The opinion
J-S27003-23
2024 PA Super 20
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JUAN EVANGALIST PERALTA :
:
Appellant : No. 291 MDA 2023
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 21, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-06-CR-0004236-2021
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
OPINION BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED: FEBRUARY 8, 2024
Juan Evangalist Peralta, Appellant, appeals from the judgment of
sentence of 45 to 90 days of incarceration following his conviction for illegally
operating a vehicle not equipped with an ignition interlock. Appellant argues
that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he was required to only drive
vehicles that contained such equipment. After careful review, we determine
that the Commonwealth failed to prove Appellant had adequate notice of his
obligations, as the statute required the Department of Transportation
(“PennDOT”) to inform Appellant of his ongoing obligation to drive with an
interlock device unless and until he obtained an unrestricted license. We thus
reverse Appellant’s conviction and vacate his judgment of sentence for that
offense. We affirm his judgment of sentence in all other respects.
On August 17, 2021, Sergeant Mark McCreary was monitoring traffic
when his license plate reader triggered an alert that a passing vehicle’s
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registration was expired.1 After confirming the result, Sergeant McCreary
stopped the vehicle, which was driven by Appellant. Appellant handed over
an expired registration, expired insurance cards, and his driver’s license,
which “indicated the ignition interlock requirement.” N.T., 11/16/22, at 22.
The Commonwealth introduced photographs and body camera footage
showing the interior of the vehicle, which did not contain an ignition interlock
device.
The Commonwealth entered into evidence a copy of Appellant’s certified
driving history provided by PennDOT to the Commonwealth. That document
showed that Appellant refused breath testing on July 21, 2018, resulting in a
one-year suspension effective September 7, 2018. The history further states
that his operating privileges were restored on January 14, 2020. Additionally,
there is a section with a header line of “interlock limited license (II LL).” Below
this heading, the following fields are listed, each of which is blank: II LL
License Class; II LL License Issued; II LL License Expires; II LL License Status.
Id. at 62 (Commonwealth’s Exhibit C-2) (some capitalization omitted).
However, at a different part of the same page, below Appellant’s date of birth
and sex, the following text appears: “Record Type: Ignition Interlock License.”
Id.
The trial court questioned Sergeant McCreary about these entries,
observing that the document “just says restoration of operating privileges
____________________________________________
1 The vehicle was not registered to Appellant.
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January 14, 2020. So that would indicate that … his operating privileges were
restored. Now, that may mean that he still was under this additional
requirement of the interlock[,] but his operating privileges are restored. It
doesn’t say that.” Id. at 48. The officer replied, “I would agree with you.
That was how I interpreted it.” Id. The trial court additionally remarked,
“Okay. Explain to me why it would … appear that … according to the first
page[,] there’s no information about an interlock limited license. And then at
the bottom of the second page it says that he is restored in January of ‘20.”
Id. at 49. Sergeant McCreary pointed out that the first page of the document
indicated that Appellant had an ignition interlock license, and he reiterated
that Appellant was in possession of a driver’s license that had an interlock
designation.
Appellant was convicted of one count of illegally operating a motor
vehicle not equipped with ignition interlock, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3808, as well as the
summary offenses of unlawfully operating a vehicle without an emission
inspection sticker and unlawfully operating a vehicle without a certificate of
inspection. The trial court imposed the above-stated sentence on Appellant.
Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion, which was denied, and a timely
notice of appeal from that order. Appellant then filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
concise statement of matters complained of on appeal. The trial court filed a
Rule 1925(a) opinion, and we now review Appellant’s two appellate claims:
1. Whether the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to
support the verdict in that the Commonwealth failed to establish
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beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of illegally operating a
motor vehicle not equipped with ignition interlock?
2. Whether the verdicts of guilty of illegally operating a motor
vehicle not equipped with ignition interlock, unlawful operation of
vehicle without emission inspection, and operation of vehicle
without official certificate of inspection was contrary to the weight
of the evidence presented at trial?
