F. Boyd & D. Bradley v. PA's Sentencing Scheme for Sentencing 18 Year Old's to Mandatory Life w/o Parole A.G.

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Francis Boyd and David Bradley, :

Petitioners :

:

v. :

:

Pennsylvania’s Sentencing Scheme for :

Sentencing 18 Year Old’s to :

Mandatory Life without Parole :

Attorney General, : No. 543 M.D. 2022

Respondent : Submitted: December 4, 2023

BEFORE: HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge

OPINION BY

JUDGE COVEY FILED: February 16, 2024

Before this Court are the Office of Attorney General’s (AG)

preliminary objections (Preliminary Objections) to Francis Boyd’s (Boyd) and

David Bradley’s (Bradley) (collectively, Petitioners) pro se petition for review filed

in this Court’s original jurisdiction (Petition). After review, this Court sustains the

AG’s Preliminary Objection1 and dismisses the Petition with prejudice.

Petitioners are inmates currently incarcerated at the State Correctional

Institution at Chester.2 Boyd was convicted, inter alia, of second-degree murder, an

1

The AG asserted five Preliminary Objections; however, this Court sustains only one of

them.

2

www.inmatelocator.cor.pa.gov/#/Result (last visited Feb. 15, 2024). Boyd’s Inmate No.

is AF6974. Bradley’s Inmate No. is GS4862.

Although Bradley’s name appears in the caption, he signed the Petition (see Petition at 41),

and the Petition occasionally references Petitioners (see Petition at 1, 40), the Petition most often

refers to Boyd and Petitioner, and does not offer any facts or claims specific to Bradley.

offense he committed when he was 18 years old.3 See Petition at 11; see also

Commonwealth v. Boyd (Pa. Super. No. 2104 EDA 2017, filed July 30, 2018) (Boyd

I). As a result of his conviction, Boyd is serving a mandatory sentence of life without

parole (LWOP). See Petition at 11; see also Boyd I.

On June 25, 2012, the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court ruled in

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), that “mandatory [LWOP] for those under

the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment [to the U.S.

Constitution’s (Eighth Amendment)4] prohibition on cruel and unusual

punishments.”5 Id. at 465 (quotation marks omitted). On January 7, 2016, in

3

[O]n December 1, 1976, a jury found [Boyd] guilty of second-

degree murder, robbery, and related offenses stemming from a

shooting and robbery at a Philadelphia bar on June 3-4, 1976. On

February 9, 1977, [Boyd] received a sentence of life imprisonment

for second-degree murder, plus an aggregate, consecutive term of

15-30 years’ imprisonment for the remaining offenses. Th[e

Pennsylvania Superior] Court affirmed [Boyd’s] judgment of

sentence on October 19, 1979, and [Boyd] did not pursue any further

appeals. See Commonwealth v. Boyd, . . . 412 A.2d 588 (Pa. Super.

1979). [Boyd’s judgment of sentence became final on November

19, 1979.] We note that [Boyd] was [at least] 18 years old at the

time he committed his offenses in June of 1976.

Commonwealth v. Boyd (Pa. Super. No. 2104 EDA 2017, filed July 30, 2018) (Boyd I), slip op. at

1-2 (internal citations and emphasis omitted).

“[A] court may not ordinarily take judicial notice in one case of the records of another case,

whether in another court or its own, even though the contents of those records may be known to

the court.” Styers v. Bedford Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 900 A.2d 895, 899 (Pa. Super. 2006) (quoting

220 P’ship v. Phila. Elec. Co., 650 A.2d 1094, 1097 (Pa. Super. 1994)). However, a limited

exception to that general rule allows “a court [considering preliminary objections] to take notice

of a fact which the parties have admitted[,] or which is incorporated into the [petition] by reference

to a prior court action.” Guarrasi v. Scott, 25 A.3d 394, 398 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (quoting

Styers, 900 A.2d at 899). Here, Boyd referenced and incorporated Boyd I in his Petition. See

Petition at 1, 6-7.

4

U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines

imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).

5

The Pennsylvania Superior Court aptly described:

2

The Miller Court applied the scientific studies and principles set

forth in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 . . . (2005) [(wherein the

U.S. Supreme Court barred capital punishment for offenders under

18 years of age)], and Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 . . . (2010)

[(wherein the U.S. Supreme Court barred LWOP for offenders

under 18 who committed non-homicide offenses)], and concluded

the prohibition against mandatory life sentences pertained to

juveniles, in particular, in the case of Miller, to two [14-]year[-]olds.

