The opinion
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued November 7, 2023 Decided February 23, 2024
No. 22-7103
PABLO ABREU,
APPELLANT
v.
HOWARD UNIVERSITY,
APPELLEE
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:21-cv-00397)
Stewart Lee Karlin, pro hac vice, argued the cause for
appellant. On the briefs was Pablo Abreu, pro se.
Daniel I. Prywes argued the cause for appellee. With him
on the brief was Rebecca K. Connolly.
Before: WILKINS and KATSAS, Circuit Judges, and
ROGERS, Senior Circuit Judge.
Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge
ROGERS.
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ROGERS, Senior Circuit Judge: Pablo Abreu challenges his
expulsion as a student at the Howard University College of
Medicine. Reviving allegations in his complaint, he contends
that the University violated, in addition to contractual rights,
his civil rights under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities
Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) & (b)(2)(A)(ii), and the
Rehabilitation Act of 1972 (“Rehabilitation Act”), 29 U.S.C.
§ 794(a) & (b)(2)(A), by refusing him an additional
opportunity to take the first of three examinations required for
licensure in the United States in view of evidence of his test-
taking-anxiety disability. The district court dismissed the
amended complaint, ruling he failed to state a contract claim
and, upon applying a one-year statute of limitations where the
statutes were silent, the statutory claims were time-barred.
Mem. Op. (June 17, 2022) 3–6. Our subsequent decision in
Stafford v. George Washington University, 56 F.4th 50, 53
(D.C. Cir. 2022), held that a three-year statute of limitations
applied to civil rights claims under Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, which also did not include a
statute of limitations, and emphasized the importance of
uniform limitations periods in this context. Abreu’s statutory
claims are civil rights claims. Accordingly, the court reverses
the dismissal of Abreu’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims
as untimely and remands those claims to the district court for
further proceedings; otherwise, the court affirms the dismissal
of his complaint.
I.
Abreu completed the second year of the University’s four-
year medical program on April 19, 2017. Under its Policies
and Procedures, medical students are required to pass the first
of three examinations, required for licensure by the state
medical board of every U.S. state and the District of Columbia,
in three attempts or fewer before starting a third year of medical
3
school. The “[a]bsolute [d]eadline” for passing the first exam
is “the second Wednesday in July of the year following the one
in which [the student] successfully completed the sophomore
year,” and failure to meet that deadline results in dismissal.
How. Univ. Coll. of Medicine’s Policies & Procedures Manual
§ XVII(A)(3)(b) (2018–2019 ed.). Abreu’s deadline was July
11, 2018.
According to the complaint, while preparing for the first
examination, Abreu reported to the University administration
that he was struggling with practice examinations. Am. Compl.
¶¶ 14-15. He was granted additional time to prepare. Id. ¶ 16.
When he failed to pass the examination on September 20, 2017,
the University approved Abreu’s request for a leave of absence
to attend an “intensive preparatory program.” Id. ¶ 17. Abreu
attended the course, at his own expense, from January to
August of 2018. Id. ¶ 19. During that period a psychologist
screened Abreu positive for “Specific Phobia: Situational
Type” relating to severe test-taking anxiety, and Attention
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (“ADHD”), id. ¶ 20, and at
Abreu’s request reported these diagnoses on June 11, 2018 to
the University, id. ¶ 22. He was granted another extension of
time to take the first examination. Id. ¶¶ 22–23.
When Abreu again failed to pass the first examination by
the July 11 deadline, the University reviewed his academic
record and Abreu requested “one last opportunity” to pass the
first examination. Abreu Ltr. (Sept. 19, 2018). He was granted
a second leave of absence and an extension of the examination
deadline to June 1, 2019. University Ltr. (Nov. 9, 2018). On
June 10, 2019, the University claimed to have informed him
that he was out of compliance with the June 1 deadline; Abreu
denied receiving prior notice of the deadline. Am. Compl. ¶¶
32–33. Abreu failed the first examination for a third time on
June 22, 2019. Id. ¶ 33. He was expelled from the medical
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school program on August 27, 2019. University Ltr. (Aug. 27,
2019).
