ordinary

judicial dicta as prophecy of what that Court might hold’; accordingly,

we do ‘not blandly shrug them off because they were not a holding.’”

(quoting Zal v. Steppe, 968 F.2d 924, 935 (9th Cir. 1992) (Noonan, J.,

concurring in part, dissenting in part))). Like the Supreme Court, we

view section 6330(d)(1) and the ultimate holding in Boechler as

distinguishable from this case.

Second, the amicus asserts that a jurisdictional interpretation of

the section 6015(e)(1)(A) filing deadline conflicts with the Supreme

Court’s holding in Auburn. In Auburn, 568 U.S. at 152, the Supreme

Court had to determine whether a 180-day deadline to request a hearing

with a review board to challenge reimbursement amounts under

42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(a)(3) was jurisdictional. It found the filing deadline

to be nonjurisdictional because it did not speak in jurisdictional terms

3 In this instance, we do not place any interpretive weight of Congress’s placing

the jurisdictional grant in a parenthetical. In Boechler, the Supreme Court noted that

a parenthetical “is typically used to convey an ‘aside’ or ‘afterthought.’” Boechler, P.C.

v. Commissioner, 142 S. Ct. at 1498 (citing Bryan A. Garner, Modern English Usage

1020 (4th ed. 2016)). But in the immediately subsequent paragraph, the Supreme

Court cited the parenthetical of section 6015(e)(1)(A) for its relative clarity. Boechler,

P.C. v. Commissioner, 142 S. Ct. at 1498–99.

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and it had even less of a jurisdictional tone than other provisions found

to be nonjurisdictional. Auburn, 568 U.S. at 154. Additionally, in

concluding that the provision was nonjurisdictional, the Supreme Court

rejected a proximity-based argument. It found the filing deadline

provision nonjurisdictional even though there were other conditions

listed in the subsections of the same provision under consideration that

it considered to be jurisdictional. Id. at 155.

The amicus argues that section 6015(e)(1)(A) is very similar to the

provision the Supreme Court analyzed in Auburn. The amicus contends

that the provisions are similar because both provisions “set out

authority for a court to rule on certain issues if certain conditions are

met.” We disagree.

First, unlike the provision in Auburn, section 6015(e)(1)(A)

speaks in jurisdictional terms and expressly refers to this Court’s

jurisdiction. Second, unlike the provision in Auburn, there is only one

condition the taxpayer must satisfy in section 6015(e)(1)(A), which is the

filing deadline. There are no conditions other than the filing deadline to

which the jurisdictional text could refer. In contrast, the provision

analyzed in Auburn had three conditions and there was ambiguity as to

whether Congress intended the filing deadline to be amongst the

conditions that were jurisdictional. That ambiguity led the Supreme

Court to hold that the filing deadline was not jurisdictional. See Auburn,

568 U.S. at 155. Unlike the provision at issue in Auburn, Congress

clearly stated that it intended for the section 6015(e)(1)(A) filing

deadline to be jurisdictional.

The amicus also points to two other cases to support its argument

that interpreting section 6015(e)(1)(A) as jurisdictional conflicts with

court rulings. See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975); Mangum v.

Action Collection Serv., Inc., 575 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2009). The amicus

points to these two cases to make the unremarkable point that the

proximity in the statute between a deadline and the jurisdictional grant

is not dispositive. Salfi, 422 U.S. at 763–64; Mangum, 575 F.3d

at 939–40; see also Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner, 142 S. Ct. at 1499

(“Rather than proximity, the important feature is the one that is missing

here: a clear tie between the deadline and the jurisdictional grant.”).

Likewise, our conclusion that section 6015(e)(1)(A) is jurisdictional is

predicated on the structure and text of the provision; namely whether

there was a clear link between the filing deadline and the jurisdictional

parenthetical. Our focus is not on the proximity between the

jurisdictional parenthetical and the filing deadline.

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The arguments put forth by Mr. Frutiger and the amicus are

unpersuasive and do not alter our conclusion in finding the 90-day filing

deadline of section 6015(e)(1)(A) jurisdictional. A plain reading of the

text shows that there is a clear link between the jurisdictional

parenthetical and the 90-day filing deadline. Furthermore, the Supreme

Court’s statement in Boechler providing that section 6015(e)(1)(A) more

clearly links the jurisdictional grant to the deadline supports our

conclusion.

2. Analyzing the Statutory Context

While we could end our analysis with the plain reading of the text,

we will address the amicus’ statutory context argument. The amicus

argues that the statutory context suggests that the filing deadline of

section 6015(e)(1)(A) is not jurisdictional because “(1) it is contained

within a largely equitable innocent spouse relief scheme, (2) it is

contained within a scheme that is unusually protective of taxpayers

(who often have been victims of spousal abuse), and (3) it is, unusually,

a deadline to file for review of an administrative determination in an

Article I court.” Although we agree with some of these points, they are

not sufficient to overcome the clear statutory text of section

6015(e)(1)(A).