Appellant’s Brief at 8 (footnotes omitted).2
Appellant’s first issue challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
convict him of the interlock offense. Our standard of review is well-settled:
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine
whether the evidence admitted at trial and all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to
the Commonwealth as verdict winner, is sufficient to prove every
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. As an
appellate court, we may not re-weigh the evidence and substitute
our judgment for that of the fact-finder. Any question of doubt is
for the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive
that as a matter of law no probability of fact can be drawn from
the combined circumstances.
Commonwealth v. Thomas, 988 A.2d 669, 670 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citations
omitted).
Before discussing the parties’ arguments, for ease of disposition, we first
set forth the relevant statutes and Appellant’s obligations under those
provisions. As a prefatory matter, the definition section of the Vehicle Code,
75 Pa.C.S. § 102, defines the term “ignition interlock limited license” (“IILL”)
as follows:
____________________________________________
2 Appellant stated in the accompanying footnotes that, upon further review,
his challenges to the weight and sufficiency of the summary offenses are
without merit. As such, he has abandoned those challenges on appeal, and
we do not address them.
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A driver’s license issued to an individual whose operating privilege
is suspended or revoked for one or more violations under section
1547 (relating to chemical testing to determine amount of alcohol
or controlled substance) or 3802 (relating to driving under
influence of alcohol or controlled substance) or under former
section 3731 (relating to driving under influence of alcohol or
controlled substance) or a violation substantially similar to a
violation under section 3802 or former section 3731 in another
jurisdiction, requiring the individual to operate only motor vehicles
equipped with a functioning ignition interlock system.
75 Pa.C.S. § 102.
Next, Section 3808(a) of the Vehicle Code codifies the criminal offense
at issue, as follows:
(a) Offense defined.--
(1) An individual required to only drive, operate or be in
actual physical control of the movement of a motor vehicle
equipped with an ignition interlock system under any of the
following who drives, operates or is in actual physical control
of the movement of a motor vehicle within this
Commonwealth without such a system commits a
misdemeanor and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to
pay a fine of not less than $300 and not more than $1,000
and to imprisonment for not more than 90 days:
(i) Section 1556 (relating to ignition interlock limited
license).
(ii) Section 3805 (relating to ignition interlock).
(iii) A requirement by another jurisdiction to operate
only a vehicle with an ignition interlock system.
75 Pa.C.S. § 3808(a).
Sections 3808(a)(1)(i) and (ii) govern when an individual must obtain
an IILL. For ease of discussion, we begin with the first four subsections of
Section 3805:
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(a) General rule.--Except as provided under subsection (a.1), if
a person violates section 3802 (relating to driving under influence
of alcohol or controlled substance) or has had their operating
privileges suspended pursuant to section 1547 (relating to
chemical testing to determine amount of alcohol or controlled
substance) or 3808(c) (relating to illegally operating a motor
vehicle not equipped with ignition interlock) and the person seeks
a restoration of operating privileges, the department shall require
as a condition of issuing a restricted license pursuant to this
section that the following occur:
(1) Any motor vehicle to be operated by the individual has
been equipped with an ignition interlock system and
remains so for the duration of the restricted license period.
(2) If there are no motor vehicles owned or to be operated
by the person or registered to the person that the person so
certify to the department in accordance with the
department’s regulations.
(a.1) Exception.--Subsection (a) shall not apply to an individual
who meets all of the following:
(1) Is subject to the penalties under section 3804(a)(1)
(relating to penalties) or subject to mandatory suspension
of operating privilege under section 3807(d) (relating to
Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition).
(2) Has not had a prior offense, as defined under section
3806 (relating to prior offenses).
(b) Application for a restricted license.--A person subject to
this section shall apply to the department for an ignition interlock
restricted license[3] under section 1951 (relating to driver’s license
and learner’s permit), which shall be clearly marked to restrict the
person to only driving, operating or being in actual physical control
of the movement of motor vehicles equipped with an ignition
interlock system. Upon issuance of an ignition interlock restricted
____________________________________________
3 The phrase “ignition interlock restricted license” is not defined. As noted
supra, the definitions section of the Vehicle Code defines the phrase “ignition
interlock limited license.” Moreover, Section 1951 of the Vehicle Code is the
general provision for issuing licenses and it does not contain any reference to
IILLs. In context, it appears the word “restricted” is used in the ordinary
sense.
