Opinion

Moody v. Ohio Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Serv.

  • 2024 Ohio 560
Court
Ohio Court of Claims
Filed
Jan 29, 2024
Status
Published
On the bench
Cain
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 15.4%

The opinion

[Cite as Moody v. Ohio Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Serv., 2024-Ohio-560.]

IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS OF OHIO

TONY MOODY Case No. 2019-01146JD

Plaintiff Judge David E. Cain

Magistrate Holly True Shaver

v.

JUDGMENT ENTRY

OHIO DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL

HEALTH AND ADDICTION SERVICES

Defendant

{¶1} Plaintiff, formerly employed by Defendant as a Therapeutic Program Worker

(TPW) at Twin Valley Behavioral Healthcare (Twin Valley), asserted claims under federal

and state law for race and national origin discrimination and a claim under state law for

retaliation. Upon defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the court rendered judgment

in favor of defendant as to all claims. After the Tenth District Court of Appeals reversed,

in part, this court’s decision granting summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim for retaliation

pursuant to R.C. 4112.99, this case was tried to a magistrate on the issues of liability and

damages as to that remaining claim.1

{¶2} Following trial, the magistrate recommended judgment in favor of defendant

after finding “that plaintiff has failed to prove both pretext and that his participation in a

protected activity (filing the OCRC/EEOC complaint) was a but-for cause of the December

2018 investigations and the pre-disciplinary meeting.” Now before the court are plaintiff’s

November 20, 2023 objections to the magistrate’s October 23, 2023 decision. In support,

plaintiff filed transcripts for the testimony of three trial witnesses: Albert Gyebi, Gideon

Ihiekonya, and Iya Ngalla. For the reasons discussed below, the court OVERRULES

plaintiff’s objections and adopts the magistrate’s decision as its own.

1 The Tenth District Court of Appeals affirmed, in part, this court’s decision granting summary

judgment and upheld the finding that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case for race and national

origin discrimination because he did not show that an adverse employment action had occurred. Moody v.

Ohio Dept. of Mental Health and Addiction Servs., 2021-Ohio-4578, 183 N.E.3d 21 (10th Dist.).

Case No. 2019-01146JD -2- JUDGMENT ENTRY

Standard of Review

{¶3} A magistrate’s decision “is not effective unless adopted by the court.”

Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(a). Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(b) provides that, “[w]hether or not objections are

timely filed, a court may adopt or reject a magistrate’s decision in whole or in part, with or

without modification.” However, when a party files objections to a magistrate’s decision,

the court “shall undertake an independent review as to the objected matters to ascertain

that the magistrate has properly determined the factual issues, and appropriately applied

the law.” Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d). In reviewing the objections, the court does not act as an

appellate court but rather conducts “a de novo review of the facts and conclusions in the

magistrate’s decision.” Ramsey v. Ramsey, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-840, 2014-

Ohio-1921, ¶ 17 (internal citations omitted).

{¶4} Objections “shall be specific and state with particularity all grounds for

objection.” Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(ii). Additionally, they must be supported “by a transcript of

all the evidence submitted to the magistrate relevant to that finding or an affidavit of that

evidence if the transcript is not available.” Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iii). When an objecting party

fails to properly support his objections with a transcript or affidavit, “the trial court must

accept the magistrate’s factual findings and limit its review to the magistrate’s legal

conclusions.” Triplett v. Warren Corr. Inst., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-728, 2013-Ohio-

2743, ¶ 13.

Relevant Background

{¶5} Plaintiff, a naturalized citizen of the United States who was born in Sierra

Leone, began working as a TPW for Twin Valley in 2013. In 2015, plaintiff received formal

workplace discipline three times for varying issues. After being transferred to a different

supervisor, plaintiff did not receive formal workplace discipline again until 2018.

{¶6} In June 2018, plaintiff did not report to work because he thought he was not

scheduled to work. After being contacted by his supervisor, plaintiff reported late to work.

Because he had previous formal workplace discipline on his record, plaintiff was given a

working suspension in August 2018 for the unauthorized tardiness. In September 2018,

plaintiff filed a discrimination charge with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission (OCRC) and

Case No. 2019-01146JD -3- JUDGMENT ENTRY

the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) based on the

August 2018 working suspension. OCRC found it was not probable that defendant had

unlawfully discriminated against plaintiff and the EEOC adopted these findings.