The Miller Court noted the difficulty in distinguishing “at this early

age between ‘the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate

yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime

reflects irreparable corruption.’” Miller, 567 U.S. at 479 . . . [(]citing

Roper, 543 U.S. at 573 . . . and Graham, 560 U.S. at 68 . . . [)]. The

[U.S. Supreme] Court reasoned: “By making youth (and all that

accompanies it) irrelevant to imposition of that harshest prison

sentence, such a scheme poses too great a risk of disproportionate

punishment.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 479 . . . .

Commonwealth v. Lee, 206 A.3d 1, 9 (Pa. Super. 2019) (emphasis omitted).

The Miller Court expressly concluded:

[A] judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating

circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty for

juveniles. By requiring that all children convicted of homicide

receive lifetime incarceration without possibility of parole,

regardless of their age and age-related characteristics and the nature

of their crimes, the mandatory[]sentencing schemes before us

violate this principle of proportionality, and so the Eighth

Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.

Miller, 567 U.S. at 489.

Notably, in response to Miller, the Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted Section

1102.1(c) of the Crimes Code, which excepted persons under the age of 18 convicted of second-

degree murder after June 24, 2012, from the mandate that all persons convicted of second-degree

murder shall be sentenced to LWOP. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102.1(c). Further, the Pennsylvania

Superior Court held that

a mandatory sentence of a term of [LWOP] for a juvenile offender

in Pennsylvania is a violation of the Eighth Amendment . . . , as well

as [a]rticle I, [s]ection 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, PA.

CONST. art. I, § 13. [If a juvenile offender] was sentenced to a

mandatory sentence of [LWOP] for the commission of a second-

degree murder as a juvenile, [Pennsylvania] courts are constrained

3

Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016), the U.S. Supreme Court held that

Miller was a new substantive constitutional rule that was retroactive on state

collateral review. See Commonwealth v. Cobbs, 256 A.3d 1192 (Pa. 2021).

Among various amended filings Boyd made between May 2012 and

August 2016 in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas (trial court/PCRA

court), he sought relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA)6 pursuant to

Miller.7 See Boyd I. However, on May 30, 2017, the trial court denied Boyd’s PCRA

filings as untimely and, on July 30, 2018, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed

the trial court’s denials on appeal. See Boyd I. On August 28, 2018, Boyd filed a

petition for allowance of appeal in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which the

Supreme Court denied on July 2, 2019. See Commonwealth v. Boyd, 216 A.3d 227

(Pa. 2019). Thereafter,8 according to the Petition, Boyd filed an Application for

Permission to File a Second or Successive Petition Pursuant to Section 2254(b) of

the U.S. Code, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (relating to federal habeas corpus applications)

(Application), in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which that court

denied on January 14, 2022.9 See Petition at 2.

On November 14, 2022, Petitioners filed the Petition in this Court,

asserting that Pennsylvania’s scheme under which 18-year-olds may be sentenced to

mandatory LWOP for second-degree murder violates the Eighth Amendment and

to vacate the judgment of sentence and remand the case to the trial

court for resentencing.

Commonwealth v. Knox, 50 A.3d 732, 745 (Pa. Super. 2012).

6

42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

7

The specific dates on which Boyd filed the relevant PCRA claims are not evident in the

Petition.

8

The filing date is not apparent in the Petition.

9

The content of the Application is not clear in the Petition.

4

article I, section 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.10 Petitioners represent in the

Petition:

[Boyd] is not claiming that he falls within the holding of

Miller. He concedes that the [U.S.] Constitution does not

protect 18-year[-]olds from receiving a mandatory

sentence of [LWOP] and that under the current federal

precedent, the Eighth Amendment . . . does not prohibit

such sentences. [Boyd] is claiming that under

Pennsylvania [s]tate [s]tatutes and the Pennsylvania

Constitution, he was not considered an “adult” during the

time that he committed his crime, and therefore fall[s]

within the ambit of the rationale of Miller [(i.e., the

immature brain theory)] . . . . Every Court in the land is

bound by the Supremacy Clause [of the U.S. Constitution,

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2].