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license to any person, the department shall notify the person that
until the person obtains an unrestricted license the person may
not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement
of any motor vehicle which is not equipped with an ignition
interlock system.
(c) Issuance of unrestricted license.--One year from the date
of issuance of an ignition interlock restricted license under this
section, if otherwise eligible, a person may be issued a
replacement license under section 1951(d) that does not contain
the ignition interlock system restriction. The department shall not
issue an unrestricted license until a person has presented all of
the following:
(1) Proof that the person has completed the ignition
interlock restricted license period under this section.
(2) Certification by the vendor that provided the ignition
interlock device that the person has complied with
subsection (h.2).
(d) Prohibition.--Except as set forth in subsections (e) and (f),
until the person obtains an unrestricted license, the person may
not own, register, drive, operate or be in actual physical control
of the movement of any motor vehicle within this Commonwealth
unless the motor vehicle is equipped with an ignition interlock
system.
75 Pa.C.S. § 3805(a)-(d).
According to the certified driving record, Appellant refused chemical
testing and received a 12-month license suspension, as set forth by Section
1547(b)(1)(i) of the Vehicle Code:
(b) Civil penalties for refusal.--
(1) If any person placed under arrest for a violation of
section 3802 is requested to submit to chemical testing and
refuses to do so, the testing shall not be conducted but upon
notice by the police officer, the department shall suspend
the operating privilege of the person as follows:
(i) Except as set forth in subparagraph (ii), for a
period of 12 months.
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75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(b)(1)(i).
Due to this suspension, Appellant was required to obtain an IILL by
virtue of Section 3805(a) if he wished to have his operating privileges
restored. According to the certified driving record, Appellant’s operating
privileges were restored on January 14, 2020. Because Appellant possessed
a driver’s license indicating that he was required to use an ignition interlock
device, it follows that he applied for the IILL. Subsection (b) required
Appellant to “apply to the department for an ignition interlock restricted
license,” and once that license was issued, subsection (c) is triggered. That
subsection states that the person must use the ignition interlock system for a
period of one year. Afterwards, the person may apply for a regular driver’s
license without the restrictions.
Subsection (d), which states that “until the person obtains an
unrestricted license, the person may not own, register, drive, operate or be in
actual physical control of the movement of any motor vehicle within this
Commonwealth unless the motor vehicle is equipped with an ignition interlock
system,” is relevant because the incident date in this case was more than one
year after Appellant was eligible to apply for a regular license. Accordingly,
the plain text of the statute means that Appellant was required to drive with
an ignition interlock system unless and until he satisfied statutory criteria for
obtaining an unrestricted license.
To obtain that license, the statute requires the holder of an IILL to prove
their compliance with whatever ignition interlock device the operator selected.
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“An ignition interlock system required to be installed under this title must be
a system which has been approved by the department. The department’s
approval of ignition interlock systems shall be published in the Pennsylvania
Bulletin.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 3805(h). Subsection (h.2) requires the vendor to
certify compliance, and the IILL holder must provide that documentation to
PennDOT. 75 Pa.C.S. § 3805(c)(2). Additionally, as cited within this
subsection, Section 1556 deals with IILLs. Subsection (a) of that statute
addresses the general standards for issuing an IILL as follows:
(a) Issuance.--
(1) The department shall issue an ignition interlock limited
license under this section to an individual whose operating
privileges have been suspended or revoked for:
***
(ii) a refusal to submit to chemical testing under
section 1547 (relating to chemical testing to
determine amount of alcohol or controlled substance).