{¶7} In December 2018, plaintiff was involved in two different investigations

regarding other TPWs acting unprofessionally with patients. During the December 2018

investigations, plaintiff related that he had witnessed TPWs acting unprofessionally with

patients and had not formally documented the occurrences in a formal incident report. In

January 2019, defendant notified plaintiff that he was being charged with violating Rule

4.13 for failing to immediately report a violation of a work rule, policy, or procedure.

{¶8} Thereafter, defendant held a pre-disciplinary meeting with plaintiff and, as a

result, issued a finding of just cause for discipline. While defendant did not make a final

determination of whether disciplinary action would be taken against plaintiff, plaintiff

received additional incident report training in March 2019. In April 2019, plaintiff resigned.

Discussion

{¶9} In his objections, plaintiff contends that the magistrate erred when concluding

that defendant’s policy required plaintiff to file an incident report regarding James’ and

Sherman’s mistreatment of patients and, thus, also erred when finding that plaintiff

violated defendant’s policy by failing to write such incident reports. Plaintiff further argues

that, because he was not required to write such incident reports, the magistrate erred in

finding that defendant’s reasons underlying the December 2018 investigations and the

pre-disciplinary conference were not pretextual and in concluding that plaintiff failed to

prove causation between those adverse employment actions and plaintiff’s participation

in protected activity.

{¶10} At the outset, the court notes that plaintiff does not dispute the accuracy of

the magistrate’s recitation of the evidence. Instead, plaintiff takes issue with the

magistrate’s omission of certain facts that plaintiff feels are probative. However, the

magistrate is not required to state in her decision every single fact on which her findings

are based. See Civ.R. 52 (“When questions of fact are tried by the court without a jury,

judgment may be general * * *.”); see also In re J.C.F, 11th Dist. Trumball No. 2020-T-

0084, 2021-Ohio-1057, ¶ 25 (“the magistrate was not required to list every finding on

Case No. 2019-01146JD -4- JUDGMENT ENTRY

which his decision was based.”). Despite plaintiff’s contention that certain omissions were

inexplicable, the magistrate specifically prefaced her tailored summation of the evidence

with the following explanation:

At trial, the magistrate heard the testimony of many witnesses. However,

keeping in mind the findings of the Tenth District Court of Appeals, this

decision will focus on the testimony and evidence presented regarding the

issues of material fact regarding pretext specifically, the incident reporting

practices at Twin Valley and defendant’s justification for the December 2018

investigations and January 2019 discipline process.

Plaintiff has not provided sufficient justification for the court to conclude that the

magistrate did not properly determine the factual issues. Therefore, the court finds no

error with the magistrate’s factual findings and adopts the same as its own.

{¶11} The court will now consider plaintiff’s objections to the magistrate’s legal

conclusions. Initially, the court notes that plaintiff’s objections devolve from the

magistrate’s interpretation of defendant’s incident reporting policies. The magistrate

specifically found that:

[t]he evidence at trial showed that defendant’s policies required an incident

report to be filed when there was an allegation of abuse or neglect of a

patient. Although it appears in the day-to-day operations of Twin Valley,

incident reports are not filed as strictly as the policies dictate, plaintiff’s

understanding that he should report incidents to a charge nurse instead of

filing an incident report himself was nonetheless incorrect. The testimony

of Ngalla, plaintiff’s supervisor, was particularly persuasive to the magistrate

to show that an incident report by the employee who witnessed the violation

was required per the policy, despite plaintiff’s assertions that an oral report

to a supervisor would suffice. The magistrate also notes that the statements

of Nkengafac, Smith, and Durunna all consistently show that their

understanding of the policy was that a written incident report was required.

The magistrate finds that plaintiff violated defendant’s written policy found

in Defendant’s Exhibit A by not writing an incident report about the conduct

of James and Sherman, and that the alleged adverse employment actions

Case No. 2019-01146JD -5- JUDGMENT ENTRY

that defendant took against plaintiff were not pretextual. Moreover, the

difference in opinion among staff about the reporting policy fails to

demonstrate that defendant’s proffered reason was not the real reason or

was an insufficient reason for the investigations and pre-disciplinary

meeting.

