Opinion

Jerry Dominguez v. Department of the Navy

Court
Merit Systems Protection Board
Filed
Mar 6, 2024
Status
Unpublished
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 15.6%

The opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

JERRY P. DOMINGUEZ, DOCKET NUMBER

Appellant, SF-0752-20-0540-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, DATE: March 6, 2024

Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Ianna Richardson , Esquire and Shaun Southworth , Atlanta, Georgia, for the

appellant.

Tony J. Miller , Esquire, Camp Pendleton, California, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman

Raymond A. Limon, Member

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which

sustained his removal. On petition for review, the appellant argues that the

administrative judge erred in sustaining three of the charges, reasserts his

affirmative defenses of reprisal for alleged equal employment opportunity (EEO)

activity and whistleblowing, and reasserts that the penalty of removal was not

1

A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).

reasonable. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. Generally , we grant petitions

such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains

erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous

interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to

the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of

the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or

involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of

the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite

the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5

of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).

After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner

has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for

review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly

MODIFIED to clarify the basis of the appellant’s reprisal claim concerning a

harassment complaint and to provide the appropriate standard in analyzing that

claim, we AFFIRM the initial decision.

We discern no error in the administrative judge’s findings that the agency

proved three of the four charges at issue in this appeal and that the penalty of

removal promotes the efficiency of the service and was reasonable. Initial

Appeal File (IAF), Tab 32, Initial Decision (ID) at 3-18, 24-29. We also discern

no error in her finding that the appellant failed to prove an affirmative defense of

whistleblower reprisal. ID at 22-24. Although we ultimately agree with the

administrative judge’s conclusion that the appellant failed to prove that his

removal was in reprisal for filing a harassment complaint with the EEO office on

October 30, 2019, we clarify here the nature of the appellant’s claim and the

appropriate standard by which to analyze that claim.

Below, the appellant asserted that he was retaliated against for protected

EEO activity—namely, for filing a harassment complaint on October 30, 2019,

with the EEO office. 2 IAF, Tab 19 at 4. To analyze this claim, the administrative

judge relied on the legal standard set forth in Savage v. Department of the Army,

122 M.S.P.R. 612, ¶ 51 (2015), which provides that, when an appellant asserts

discrimination or retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16, he must show that the

prohibited consideration was a motivating factor in the contested personnel

action. ID at 19. The administrative judge later correctly observed, however,

that the appellant’s harassment complaint on which his reprisal claim is based

was explicitly not alleging that he was harassed on the basis of a protected

category covered under the discrimination laws, such as race, sex, religion, age,

or disability. ID at 20; IAF, Tab 21 at 54. Because the appellant’s harassment

complaint was not so based, we modify the initial decision to find that his claim

should be construed as one of general reprisal. See, e.g., Mattison v. Department

of Veterans Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 492, ¶ 8 (2016) (applying the Warren standard

to the appellant’s affirmative defense of retaliation for filing appeals arising

under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(ii), in which he did not allege, among other

things, reprisal for equal employment opportunity activity protected under title

VII). To prove a claim of general reprisal, the appellant must show by

preponderant evidence that: (1) he engaged in protected activity; (2) the accused

official knew of the protected activity; (3) the adverse employment action under

review could, under the circumstances, have been retaliation; and (4) there was a

genuine nexus between the retaliation and the adverse employment action.

See Warren v. Department of the Army, 804 F.2d 654, 656-58 (Fed. Cir. 1986);

Mattison, 123 M.S.P.R. 492, ¶ 8; Cloonan v. U.S. Postal Service, 65 M.S.P.R. 1,

4 (1994).

In applying this standard, we rely on the administrative judge’s assessment

of the relevant evidence. In the initial decision, the administrative judge

2

The appellant also asserted that he filed an EEO complaint, IAF, Tab 19 at 4, but as

the administrative judge correctly observed, there is no EEO complaint in the record, ID

at 19, and a representative from the agency’s EEO office submitted a statement that

there is no EEO complaint by the appellant on record, IAF, Tab 9 at 20.

correctly observed that there was no evidence that anybody responsible for the

removal decision referenced the harassment complaint and that there was no

circumstantial evidence supporting an inference of retaliation, “other than the

appellant had talked to the EEO counselor when his removal was proposed and

decided.” ID at 22. The administrative judge considered that the appellant’s

supervisor, who was also the proposing official, may have been aware of the

complaint, but found nothing suspicious in this knowledge, particularly because

the supervisor began documenting for human resources the basis of the

disciplinary action in June or July of 2019—well before the appellant filed the

October 30, 2019 harassment complaint and well before the appellant told his

supervisor that he had gone to an EEO counselor. Id. at 21-22. The

administrative judge also considered that the deciding official was aware of the

harassment complaint but emphasized that he was unaware of the content of the

complaint. ID at 22. She ultimately concluded that the appellant failed to present

any evidence “that the agency took this removal action in retaliation for the

appellant going to an EEO counselor and complaining about the workplace.” Id.

We conclude that the findings in the initial decision are sound and

accurately reflect the record evidence. 3 We further find that, even though the

deciding official and the appellant’s supervisor—also the proposing official—

knew of the harassment complaint, the appellant has failed to show that his

3

We have considered the appellant’s argument on review that when he raised his

concern about harassment with his supervisor, the supervisor responded “in a retaliatory

manner” stating that he “was not going anywhere.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 8. The appellant

asserts that this response “is close to direct evidence of retaliation because it is a

threat.” Id. We disagree. The appellant’s interpretation of his supervisor’s alleged

statement is nothing more than speculation as to the supervisor’s motives. The

statement does not include any threat and, on its face, suggests only that the supervisor

did not intend to leave the agency due to the appellant’s harassment complaint. Thus,

the appellant’s argument on review does not constitute a basis to disturb the ultimate

finding in the initial decision that the appellant failed to establish this affirmative

defense. See Duncan v. Department of the Air Force, 115 M.S.P.R. 275, ¶ 9 (2010)

(finding that an appellant’s speculation did not rise to the level of preponderant

evidence), aff’d, 674 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

removal could, under the circumstances, have been retaliation or that there was

any genuine nexus between the retaliation and the removal action.

See Mattison, 123 M.S.P.R. 492, ¶ 8. Accordingly, we agree with the

administrative judge that the appellant failed to establish this affirmative defense.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 4

The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the

Board’s final decision in this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You may obtain

review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of

your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate

forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following

summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not

provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and

the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule

regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of

this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your

claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file

within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your

chosen forum.

Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review

below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions

about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you

should contact that forum for more information.

(1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking

judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court

4

Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated

the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the

Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.

within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.

§ 7703(b)(1)(A).

If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the

following address:

U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20439

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that

any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of

discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you

were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action

was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain

judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination

claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you

receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems

Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file

with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative

receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on

race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be

entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any

requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.

Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective

websites, which can be accessed through the link below:

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .

Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding

all other issues . 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the

EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive

this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file

with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives

this decision.

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the

address of the EEOC is:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, D.C. 20013

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or

by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

131 M Street, N.E.

Suite 5SW12G

Washington, D.C. 20507

(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection

Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised

claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).

If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section

2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),

(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of

competent jurisdiction. 5 The court of appeals must receive your petition for

review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.

§ 7703(b)(1)(B).

If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for

the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the

following address:

U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20439

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.

5

The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain

whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on

December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on

July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of

MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.

The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,

132 Stat. 1510.

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that

any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their

respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .

FOR THE BOARD: ______________________________

Gina K. Grippando

Clerk of the Board

Washington, D.C.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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