Petition at 13 (italic emphasis added). Petitioners specifically contend that since an

adult is defined under Pennsylvania law as “[a]n individual 21 years of age or

over[,]” Section 1991 of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1991,

an 18-year-old is a minor to whom the Miller rationale should apply. See Petition at

11-12. Petitioners add that Miller and Montgomery do not preclude Pennsylvania

from establishing its own standards to LWOP sentences, see Jones v. Mississippi,

10

Article I, section 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides: “Excessive bail shall not

be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel punishments inflicted.” PA. CONST. art. I, §

13.

“Pennsylvania courts have repeatedly and unanimously held that the

Pennsylvania prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is

coextensive with the Eighth [Amendment] and [the] Fourteenth

Amendment[] to the [U.S.] Constitution[, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV

(relating to due process and equal protection)], and that the

Pennsylvania Constitution affords no broader protection against

excessive sentences than that provided by the Eighth

Amendment . . . .” Commonwealth v. Elia, 83 A.3d 254, 267 (Pa.

Super. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Accordingly, we only need to review [Petitioners’] claim under the

Eighth Amendment.

Commonwealth v. Ishankulov, 275 A.3d 498, 505 (Pa. Super. 2022).

5

593 U.S. 98 (2021), and they urge this Court to “draw its own line” for persons who

were 18 years old when they committed their crimes. Petition at 2.

On January 12, 2023, the AG filed its Preliminary Objections and a

brief in support thereof, asserting: (1) Petitioners failed to effectuate proper service

on the AG pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure (Rule) 1514(c);

(2) this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear a collateral challenge to Petitioners’ criminal

sentences because Petitioners’ claims fall outside Section 761 of the Judicial Code,

42 Pa.C.S. § 761; (3) the AG is not a proper party to this action because the AG

cannot set the date on which Petitioners would be eligible for parole; (4) Petitioners

failed to exhaust their administrative remedies under the PCRA; and (5) Petitioners

failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted (demurrer). On February

15, 2023, Petitioners filed an answer opposing the AG’s Preliminary Objections.

Petitioners did not file a brief opposing the Preliminary Objections.11

Initially, Rule 1516(b) authorizes the filing of preliminary objections to

an original jurisdiction petition for review. See Pa.R.A.P. 1516(b).

In ruling on preliminary objections, [this Court] must

accept as true all well-pleaded material allegations in the

petition for review, as well as all inferences reasonably

deduced therefrom. The Court need not accept as true

conclusions of law, unwarranted inferences from facts,

argumentative allegations, or expressions of opinion. In

order to sustain preliminary objections, it must appear with

certainty that the law will not permit recovery, and any

doubt should be resolved by a refusal to sustain them.

A preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer admits

every well-pleaded fact in the [petition for review] and all

inferences reasonably deducible therefrom. It tests the

11

By March 3, 2023 Order, this Court directed Petitioners to file their opposing brief on or

before April 3, 2023. By May 9, 2023 Order, this Court directed Petitioners to file their opposing

brief on or before May 23, 2023, or the Court would proceed to decide the matter without it.

Because Petitioners did not timely file an opposing brief, this Court will proceed to decide the

matter without it.

6

legal sufficiency of the challenged pleadings and will be

sustained only in cases where the pleader has clearly failed

to state a claim for which relief can be granted. When

ruling on a demurrer, a court must confine its analysis to

the [petition for review].

Torres v. Beard, 997 A.2d 1242, 1245 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (citations omitted).

Nonetheless, “[c]ourts reviewing preliminary objections may not only consider the

facts pled in the [petition for review], but also any documents or exhibits attached to

it.” Foxe v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 214 A.3d 308, 310 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019) (quoting

Allen v. Dep’t of Corr., 103 A.3d 365, 369 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014)).

Because it is dispositive, this Court first addresses whether this Court

lacks jurisdiction over this matter (Second Preliminary Objection). The

Pennsylvania Supreme Court has articulated:

Article V, [s]ection 4 of the Pennsylvania Constitution,

adopted April 23, 1968, created the Commonwealth Court

and stated that [it] shall “have such jurisdiction as shall be

provided by law.” [PA. CONST. art. V, § 4.] The General

Assembly enacted Section 761 of the Judicial Code, which

conferred the Commonwealth Court with original and

exclusive jurisdiction over certain cases, including civil

actions or proceedings against government agencies and

officials. The conferral of original and exclusive

jurisdiction creates subject[ ]matter jurisdiction in the

Commonwealth Court for the specified classes of claims.