Upon review, the court finds no error with the magistrate’s legal conclusions.

{¶12} It is the court’s view that the magistrate, as the trier of fact in a bench trial, is

free to rely on the facts she deems most relevant and material to the issues at hand and

free to disregard some evidence and rely on other evidence, in part, in whole, or any

deviation in between. See Siegel v. State, 28 N.E.3d 612, 2015-Ohio-441, ¶ 12 (10th

Dist.) (Any “suggestion that a magistrate * * * is incapable of deciding the facts and

weighing the credibility of witnesses, lacks merit.”). While plaintiff filed a transcript of

Ngalla’s testimony, this is only one excerpt of trial testimony out of many that the

magistrate used to interpret defendant’s incident reporting practices at Twin Valley.

Notably, the magistrate also relied on the statements of Nkengafac, Smith, and Durunna

to reach her conclusion. Therefore, plaintiff failed to support his argument by a transcript

of all the evidence submitted to the magistrate relevant to the challenged finding in

accordance with Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iii).

{¶13} Moreover, the plain language of the policy speaks for itself. Even

considering the difference in opinion among staff about how the incident reporting policy

operates, incident reports not being filed as strictly as the policies dictate in the day-to-

day operations of Twin Valley is not sufficient evidence to establish that unlawful

retaliation was defendant’s real reason for the December 2018 investigation and the pre-

disciplinary meeting. Upon review, the court agrees with the magistrate that “both

December investigations were triggered by employee incident reports, including one

plaintiff himself initiated[,] * * * and defendant had a duty to interview witnesses because

those incident reports had been filed.” Based on plaintiff’s own statements during these

interviews, defendant identified that plaintiff was not filing incident reports when he

witnessed policy violations of other TPWs. Therefore, the magistrate properly found “that

the pre-disciplinary meeting occurred because of the answers plaintiff gave during the

investigative interviews.”

Case No. 2019-01146JD -6- JUDGMENT ENTRY

{¶14} While plaintiff may disagree that the unreported violations at issue required

a formal incident report, defendant had an obligation to investigate and that investigation

illuminated plaintiff’s failure to properly report, which reasonably warranted retraining.

Generally, “it is not the role of the judiciary to ‘second guess the business judgments by

an employer making personnel decisions.’” Morrissette v. DFS Servs., LLC, 10th Dist.

Franklin No. 12AP-611, 2013-Ohio-4336, ¶ 40, quoting Manofsky v. Goodyear Tire &

Rubber Co., 69 Ohio App.3d 663, 669, 591 N.E.2d 752 (9th Dist.1990). Because there

is insufficient evidence to conclude that defendant held the pre-disciplinary meeting and

required plaintiff to retrain because plaintiff filed the September 2018 discrimination

charge with the OCRC/EEOC, the court will not substitute its judgment for defendant’s

regarding the implementation of its own incident reporting policies. See id., citing Brown

v. Renter’s Choice, Inc., 55 F.Supp.2d 788, 795 (N.D.Ohio 1999), quoting Nix v. WLCY

Radio/Rahall Communications, 738 F.2d 1181, 1187 (11th Cir.1984) (“An employer may

make employment decisions ‘for a good reason, a bad reason, a reason based on

erroneous facts, or for no reason at all, as long as its action is not for a discriminatory

reason.’”). Therefore, the court finds that the magistrate properly concluded that plaintiff

failed to prove that the real reason for the investigations and pre-disciplinary meeting was

unlawful retaliation and that he failed to present credible evidence to show a causal

relationship existed between the protected activity and the adverse employment actions.

Consequently, the Court OVERRULES plaintiff’s objections.

Conclusion

{¶15} For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that the magistrate properly

determined the factual issues and appropriately applied the law. The court OVERRULES

plaintiff’s objections. The Court adopts the magistrate’s decision and recommendation as

its own, and judgment shall be rendered in favor of defendant. Court costs are assessed

against Plaintiff. The clerk shall serve upon all parties notice of this judgment and its date

of entry upon the journal.

DAVID E. CAIN

Case No. 2019-01146JD -7- JUDGMENT ENTRY

Judge

Filed January 29, 2024

Sent to S.C. Reporter 2/15/24

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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