Abreu sued the University on February 12, 2021, alleging
a failure to accommodate under the ADA and Rehabilitation
Act, based on the denial of his requests for additional attempts
to take the first examination. Compl. ¶¶ 29–38. He also
alleged that the University breached its Policies and Procedures
by “dismiss[ing] [him] before the . . . stated cutoff date for
completion” of the examination. Id. ¶ 28. The district court
ruled that the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims were time
barred. Because neither Act included a statute of limitations,
the district court, looking to Jaiyeola v. District of Columbia,
40 A.3d 356 (D.C. 2012), ruled that a one-year statute of
limitations applied and dismissed the ADA and Rehabilitation
Act claims as time barred. Mem. Op. (Nov. 2, 2021) 7–8. The
district court also ruled that he failed to state a claim for breach
of contract and dismissed the complaint with leave to amend.
Id. at 9–10. In an amended complaint, Abreu added a claim for
breach of an implied contractual right to a reasonable
accommodation. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 41–49. The University
moved to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment.
The district court dismissed the amended complaint, and Abreu
appeals.
II.
The ADA and the Rehabilitation Act do not contain a
statute of limitations. Long v. Howard Univ., 512 F. Supp. 2d
1, 11 (D.D.C. 2007), aff'd, 550 F.3d 21 (D.C. Cir. 2008);
Alexander v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 826 F.3d
544, 551 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Where Congress is silent, the court
“do[es] not ordinarily assume that Congress intended that there
be no time limit on actions at all.” DelCostello v. Teamsters,
462 U.S. 151, 158 (1983). The “settled practice has been to
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adopt a local time limitation as federal law if it is not
inconsistent with federal law or policy to do so.” Wilson v.
Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266–67 (1985).
In finding the most appropriate or analogous D.C. statute
of limitations, the district court looked to Jaiyeola v. District of
Columbia, 40 A.3d 356, 368 (D.C. 2012). There the D.C.
Court of Appeals applied the one-year statute of limitations
from the D.C. Human Rights Act, D.C. CODE § 2-1403.16, to
federal Rehabilitation Act claims. Federal district courts in this
circuit applied the same one-year statute of limitations to ADA
claims. See, e.g., Arthur v. D.C. Hous. Auth., No. 18-cv-2037,
2020 WL 1821111, at *6–7 (D.D.C. Apr. 11, 2020); Brown v.
District of Columbia, No. 16-cv-0947, 2019 WL 4345710, at
*5 (D.D.C. Sept. 12, 2019).
Subsequent to the district court’s judgment in Abreu’s
case, this court in Stafford v. George Washington University,
56 F.4th 50, 52 (D.C. Cir. 2022), applied the three-year statute
of limitations for personal injury actions under D.C. law, D.C.
CODE § 12-301(8), to a Title VI discrimination claim. It
explained that “selecting the appropriate statute of limitations
in a federal civil rights action presents a question of federal, not
state, law.” Stafford, 56 F.4th at 54. It concluded that Jaiyeola
“conflicts with Wilson [v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985)] and
Goodman [v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987)].” Id. For
“a personal injury tort is the only single analogue that could
cover such diverse causes of action and accord civil rights
statutes ‘a sweep as broad as [their] language.’” Id. (quoting
Wilson, 471 U.S. at 272 (alteration in original)). Applying the
statute of limitations for personal injury claims “vindicate[s]
the federal interests underlying civil rights laws” by
“select[ing] a statutory period that applies to a large number of
civil claims,” which minimizes the potential for discrimination
in state law against federal claims. Id. (citing Wilson, 471 U.S.
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at 279). Because “discrimination is ‘a fundamental injury to
the individual rights of a person,’ [it is] a quintessential
personal injury.” Id. (quoting Goodman, 482 U.S. at 661). The
court emphasized the importance of a uniform statute of
limitations for civil rights claims: Uniformity “avoid[s]
‘bre[eding] chaos and uncertainty’” because the same statute of
limitations can be applied consistently across federal civil
rights claims. Id. at 55 (quoting Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235,
243 (1989) (second alteration in original)).
The University would distinguish Stafford because the
court was addressing Title VI rather than the ADA or
Rehabilitation Act. True, but this court’s reasoning in Stafford
applies to “civil rights claims” involving “discrimination.” 56
F.4th at 54. Abreu’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims are
civil rights claims alleging discrimination based on disability.