(2) The department shall issue an ignition interlock limited
license under the provisions of this section only upon
receiving proof that any motor vehicle to be operated by the
individual has been equipped with an approved ignition
interlock system as defined in section 3801 (relating to
definitions) as a condition of issuing an ignition interlock
limited license. Any vehicle to be operated by the individual,
during any period in which the individual holds a valid
ignition interlock limited license, must be equipped with an
ignition interlock system.
(3) An ignition interlock limited license issued under the
provisions of this section permits an individual to operate
motor vehicles equipped with a functioning ignition interlock
system, as defined in section 3801.
(4) Any period in which an individual holds a valid ignition
interlock limited license under this section shall be counted
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toward satisfaction of any mandatory period of ignition
interlock use imposed under section 3805 (relating to
ignition interlock) arising from the same incident.
75 Pa.C.S. § 1556(a).4
With these provisions in mind, we now set forth the parties’ arguments.
Appellant cites the certified driving history, which established that his driving
privileges were restored on January 14, 2020, and emphasizes that the first
page of that document “fails to provide any information in the ‘Interlock
Limited License’ column but does note that his driver’s license issue date was
Jan. 14, 2020.” Appellant’s Brief at 28. Appellant argues that Section 3808
is not a strict liability offense, citing analogous cases holding that the
Commonwealth must establish notice that an offender was aware that their
license had been suspended. Appellant argues that the Commonwealth failed
to show that PennDOT complied with Section 3808(b), which states PennDOT
____________________________________________
4 The reference in paragraph (4) of time counting towards the mandatory
requirements of Section 3805 is because other portions of Section 1556 permit
individuals whose license is suspended due to certain DUI offenses to request
an IILL before their full period of suspension expires. In Appellant’s case, the
underlying basis for using an IILL was a suspension under 75 Pa.C.S. §
1547(b)(1)(i). He would have been eligible to request an IILL six months into
his suspension pursuant to Section 1556(f):
(f) Suspension eligibility.--The following shall apply:
(1) An individual whose license has been suspended under
section 1547(b) shall be eligible to apply for and, if
otherwise qualified, be issued an ignition interlock limited
license under this section if the individual:
(i) has served six months of the suspension imposed
under section 1547(b)(1)(i)….
75 Pa.C.S. § 1556(f).
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“shall notify the person that until the person obtains an unrestricted license
the person may not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the
movement of any motor vehicle which is not equipped with an ignition
interlock system.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 3805(b). Appellant argues that he cannot be
expected to show that he did not receive this notice, as this would force him
to prove his own innocence.
The Commonwealth, in contrast, does not view its failure to show that
the Section 3808(b) notice requirements were given as relevant because of
the principle that ignorance of the law is no excuse. The Commonwealth
argues that the statute put Appellant on notice of his obligations, as the
statute specified that an IILL holder must use an ignition interlock device until
a replacement license is issued and, to obtain that license, Appellant had to
prove to PennDOT that he complied with the ignition interlock requirements.
Whether this statute requires notice and, if so, what type of notice,
appears to be an issue of first impression. We agree with Appellant that
precedents involving 75 Pa.C.S. § 1543 are analogous. Section 1543(b) of
the Vehicle Code states that a person is guilty of that offense if he or she
“drives … at a time when the person’s operating privilege is suspended or
revoked” due to certain enumerated offenses related to DUIs. Case law holds
that the Commonwealth is required to show that the offender had notice of
the suspension. Appellant cites Commonwealth v. Crockford, 660 A.2d
1326, 1327 (Pa. Super. 1995) (en banc), which aptly summarized the
applicable principles of law. “The seminal case in this area is Commonwealth
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v. Kane, … 333 A.2d 925 ([Pa.] 1975), which held that it is necessary for the
Commonwealth to prove that the accused had actual notice of suspension in
order to convict of driving while under suspension.” Id. at 1328. “Notice is,
therefore, a judicially created element, designed to protect a defendant’s due
process rights.” Id. at 1329.
The Kane holding recognizes that there is often a lag between a
conviction and the collateral consequence of license suspension. We see that
gap here; the certified driving record shows that Appellant refused a breath
test on July 21, 2018, and the official notice of suspension was mailed August
3, 2018, and made effective September 7, 2018. Without notice, Appellant
would not know when his license became suspended. Thus, we agree that
notice of the ignition interlock restriction is necessary.