Scott v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 284 A.3d 178, 186 (Pa. 2022). Section 761(a) of

the Judicial Code provides, in relevant part:

The Commonwealth Court shall have original

jurisdiction of all civil actions or proceedings:

(1) Against the Commonwealth government, including

any officer thereof, acting in his official capacity, except:

(i) actions or proceedings in the nature of

applications for a writ of habeas corpus or post-

7

conviction relief not ancillary to proceedings

within the appellate jurisdiction of the court[.12]

42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a) (bold and underline emphasis added).

Correspondingly, the General Assembly created the PCRA as “the sole

means of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and

statutory remedies for the same purpose that exist when this subchapter takes effect,

including habeas corpus and coram nobis.” Section 9542 of the PCRA, 42 Pa.C.S.

§ 9542. Moreover, Section 9545(a) of the PCRA specifies, in pertinent part:

“Original jurisdiction over a proceeding under [the PCRA] shall be in the court

of common pleas.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(a) (emphasis added). Accordingly, this Court

lacks jurisdiction to decide this matter and may transfer it to the proper trial court.

See Dockery v. Wolf, 259 A.3d 566 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021).

However, Section 9545(b)(1) of the PCRA provides that petitions filed

pursuant to the PCRA, including a second or subsequent petition, generally “shall

be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final.” 42 Pa.C.S. §

9545(b)(1). Section 9545(b)(1) of the PCRA offers exceptions to the PCRA petition

filing deadline only when

the petition alleges and the petitioner proves that:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result

of interference by government officials with the

presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution

or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws

of the [U.S.];

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were

unknown to the petitioner and could not have been

ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was

recognized by the Supreme Court of the [U.S.] or the

12

“Postconviction relief . . . is not part of the criminal proceeding itself, and it is . . .

considered to be civil in nature.” Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 556-57 (1987).

8

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period

provided in this section and has been held by that court to

apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). Thus, in those three limited circumstances, “[a]ny petition

invoking an exception provided in [Section 9545(b)(1) of the PCRA] . . . shall be

filed within one year of the date the claim could have been presented.”13 Section

9545(b)(2) of the PCRA, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).

Regardless of which limitations period applies (one year after final

judgment or one year after the U.S. or Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognizes a

new, retroactive constitutional right), “[i]t is well settled that ‘[t]he PCRA’s

timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in nature and must be strictly

construed; courts may not address the merits of the issues raised in a petition if

it is not timely filed.’” Commonwealth v. Towles, 300 A.3d 400, 415 (Pa. 2023)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d 1263, 1267-68 (Pa. 2008)

(emphasis added)); see also Commonwealth v. McGee, 302 A.3d 659, 667 (Pa. 2023)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Jackson, 30 A.3d 516, 523 (Pa. Super. 2011) (“[W]hen

the one-year filing deadline of [S]ection 9545 [of the PCRA] has expired, and no

statutory exception has been pled or proven, a PCRA court cannot invoke inherent

jurisdiction to correct orders, judgments and decrees, even if the error is patent and

obvious.”)); Commonwealth v. Lee, 206 A.3d 1, 11 (Pa. Super. 2019) (“It is not [a]

[c]ourt’s role to override the gatekeeping function of the PCRA time-bar and create

jurisdiction where it does not exist.”). “The PCRA’s strict one-year limit on filing a

petition reflects the General Assembly’s intent to accord finality to the criminal

process.” Scott, 284 A.3d at 187.

13

Until October 24, 2018, when the General Assembly amended Section 9545(b)(2) of the

PCRA, the time for filing a petition was 60 days from the date the claim could have been presented.

See 2018 Pa. Legis. Serv. Act 2018-146 (S.B. 915), effective as of December 24, 2018. The

amendment applies only to claims arising one year before the December 24, 2018 effective date

or thereafter.