First, it is unclear what weight, if any, we should give to the

equitable nature of section 6015. Relief under section 6015(f) is

equitable. And section 6015(b) certainly contains an equitable

component, in that relief is available for an understatement if “taking

into account all the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the

[innocent spouse] liable.” I.R.C. § 6015(b)(1)(D). But this is merely one

of several requirements to obtain relief under section 6015(b). And relief

under section 6015(c) and (d) contains no equitable component; relief is

based solely on detailed rules. The partial equitable nature of section

6015 is not enough to overcome the clear statutory text.

Second, it is likewise unclear what weight we should give the

legislation surrounding the enactment of section 6015. The amicus cites

Henderson as support for its argument that we should look to the

protective nature of the enacting legislation. In Henderson, 562 U.S.

at 441, the Supreme Court found a filing deadline nonjurisdictional in

part because the provision “was enacted as part of the [Veterans’

Judicial Review Act], and that legislation was decidedly favorable to

veterans.” Section 6015 was enacted as part of the Internal Revenue

Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (RRA), Pub. L. No. 105-

11

206, 112 Stat. 685, as part of Title III of that act, labeled “Taxpayer

Protection and Rights.” Like Henderson, section 6015 was part of

legislation that had taxpayer-favorable aspects to it. But just because

section 6015 was enacted under taxpayer-favorable legislation does not

mean that Congress intended for the filing deadline of section

6015(e)(1)(A) to be nonjurisdictional. As we have stated, section 6015

contains both equitable and nonequitable components. It being enacted

under taxpayer-favorable legislation does not make every part of it

equitable. Concluding that the filing deadline of section 6015(e)(1)(A) is

nonjurisdictional because it was enacted under RRA Title III would

require us to go against the clear statutory text and make statutory

context the deciding factor. We decline to do so. Notably, the Supreme

Court in Boechler did not put any weight on the fact that section

6330(d)(1) was enacted as part of RRA Title III in concluding that the

30-day filing deadline was nonjurisdictional. See Boechler, P.C. v.

Commissioner, 142 S. Ct. 1493. Thus, we give little weight to this

argument and find it unpersuasive.

Lastly, the amicus argues that because section 6015(e)(1)(A) is

“part of an Article I court’s review of an administrative determination

that is ‘unusually protective’ of the individuals seeking its benefits,” that

context indicates that the filing deadline should be held

nonjurisdictional. Again, the amicus cites Henderson as support. In

Henderson, the Supreme Court also looked to the “characteristics of the

review scheme that Congress created for the adjudication of veterans’

benefits claims” to help determine whether Congress intended for the

filing deadline to be jurisdictional. Henderson, 562 U.S. at 440. In

examining the review scheme, the Supreme Court noted stark

differences between ordinary civil litigation and the system Congress

created to adjudicate veterans’ benefits claims, stating that unlike

ordinary civil litigation,

a veteran seeking benefits need not file an initial claim

within any fixed period after the alleged onset of disability

or separation from service. When a claim is filed,

proceedings before the VA are informal and

nonadversarial. The VA is charged with the responsibility

of assisting veterans in developing evidence that supports

their claims, and in evaluating that evidence, the VA must

give the veteran the benefit of any doubt. If a veteran is

unsuccessful before a regional office, the veteran may

obtain de novo review before the Board, and if the veteran

loses before the Board, the veteran can obtain further

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review in the Veterans Court. A Board decision in the

veteran’s favor, on the other hand, is final. And even if a

veteran is denied benefits after exhausting all avenues of

administrative and judicial review, a veteran may reopen

a claim simply by presenting “new and material evidence.”

Id. at 440–41. On the basis of this review scheme, the Supreme Court

concluded that “[r]igid jurisdictional treatment of the . . . period for filing

a notice of appeal in the Veterans Court would clash sharply with this

[pro-veteran] scheme” and thus found the filing deadline

nonjurisdictional. Id. at 441.

The amicus contends that the review schemes for innocent spouse

and veteran benefit claims are similar in that “rigid treatment of the

90-day innocent spouse judicial review filing deadline would also clash

sharply with the administrative scheme for applying for § 6015 relief”

and, therefore, should be treated similarly by finding this filing deadline

nonjurisdictional. But we disagree. While there are a few similarities in

the schemes, overall they are different. The process for receiving

innocent spouse relief is not informal and has rigid steps. Therefore,

finding the filing deadline of section 6015(e)(1)(A) jurisdictional does not

clash sharply with the innocent spouse relief process created by

Congress. We find this argument unpersuasive.

The amicus’ statutory context arguments are not strong enough

to overcome the statutory text. We thus conclude that the filing deadline

of section 6015(e)(1)(A) is jurisdictional.

III. Conclusion

The 90-day filing deadline of section 6015(e)(1)(A) is

jurisdictional. Because Mr. Frutiger failed to file his Petition within

90 days of his Notice of Determination, his Petition is untimely and we

do not have jurisdiction to hear his case.

To reflect the foregoing,

An appropriate order will be issued.