Briefly, we note that Appellant describes this notice component as
implicating mens rea. “The term mens rea is Latin for guilty mind and is
defined as ‘[t]he state of mind that the prosecution, to secure a conviction,
must prove that a defendant had when committing a crime[.]’”
Commonwealth v. Andre, 17 A.3d 951, 958 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation
omitted; bracketing in original). The General Assembly has enacted Section
302 of the Crimes Code, which supplies defaults in the absence of a statutory
mens rea requirement. Commonwealth v. Moran, 104 A.3d 1136, 1149
(Pa. 2014) (stating that our Supreme Court has “repeatedly held § 302
provides the default level of culpability where a criminal statute does not
include an express mens rea”). Under the default provision of Section 302(c),
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“[w]hen the culpability sufficient to establish a material element of an offense
is not prescribed by law, such element is established if a person acts
intentionally, knowingly or recklessly with respect thereto.” 18 Pa.C.S. §
302(c).
Notwithstanding, the parties’ dispute is not about culpability but rather
whether the Commonwealth must show notice as contemplated by precedents
like Crockford. The rationale of those cases is not grounded in mens rea in
terms of conduct but rather notice as a component of procedural due process.
Indeed, both Section 1543(b) and Section 3808 of the Vehicle Code seem to
establish a strict liability scheme, as the decision to drive while knowing that
their license is suspended (Section 1543) or that their license is restricted by
an ignition interlock requirement (Section 3808) suffices to establish liability
if the individual chooses to drive while knowing of those restrictions. Thus,
the offense seems to establish strict liability, as it is awareness of the
restrictions that creates liability, not any “guilty mind” with respect to the
conduct itself. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Samuels, 778 A.2d 638, 643
(Pa. 2001) (Saylor, J., concurring) (“[I]t is widely accepted that the legislative
branch may impose absolute liability for ‘public welfare offenses’ to promote
the public welfare by enforcing compliance with regulatory schemes.”);
Commonwealth v. Collins, 810 A.2d 698, 703 (Pa. Super. 2002) (rejecting
a claim that the Commonwealth was required to prove that a DUI defendant
voluntary ingested the intoxicant as the statute lacked a culpability provision;
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“We interpret this omission to mean that the legislature intended Driving
Under the Influence to be a strict or absolute liability offense.”).
We conclude that the Commonwealth was required to establish
Appellant had notice of that restriction. However, we note that there are two
separate types of notice at issue. The first is notice that Appellant was not
permitted to operate a motor vehicle unless it had an ignition interlock device
installed. While the Commonwealth did not show that PennDOT sent any type
of documentation beyond Appellant’s license suspension for refusing a breath
test, an obvious indicator that Appellant had notice is the fact that he
possessed an IILL. The statutory framework establishes that PennDOT does
not issue this license on its own initiative. Instead, upon restoration of
operating privileges, the individual can request an IILL. That Appellant
physically possessed his IILL card is sufficient proof that he had actual notice
that his license was restricted.
The second type of notice is whether Appellant had notice that, by virtue
of having an IILL, he was not to operate a vehicle without an ignition interlock
device until he obtained a replacement license, even if the one-year time
period had elapsed. One answer to this question is the foregoing: by having
an IILL, Appellant knew he was limited to using vehicles with an ignition
interlock device. The other answer is that having an IILL is not enough,
because that does not necessarily tell you how long you must comply with the
restriction. The Commonwealth urges the former, while Appellant asks this
Court to adopt the latter.
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The Commonwealth’s position relies on the proposition that ignorance
of the law is no excuse. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199
(1991) (“The general rule that ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no
defense to criminal prosecution is deeply rooted in the American legal
system.”). As set forth supra, the statute’s plain language supplies the
requisite notice.