9

In the instant matter, Boyd’s judgment of sentence became final on

November 19, 1979. Boyd could not have filed a PCRA petition based on Miller

until Miller was decided on June 25, 2012. The Boyd I Court clearly reviewed

Boyd’s claim under the newly-recognized constitutional right exception in Section

9545(b)(1)(iii) of the PCRA, based on Miller, at some point after the Montgomery

Court ruled in 2016 that Miller applied retroactively. The Boyd I Court declared

that, although Miller applied retroactively,

[Boyd] has not demonstrated that the rule created in Miller

applies to him. . . . [Boyd] was - at best - nearly [18½]

years old at the time of the underlying crimes. Th[e

Pennsylvania Superior] Court has explained that

“petitioners who were older than 18 at the time they

committed murder are not within the ambit of the Miller

decision and therefore may not rely on that decision to

bring themselves within the time-bar exception in Section

9545(b)(1)(iii) [of the PCRA].” See Commonwealth v.

Furgess, 149 A.3d 90, 94 (Pa. Super. 2016); see also

Commonwealth v. Woods, 179 A.3d 37, 38, 44 (Pa. Super.

2017) (determining that Miller did not apply to the

appellant’s case where the appellant was 18 years and 36

days old when he committed his crime). Thus, [Boyd]

cannot establish a timeliness exception on this basis.

Boyd I, slip op. at 8-9. The Boyd I Court concluded that since Boyd’s claim did not

fall under the exception in Section 9545(b)(1)(iii) of the PCRA, it was untimely and,

thus, the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to proceed to decide the merits of Boyd’s

PCRA claims.

In the current PCRA Petition, relying on Lee, Petitioners assert that

because their brains were underdeveloped when they committed their crimes, they

could not form the requisite intent for second-degree murder and, applying Miller’s

rationale (rather than its holding), they were less culpable and, therefore, entitled to

10

relief.14 According to Petitioners, “this Court can do what the [Lee C]ourt couldn’t

do, which is hear [P]etitioner[s’] claims.” Petition at 17.

Although it is not clear in the Petition precisely when Boyd amended

his 2012 PCRA petition to invoke Miller, the Boyd I Court clearly determined in

2018 that Boyd’s claim was late-filed. It is no less late-filed now. Eleven years have

passed since the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller. Seven years have passed since

the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Miller applied retroactively. Lee cannot satisfy

Section 9545(b)(1)(iii) of the PCRA because it did not present “a constitutional right

that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the [U.S.] or the Supreme Court of

Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that

court to apply retroactively.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii). However, even if this

Court was to consider that Petitioners based their new claim on Lee’s immature brain

theory, Lee was decided on March 1, 2019, and Petitioners filed the subject Petition

more than three and one-half years later, on November 14, 2022.15

14

Lee ask[ed] th[e Pennsylvania Superior] Court to expand the

holding in Miller to apply to her, as one over the age of 18 at the

time of her offense who allege[d] “characteristics of youth” that

render[ed] her categorically less culpable under Miller. Miller, 567

U.S. at 472-73 . . . . Lee characterize[d] this argument as “rationale

versus holding.” She argue[d] that Miller must be construed to

include not only the narrow holding identified in [Commonwealth

v.] Cintora[, 69 A.3d 759 (Pa. Super. 2013), abrogation on other

grounds recognized in Furgess] and Furgess, and more recently,

th[e] [Superior] Court’s en banc decision in . . . Montgomery, but

also the underlying reasoning, scientific principles, and well-

established rationale upon which the [U.S. Supreme] Court in Miller

and Montgomery relied.

Lee, 206 A.3d at 7 (emphasis omitted).

15

Lee also fails to wholly support Petitioners’ claim on the merits. The Lee Court

concluded that Miller’s prohibition on mandatory LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders as cruel

and unusual punishment did not extend to Lee who, despite her argument that her brain was

11

Moreover, the Lee Court observed:

In Commonwealth v. Chambers, 35 A.3d 34 (Pa. Super.

2011), . . . Chambers filed an untimely PCRA petition and

sought to establish that he had satisfied the exception

contained in [S]ection 9545(b)(1)(iii) [of the PCRA] by

arguing that the rationale utilized by the [U.S.] Supreme

Court establishing a new constitutional right in Graham

[v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010)], entitled him to relief. . . .

underdeveloped at time of her crime, like Petitioners, was over the age of 18 when she committed

second-degree murder. The Lee Court reasoned:

The express age limit, however, though arguably not critical to the

Miller holding, is, in our opinion, essential to an orderly and

practical application of the law. Conceptually, there may not be any

statistically significant difference between the mental maturity of a

17-year-old and an 18-year-old, or an 18-year-old and a 19-year-old,

and so the question becomes, where do we draw the line?