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 52, 56. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii); 29
U.S.C. § 794(a) & (b)(2)(A). Applying the statute of
limitations for personal injury to ADA and Rehabilitation Act
claims serves “the need for certainty and uniformity”
emphasized in Stafford, 56 F.4th at 55.
Upon applying the three-year statute of limitations,
Abreu’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims are not time
barred. He was expelled from the medical school on August
27, 2019, and filed suit on February 12, 2021. So the court
need not reach Abreu’s related contention that the four-year
default statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 1658, for
actions arising under federal statutes lacking a statute of
limitations and that were enacted after December 1, 1990,
applies here. The court also does not reach the question
whether tolling of statute of limitations for cases filed in the
D.C. Superior Court during the COVID-19 pandemic would
apply to claims filed in the federal court.
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Alternatively, the University maintains that even if the
three-year statute of limitations applies, the district court’s
dismissal of Abreu’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims
should be upheld based on the failure to state a claim.
Specifically, in its view, the accommodations sought were
neither “reasonable” nor “required, because they sought a
fundamental modification of the University’s academic
program and standards.” Appellee’s Br. at 31. The district
court did not reach that question, so this court remands for the
district court to address it in the first instance. See, e.g., Liberty
Prop. Tr. v. Rep. Prop. Corp., 577 F.3d 335, 341 (D.C. Cir.
2009).
The University also maintains that Abreu did not
adequately allege that he was a “qualified individual” under the
ADA and Rehabilitation Act. Appellee’s Br. at 35–36. This
argument was not raised in the district court and it is forfeited.
Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976); Simon v. Republic
of Hungary, 77 F.4th 1077, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 2023).
III.
Even assuming for the purpose of this appeal that the
University’s Policies and Procedures Manual is a contract,
Abreu impermissibly “tries to recast his ADA and
Rehabilitation Act claims as contract claims . . . to act in good
faith.” Mem. Op. (June 17, 2022) 5; Appellant’s Br. at 28.
Mutuality of legal obligations is lacking here. Under D.C. law,
a party must be obligated by the contract to do something not
otherwise required. Eastbanc, Inc. v. Georgetown Park
Assocs. II, L.P., 940 A.2d 996, 1003 (D.C. 2008). The
mandates in the ADA and Rehabilitation Act to grant
reasonable accommodations bind the University in any event.
Abreu raises no obligation beyond the laws with which the
University is obligated to comply to demonstrate the requisite
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mutuality of legal obligation under D.C. law. See Appellant’s
Br. at 30–31.
For the first time on appeal, Abreu relies on provisions of
the Policies and Procedures Manual regarding the University’s
statutory obligations under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act.
See Appellant’s Br. at 30–31 (citing 2015–2016 First Year
Handbook-Student Handbook-Policy and Procedure
Handbook at 20–21; Manual § IX(A), (C) & (D)). Taken as
Abreu presents them, these excerpts do no more than outline
the University’s commitment to follow existing law: “In
compliance with the law (Section 504, Rehabilitation Act and
the American[s] with Disabilities Act, ‘ADA’), [the]
University is committed to providing its disabled students with
reasonable accommodations.” Appellant’s Br. at 30 (quoting
2015–2016 First Year Handbook-Student Handbook-Policy
and Procedure Handbook at 20–21). Abreu’s citations, even
assuming his belated reliance on them does not bar his claim
on appeal, do not cure the mutuality-of-obligation defect of
Abreu’s contractual claim.
The district court also properly dismissed the portion of
Abreu’s breach-of-contract claim concerning the date of his
dismissal. The Manual required Abreu to pass the first of three
examinations for licensure by July 11, 2018. Manual
§ XVII(A)(3)(b). Abreu received an extension until June 1,
2019, but still had not passed the examination when the
University expelled him from the medical school on August 27,
2019. The district court correctly found that Abreu was not
expelled prematurely under the Manual and consequently
failed to state a claim for breach of contract.
Accordingly, the court affirms the dismissal of Abreu’s
contractual claims, reverses the dismissal of his ADA and
Rehabilitation Act claims as barred by a one-year statute of
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limitations, and remands his statutory claims to the district
court for further proceedings.