We are not persuaded that application of this maxim should prevail, as
this argument overlooks the General Assembly’s instruction within Section
3805(b) that PennDOT must inform an IILL holder of the ignition interlock
requirement. The Commonwealth’s reliance on the general rule writes out
this language. We acknowledge that the textual command could be
interpreted as a courtesy: PennDOT was required to tell Appellant that, until
he obtained an unrestricted license, he was not permitted to drive unless the
vehicle had an ignition interlock device, but if PennDOT failed to do so, the
onus is still on the offender consistent with the general principle that ignorance
of the law is no excuse. However, we conclude that this interpretation is not
consistent with legislative intent. “The object of all interpretation and
construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the
General Assembly. Every statute shall be construed, if possible, to give effect
to all its provisions.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). The Commonwealth’s
interpretation makes the notice requirement entirely superfluous. “We are
not permitted to ignore the language of a statute, nor may we deem any
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language to be superfluous.” Commonwealth v. McCoy, 962 A.2d 1160,
1168 (Pa. 2009).
If the General Assembly intended that the notice provision was
irrelevant to the motorist’s duty to comply, it could have clearly stated that
point. In this regard, the General Assembly has stated in the Sexual Offender
and Registration Notification Act (“SORNA”) context that a failure to inform is
irrelevant to the registrant’s duties. That statute is analogous because, like
license suspensions, sexual offender obligations are collateral consequences
that flow from a criminal conviction. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 240
A.3d 654, 657–58 (Pa. Super. 2020) (noting that our Supreme Court has
deemed Subchapter I of SORNA to be non-punitive; “Non-punitive,
administrative requirements are merely collateral consequences of a criminal
conviction.”); see also Commonwealth v. Duffey, 639 A.2d 1174, 1176
(Pa. 1974) (“Courts of this Commonwealth have consistently recognized that
a license suspension is a collateral civil consequence of a criminal
conviction.”). Collateral obligations, in turn, may impose further requirements
that, if not followed, subject the offender to criminal penalties. Again, SORNA
is readily comparable. A person who is required to register as a sex offender
is subject to criminal penalties if he or she fails to comply with those
requirements. Similarly, a person who has an IILL is required to use an
ignition interlock device and is subject to criminal penalties if he or she fails
to comply with their requirement to use an ignition interlock device. Section
9799.20 states:
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In order to implement the provisions of section 9799.19 (relating
to initial registration), as appropriate, the Pennsylvania State
Police, the court having jurisdiction over the sexual offender, the
chief juvenile probation officer of the court and the appropriate
official of the Department of Corrections, county office of
probation and parole, the Department of Human Services or a
State or county correctional institution shall:
(1) Inform the individual required to register of the
individual’s duties under this subchapter.
(2) Require the individual to read and sign a form stating
that the duty to register has been explained and that the
individual understands the registration requirement.
(3) Collect the information required under section
9799.16(b) and (c) (relating to registry) and forward the
information to the Pennsylvania State Police for inclusion in
the registry as set forth in this subchapter.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.20.
Section 9799.20 itself does not address any consequences of a failure
to inform. However, Section 9799.23 — which addresses a trial court’s duties
to inform certain individuals who are sentenced, adjudicated delinquent, or
committed for involuntary treatment of their registration obligations — states
that a “[f]ailure by the court to provide the information required in this section,
to correctly inform a sexual offender of the sexual offender’s obligations or to
require a sexual offender to register shall not relieve the sexual offender from
the requirements of this subchapter.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.23(b)(1). Similarly,
the statute addressing the periodic verification duties of a sexual offender
requires the Pennsylvania State Police to send notice by mail to “facilitate the
process of verification of information[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.25(c). That
statute likewise clarifies that any failure to do so does not relieve the offender
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of their obligations. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.25(d). Similar provisions appear in
Subchapter I of SORNA, which applies to offenders whose offenses predated
the enactment of SORNA in 2012.
Our recent decision in Commonwealth v. Roberts, 293 A.3d 1221,
1226 (Pa. Super. 2023), appeal granted, 2023 WL 5923298 (Pa. Sept. 12,
2023), supports our conclusion that these statutes are relevant to our
analysis. In that case, Roberts was subject to lifetime registration due to a
conviction and required to report annually to the Pennsylvania State Police.
In 2020, he failed to appear for his annual appearance, and was charged.
Roberts argued that “there was insufficient proof of his mens rea under 18
Pa.C.S.[] § 4915.2(a)(1), (2),” which supplies a mens rea of “knowingly.” Id.
at 1225. We observed that “the statute does not require proof that Roberts
knew of his lifelong-registration requirement.” Id. We concluded that that
the General Assembly, “when enacting SORNA, codified the ancient maxim
that ignorance of the law is no excuse. Roberts may not excuse
noncompliance with SORNA based on alleged ignorance of his lifetime-
registration obligation.” Id. at 1226 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Notably, citing the statutory provisions stating that the failure to inform is
irrelevant to the offender’s obligations, we stated “there is no notice
requirement in SORNA. The statute expressly negates and disclaims such a
requirement.” Id.
While Roberts reaches the opposite conclusion in terms of result, we
deemed relevant the fact that the statute “negates and disclaims” any notice
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requirement. Section 3805(b), in contrast, requires notice but is silent as to
what happens if PennDOT fails to comply (or, by extension, if the
Commonwealth fails to prove that the notice was given). We therefore deem
the notice requirement to be a key part of legislative intent.
We determine that the placement of this obligation is relevant as well.
If this obligation were merely promulgated as a regulation, the
Commonwealth’s argument would be far more compelling. But Section 3808,
which sets forth the substantive elements of the crime, incorporates within its
definition Section 3805. By codifying the notice requirement within Section
3805(b), the General Assembly made notice an integral part of the statute.
While notice is not an element of the crime, we find that the General Assembly
intended for the notice function to protect due process rights. Thus, the
Commonwealth was required to show notice.
Finally, we conclude that the notice provision indeed protects a citizen’s
due process rights. The General Assembly’s intent in this regard is arguably
not controlling; as we stated in Crockford, supra at 1329, “[n]otice is … a
judicially created element, designed to protect a defendant’s due process
rights.” But two points warrant paying particular attention to the General
Assembly’s intent. First, the statutory notice requirement reflects a legislative
intent to override the maxim that ignorance of the law is no excuse. Second,
the General Assembly may have required PennDOT to give notice because a
person may reasonably assume that once the one-year period has expired, as
it did in this case, that full restoration of driving privileges is automatic. While
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an offender is statutorily required to certify their compliance, it would not be
unreasonable for a person to think that the ignition interlock device
automatically reported its usage statistics. Relatedly, an offender who is
aware of their duty to certify may think that their obligation ceases unless
their application for an unrestricted license is rejected.5 The complexity of the
statute justifies a conclusion that notice is needed to sustain a conviction.
Because the Commonwealth failed to show that PennDOT satisfied its Section
3805(b) obligation, we conclude that reversal of Appellant’s conviction for
illegally operating a motor vehicle not equipped with an ignition interlock is
warranted.6
Conviction for illegally operating a motor vehicle not equipped with
ignition interlock is reversed. Judgment of sentence for that conviction
vacated. Judgment of sentence at the remaining summary offenses affirmed.7
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5 The certified driving history is confusing in this regard, as the fields indicating
when Appellant’s IILL was issued and/or expired are blank.
Additionally, as the trial judge’s questions at trial reflect, the fact that
Appellant’s operating privileges were restored is confusing. In truth, operating
privileges in this context are better described as conditionally restored. The
requirement that the driver use an ignition interlock device is an additional
condition that must be followed for one year before full operating privileges
are restored.
6 Due to our disposition, we need not address Appellant’s weight claim
pertaining to his conviction for illegally operating a motor vehicle not equipped
with ignition interlock.
7 Because Appellant has served the maximum period of incarceration and no
probationary sentence was imposed, there is no need to remand for
resentencing.
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J-S27003-23
Judge Bowes joins this memorandum.
Judge Sullivan concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 02/08/2024
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