Drawing the line at 18 years of age is subject, of course, to

the objections always raised against categorical rules. The

qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not

disappear when an individual turns 18. By the same token,

some under 18 have already attained a level of maturity

some adults will never reach. [H]owever, a line must be

drawn. . . . The age of 18 is the point where society draws

the line for many purposes between childhood and

adulthood. It is, we conclude, the age at which the line for

death eligibility ought to rest.

Roper . . . , 543 U.S. at 574 . . . (holding Eighth Amendment . . .

prohibits imposition of death penalty for crime committed by

juvenile).

We recognize that the principles underlying the Miller holding are

more general; who qualifies as a “juvenile” and whether Miller

applies to Lee are better characterized as questions on the merits,

not as preliminary jurisdictional questions under [S]ection

9545(b)(1)(iii) [of the PCRA]. As compelling as the “rationale”

argument is, we find it untenable to extend Miller to one who is over

the age of 18 at the time of his or her offense for purposes of

satisfying the newly-recognized constitutional right exception in

[S]ection 9545(b)(1)(iii) [of the PCRA].

Lee, 206 A.3d at 9-10 (emphasis omitted).

12

....

Concluding Chambers misapprehended the scope of the

timeliness exception embodied in [Section] 9545(b)(1)(iii)

[of the PCRA], [the Pennsylvania Superior Court] stated:

For purposes of deciding whether the timeliness

exception to the PCRA based on the creation of a

new constitutional right is applicable, the

distinction between the holding of a case and its

rationale is crucial since only a precise creation

of a constitutional right can afford a petitioner

relief. . . . [T]he rationale used by the [U.S.]

Supreme Court is irrelevant to the evaluation of a

[Section] 9545(b)(1)(iii) [of the PCRA] timeliness

exception to the PCRA, as the right must be one

that has been expressly recognized by either the

Pennsylvania or [U.S.] Supreme Court. Thus, for

the purpose of the timeliness exception to the

PCRA, only the holding of the case is relevant.

Chambers, 35 A.3d at 40-43 ([italic] emphasis added).

Here, as in Chambers, Lee is not basing her argument on

any newly-recognized constitutional right as

contemplated by the PCRA. For this reason, we find Lee’s

reliance on . . . the principle that stare decisis directs courts

to adhere not only to holdings of prior cases, but also to

explications of the governing rules of law, is misplaced.

“While rationales that support holdings are used by

courts to recognize new rights, this judicial tool is not

available to PCRA petitioners.” Chambers, [35 A.3d] at

42. See also Seminole Tribe [of Fl. v. Florida], 517 U.S.

[44,] 67 [(1996)] (“When an opinion issues for the Court,

it is not only the result but also those portions of the

opinion necessary to that result by which we are bound.”).

Simply put, that principle is not applicable in the context

of collateral review.

Lee, 206 A.3d at 10-11 (bold citation emphasis omitted; bold text emphasis added).

Petitioners’ same arguments are similarly unavailing here.

Because the Petition is late-filed and in the absence of an applicable

exception under Section 9545(b)(1) of the PCRA, even if this Court transferred the

13

matter to the trial court, the trial court “cannot invoke inherent jurisdiction” to rule

on the Petition. McGee, 302 A.3d at 667 (quoting Jackson, 30 A.3d at 523).

Accordingly, notwithstanding that this Court could transfer this matter to the trial

court, see Dockery, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that transfer of a case

to the trial court/PCRA court is not warranted where a PCRA petition would be

dismissed as untimely. See Scott. “As there is no possibility that the result would

be any different, judicial economy dictates that” this Court sustain the Second

Preliminary Objection and dismiss the Petition. Id. at 198.

Based on the foregoing, the AG’s Second Preliminary Objection is

sustained, and the Petition is dismissed with prejudice.

_________________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

14

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Francis Boyd and David Bradley, :

Petitioners :

:

v. :

:

Pennsylvania’s Sentencing Scheme for :

Sentencing 18 Year Old’s to :

Mandatory Life without Parole :

Attorney General, : No. 543 M.D. 2022

Respondent :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 16th day of February, 2024, the Office of Attorney

General’s second preliminary objection is SUSTAINED, and Francis Boyd’s and

David Bradley’s petition for review is DISMISSED with prejudice.

_________________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge